On the 12th the Army of the Valley had once more moved westward, and, crossing South River, had encamped in the woods near Mount Meridian.
Here for five days, by the sparkling waters of the Shenandoah, the wearied soldiers rested, while their indefatigable leader employed ruse after ruse to delude the enemy. The cavalry, though far from support, was ordered to manoeuvre boldly to prevent all information reaching the Federals, and to follow Fremont so long as he retreated.* (* "The only true rule for cavalry is to follow as long as the enemy retreats."--Jackson to Munford, June 13.) The bearers of flags of truce were impressed with the idea that the Southerners were advancing in great strength. The outpost line was made as close as possible; no civilians were allowed to pa.s.s; and the troopers, so that they should have nothing to tell it they were captured, were kept in ignorance of the position of their own infantry. The general"s real intentions were concealed from everyone except Colonel Munford. The officers of the staff fared worse than the remainder of the army. Not only were they debarred from their commander"s confidence, but they became the unconscious instruments whereby false intelligence was spread. "The engineers were directed to prepare a series of maps of the Valley; and all who acquired a knowledge of this carefully divulged order told their friends in confidence that Jackson was going at once in pursuit of Fremont. As those friends told their friends without loss of time, it was soon the well-settled conviction of everybody that nothing was further from Jackson"s intention than an evacuation of the Valley."
June 17.
On June 17 arrived a last letter from Lee:--
"From your account of the position of the enemy I think it would be difficult for you to engage him in time to unite with this army in the battle for Richmond. Fremont and Shields are apparently retrograding, their troops shaken and disorganised, and some time will be required to set them again in the field. If this is so, the sooner you unite with this army the better. McClellan is being strengthened...There is much sickness in his ranks, but his reinforcements by far exceed his losses. The present, therefore, seems to be favourable for a junction of your army and this. If you agree with me, the sooner you can make arrangements to do so the better. In moving your troops you could let it be understood that it was to pursue the enemy in your front. Dispose those to hold the Valley, so as to deceive the enemy, keeping your cavalry well in their front, and at the proper time suddenly descending upon the Pamunkey. To be efficacious the movement must be secret. Let me know the force you can bring, and be careful to guard from friends and foes your purpose and your intention of personally leaving the Valley. The country is full of spies, and our plans are immediately carried to the enemy."* (* O.R. volume 12 part 3 page 913.)
The greater part of these instructions Jackson had already carried out on his own initiative. There remained but to give final directions to Colonel Munford, who was to hold the Valley, and to set the army in motion. Munford was instructed to do his best to spread false reports of an advance to the Potomac. Ewell"s division was ordered to Charlottesville. The rest of the Valley troops were to follow Ewell; and Whiting and Lawton, who, in order to bewilder Fremont, had been marched from Staunton to Mount Meridian, and then back to Staunton, were to take train to Gordonsville. It was above all things important that the march should be secret. Not only was it essential that Lincoln should not be alarmed into reinforcing McClellan, but it was of even more importance that McClellan should not be alarmed into correcting the faulty distribution of his army.
So long as he remained with half his force on one bank of the Chickahominy and half on the other, Lee had a fair chance of concentrating superior numbers against one of the fractions. But if McClellan, warned of Jackson"s approach, were to ma.s.s his whole force on one bank or the other, there would be little hope of success for the Confederates.
The ultimate object of the movement was therefore revealed to no one, and the most rigorous precautions were adopted to conceal it.
Jackson"s letters from Richmond, in accordance with his own instructions, bore no more explicit address than "Somewhere." A long line of cavalry, occupying every road, covered the front, and prevented anyone, soldier or civilian, preceding them toward Richmond. Far out to either flank rode patrols of hors.e.m.e.n, and a strong rear-guard swept before it campfollowers and stragglers. At night, every road which approached the bivouacs was strongly picketed, and the troops were prevented from communicating with the country people. The men were forbidden to ask the names of the villages through which they pa.s.sed; and it was ordered that to all questions they should make the one answer: "I don"t know." "This was just as much license as the men wanted," says an eye-witness, "and they forthwith knew nothing of the past, present, or future." An amusing incident, it is said, grew out of this order. One of General Hood"s* (* Whiting"s division.) Texans left the ranks on the march, and was climbing a fence to go to a cherry-tree near at hand, when Jackson rode by and saw him.
"Where are you going?" asked the general.
"I don"t know," replied the soldier.
"To what command do you belong?"
"I don"t know."
"Well, what State are you from?"
"I don"t know."
"What is the meaning of all this?" asked Jackson of another.
"Well," was the reply, "Old Stonewall and General Hood gave orders yesterday that we were not to know anything until after the next fight."
Jackson laughed and rode on.* (* Cooke page 205.)
The men themselves, intelligent as they were, were unable to penetrate their general"s design. When they reached Charlottesville it was reported in the ranks that the next march would be northwards, to check a movement of Banks across the Blue Ridge. At Gordonsville it was supposed that they would move on Washington.
"I recollect," says one of the Valley soldiers, "that the pastor of the Presbyterian church there, with whom Jackson spent the night, told me, as a profound secret, not to be breathed to mortal man, that we would move at daybreak on Culpeper Court House to intercept a column of the enemy coming across the mountains. He said there could be no mistake about this, for he had it from General Jackson himself.
We did move at daybreak, but instead of moving on Culpeper Court House we marched in the opposite direction. At Hanover Junction we expected to head towards Fredericksburg to meet McDowell, and the whole movement was so secretly conducted that the troops were uncertain of their destination until the evening of June 26, when they heard A.P. Hill"s guns at Mechanicsville, and made the woods vibrate with their shouts of antic.i.p.ated victory."* (* Communicated by the Reverend J.W. Jones, D.D.)
At Gordonsville a rumour, which proved to be false, arrested the march of the army for a whole day. On the 21st the leading division arrived at Frederickshall, fifty miles from Richmond, and there halted for the Sunday. They had already marched fifty miles, and the main body, although the railway had been of much service, was still distant. There was not sufficient rolling stock available to transport all the infantry simultaneously, and, in any case, the cavalry, artillery, and waggons must have proceeded by road. The trains, therefore, moving backwards and forwards along the line, and taking up the rear brigades in succession, forwarded them in a couple of hours a whole day"s march. Beyond Frederickshall the line had been destroyed by the enemy"s cavalry.
At 1 A.M. on Monday morning, Jackson, accompanied by a single orderly, rode to confer with Lee, near Richmond.
June 28.
He was provided with a pa.s.s, which Major Dabney had been instructed to procure from General Whiting, the next in command, authorising him to impress horses; and he had resorted to other expedients to blind his friends. The lady of the house which he had made his headquarters at Frederickshall had sent to ask if the general would breakfast with her next morning. He replied that he would be glad to do so if he were there at breakfast time; and upon her inquiry as to the time that would be most convenient, he said: "Have it at your usual time, and send for me when it is ready." When Mrs. Harris sent for him, Jim, his coloured servant, replied to the message: "Sh! you don"t "spec" to find the general here at this hour, do you? He left here "bout midnight, and I "spec" by this time he"s whippin" Banks in the Valley."
During the journey his determination to preserve his incognito was the cause of some embarra.s.sment. A few miles from his quarters he was halted by a sentry. It was in vain that he represented that he was an officer on duty, carrying dispatches. The sentry, one of the Stonewall Brigade, was inexorable, and quoted Jackson"s own orders.
The utmost that he would concede was that the commander of the picket should be called. When this officer came he recognised his general.
Jackson bound them both to secrecy, and praising the soldier for his obedience, continued his ride. Some hours later his horse broke down.
Proceeding to a plantation near the road, he told his orderly to request that a couple of horses might be supplied for an officer on important duty. It was still dark, and the indignant proprietor, so unceremoniously disturbed by two unknown soldiers, who declined to give their names, refused all aid. After some parley Jackson and his orderly, finding argument wasted, proceeded to the stables, selected the two best horses, shifted the saddles, and left their own chargers as a temporary exchange.
At three o"clock in the afternoon, after pa.s.sing rapidly through Richmond, he reached the headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief. It is unfortunate that no record of the meeting that took place has been preserved. There were present, besides Lee and Jackson, the three officers whose divisions were to be employed in the attack upon the Federals, Longstreet, A.P. Hill, and D.H. Hill. The names of the two former are a.s.sociated with almost every Confederate victory won upon the soil of Virginia. They were trusted by their great leader, and they were idolised by their men. Like others, they made mistakes; the one was sometimes slow, the other careless; neither gave the slightest sign that they were capable of independent command, and both were at times impatient of control. But, taking them all in all, they were gallant soldiers, brave to a fault, vigorous in attack, and undaunted by adverse fortune. Longstreet, st.u.r.dy and sedate, his "old war-horse" as Lee affectionately called him, bore on his broad shoulders the weight of twenty years" service in the old army. Hill"s slight figure and delicate features, instinct with life and energy, were a marked contrast to the heavier frame and rugged lineaments of his older colleague.
Already they were distinguished. In the hottest of the fight they had won the respect that soldiers so readily accord to valour; yet it is not on these stubborn fighters, not on their companion, less popular, but hardly less capable, that the eye of imagination rests. Were some great painter, gifted with the sense of historic fitness, to place on his canvas the council in the Virginia homestead, two figures only would occupy the foreground: the one weary with travel, white with the dust of many leagues, and bearing on his frayed habiliments the traces of rough bivouacs and mountain roads; the other, tall, straight, and stately; still, for all his fifty years, remarkable for his personal beauty, and endowed with all the simple dignity of a n.o.ble character and commanding intellect. In that humble chamber, where the only refreshment the Commander-in-Chief could offer was a gla.s.s of milk, Lee and Jackson met for the first time since the war had begun. Lee"s hours of triumph had yet to come. The South was aware that he was sage in council; he had yet to prove his mettle in the field. But there was at least one Virginia soldier who knew his worth. With the prescient sympathy of a kindred spirit Jackson had divined his daring and his genius, and although he held always to his own opinions, he had no will but that of his great commander. With how absolute a trust his devotion was repaid one of the brightest pages in the history of Virginia tells us; a year crowded with victories bears witness to the strength begotten of their mutual confidence. So long as Lee and Jackson led her armies hope shone on the standards of the South. Great was the constancy of her people; wonderful the fort.i.tude of her soldiers; but on the shoulders of her twin heroes rested the burden of the tremendous struggle.
To his four major-generals Lee explained his plan of attack, and then, retiring to his office, left them to arrange the details. It will be sufficient for the present to state that Jackson"s troops were to encamp on the night of the 25th east of Ashland, fifteen miles north of Richmond, between the village and the Virginia Central Railway. The day following the interview, the 24th, he returned to his command, rejoining the column at Beaver Dam Station.
June 24.
His advanced guard were now within forty miles of Richmond, and, so far from McDowell being on his heels, that general was still north of Fredericksburg. No reinforcements could reach McClellan for several days; the Confederates were concentrated round Richmond in full strength; and Lee"s strategy had been entirely successful. Moreover, with such skill had Jackson"s march been made that the Federal generals were absolutely ignorant of his whereabouts. McClellan indeed seems to have had some vague suspicion of his approach; but Lincoln, McDowell, Banks, Fremont, together with the whole of the Northern people and the Northern press, believed that he was still west of Gordonsville. Neither scout, spy, nor patrol was able to penetrate the cordon of Munford"s outposts. Beyond his pickets, strongly posted at New Market and Conrad"s Store, all was dim and dark. Had Jackson halted, awaiting reinforcements? Was he already in motion, marching swiftly and secretly against some isolated garrison?
Was he planning another dash on Washington, this time with a larger army at his back? Would his advance be east or west of the Blue Ridge, across the sources of the Rappahannock, or through the Alleghanies? Had he 15,000 men or 50,000?
Such were the questions which obtruded themselves on the Federal generals, and not one could give a satisfactory reply. That a blow was preparing, and that it would fall where it was least expected, all men knew. "We have a determined and enterprising enemy to contend with," wrote one of Lincoln"s generals. "Jackson," said another, "marches thirty miles a day." The successive surprises of the Valley campaign had left their mark; and the correspondence preserved in the Official Records is in itself the highest tribute to Jackson"s skill.
He had gained something more than the respect of his enemies. He had brought them to fear his name, and from the Potomac to the Rappahannock uncertainty and apprehension reigned supreme. Not a patrol was sent out which did not expect to meet the Confederate columns, pressing swiftly northward; not a general along the whole line, from Romney to Fredericksburg, who did not tremble for his own security.
There was sore trouble on the Shenandoah. The disasters of M"Dowell and Front Royal had taught the Federal officers that when the Valley army was reported to be sixty miles distant, it was probably deploying in the nearest forest; and with the rout of Winchester still fresh in their memories they knew that pursuit would be as vigorous as attack would be sudden. The air was full of rumours, each more alarming than its predecessor, and all of them contradictory.
The reports of the cavalry, of spies, of prisoners, of deserters, of escaped negroes, told each a different story.
Jackson, it was at first reported, had been reinforced to the number of 35,000 men.* (* The telegrams and letters containing the reports quoted on pages 399-400 are to be found in O.R. volume 11 part 3 and volume 12 part 3.) A few days later his army had swelled to 60,000 with 70 guns, and he was rebuilding the bridge at Port Republic in order to follow Fremont. On June 13 he was believed to be moving through Charlottesville against one or other of McDowell"s divisions.
"He was either going against Shields at Luray, or King at Catlett"s, or Doubleday at Fredericksburg, or going to Richmond." On the 16th it was absolutely certain that he was within striking distance of Front Royal. On the 18th he had gone to Richmond, but Ewell was still in the Valley with 40,000 men. On the 19th Banks had no doubt but that another immediate movement down the Valley was intended "with 80,000 or more." On the 20th Jackson was said to be moving on Warrenton, east of the Blue Ridge. On the 22nd "reliable persons" at Harper"s Ferry had learned that he was about to attack Banks at Middletown; and on the same day Ewell, who was actually near Frederickshall, was discovered to be moving on Moorefield! On the 25th Fremont had been informed that large reinforcements had reached Jackson from Tennessee; and Banks was on the watch for a movement from the west.
Fremont heard that Ewell designed to attack Winchester in rear, and the threat from so dangerous a quarter made Lincoln anxious.
"We have no definite information," wrote Stanton to McClellan, "as to the numbers or position of Jackson"s force. Within the last two days the evidence is strong that for some purpose the enemy is circulating rumours of Jackson"s advance in various directions, with a view to conceal the real point of attack. Neither McDowell nor Banks nor Fremont appear to have any accurate knowledge of the subject."
This was on June 25, the day the Valley army halted at Ashland; but the climax was reached on the 28th. For forty-eight hours Jackson had been fighting McClellan, yet Banks, although "quite confident that he was not within thirty miles, believed that he was preparing for an attack on Middletown." To reach Middletown Jackson would have had to march one hundred and fifty miles!
Under the influence of these rumours the movements of the Federal troops were erratic in the extreme.
Fremont, who had originally been ordered to remain at Harrisonburg, had fallen back on Banks at Middletown, although ordered to Front Royal, was most reluctant to move so far south. Shields was first ordered to stand fast at Luray, where he would be reinforced by Ricketts, and was then ordered to fall back on Front Royal.
Reinforcements were ordered to Romney, to Harper"s Ferry, and to Winchester; and McDowell, who kept his head throughout, struggled in vain to reunite his scattered divisions. Divining the true drift of the Confederate strategy, he realised that to protect Washington, and to rescue McClellan, the surest method was for his own army corps to march as rapidly as possible to the Chickahominy. But his pleadings were disregarded. Lincoln and Stanton had not yet discovered that the best defence is generally a vigorous attack. They had learned nothing from the Valley campaign, and they were infected with the fears of Banks and Fremont. Jackson was well on his way to Richmond before Shields and Ricketts were permitted to cross the Blue Ridge; and it was not till the 25th that McDowell"s corps was once more concentrated at Fredericksburg. The Confederates had gained a start of five marches, and the Northern Government was still ignorant that they had left the Valley.
McClellan was equally in the dark. Faint rumours had preceded the march of Jackson"s army, but he had given them scant credit. On the morning of the 26th, however, he was rudely enlightened. It was but too clear that Jackson, strongly reinforced from Richmond, was bearing down upon his most vulnerable point--his right wing, which, in antic.i.p.ation of McDowell"s advance, remained exposed on the north bank of the Chickahominy.
Nor was this the sum of his troubles. On this same day, when his outposts were falling back before superior numbers, and the Valley regiments were closing round their flank, he received a telegram from Stanton, informing him that the forces commanded by McDowell, Banks, and Fremont were to form one army under Major-General Pope; and that this army was "to attack and overcome the rebel forces under Jackson and Ewell, and threaten the enemy in the direction of Charlottesville!" All hope of succour pa.s.sed away, and the "Young Napoleon" was left to extricate himself as best he could, from his many difficulties; difficulties which were due in part to his own political blindness, in part to the ignorance of Lincoln, but, in a far larger degree, to the consummate strategy of Lee and Jackson.
NOTE
The Marches in the Valley Campaign, March 22 to June 25, 1862.
Miles March 22 Mount Jackson-Strasburg 28 March 23 Strasburg-Kernstown-Newtown 18 Battle of Kernstown March 24-26 Newtown-Mt. Jackson 35 April 17-19 Mt. Jackson-Elk Run Valley 50 April 30-May 8 Elk Run Valley-Mechum"s River Station 60 May 7-8 Staunton-Shenandoah Mt. 32 Battle of M"Dowell May 9-11 Bull Pasture Mount-Franklin 30 Skirmishes May 12-15 Franklin-Lebanon Springs 40 May 17 Lebanon Springs-Bridgewater 18 May 19-20 Bridgewater-New Market 24 May 1 New Market-Luray 12 May 22 Luray-Milford 12 May 23 Milford-Front Royal-Cedarville 22 Action at Front Royal May 24 Cedarville-Abraham"s Creek 22 Action at Middletown and Newtown May 25 Abraham"s Creek-Stevenson"s 7 Battle of Winchester May 28 Stevenson"s-Charlestown 15 Skirmish May 29 Charlestown-Halltown 5 Skirmish May 30 Halltown-Winchester 25 May 31 Winchester-Strasburg 18 June 1 Strasburg-Woodstock 12 Skirmish June 2 Woodstock-Mount Jackson 12 June 3 Mount Jackson-New Market 7 June 4-5 New Market-Port Republic 30 June 8 Battle of Cross Keys June 9 Cross Keys-Brown"s Gap 16 Battle of Port Republic June 12 Brown"s Gap-Mount Meridian 10 June 17-25 Mount Meridian-Ashland Station (one rest day) 120 --- 676 miles in 48 marching days Average 14 miles per diem
CHAPTER 1.12. REVIEW OF THE VALLEY CAMPAIGN.
In March, 1862, more than 200,000 Federals were prepared to invade Virginia. McClellan, before McDowell was withheld, reckoned on placing 150,000 men at West Point. Fremont, in West Virginia, commanded 30,000, including the force in the Kanawha Valley; and Banks had crossed the Potomac with over 30,000.
Less than 60,000 Confederate soldiers were available to oppose this enormous host, and the numerical disproportion was increased by the vast material resources of the North. The only advantages which the Southerners possessed were that they were operating in their own country, and that their cavalry was the more efficient. Their leaders, therefore, could count on receiving more ample and more accurate information than their adversaries.* (* "If I were mindful only of my own glory, I would choose always to make war in my own country, for there every man is a spy, and the enemy can make no movement of which I am not informed." Frederick the Great"s Instructions to his Generals.) But, except in these respects, everything was against them. In mettle and in discipline the troops were fairly matched. On both sides the higher commands, with few exceptions, were held by regular officers, who had received the same training. On both sides the staff was inexperienced. If the Confederate infantry were better marksmen than the majority of the Federals, they were not so well armed; and the Federal artillery, both in materiel and in handling, was the more efficient.