A full discussion of the Chancellorsville campaign does not fall within the scope of this biography, but in justice to the Southern generals--to Lee who resolved to stand his ground, and to Jackson who approved the resolution--it must be explained that they were in no way responsible for the absence of 20,000 veterans. Undoubtedly the situation on the Atlantic littoral was sufficiently embarra.s.sing to the Confederate authorities. The presence of a Federal force at New Berne, in North Carolina, threatened the main line of railway by which Wilmington and Charleston communicated with Richmond, and these two ports were of the utmost importance to the Confederacy. So enormous were the profits arising from the exchange of munitions of war and medicines* (* Quinine sold in the South for one hundred dollars (Confederate) the ounce. O.R. volume 25 part 2 page 79.) for cotton and tobacco that English ship-owners embarked eagerly on a lucrative if precarious traffic. Blockade-running became a recognised business. Companies were organised which possessed large fleets of swift steamers. The Bahamas and Bermuda became vast entrepots of trade. English seamen were not to be deterred from a perilous enterprise by fear of Northern broadsides or Northern prisons, and despite the number and activity of the blockading squadrons the cordon of cruisers and gunboats was constantly broken. Many vessels were sunk, many captured, many wrecked on a treacherous coast, and yet enormous quant.i.ties of supplies found their way to the a.r.s.enals and magazines of Richmond and Atlanta. The railways, then, leading from Wilmington and Charleston, the ports most accessible to the blockade-runners, were almost essential to the existence of the Confederacy. Soon after the battle of Fredericksburg, General D.H.
Hill was placed in command of the forces which protected them, and, at the beginning of the New Year, Ransom"s division* (* 3594 officers and men. Report of December 1. O.R. volume 21 page 1082.) was drawn from the Rappahannock to reinforce the local levies. A few weeks later* (* Middle of February.) General Lee was induced by Mr. Seddon to send Longstreet, with the divisions of Hood and Pickett,* (*
Pickett, 7,165; Hood, 7,956: 15,121 officers and men.) to cover Richmond, which was menaced both from Fortress Monroe and Suffolk.*
(* Lee thought Pickett was sufficient. O.R. volume 21 page 623.)
The Commander-in-Chief, however, while submitting to this detachment as a necessary evil, had warned General Longstreet so to dispose his troops that they could return to the Rappahannock at the first alarm.
"The enemy"s position," he wrote, "on the sea-coast had been probably occupied merely for purposes of defence, it was likely that they were strongly intrenched, and nothing would be gained by attacking them."
The warning, however, was disregarded; and that Mr. Seddon should have yielded, in the first instance, to the influence of the sea-power, exciting apprehensions of sudden attack along the whole seaboard of the Confederacy, may be forgiven him. Important lines of communication were certainly exposed. But when, in defiance of Lee"s advice that the divisions should be retained within easy reach of Fredericksburg, he suggested to Longstreet the feasibility of an attack on Suffolk, one hundred and twenty miles distant from the Rappahannock, he committed an unpardonable blunder.
Had Jackson been in Longstreet"s place, the Secretary"s proposal, however promising of personal renown, would unquestionably have been rejected. The leader who had kept the main object so steadfastly in view throughout the Valley campaign would never have overlooked the expressed wishes of the Commander-in-Chief. Longstreet, however, brilliant fighting soldier as he was, appears to have misconceived the duties of a detached force. He was already prejudiced in favour of a movement against Suffolk. Before he left for his new command, he had suggested to Lee that one army corps only should remain on the Rappahannock, while the other operated south of Richmond; and soon after his arrival he urged upon his superior that, in case Hooker moved, the Army of Northern Virginia should retire to the North Anna.
In short, to his mind the operations of the main body should be made subservient to those of the detached force; Lee, with 30,000 men, holding Hooker"s 130,000 in check until Longstreet had won his victory and could march north to join him. Such strategy was not likely to find favour at headquarters. It was abundantly evident, in the first place, that the Army of Northern Virginia must be the princ.i.p.al objective of the Federals; and, in the second place, that the defeat of the force of Suffolk, if it were practicable, would have no effect whatever upon Hooker"s action, except insomuch that his knowledge of Longstreet"s absence might quicken his resolution to advance. Had Suffolk been a point vital to the North the question would have a.s.sumed a different shape. As it was, the town merely covered a tract of conquered territory, the Norfolk dockyard, and the mouth of the James River. The Confederates would gain little by its capture; the Federals would hardly feel its loss. It was most improbable that a single man of Hooker"s army would be detached to defend a point of such comparative insignificance, and it was quite possible that Longstreet would be unable to get back in time to meet him, even on the North Anna. General Lee, however, anxious as ever to defer to the opinions of the man on the spot, as well as to meet the wishes of the Government, yielded to Longstreet"s insistence that a fine opportunity for an effective blow presented itself, and in the first week of April the latter marched against Suffolk.
April 17.
His movement was swift and sudden. But, as Lee had antic.i.p.ated, the Federal position was strongly fortified, with the flanks secure, and Longstreet had no mind to bring matters to a speedy conclusion. "He could reduce the place," he wrote on April 17, "in two or three days, but the expenditure of ammunition would be very large; or he could take it by a.s.sault, but at a cost of 3000 men."
The Secretary of War agreed with him that the sacrifice would be too great, and so, at a time when Hooker was becoming active on the Rappahannock, Lee"s lieutenant was quietly investing Suffolk, one hundred and twenty miles away.
From that moment the Commander-in-Chief abandoned all hope that his missing divisions would be with him when Hooker moved. Bitterly indeed was he to suffer for his selection of a commander for his detached force. The loss of 3000 men at Suffolk, had the works been stormed, and Hood and Pickett marched instantly to the Rappahannock, would have been more than repaid. The addition of 12,000 fine soldiers, flushed with success, and led by two of the most brilliant fighting generals in the Confederate armies, would have made the victory of Chancellorsville a decisive triumph. Better still had Longstreet adhered to his original orders. But both he and Mr. Seddon forgot, as Jackson never did, the value of time, and the grand principle of concentration at the decisive point.
Happily for the South, Hooker, although less flagrantly, was also oblivious of the first axiom of war. As soon as the weather improved he determined to move against Richmond. His task, however, was no simple one. On the opposite bank of the Rappahannock, from Banks"
Ford to Port Royal, a distance of twenty miles, frowned line upon line of fortifications, protected by abattis, manned by a numerous artillery, against which it was difficult to find position for the Federal guns, and occupied by the victors of Fredericksburg. A frontal attack gave even less promise of success than in Burnside"s disastrous battle. But behind Lee"s earthworks were his lines of supply; the Richmond Railway, running due south, with the road to Bowling Green alongside; and second, the plank road, which, running at first due west, led past Chancellorsville, a large brick mansion, standing in a dense forest, to Orange Court House and the depots on the Virginia Central Railroad.
At these roads and railways Hooker determined to strike, expecting that Lee would at once fall back, and give the Army of the Potomac the opportunity of delivering a heavy blow.* (* Hooker to Lincoln, April 12, O.R. volume 25 part 2 page 199.) To effect his object he divided his 130,000 men into three distinct bodies. The cavalry, which, with the exception of one small brigade, had moved under General Stoneman to Warrenton Junction, was to march by way of Rappahannock Station, and either capturing or pa.s.sing Culpeper and Gordonsville, to cut the Confederate communications, and should Lee retreat, to hold him fast.* (* The cavalry was to take supplies for six days, food and forage, depending on the country and on captures for any further quant.i.ty that might be required.) General Sedgwick, with two army corps, the First and Sixth, forming the left wing of the army, was to cross the river below Fredericksburg, make a brisk demonstration of attack, and if the enemy fell back follow him rapidly down the Bowling Green and Telegraph roads. Then, while Lee"s attention was thus attracted, the right wing, composed of the Fifth, Eleventh, and Twelfth Corps, with Pleasonton"s brigade of cavalry, under Hooker"s own command, would move up the Rappahannock to Kelly"s Ford, push forward to the Rapidan, cross at Ely"s and Germanna fords, and march upon Chancellorsville. The Third Corps was to remain concentrated on the Stafford Heights, ready to reinforce either wing as circ.u.mstances might require. The Second Corps was to leave one division on outpost at Falmouth, and to post two divisions on the north bank of the Rappahannock opposite Banks" Ford.
It will be observed that this design would place a wide interval between the two wings of the Federal army, thus giving the Confederates, although much inferior in numbers, the advantage of the interior lines.* (* From Franklin"s Crossing below Fredericksburg, where Sedgwick"s bridges were thrown, to Kelly"s Ford is 27 miles; to Ely"s Ford 19 miles, and to Chancellorsville 11 miles.) Hooker, however, who knew the Confederate strength to a man, was confident that Lee, directly he found his position turned, and Stoneman in his rear, would at once retreat on Richmond. Yet he was not blind to the possibility that his great adversary, always daring, might a.s.sume the offensive, and attempt to crush the Federal wings in detail. Still the danger appeared small. Either wing was practically equal to the whole Confederate force. Sedgwick had 40,000, with the Third Corps, 19,000, and a division of the Second, 5,500, close at hand; Hooker 42,000, with two divisions of the Second Corps, 11,000, at Banks"
Ford; the Third Corps could reinforce him in less than four-and-twenty hours; and Stoneman"s 10,000 sabres, riding at will amongst Lee"s supply depots, would surely prevent him from attacking.
Still precaution was taken in case the attempt were made. Sedgwick, if the enemy detached any considerable part of his force towards Chancellorsville, was "to carry the works at all hazards, and establish his force on the Telegraph road."* (* O.R. volume 25 page 268.) The right wing, "if not strongly resisted, was to advance at all hazards, and secure a position uncovering Banks" Ford."* (* O.R.
volume 25 page 274.) Were the Confederates found in force near Chancellorsville, it was to select a strong position and await attack on its own ground, while Sedgwick, coming up from Fredericksburg, would a.s.sail the enemy in flank and rear.
Such was the plan which, if resolutely carried out, bade fair to crush Lee"s army between the upper and the nether millstones, and it seems that the size and condition of his forces led Hooker to antic.i.p.ate an easy victory. If the Army of the Potomac was not "the finest on the planet," as in an order of the day he boastfully proclaimed it, it possessed many elements of strength. Hooker was a strict disciplinarian with a talent for organisation. He had not only done much to improve the efficiency of his troops, but his vigorous measures had gone far to restore their confidence. When he succeeded Burnside a large proportion of the soldiers had lost heart and hope.
The generals who had hitherto commanded them, when compared with Lee and Jackson, were mere pigmies, and the consciousness that this was the case had affected the entire army. The Official Records contain much justification of Jackson"s anxiety that Burnside should be fought on the North Anna, where, if defeated, he might have been pursued. Although there had been no pursuit after the battle of Fredericksburg, no hara.s.sing marches, no continued retreat, with lack of supplies, abandoning of wounded, and constant alarms, the Federal regiments had suffered terribly in morale.
"The winter rains set in," said Hooker, "and all operations were for a while suspended, the army literally finding itself buried in mud, from which there was no hope of extrication before spring.
"With this prospect before it, taken in connection with the gloom and despondency which followed the disaster of Fredericksburg, the army was in a forlorn, deplorable condition. Reference to the letters from the army at this time, public and private, affords abundant evidence of its demoralisation; and these, in their turn, had their effect upon the friends and relatives of the soldiers at home. At the time the army was turned over to me desertions were at the rate of about two hundred a day. So anxious were parents, wives, brothers and sisters, to relieve their kindred, that they filled the express trains with packages of citizens" clothing to a.s.sist them in escaping from service. At that time, perhaps, a majority of the officers, especially those high in rank, were hostile to the policy of the Government in the conduct of the war. The emanc.i.p.ation proclamation had been published a short time before, and a large element of the army had taken sides antagonistic to it, declaring that they would never have embarked in the war had they antic.i.p.ated the action of the Government. When rest came to the army, the disaffected, from whatever cause, began to show themselves, and make their influence felt in and out of the camps. I may also state that at the moment I was placed in command I caused a return to be made of the absentees of the army, and found the number to be 2922 commissioned officers and 81,964 non-commissioned officers and privates. They were scattered all over, the country, and the majority were absent from causes unknown."* (* Report of Committee on the Conduct of the War.)
In the face of this remarkable report it is curious to read, in the pages of a brilliant military historian, that "armies composed of the citizens of a free country, who have taken up arms from patriotic motives...have constantly exhibited an astonishing endurance, and possessing a bond of cohesion superior to discipline, have shown their power to withstand shocks that would dislocate the structure of other military organisations."* (* Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac. By William Swinton page 267.) A force which had lost twenty-five per cent of its strength by desertion, although it had never been pursued after defeat, would not generally be suspected of peculiar solidity. Nevertheless, the Northern soldiers must receive their due. Want of discipline made fearful ravages in the ranks, but, notwithstanding the defection of so many of their comrades, those that remained faithful displayed the best characteristics of their race. The heart of the army was still sound, and only the influence of a strong and energetic commander was required to restore its vitality. This influence was supplied by Hooker. The c.u.mbrous organisation of Grand Divisions was abolished. Disloyal and unsuccessful generals were removed. Salutary changes were introduced into the various departments of the staff. The cavalry, hitherto formed in independent brigades, was consolidated into a corps of three divisions and a brigade of regulars, and under a system of careful and uniform inspection made rapid improvement. Strong measures were taken to reduce the number of deserters. The ranks were filled by the return of absentees. New regiments were added to the army corps. The troops were constantly practised in field exercises, and generals of well-deserved reputation were selected for the different commands. "All were actuated," wrote Hooker, "by feelings of confidence and devotion to the cause, and I felt that it was a living army, and one well worthy of the Republic."
On April 27, after several demonstrations, undertaken with a view of confusing the enemy, had been made at various points, the grand movement began.
The Confederate army still held the lines it had occupied for the past four months. Jackson"s army corps extended from Hamilton"s Crossing to Port Royal. McLaws" and Anderson"s divisions occupied Lee"s Hill and the ridge northward, and a brigade watched Banks"
Ford. Stuart was with his main body, some 2400 strong, at Culpeper, observing the great ma.s.s of Federal hors.e.m.e.n at Warrenton Junction, and the line of the Rappahannock was held by cavalry pickets.
The strength of the Army of Northern Virginia, so far as can be ascertained, did not exceed 62,000 officers and men.
SECOND CORPS.
A.P. Hill"s Division 11,500 Rodes" Division 9,500 Colston"s (Jackson"s own) Division, 6,600 Early"s Division 7,500 Artillery 2,100
FIRST CORPS.
Anderson"s Division 8,100 McLaws" Division 8,600 Artillery 1,000
CAVALRY Fitzhugh Lee"s Brigade 1,500 W.H.F. Lee"s Brigade (two regiments) 900 Reserve Artillery 700 Add for reinforcements received since March 1, date of last return 4,000 ------ Total 62,000 and l70 guns.
Thus the road to Richmond, threatened by a host of 130,000 men and 428 guns, was to be defended by a force of less than half the size.
Ninety-nine generals out of a hundred would have considered the situation hopeless. The Confederate lines at Fredericksburg were certainly very strong, but it was clearly impossible to prevent the Federals outflanking them. The disparity in strength was far greater than at Sharpsburg, and it seemed that by sheer weight of numbers the Southern army must inevitably be driven back. Nor did it appear, so overwhelming were the Federal numbers, that counter-attack was feasible. The usual resource of the defender, if his adversary marches round his flank, is to strike boldly at his communications.
Here, however, Hooker"s communications with Aquia Creek were securely covered by the Rappahannock, and so great was his preponderance of strength, that he could easily detach a sufficient force to check the Confederates should they move against them.
Yet now, as on the Antietam, Lee and Jackson declined to take numbers into consideration. They knew that Hooker was a brave and experienced soldier, but they had no reason to antic.i.p.ate that he would handle his vast ma.s.ses with more skill than McClellan. That the Northern soldiers had suffered in morale they were well aware, and while they divined that the position they themselves had fortified might readily be made untenable, the fact that such was the case gave them small concern. They were agreed that the best measures of defence, if an opening offered, lay in a resolute offensive, and with Hooker in command it was not likely that the opportunity would be long delayed.
No thought of a strategic retreat, from one position to another, was entertained. Manoeuvre was to be met by manoeuvre, blow by counterblow.* (* "The idea of securing the provisions, waggons, guns, of the enemy is truly tempting, and the idea has haunted me since December." Lee to Trimble, March 8, 1862. O.R. volume 25 part 2 page 658.) If Hooker had not moved Lee would have forestalled him. On April 16 he had written to Mr. Davis: "My only anxiety arises from the condition of our horses, and the scarcity of forage and provisions. I think it is all important that we should a.s.sume the aggressive by the 1st of May...If we could be placed in a condition to make a vigorous advance at that time, I think the Valley could be swept of Milroy (commanding the Federal forces at Winchester), and the army opposite [Hooker"s] be thrown north of the Potomac."* (*
O.R. vol 25 page 725.) Jackson, too, even after Hooker"s plan was developed, indignantly repudiated the suggestion that the forthcoming campaign must be purely defensive. When some officer on his staff expressed his fear that the army would be compelled to retreat, he asked sharply, "Who said that? No, sir, we shall not fall back, we shall attack them."
At the end of the month, however, Longstreet with his three divisions was still absent; sufficient supplies for a forward movement had not yet been acc.u.mulated;* (* "From the condition of our horses and the amount of our supplies I am unable even to act on the defensive as vigorously as circ.u.mstances might reguire." Lee to Davis, April 27, O.R. volume 25 page 752.) two brigades of cavalry, Hampton"s and Jenkins", which had been sent respectively to South Carolina and the Valley, had not rejoined,* (* On April 20 Lee had asked that the cavalry regiments not needed in other districts might be sent to the Army of Northern Virginia. The request was not compiled with until too late. O.R. volume 25 pages 740, 741.) and Hooker had already seized the initiative.
The first news which came to hand was that a strong force of all arms was moving up the Rappahannock in the direction of Kelly"s Ford.
April 28.
This was forwarded by Stuart on the evening of April 28. The next morning the Federal movements, which might have been no more than a demonstration, became p.r.o.nounced.
April 29.
Under cover of a thick fog, pontoon bridges were laid at Deep Run below Fredericksburg; Sedgwick"s troops began to cross, and were soon engaged with Jackson"s outposts; while, at the same time, the report came in that a force of unknown strength had made the pa.s.sage at Kelly"s Ford.
Lee displayed no perturbation. Jackson, on receiving information of Sedgwick"s movement from his outposts, had sent an aide-de-camp to acquaint the Commander-in-Chief. The latter was still in his tent, and in reply to the message said: "Well, I heard firing, and I was beginning to think that it was time some of your lazy young fellows were coming to tell me what it was about. Tell your good general he knows what to do with the enemy just as well as I do."* (* On March 12, before Hooker had even framed his plan of operations, Lee had received information that the Federals, as soon as the state of the roads permitted, would cross at United States, Falmouth, and some point below; the attempt at Falmouth to be a feint. O.R. volume 25 part 2 page 664.)
The divisions of the Second Army Corps were at once called up to their old battle-ground, and while they were on the march Jackson occupied himself with watching Sedgwick"s movements. The Federals were busily intrenching on the river bank, and on the heights behind frowned the long line of artillery that had proved at Fredericksburg so formidable an obstacle to the Confederate attack. The enemy"s position was very strong, and the time for counterstroke had not yet come. During the day the cavalry was actively engaged between the Rappahannock and the Rapidan, testing the strength of the enemy"s columns. The country was wooded, the Federals active, and as usual in war, accurate information was difficult to obtain and more difficult to communicate. It was not till 6.30 P.M. that Lee received notice that troops had crossed at Ely"s and Germanna Fords at 2 P.M.
Anderson"s division was at once dispatched to Chancellorsvile.
April 30.
The next message, which does not appear to have been received until the morning of the 30th, threw more light on the situation. Stuart had made prisoners from the Fifth, the Eleventh, and the Twelfth Corps, and had ascertained that the corps commanders, Meade, Howard, and Sloc.u.m, were present with the troops. Anderson, moreover, who had been instructed to select and intrench a strong position, was falling back from Chancellorsville before the enemy"s advance, and two things became clear:--
1. That it was Hooker"s intention to turn the Confederate left.
2. That he had divided his forces.
The question now to be decided was which wing should be attacked first. There was much to be said in favour of crushing Sedgwick. His numbers were estimated at 35,000 men, and the Confederates had over 60,000. Moreover, time is a most important consideration in the use of interior lines. The army was already concentrated in front of Sedgwick, whereas it would require a day"s march to seek Hooker in the forest round Chancellorsville. Sedgwick"s, too, was the smaller of the Federal wings, and his overthrow would certainly ruin Hooker"s combinations. "Jackson at first," said Lee, "preferred to attack Sedgwick"s force in the plain of Fredericksburg, but I told him I feared it was as impracticable as it was at the first battle of Fredericksburg. It was hard to get at the enemy, and harder to get away if we drove him into the river, but if he thought it could be done, I would give orders for it." Jackson asked to be allowed to examine the ground, but soon came to the conclusion that the project was too hazardous and that Lee was right. Orders were then issued for a concentration against Hooker, 10,000 men, under General Early, remaining to confront Sedgwick on the heights of Fredericksburg.
We may now turn to the movements of the Federals.
Hooker"s right wing had marched at a speed which had been hitherto unknown in the Army of the Potomac. At nightfall, on April 30, the three army corps, although they had been delayed by the Confederate cavalry, were a.s.sembled at Chancellorsville. In three days they had marched forty-six miles over bad roads, had forded breast-high two difficult rivers, established several bridges, and captured over a hundred prisoners.* (* The troops carried eight days" supplies: three days" cooked rations with bread and groceries in the haversacks; five days" bread and groceries in the knapsacks; five days" "beef on the hoof." The total weight carried by each man, including sixty rounds of ammunition, was 45 pounds. The reserve ammunition was carried princ.i.p.ally by pack mules, and only a small number of waggons crossed the Rappahannock. Four pontoon bridges were laid by the engineers.
One bridge took three-quarters of an hour to lay; the other three, one and a half hour to lay, and an hour to take up. Each bridge was from 100 to 140 yards long. O.R. volume 25 pages 215, 216.) Heavy reinforcements were in rear. The two divisions of the Second Corps had marched from Banks" Ford to United States Ford, six miles from Chancellorsville; while the Third Corps, ordered up from the Stafford Heights, was rapidly approaching the same point of pa.s.sage. Thus, 70,000 men, in the highest spirits at the success of their manoeuvres, were ma.s.sed in rear of Lee"s lines, and Hooker saw victory within his grasp.
"It is with heartfelt satisfaction," ran his general order, "that the commanding general announces to his army that the operations of the last three days have determined that our enemy must either ingloriously fly or come out from behind his defences, and give us battle on our own ground, where certain destruction awaits him. The operations of the Fifth, Eleventh, and Twelfth Corps have been a succession of splendid achievements."
Hooker was skinning the lion while the beast yet lived, but he had certainly much reason for congratulation. His manoeuvres had been skilfully planned and energetically executed. The two rivers which protected the Confederate position had been crossed without loss; the Second and Third Corps had been brought into close touch with the right wing; Lee"s earthworks were completely turned, and Stoneman"s cavalry divisions, driving the enemy"s patrols before them, were already within reach of Orange Court House, and not more than twenty miles from Gordonsville. Best of all, the interval between the two wings--twenty-six miles on the night of the 28th--was now reduced to eleven miles by the plank road.