____________ Irish Battn.)
Fulkerson, further to the left, was more fortunate than the 27th.
Before he began his advance along the ridge he had deployed his two battalions under cover, and when the musketry broke out on his right front, they were moving forward over an open field. Half-way across the field ran a stone wall or fence, and beyond the wall were seen the tossing colours and bright bayonets of a line of battle, just emerging from the woods. Then came a race for the wall, and the Confederates won. A heavy fire, at the closest range, blazed out in the face of the charging Federals, and in a few moments the stubble was strewn with dead and wounded. A Pennsylvania regiment, leaving a colour on the field, gave way in panic, and the whole of the enemy"s force retreated to the shelter of the woods. An attempt to turn Jackson"s left was then easily frustrated; and although the Federals maintained a heavy fire, Fulkerson"s men held stubbornly to the wall.
In the centre of the field the Northern riflemen were sheltered by a bank; their numbers continually increased, and here the struggle was more severe. The 4th and 33rd Virginia occupied this portion of the line, and they were without support, for the 2nd Virginia and the Irish battalion, the last available reserves upon the ridge, had been already sent forward to reinforce the right.
The right, too, was hardly pressed. The Confederate infantry had everywhere to do with superior numbers, and the artillery, in that wooded ground, could lend but small support. The batteries protected the right flank, but they could take no share in the struggle to the front; and yet, as the dusk came on, after two long hours of battle, the white colours of the Virginia regiments, fixed fast amongst the rocks, still waved defiant. The long grey line, "a ragged spray of humanity," plied the ramrod with still fiercer energy, and pale women on the hills round Winchester listened in terror to the crashing echoes of the leafless woods. But the end could not be long delayed.
Ammunition was giving out. Every company which had reached the ridge had joined the fighting line. The ranks were thinning. Many of the bravest officers were down, and the Northern regiments, standing staunchly to their work, had been strongly reinforced.
Ashby for once had been mistaken. It was no rearguard that barred the road to Winchester, but Shields" entire division, numbering at least 9000 men. A prisoner captured the day before had admitted that the Confederates were under the impression that Winchester had been evacuated, and that Jackson had immediately moved forward. Shields, an able officer, who had commanded a brigade in Mexico, saw his opportunity. He knew something of his opponent, and antic.i.p.ating that he would be eager to attack, had ordered the greater part of his division to remain concealed. Kimball"s brigade and five batteries were sent quietly, under cover of the night, to Pritchard"s Hill.
Sullivan"s brigade was posted in support, hidden from view behind a wood. The cavalry and Tyler"s brigade were held in reserve, north of the town, at a distance where they were not likely to be observed by the inhabitants. As soon as the Confederates came in sight, and Kimball deployed across the pike, Tyler was brought through the town and placed in rear of Sullivan, at a point where the road dips down between two parallel ridges. Shields himself, wounded in the skirmish of the preceding day, was not present at the action, although responsible for these dispositions, and the command had devolved on Kimball. That officer, when Jackson"s design became apparent, ordered Tyler to occupy the wooded ridge; and it was his five regiments, over 3000 strong, which had struck so strongly at the Confederate advance.
But although superior in numbers by a third, they were unable to make headway. Kimball, however, rose to the situation before it was too late. Recognising that Ashby"s weak attack was nothing more than a demonstration, he hurried nearly the whole of his own brigade, followed by three battalions of Sullivan"s, to Tyler"s aid, leaving a couple of battalions and the artillery to hold the pike.
"The struggle," says Shields, "had been for a short time doubtful,"*
(* O.R. volume 12 part 1 page 341.) but this reinforcement of 3000 bayonets turned the scale. Jackson had ordered the 5th and 42nd Virginia to the ridge, and a messenger was sent back to hurry forward the 48th. But it was too late. Before the 5th could reach the heights the centre of the Confederate line was broken. Garnett, the commander of the Stonewall Brigade, without referring to the general, who was in another part of the field, had given the order to fall back.
Fulkerson, whose right was now uncovered, was obliged to conform to the rearward movement, and moving across from Pritchard"s Hill, two Federal regiments, despite the fire of the Southern guns, made a vigorous attack on Jackson"s right. The whole Confederate line, long since dissolved into a crowd of skirmishers, and with the various regiments much mixed up, fell back, still fighting, through the woods. Across the clearing, through the clouds of smoke, came the Northern ma.s.ses in pursuit. On the extreme right a hot fire of canister, at a range of two hundred and fifty yards, drove back the troops that had come from Pritchard"s Hill; but on the wooded ridge above the artillery was unable to hold its own. The enemy"s riflemen swarmed in the thickets, and the batteries fell back. As they limbered up one of the six-pounders was overturned. Under a hot fire, delivered at not more than fifty paces distant, the sergeant in charge cut loose the three remaining horses, but the gun was abandoned to the enemy.
Jackson, before the Federal reinforcements had made their presence felt, was watching the progress of the action on the left. Suddenly, to his astonishment and wrath, he saw the lines of his old brigade falter and fall back. Galloping to the spot he imperatively ordered Garnett to hold his ground, and then turned to restore the fight.
Seizing a drummer by the shoulder, he dragged him to a rise of ground, in full view of the troops, and bade him in curt, quick tones, to "Beat the rally!" The drum rolled at his order, and with his hand on the frightened boy"s shoulder, amidst a storm of b.a.l.l.s, he tried to check the flight of his defeated troops. His efforts were useless. His fighting-line was shattered into fragments; and although, according to a Federal officer, "many of the brave Virginians lingered in rear of their retreating comrades, loading as they slowly retired, and rallying in squads in every ravine and behind every hill--or hiding singly among the trees,"* (* Colonel E.H.C. Cavins, 14th Indiana. Battles and Leaders volume 2 page 307.) it was impossible to stay the rout. The enemy was pressing forward in heavy force, and their shouts of triumph rang from end to end of the field of battle. No doubt remained as to their overwhelming numbers, and few generals but would have been glad enough to escape without tempting fortune further.
It seemed almost too late to think of even organising a rear-guard.
But Jackson, so far from preparing for retreat, had not yet ceased to think of victory. The 5th and 42nd Virginia were coming up, a compact force of 600 bayonets, and a vigorous and sudden counterstroke might yet change the issue of the day. The reinforcements, however, had not yet come in sight, and galloping back to meet them he found that instead of marching resolutely against the enemy, the two regiments had taken post to the rear, on the crest of a wooded swell, in order to cover the retreat. On his way to the front the colonel of the 5th Virginia had received an order from Garnett instructing him to occupy a position behind which the fighting-line might recover its formation. Jackson was fain to acquiesce; but the fighting-line was by this time scattered beyond all hope of rallying; the opportunity for the counterstroke had pa.s.sed away, and the battle was irretrievably lost.
Arrangements were quickly made to enable the broken troops to get away without further molestation. A battery was ordered to take post at the foot of the hill, and Funsten"s cavalry was called up from westward of the ridge. The 42nd Virginia came into line on the right of the 5th, and covered by a stone wall and thick timber, these two small regiments, encouraged by the presence of their commander, held stoutly to their ground. The attack was pressed with reckless gallantry. In front of the 5th Virginia the colours of the 5th Ohio changed hands no less than six times, and one of them was pierced by no less than eight-and-forty bullets. The 84th Pennsylvania was twice repulsed and twice rallied, but on the fall of its colonel retreated in confusion. The left of the 14th Indiana broke; but the 13th Indiana now came up, and "inch by inch," according to their commanding officer, the Confederates were pushed back. The 5th Virginia was compelled to give way before a flanking fire; but the colonel retired the colours to a short distance, and ordered the regiment to re-form on them. Again the heavy volleys blazed out in the gathering twilight, and the sheaves of death grew thicker every moment on the bare hillside. But still the Federals pressed on, and swinging round both flanks, forced the Confederate rear-guard from the field, while their cavalry, moving up the valley of the Opequon, captured several ambulances and cut off some two or three hundred fugitives.
As the night began to fall the 5th Virginia, retiring steadily towards the pike, filed into a narrow lane, fenced by a stone wall, nearly a mile distant from their last position, and there took post for a final stand. Their left was commanded by the ridge, and on the heights in the rear, coming up from the Opequon valley, appeared a large ma.s.s of Northern cavalry. It was a situation sufficiently uncomfortable. If the ground was too difficult for the hors.e.m.e.n to charge over in the gathering darkness, a volley from their carbines could scarcely have failed to clear the wall. "A single ramrod," it was said in the Confederate ranks, "would have spitted the whole battalion." But not a shot was fired. The pursuit of the Federal infantry had been stayed in the pathless woods, the cavalry was held in check by Funsten"s squadrons, and the 5th was permitted to retire unmolested.
(MAP. BATTLE OF KERNSTOWN. SUNDAY, MARCH 23RD. 1862. Showing: West: Neal"s Dam, North: Winchester, South: Opequon Creek, East: old Road to Front Royal.)
The Confederates, with the exception of Ashby, who halted at Bartonsville, a farm upon the pike, a mile and a half from the field of battle, fell back to Newtown, three miles further south, where the trains had been parked. The men were utterly worn out. Three hours of fierce fighting against far superior numbers had brought them to the limit of their endurance. "In the fence corners, under the trees, and around the waggons they threw themselves down, many too weary to eat, and forgot, in profound slumber, the trials, the dangers, and the disappointments of the day."* (* Jackson"s Valley Campaign, Colonel William Allan, C.S.A. page 54.)
Jackson, when the last sounds of battle had died away, followed his troops. Halting by a camp-fire, he stood and warmed himself for a time, and then, remounting, rode back to Bartonsville. Only one staff officer, his chief commissary, Major Hawks, accompanied him. The rest had dropped away, overcome by exhaustion. "Turning from the road into an orchard, he fastened up his horse, and asked his companion if he could make a fire, adding, "We shall have to burn fence-rails to-night." The major soon had a roaring fire, and was making a bed of rails, when the general wished to know what he was doing. "Finding a place to sleep," was the reply. "You seem determined to make yourself and those around you comfortable," said Jackson. And knowing the general had fasted all day, he soon obtained some bread and meat from the nearest squad of soldiers, and after they had satisfied their hunger, they slept soundly on the rail-bed in a fence-corner."
Such was the battle of Kernstown, in which over 1200 men were killed and wounded, the half of them Confederates. Two or three hundred prisoners fell into the hands of the Federals. Nearly one-fourth of Jackson"s infantry was hors de combat, and he had lost two guns. His troops were undoubtedly depressed. They had antic.i.p.ated an easy victory; the overwhelming strength of the Federals had surprised them, and their losses had been severe. But no regret disturbed the slumbers of their leader. He had been defeated, it was true; but he looked further than the immediate result of the engagement. "I feel justified in saying," he wrote in his short report, "that, though the battle-field is in the possession of the enemy, yet the most essential fruits of the victory are ours." As he stood before the camp-fire near Newtown, wrapped in his long cloak, his hands behind his back, and stirring the embers with his foot, one of Ashby"s youngest troopers ventured to interrupt his reverie. "The Yankees don"t seem willing to quit Winchester, General!" "Winchester is a very pleasant place to stay in, sir!" was the quick reply. Nothing daunted, the boy went on: "It was reported that they were retreating, but I guess they"re retreating after us." With his eyes still fixed on the blazing logs: "I think I may say I am satisfied, sir!" was Jackson"s answer; and with no further notice of the silent circle round the fire, he stood gazing absently into the glowing flames.
After a few minutes the tall figure turned away, and without another word strode off into the darkness.
That Jackson divined the full effect of his attack would be to a.s.sert too much. That he realised that the battle, though a tactical defeat, was strategically a victory is very evident. He knew something of Banks, he knew more of McClellan, and the bearing of the Valley on the defence of Washington had long been uppermost in his thoughts. He had learned from Napoleon to throw himself into the spirit of his enemy, and it is not improbable that when he stood before the fire near Newtown he had already foreseen, in some degree at least, the events that would follow the news of his attack at Kernstown.
The outcome of the battle was indeed far-reaching. "Though the battle had been won," wrote Shields, "still I could not have believed that Jackson would have hazarded a decisive engagement, so far from the main body, without expecting reinforcements; so, to be prepared for such a contingency, I set to work during the night to bring together all the troops within my reach. I sent an express after Williams"
division, requesting the rear brigade, about twenty miles distant, to march all night and join me in the morning. I swept the posts in rear of almost all their guards, hurrying them forward by forced marches, to be with me at daylight."* (* O.R. volume 12 part 1 page 341.)
General Banks, hearing of the engagement on his way to Washington, halted at Harper"s Ferry, and he also ordered Williams" division to return at once to Winchester.
One brigade only,* (* Abercrombie"s, 4500 men and a battery. The brigade marched to Warrenton, where it remained until it was transferred to McDowell"s command.) which the order did not reach, continued the march to Mana.s.sas. This counter-movement met with McClellan"s approval. He now recognised that Jackson"s force, commanded as it was, was something more than a mere corps of observation, and that it was essential that it should be crushed.
"Your course was right," he telegraphed on receiving Banks" report.
"As soon as you are strong enough push Jackson hard and drive him well beyond Strasburg...The very moment the thorough defeat of Jackson will permit it, resume the movement on Mana.s.sas, always leaving the whole of Shields" command at or near Strasburg and Winchester until the Mana.s.sas Gap Railway is fully repaired.
Communicate fully and act vigorously."* (* O.R. volume 12 part 3 page 16.)
8000 men (Williams" division) were thus temporarily withdrawn from the force that was to cover Washington from the south. But this was only the first step. Jackson"s action had forcibly attracted the attention of the Federal Government to the Upper Potomac. The President was already contemplating the transfer of Blenker"s division from McClellan to Fremont; the news of Kernstown decided the question, and at the end of March these 9000 men were ordered to West Virginia, halting at Strasburg, in case Banks should then need them, on their way.* (* Blenker"s division was at Hunter"s Chapel, south of Washington, when it received the order.) But even this measure did not altogether allay Mr. Lincoln"s apprehensions. McClellan had a.s.sured him, on April 1, that 73,000 men would be left for the defence of the capital and its approaches. But in the original arrangement, with which the President had been satisfied, Williams was to have been brought to Mana.s.sas, and Shields alone left in the Shenandoah Valley. Under the new distribution the President found that the force at Mana.s.sas would be decreased by two brigades; and, at the same time, that while part of the troops McClellan had promised were not forthcoming, a large portion of those actually available were good for nothing. The officer left in command at Washington reported that "nearly all his force was imperfectly disciplined; that several of the regiments were in a very disorganised condition; that efficient artillery regiments had been removed from the forts, and that he had to relieve them with very new infantry regiments, entirely unacquainted with the duties of that arm."* (* Report of General Wadsworth; O.R. volume 12 part 3 page 225.) Lincoln submitted the question to six generals of the regular army, then present in Washington; and these officers replied that, in their opinion, "the requirement of the President that this city shall be left entirely secure has not been fully complied with."* (* Letter of Mr. Stanton; O.R. volume 19 part 2 page 726.)
On receiving this report, Lincoln ordered the First Army Corps, 37,000 strong, under General McDowell, to remain at Mana.s.sas in place of embarking for the Peninsula; and thus McClellan, on the eve of his advance on Richmond, found his original force of 150,000 reduced by 46,000 officers and men. Moreover, not content with detaching McDowell for a time, Lincoln, the next day, a.s.signed that general to an independent command, covering the approaches to Washington; Banks, also, was withdrawn from McClellan"s control, and directed to defend the Valley. The original dissemination of the Federal forces was thus gravely accentuated, and the Confederates had now to deal with four distinct armies, McClellan"s, McDowell"s, Banks", and Fremont"s, dependent for co-operation on the orders of two civilians, President Lincoln and his Secretary of War. And this was not all. McDowell had been a.s.signed a most important part in McClellan"s plan of invasion.
The road from Fortress Monroe was barred by the fortifications of Yorktown. These works could be turned, however, by sending a force up the York River. But the pa.s.sage of the stream was debarred to the Federal transports by a strong fort at Gloucester Point, on the left bank, and the capture of this work was to be the task of the First Army Corps. No wonder that McClellan, believing that Johnston commanded 100,000 men, declared that in his deliberate judgment the success of the Federal cause was imperilled by the order which detached McDowell from his command. However inadequately the capital might be defended, it was worse than folly to interfere with the general"s plans when he was on the eve of executing them. The best way of defending Washington was for McClellan to march rapidly on Richmond, and seize his adversary by the throat. By depriving him of McDowell, Lincoln and his advisers made such a movement difficult, and the grand army of invasion found itself in a most embarra.s.sing situation. Such was the effect of a blow struck at the right place and the right time, though struck by no more than 3000 bayonets.
The battle of Kernstown was undoubtedly well fought. It is true that Jackson believed that he had no more than four regiments of infantry, a few batteries, and some cavalry before him. But it was a skilful manoeuvre, which threw three brigades and three batteries, more than two-thirds of his whole strength, on his opponent"s flank. An ordinary general would probably have employed only a small portion of his force in the turning movement. Not so the student of Napoleon.
"In the general"s haversack," says one of Jackson"s staff, "were always three books: the Bible, Napoleon"s Maxims of War, and Webster"s Dictionary--for his spelling was uncertain--and these books he constantly consulted." Whether the chronicles of the Jewish kings threw any light on the tactical problem involved at Kernstown may be left to the commentators; but there can be no question as to the Maxims. To hurl overwhelming numbers at the point where the enemy least expects attack is the whole burden of Napoleon"s teaching, and there can be no doubt but that the wooded ridge, unoccupied save by a few scouts, was the weakest point of the defence.
The manoeuvre certainly surprised the Federals, and it very nearly beat them. Tyler"s brigade was unsupported for nearly an hour and a half. Had his battalions been less staunch, the tardy reinforcements would have been too late to save the day. Coming up as they did, not in a ma.s.s so strong as to bear all before it by its own inherent weight, but in successive battalions, at wide intervals of time, they would themselves have become involved in a desperate engagement under adverse circ.u.mstances. Nor is Kimball to be blamed that he did not throw greater weight on Jackson"s turning column at an earlier hour.
Like Shields and Banks, he was unable to believe that Jackson was unsupported. He expected that the flank attack would be followed up by one in superior numbers from the front. He could hardly credit that an inferior force would deliberately move off to a flank, leaving its line of retreat to be guarded by a few squadrons, weakly supported by infantry; and the audacity of the a.s.sailant had the usual effect of deceiving the defender.
Kernstown, moreover, will rank as an example of what determined men can do against superior numbers. The Confederates on the ridge, throughout the greater part of the fight, hardly exceeded 2000 muskets. They were a.s.sailed by 3000, and proved a match for them. The 3000 were then reinforced by at least 3000 more, whilst Jackson could bring up only 600 muskets to support an already broken line.
Nevertheless, these 6000 Northerners were so roughly handled that there was practically no pursuit. When the Confederates fell back every one of the Federal regiments had been engaged, and there were no fresh troops wherewith to follow them. Jackson was perfectly justified in reporting that "Night and an indisposition of the enemy to press further terminated the battle."* (* O.R. volume 12 part 1 page 382.)
But the action was attended by features more remarkable than the stubborn resistance of the Virginia regiments. It is seldom that a battle so insignificant as Kernstown has been followed by such extraordinary results. Fortune indeed favoured the Confederates. At the time of the battle a large portion of McClellan"s army was at sea, and the attack was delivered at the very moment when it was most dreaded by the Northern Government. Nor was it to the disadvantage of the Southerners that the real head of the Federal army was the President, and that his strategical conceptions were necessarily subservient to the att.i.tude of the Northern people. These were circ.u.mstances purely fortuitous, and it might seem, therefore, that Jackson merely blundered into success. But he must be given full credit for recognizing that a blow at Banks might be fraught with most important consequences. It was with other ideas than defeating a rear-guard or detaining Banks that he seized the Kernstown ridge. He was not yet aware of McClellan"s plan of invasion by sea; but he knew well that any movement that would threaten Washington must prove embarra.s.sing to the Federal Government; that they could not afford to leave the Upper Potomac ill secured; and that the knowledge that an active and enterprising enemy, who had shown himself determined to take instant advantage of every opportunity, was within the Valley, would probably cause them to withdraw troops from McClellan in order to guard the river. A fortnight after the battle, asking for reinforcements, he wrote, "If Banks is defeated it may greatly r.e.t.a.r.d McClellan"s movements."* (* Ibid part 3 page 844.)
Stubborn as had been the fighting of his brigades, Jackson himself was not entirely satisfied with his officers. When Sullivan and Kimball came to Tyler"s aid, and a new line of battle threatened to overwhelm the Stonewall regiments, Garnett, on his own responsibility, had given the order to retire. Many of the men, their ammunition exhausted, had fallen to the rear. The exertions of the march had begun to tell. The enemy"s attacks had been fiercely pressed, and before the pressure of his fresh brigades the Confederate power of resistance was strained to breaking-point.
Garnett had behaved with conspicuous gallantry. The officers of his brigade declared that he was perfectly justified in ordering a retreat. Jackson thought otherwise, and almost immediately after the battle he relieved him of his command, placed him under arrest, and framed charges for his trial by court-martial. He would not accept the excuse that ammunition had given out. At the time the Stonewall Brigade gave back the 5th and 42nd Virginia were at hand. The men had still their bayonets, and he did not consider the means of victory exhausted until the cold steel had been employed. "He insisted," says Dabney, "that a more resolute struggle might have won the field."* (*
Dabney volume 2 page 46.)
Now, in the first place, it must be conceded that Garnett had not the slightest right to abandon his position without a direct order.* (*
He was aware, moreover, that supports were coming up, for the order to the 5th Virginia was sent through him. Report of Colonel W.H.
Harman, 5th Virginia, O.R. volume 12 part 1 pages 391 and 392.) In the second, if we turn to the table of losses furnished by the brigade commander, we find that in Garnett"s four regiments, numbering 1100 officers and men, there fell 153. In addition, 148 were reported missing, but, according to the official reports, the majority of these were captured by the Federal cavalry and were unwounded. At most, then, when he gave the order to retreat, Garnett had lost 200, or rather less than 20 per cent.
Such loss was heavy, but by no means excessive. A few months later hardly a brigade in either army would have given way because every fifth man had fallen. A year later and the Stonewall regiments would have considered an action in which they lost 200 men as nothing more than a skirmish.* (* On March 5, 1811, in the battle fought on the arid ridges of Barossa, the numbers were almost identical with those engaged at Kernstown. Out of 4000 British soldiers there fell in an hour over 1200, and of 9000 French more than 2000 were killed or wounded; and yet, although the victors were twenty-four hours under arms without food, the issue was never doubtful.) The truth would seem to be that the Valley soldiers were not yet blooded. In peace the individual is everything; material prosperity, self-indulgence, and the preservation of existence are the general aim. In war the individual is nothing, and men learn the lesson of self-sacrifice.
But it is only gradually, however high the enthusiasm which inspires the troops, that the ideas of peace become effaced, and they must be seasoned soldiers who will endure, without flinching, the losses of Waterloo or Gettysburg. Discipline, which means the effacement of the individual, does more than break the soldier to unhesitating obedience; it trains him to die for duty"s sake, and even the Stonewall Brigade, in the spring of 1862, was not yet thoroughly disciplined. "The lack of competent and energetic officers," writes Jackson"s chief of the staff, "was at this time the bane of the service. In many there was neither an intelligent comprehension of their duties nor zeal in their performance. Appointed by the votes of their neighbours and friends, they would neither exercise that rigidity in governing, nor that detailed care in providing for the wants of their men, which are necessary to keep soldiers efficient.
The duties of the drill and the sentry-post were often negligently performed; and the most profuse waste of ammunition and other military stores was permitted. It was seldom that these officers were guilty of cowardice upon the field of battle, but they were often in the wrong place, fighting as common soldiers when they should have been directing others. Above all was their inefficiency marked in their inability to keep their men in the ranks. Absenteeism grew under them to a monstrous evil, and every poltroon and laggard found a way of escape. Hence the frequent phenomenon that regiments, which on the books of the commissary appeared as consumers of 500 or 1000 rations, were reported as carrying into action 250 or 300 bayonets."*
(* Dabney volume 2 pages 18 and 19.) It is unlikely that this picture is over-coloured, and it is certainly no reproach to the Virginia soldiers that their discipline was indifferent. There had not yet been time to transform a mult.i.tude of raw recruits into the semblance of a regular army. Competent instructors and trained leaders were few in the extreme, and the work had to be left in inexperienced hands.
One Stonewall Jackson was insufficient to leaven a division of 5000 men.
In the second place, Jackson probably remembered that the Stonewall Brigade at Bull Run, dashing out with the bayonet on the advancing Federals, had driven them back on their reserves. It seems hardly probable, had Garnett at Kernstown held his ground a little longer, that the three regiments still intact could have turned the tide of battle. But it is not impossible. The Federals had been roughly handled. Their losses had been heavier than those of the Confederates. A resolute counterstroke has before now changed the face of battle, and among unseasoned soldiers panic spreads with extraordinary effect. So far as can be gathered from the reports, there is no reason to suspect that the vigour of the Federal battalions was as yet relaxed. But no one who was not actually present can presume to judge of the temper of the troops. In every well-contested battle there comes a moment when the combatants on both sides become exhausted, and the general who at that moment finds it in his heart to make one more effort will generally succeed. Such was the experience of Grant, Virginia"s stoutest enemy.* (* Grant"s Memoirs.) That moment, perhaps, had come at Kernstown; and Jackson, than whom not Skobeleff himself had clearer vision or cooler brain in the tumult of battle, may have observed it. It cannot be too often repeated that numbers go for little on the battle-field. It is possible that Jackson had in his mind, when he declared that the victory might yet have been won, the decisive counterstroke at Marengo, where 20,000 Austrians, pressing forward in pursuit of a defeated enemy, were utterly overthrown by a fresh division of 6000 men supported by four squadrons.* (* The morning after the battle one of the Confederate officers expressed the opinion that even if the counterstroke had been successful, the Federal reserves would have arrested it. Jackson answered, "No, if I had routed the men on the ridge, they would all have gone off together.")
Tactical unity and morale are factors of far more importance in battle than mere numerical strength. Troops that have been hotly engaged, even with success, and whose nerves are wrought up to a high state of tension, are peculiarly susceptible to surprise. If they have lost their order, and the men find themselves under strange officers, with unfamiliar faces beside them, the counterstroke falls with even greater force. It is at such moments that cavalry still finds its opportunity. It is at such moments that a resolute charge, pushed home with drums beating and a loud cheer, may have extraordinary results. On August 6, 1870, on the heights of Worth, a German corps d"armee, emerging, after three hours" fierce fighting, from the great wood on McMahon"s flank, bore down upon the last stronghold of the French. The troops were in the utmost confusion.
Divisions, brigades, regiments, and companies were mingled in one motley ma.s.s. But the enemy was retreating; a heavy force of artillery was close at hand, and the infantry must have numbered at least 10,000 rifles. Suddenly three battalions of Turcos, numbering no more than 1500 bayonets, charged with wild cries, and without firing, down the gra.s.sy slope. The Germans halted, fired a few harmless volleys, and then, turning as one man, bolted to the shelter of the wood, twelve hundred yards in rear.
According to an officer of the 14th Indiana, the Federals at Kernstown were in much the same condition as the Germans at Worth.
"The Confederates fell back in great disorder, and we advanced in disorder just as great. Over logs, through woods, over hills and fields, the brigades, regiments, and companies advanced, in one promiscuous, mixed, and uncontrollable ma.s.s. Officers shouted themselves hoa.r.s.e in trying to bring order out of confusion, but all their efforts were unavailing along the front line, or rather what ought to have been the front line."* (* Colonel E.H.C. Cavins, Battles and Leaders volume 2 page 307.)
Garnett"s conduct was not the only incident connected with Kernstown that troubled Jackson. March 23 was a Sunday. "You appear much concerned," he writes to his wife, "at my attacking on Sunday. I am greatly concerned too; but I felt it my duty to do it, in consideration of the ruinous effects that might result from postponing the battle until the morning. So far as I can see, my course was a wise one; the best that I could do under the circ.u.mstances, though very distasteful to my feelings; and I hope and pray to our Heavenly Father that I may never again be circ.u.mstanced as on that day. I believed that, so far as our troops were concerned, necessity and mercy both called for the battle. I do hope that the war will soon be over, and that I shall never again be called upon to take the field. Arms is a profession that, if its principles are adhered to, requires an officer to do what he fears may be wrong, and yet, according to military experience, must be done if success is to be attained. And the fact of its being necessary to success, and being accompanied with success, and that a departure from it is accompanied with disaster, suggests that it must be right. Had I fought the battle on Monday instead of Sunday, I fear our cause would have suffered, whereas, as things turned out, I consider our cause gained much from the engagement."
We may wonder if his wife detected the unsoundness of the argument.
To do wrong--for wrong it was according to her creed--in order that good may ensue is what it comes to. The literal interpretation of the Scriptural rule seems to have led her husband into difficulties; but the incident may serve to show with what earnestness, in every action of his life, he strove to shape his conduct with what he believed to be his duty.
It has already been observed that Jackson"s reticence was remarkable.
No general could have been more careful that no inkling of his design should reach the enemy. He had not the slightest hesitation in withholding his plans from even his second in command; special correspondents were rigorously excluded from his camps; and even with his most confidential friends his reserve was absolutely impenetrable. During his stay at Winchester, it was his custom directly he rose to repair to headquarters and open his correspondence. When he returned to breakfast at Dr. Graham"s there was much anxiety evinced to hear the news from the front. What the enemy was doing across the Potomac, scarce thirty miles away, was naturally of intense interest to the people of the border town. But not the smallest detail of intelligence, however unimportant, escaped his lips. To his wife he was as uncommunicative as to the rest.
Neither hint nor suggestion made the least impression, and direct interrogations were put by with a quiet smile. Nor was he too shy to suggest to his superiors that silence was golden. In a report to Johnston, written four days after Kernstown, he administered what can scarcely be considered other than a snub, delicately expressed but unmistakable:--
"It is understood in the Federal army that you have instructed me to keep the forces now in this district and not permit them to cross the Blue Ridge, and that this must be done at every hazard, and that for the purpose of effecting this I made my attack. I have never so much as intimated such a thing to anyone."* (* O.R. volume 12 part 3 page 840.)
It cannot be said that Jackson"s judgment in attacking Shields was at once appreciated in the South. The defeat, at first, was ranked with the disasters in the West. But as soon as the effects upon the enemy were appreciated the tide of popular feeling turned. The gallantry of the Valley regiments was fully recognised, and the thanks of Congress were tendered to Jackson and his troops.