(MAP. The Field of Fredericksburg.)
The coppice was triangular in shape, and extended nearly six hundred yards beyond the embankment. The base, which faced the Federals, was five hundred yards long. Beyond the apex the ground was swampy and covered with scrub, and the ridge, depressed at this point to a level with the plain, afforded no position from which artillery could command the approach to or issue from this patch of jungle. A s.p.a.ce of seven hundred yards along the front was thus left undefended by direct fire.
Early, who with D.H. Hill had marched in shortly after daybreak, formed the right of the third line, Taliaferro the left. The division of D.H. Hill, with several batteries, formed the general reserve, and a portion of Early"s artillery was posted about half a mile in rear of his division, in readiness, if necessary, to relieve the guns on Prospect Hill.
Jackson"s line was two thousand six hundred yards in length, and his infantry 30,000 strong, giving eleven rifles to the yard; but nearly three-fourths of the army corps, the divisions of Early, Taliaferro, and D.H. Hill, were in third line and reserve. Of his one hundred and twenty-three guns only forty-seven were in position, but the wooded and broken character of the ground forbade a further deployment of his favourite arm. His left, near Deep Run, was in close touch with Hood"s division of Longstreet"s army corps; and in advance of his right, already protected by the Ma.s.saponax, was Stuart with two brigades and his horse-artillery. One Whitworth gun, a piece of great range and large calibre, was posted on the wooded heights beyond the Ma.s.saponax, north-east of Yerby"s House.
Jackson"s dispositions were almost identical with those which he had adopted at the Second Mana.s.sas. His whole force was hidden in the woods; every gun that could find room was ready for action, and the batteries were deployed in two ma.s.ses. Instead, however, of giving each division a definite section of the line, he had handed over the whole front to A.P. Hill. This arrangement, however, had been made before D.H. Hill and Early came up, and with the battle imminent a change was hazardous. In many respects, moreover, the ground he now occupied resembled that which he had so successfully defended on August 29 and 30. There was the wood opposite the centre, affording the enemy a covered line of approach; the open fields, pasture and stubble, on either hand; the stream, hidden by timber and difficult of pa.s.sage, on the one flank, and Longstreet on the other. But the position at Fredericksburg was less strong for defence than that at the Second Mana.s.sas, for not only was Jackson"s line within three thousand yards--a long range but not ineffective--of the heavy guns on the Stafford Heights, but on the bare plain between the railway and the river there was ample room for the deployment of the Federal field-batteries. At the Second Mana.s.sas, on the other hand, the advantages of the artillery position had been on the side of the Confederates.
Nevertheless, with the soldiers of Sharpsburg, ragged indeed and under-fed, but eager for battle and strong in numbers, there was no reason to dread the powerful artillery of the foe; and Jackson"s confidence was never higher than when, accompanied by his staff, he rode along his line of battle. He was not, however, received by his soldiers with their usual demonstrations of enthusiastic devotion. In honour of the day he had put on the uniform with which Stuart had presented him; the old cadet cap, which had so often waved his men to victory, was replaced by a head-dress resplendent with gold lace; "Little Sorrel" had been deposed in favour of a more imposing charger; and the veterans failed to recognise their commander until he had galloped past them. A Confederate artillery-man has given a graphic picture of his appearance when the fight was at its hottest:--
"A general officer, mounted upon a superb bay horse and followed by a single courier, rode up through our guns. Looking neither to the right nor the left, he rode straight to the front, halted, and seemed gazing intently on the enemy"s line of battle. The outfit before me, from top to toe, cap, coat, top-boots, horse and furniture, were all of the new order of things. But there was something about the man that did not look so new after all. He appeared to be an old-time friend of all the turmoil around him. As he had done us the honour to make an afternoon call on the artillery, I thought it becoming in someone to say something on the occasion. No one did, however, so, although a somewhat bashful and weak-kneed youngster, I plucked up courage enough to venture to remark that those big guns over the river had been knocking us about pretty considerably during the day.
He quickly turned his head, and I knew in an instant who it was before me. The clear-cut, chiselled features; the thin, compressed and determined lips; the calm, steadfast eye; the countenance to command respect, and in time of war to give the soldier that confidence he so much craves from a superior officer, were all there.
He turned his head quickly, and looking me all over, rode up the line and away as quickly and silently as he came, his little courier hard upon his heels; and this was my first sight of Stonewall Jackson."
From his own lines Jackson pa.s.sed along the front, drawing the fire of the Federal skirmishers, who were creeping forward, and proceeded to the centre of the position, where, on the eminence which has since borne the name of Lee"s Hill, the Commander-in-Chief, surrounded by his generals, was giving his last instructions. It was past nine o"clock. The sun, shining out with almost September warmth, was drawing up the mist which hid the opposing armies; and as the dense white folds dissolved and rolled sway, the Confederates saw the broad plain beneath them dark with more than 80,000 foes. Of these the left wing, commanded by Franklin, and composed of 55,000 men and 116 guns, were moving against the Second Corps; 30,000, under Sumner, were forming for attack on Longstreet, and from the heights of Stafford, where the reserves were posted in dense ma.s.ses, a great storm of shot and sh.e.l.l burst upon the Confederate lines. "For once," says Dabney, "war unmasked its terrible proportions with a distinctness. .h.i.therto unknown in the forest-clad landscapes of America, and the plain of Fredericksburg presented a panorama that was dreadful in its grandeur." It was then that Longstreet, to whose st.u.r.dy heart the approach of battle seemed always welcome, said to Jackson, "General, do not all those mult.i.tudes of Federals frighten you?" "We shall very soon see whether I shall not frighten them;" and with this grim reply the commander of the Second Corps rode back to meet Franklin"s onset.
9 A.M.
The Federals were already advancing. From Deep Run southward, for more than a mile and a half, three great lines of battle, accompanied by numerous batteries, moved steadily forward, powerful enough, to all appearance, to bear down all opposition by sheer weight of numbers. "On they came," says an eye-witness, "in beautiful order, as if on parade, their bayonets glistening in the bright sunlight; on they came, waving their hundreds of regimental flags, which relieved with warm bits of colouring the dull blue of the columns and the russet tinge of the wintry landscape, while their artillery beyond the river continued the cannonade with unabated fury over their heads, and gave a background of white fleecy smoke, like midsummer clouds, to the animated picture."
And yet that vast array, so formidable of aspect, lacked that moral force without which physical power, even in its most terrible form, is but an idle show. Not only were the strength of the Confederate position, the want of energy in the preliminary movements, the insecurity of their own situation, but too apparent to the intelligence of the regimental officers and men, but they mistrusted their commander. Northern writers have recorded that the Army of the Potomac never went down to battle with less alacrity than on this day at Fredericksburg.
Nor was the order of attack of such a character as to revive the confidence of the troops. Burnside, deluded by the skill with which Jackson had hidden his troops into the belief that the Second Army Corps was still at Port Royal, had instructed Franklin to seize the ridge with a single division, and Meade"s 4,500 Pennsylvanians were sent forward alone, while the remainder of the Grand Division, over 50,000 strong, stood halted on the plain, awaiting the result of this hopeless manoeuvre.* (* Franklin"s Grand Division consisted of the 42,800 men, and 12,000 of Hooker"s Grand Division had reinforced him.) Meade advanced in three lines, each of a brigade, with skirmishers in front and on the flank, and his progress was soon checked. No sooner had his first line crossed the Richmond road than the left was a.s.sailed by a well-directed and raking artillery fire.
Captain Pelham, commanding Stuart"s horse-artillery, had galloped forward by Jackson"s orders with his two rifled guns, and, escorted by a dismounted squadron, had come into action beyond a marshy stream which ran through a tangled ravine on the Federal flank. So telling was his fire that the leading brigade wavered and gave ground; and though Meade quickly brought up his guns and placed his third brigade en potence in support, he was unable to continue his forward movement until he had brushed away his audacious antagonist. The four Pennsylvania batteries were reinforced by two others; but rapidly changing his position as often as the Federal gunners found his range, for more than half an hour Pelham defied their efforts, and for that s.p.a.ce of time arrested the advance of Meade"s 4,500 infantry. One of his pieces was soon disabled; but with the remaining gun, captured from the enemy six months before, he maintained the unequal fight until his limbers were empty, and he received peremptory orders from Stuart to withdraw.
On Pelham"s retirement, Franklin, bringing several batteries forward to the Richmond road, for more than half an hour subjected the woods before him to a heavy cannonade, in which the guns on the Stafford Heights played a conspicuous part. Hidden, however, by the thick timber, Jackson"s regiments lay secure, unharmed by the tempest that crashed above them through the leafless branches; and, reserving their fire for the hostile infantry, his guns were silent. The general, meanwhile, according to his custom, had walked far out into the fields to reconnoitre for himself, and luck favoured the Confederacy on this day of battle. Lieutenant Smith was his only companion, and a Federal sharpshooter, suddenly rising from some tall weeds two hundred paces distant, levelled his rifle and fired. The bullet whistled between their heads, and Jackson, turning with a smile to his aide-de-camp, said cheerfully: "Mr. Smith, had you not better go to the rear? They may shoot you." Then, having deliberately noted the enemy"s arrangements, he returned to his station on Prospect Hill.
11.15 A.M.
It was past eleven before Meade resumed his advance. Covered by the fire of the artillery, his first line was within eight hundred yards of Jackson"s centre, when suddenly the silent woods awoke to life.
The Confederate batteries, pushing forward from the covert, came rapidly into action, and the flash and thunder of more than fifty guns revealed to the astonished Federals the magnitude of the task they had undertaken. From front and flank came the scathing fire; the skirmishers were quickly driven in, and on the closed ranks behind burst the full fury of the storm. Dismayed and decimated by this fierce and unexpected onslaught, Meade"s brigades broke in disorder and fell back to the Richmond road.
For the next hour and a half an artillery duel, in which over 400 guns took part, raged over the whole field, and the Confederate batteries, their position at last revealed, engaged with spirit the more numerous and powerful ordnance of the enemy. Then Franklin brought up three divisions to Meade"s support; and from the smouldering ruins of Fredericksburg, three miles to the northward, beyond the high trees of Hazel Run, the deep columns of Sumner"s Grand Division deployed under the fire of Longstreet"s guns. Sumner"s attack had been for some time in progress before Franklin was in readiness to co-operate. The battle was now fully developed, and the morning mists had been succeeded by dense clouds of smoke, shrouding bill and plain, through which the cannon flashed redly, and the defiant yells of Longstreet"s riflemen, mingled with their rattling volleys, stirred the pulses of Jackson"s veterans. As the familiar sounds were borne to their ears, it was seen that the dark lines beyond the Richmond road were moving forward, and the turn of the Second Corps had come.
1 P.M.
It was one o"clock, and Jackson"s guns had for the moment ceased their fire. Meade"s Pennsylvanians had rallied. Gibbon"s division had taken post on their right; Biney and Newton were in support; and Doubleday, facing south, was engaged with Stuart"s dismounted troopers. Twenty-one guns on the right, and thirty on the left, stationed on the Richmond road, a thousand yards from the Confederate position, formed a second tier to the heavier pieces on the heights, and fired briskly on the woods. Preceded by clouds of skirmishers, Meade and Gibbon advanced in column of brigades at three hundred paces distance, the whole covering a front of a thousand yards; and the supporting divisions moved up to the Richmond road.
When the Federals reached the scene of their former repulse, Jackson"s guns again opened; but without the same effect, for they were now exposed to the fire of the enemy"s batteries at close range.
Even Pelham could do but little; and the artillery beyond the railroad on Hill"s left was quickly driven in.
Meade"s rear brigade was now brought up and deployed on the left of the first, in the direction of the Ma.s.saponax, thus further extending the front.
The leading brigade made straight for the tongue of woodland which interposed between Lane and Archer. As they neared the Confederate line, the Pennsylvanians, masked by the trees, found that they were no longer exposed to fire, and that the coppice was unoccupied.
Quickly crossing the border, through swamp and undergrowth they pushed their way, and, bursting from the covert to the right, fell on the exposed flank of Lane"s brigade. The fight was fierce, but the Southerners were compelled to give ground, for neither Archer nor Gregg was able to lend a.s.sistance.
Meade"s second brigade, though following close upon the first, had, instead of conforming to the change of direction against Lane"s flank, rushed forward through the wood. Two hundred paces from the embankment it came in contact with Archer"s left, which was resting on the very edge of the coppice. The Confederates were taken by surprise. Their front was secured by a strong skirmish line; but on the flank, as the thickets appeared impenetrable, neither scouts nor pickets had been thrown out, and the men were lying with arms piled.
Two regiments, leaping to their feet and attempting to form line to the left, were broken by a determined charge, and gave way in disorder. The remainder, however, stood firm, for the Federals, instead of following up their success in this direction, left Archer to be dealt with by the third brigade of the division, which had now reached the railroad, and swept on towards the military road, where Gregg"s brigade was drawn up within the forest. So thick was the cover, and so limited the view, that General Gregg, taking the advancing ma.s.s for part of Archer"s line retiring, restrained the fire of his men. The Federals broke upon his right. He himself fell mortally wounded. His flank regiment, a battalion of conscripts, fled, except one company, without firing a shot. The two regiments on the opposite flank, however, were with great readiness turned about, and changing front inwards, arrested the movement of the enemy along the rear.
The Federals had now been joined by a portion of the first brigade, inspirited by their victory over Lane, and the moment, to all appearance, seemed critical in the extreme for the Confederates. To the left rear of the attacking column, Meade"s third brigade was held in check by Walker"s batteries and the st.u.r.dy Archer, who, notwithstanding that a strong force had pa.s.sed beyond his flank, and had routed two of his regiments, still resolutely held his ground, and prevented his immediate opponents from joining the intruding column. To the right rear, opposite Pender, Gibbon"s division had been checked by the fire of the great battery near Bernard"s Cabin; two of his brigades had been driven back, and the third had with difficulty gained the shelter of the embankment. So from neither left nor right was immediate support to be expected by Meade"s victorious regiments. But on the Richmond road were the divisions of Birney and Newton, with Doubleday"s and Sickles" not far in rear, and 20,000 bayonets might have been thrown rapidly into the gap which the Pennsylvanians had so vigorously forced. Yet Jackson"s equanimity was undisturbed. The clouds of smoke and the thick timber hid the fighting in the centre from his post of observation on Prospect Hill, and the first intimation of the enemy"s success was brought by an aide-de-camp, galloping wildly up the slope. "General," he exclaimed in breathless haste, "the enemy have broken through Archer"s left, and General Gregg says he must have help, or he and General Archer will both lose their position." Jackson turned round quietly, and without the least trace of excitement in either voice or manner, sent orders to Early and Taliaferro, in third line, to advance with the bayonet and clear the front. Then, with rare self-restraint, for the fighting instinct was strong within him, and the danger was so threatening as to have justified his personal interference, he raised his field-gla.s.ses and resumed his scrutiny of the enemy"s reserves on the Richmond road.
1.45 P.M.
His confidence in his lieutenants was not misplaced. Early"s division, already deployed in line, came forward with a rush, and the Stonewall Brigade, responding with alacrity to Jackson"s summons, led the advance of Taliaferro.
The counterstroke was vigorous. Meade"s brigades had penetrated to the heart of the Confederate position, but their numbers were reduced to less than 2000 bayonets; in the fierce fighting and dense thickets they had lost all semblance of cohesion, and not a single regiment had supported them. The men looked round in vain for help, and the forest around them resounded with the yells of the Confederate reinforcements. a.s.sailed in front and flank by a destructive fire, the Pennsylvanians were rapidly borne back. Hill"s second line joined in Early"s advance. Gibbon was strongly attacked. Six brigades, sweeping forward from the forest, dashed down the slopes, and in a few moments the broken remnants of the Federal divisions were dispersing in panic across the plain. As the enemy fled the Confederate gunners, disregarding the sh.e.l.ls of Franklin"s batteries, poured a heavy fire into the receding ma.s.s; and although instructions had been given that the counterstroke was not to pa.s.s the railroad, Hoke"s and Atkinson"s brigades,* (* Of Early"s Division.) carried away by success and deaf to all orders, followed in swift pursuit.
Some of Birney"s regiments, tardily coming forward to Meade"s support, were swept away, and the yelling line of grey infantry, shooting down the fugitives and taking many prisoners, pressed on towards the Richmond road. There the remainder of Birney"s division was drawn up, protected by the breast-high bank, and flanked by artillery; yet it seemed for a moment as if the two Confederate brigades would carry all before them.
The troops of Meade and Gibbon were streaming in confusion to the rear. Two batteries had been abandoned, and before Hake"s onset the left of Birney"s infantry gave ground for fifty yards. But the rash advance had reached its climax. Unsupported, and with empty cartridge-boxes, the Southerners were unable to face the fire from the road; sixteen guns had opened on them with canister; and after suffering heavy losses in killed, wounded, and prisoners, they withdrew in disorder but unpursued.
The success of the Second Army Corps was greater than even Jackson realised. Meade and Gibbon had lost 4000 officers and men; and it was not till late in the afternoon that they were rallied on the river bank. The casualties in Birney"s division swelled the total to 5000, and the Confederate counterstroke had inflicted a heavier blow than the tale of losses indicates. Not only the troops which had been engaged, but those who had witnessed their defeat, who had seen them enter the enemy"s position, and who knew they should have been supported, were much disheartened.
2.30 P.M.
At 2.30 P.M., soon after the repulse of Hake and Atkinson, Burnside, having just witnessed the signal failure of a fourth a.s.sault on Longstreet, sent an urgent order to Franklin to renew his attack.
Franklin made no response. He had lost all confidence both in his superior and his men, and he took upon himself to disobey.
On the Confederate side Taliaferro and Early, with part of the Light Division, now held the railway embankment and the skirt of the woods.
D.H. Hill was brought up into third line, and the shattered brigades of A.P. Hill were withdrawn to the rear. During the rest of the afternoon the skirmishers were actively engaged, but although Jackson"s victorious soldiery long and eagerly expected a renewal of the a.s.sault, the enemy refused to be again tempted to close quarters.
On the left, meanwhile, where the battle still raged, the Confederates were equally successful. Against an impregnable position 40,000 Northerners were madly hurled by the general of Mr. Lincoln"s choice. By those hapless and stout-hearted soldiers, sacrificed to incompetency, a heroism was displayed which won the praise and the pity of their opponents. The attack was insufficiently prepared, and feebly supported, by the artillery. The troops were formed on a narrow front. Marye"s Hill, the strongest portion of the position, where the Confederate infantry found shelter behind a stout stone wall, and numerous batteries occupied the commanding ground in rear, was selected for a.s.sault. Neither feint nor demonstration, the ordinary expedients by which the attacker seeks to distract the attention and confuse the efforts of the defence, was made use of; and yet division after division, with no abatement of courage, marched in good order over the naked plain, dashed forward with ever-thinning ranks, and then, receding sullenly before the storm of fire, left, within a hundred yards of the stone wall, a long line of writhing forms to mark the limit of their advance.
3 P.M.
Two army corps had been repulsed by Longstreet with fearful slaughter when Meade and Gibbon gave way before Jackson"s counterstroke, and by three o"clock nearly one-half of the Federal army was broken and demoralised. The time appeared to have come for a general advance of the Confederates. Before Fredericksburg, the wreck of Sumner"s Grand Division was still clinging to such cover as the ground afforded. On the Richmond road, in front of Jackson, Franklin had abandoned all idea of the offensive, and was bringing up his last reserves to defend his line. The Confederates, on the other hand, were in the highest spirits, and had lost but few.
General Lee"s arrangements, however, had not included preparation for a great counterstroke, and such a movement is not easily improvised.
The position had been occupied for defensive purposes alone. There was no general reserve, no large and intact force which could have moved to the attack immediately the opportunity offered. "No skill,"
says Longstreet, "could have marshalled our troops for offensive operations in time to meet the emergency. My line was long and over broken country, so much so that the troops could not be promptly handled in offensive operations. Jackson"s corps was in ma.s.s, and could he have antic.i.p.ated the result of my battle, he would have been justified in pressing Franklin to the river when the battle of the latter was lost. Otherwise, pursuit would have been as unwise as the attack he had just driven off. It is well known that after driving off attacking forces, if immediate pursuit can be made, so that the victors can go along with the retreating forces pell-mell, it is well enough to do so; but the attack should be immediate. To follow a success by counter-attack against the enemy in position is problematical."* (* Battles and Leaders volume 3 pages 82-3.)
Moreover, so large was the battle-field, so limited the view by reason of the woods, and with such ease had the Federal attacks been repulsed, that General Lee was unaware of the extent of his success.
Ignorant, too, as he necessarily was, of the mistrust and want of confidence in its leaders with which the Federal army was infected, he was far from suspecting what a strong ally he had in the hearts of his enemies; while, on the other hand, the inaccessible batteries on the Stafford Heights were an outward and visible token of unabated strength.
Jackson, however, although the short winter day was already closing in, considered that the attempt was worth making. About 3 P.M. he had seen a feeble attack on the Confederate centre repulsed by Hood and Pender, and about the same time he received information of Longstreet"s success.
Franklin, meanwhile, was reforming his lines behind the high banks of the Richmond road, and the approach of his reserves, plainly visible from the Confederate position, seemed to presage a renewed attack. "I waited some time," says Jackson, "to receive it, but he making no forward movement, I determined, if prudent, to do so myself. The artillery of the enemy was so judiciously posted as to make an advance of our troops across the plain very hazardous; yet it was so promising of good results, if successfully executed, as to induce me to make preparations for the attempt. In order to guard against disaster, the infantry was to be preceded by artillery, and the movement postponed until late in the afternoon, so that if compelled to retire, it would be under cover of the night."* (* Jackson"s Reports, O.R. volume 21 page 634.)
Jackson"s decision was not a little influenced by Stuart, or rather by the reports which Stuart, who had sent out staff officers to keep the closest watch on the enemy"s movements, had been able to furnish of the demoralised condition of a great part of Franklin"s force. The cavalry general, as soon as he verified the truth of these reports in person, galloped off to confer with Jackson on Prospect Hill, and a message was at once sent to Lee, requesting permission for an advance. A single cannon shot was to be the signal for a general attack, which Stuart, striking the enemy in flank, was to initiate with his two brigades and the lighter guns.
"Returning to our position," to quote Stuart"s chief of staff, "we awaited in anxious silence the desired signal; but minute after minute pa.s.sed by, and the dark veil of the winter night began to envelop the valley, when Stuart, believing that the summons agreed upon had been given, issued the order to advance. Off we went into the gathering darkness, our sharpshooters driving their opponents easily before them, and Pelham with his guns, pushing ahead at a trot, giving them a few shots whenever the position seemed favourable, and then again pressing forward. This lasted about twenty minutes, when the fire of the enemy"s infantry began to be more and more destructive, and other fresh batteries opened upon us. Still all remained silent upon our main line. Our situation had become, indeed, a critical one, when a courier from General Jackson galloped up at full speed, bringing the order for Stuart to retreat as quickly as he could to his original position."
Under cover of the night this retrograde movement was effected without loss; and the cavalry, as they marched back, saw the camp-fires kindling on the skirts of the forest, and the infantry digging intrenchments by the fitful glare.
The Second Corps had not come into action. Jackson had issued orders that every gun, of whatever calibre or range, which was not disabled should be brought to the front and open fire at sunset; and that as soon as the enemy showed signs of wavering, the infantry should charge with fixed bayonets, and sweep the invaders into the river.
Hood"s division, which had been temporarily placed at his disposal, was instructed to co-operate.* (* Advance and Retreat, Lieutenant-General J.B. Hood page 50.) It appears, however, that it had not been easy, in the short s.p.a.ce of daylight still available, to remedy the confusion into which the Confederates had been thrown by Meade"s attack and their own counterstroke. The divisions were to some extent mixed up. Several regiments had been broken, and the ammunition of both infantry and artillery needed replenishment.
Moreover, it was difficult in the extreme to bring the batteries forward through the forest; and, when they eventually arrived, the strength of the Federal position was at once revealed. Franklin"s line was defended by a hundred and sixteen field pieces, generally of superior metal to those of the Confederates, and the guns on the Stafford Heights, of which at least thirty bore upon Jackson"s front, were still in action. As the first Confederate battery advanced, this great array of artillery, which had been for some time comparatively quiet, reopened with vigour, and, to use Jackson"s words, "so completely swept our front as to satisfy me that the proposed movement should be abandoned."