Eighteen miles west of Staunton a Federal picket was overrun, and in the pa.s.s leading to the Shenandoah Mountain Johnson captured a camp that had just been abandoned. The Federal rear-guard fired a few sh.e.l.ls, and the Confederates went into bivouac. Johnson had marched fourteen and Jackson twenty miles.
That night Milroy concentrated his whole brigade of 3700 men at M"Dowell, a little village at the foot of the Bull Pasture Mountain, and sent back in haste for reinforcements. Fremont"s command was much strung out. When Milroy had moved from Cheat Mountain through Monterey, twelve miles west of M"Dowell,* (* See ante, pages 185, 269, 275.) the remainder of the army had started up the South Branch Valley to reinforce him. But snowstorms and heavy rains had much delayed the march, and Schenck"s brigade had not advanced beyond Franklin, thirty-four miles north of M"Dowell. Fremont himself, with a couple of battalions, was approaching Petersburg, thirty-five miles from Franklin; and Blenker"s division, still further to the rear, had not yet quitted Romney.
May 8.
"On the following morning," to quote from Jackson"s report, "the march was resumed, General Johnson"s brigade still in front. The head of the column was halted near the top of Bull Pasture Mountain, and General Johnson, accompanied by a party of thirty men and several officers, with a view to a reconnaissance of the enemy"s position, ascended Sitlington"s Hill, an isolated spur on the left of the turnpike and commanding a full view of the village of M"Dowell. From this point the position, and to some extent the strength, of the enemy could be seen. In the valley in which M"Dowell is situated was observed a considerable force of infantry. To the right, on a height, were two regiments, but too distant for an effective fire to that point. Almost a mile in front was a battery supported by infantry.
The enemy, observing a reconnoitring party, sent a small body of skirmishers, which was promptly met by the men with General Johnson and driven back. For the purpose of securing the hill all of General Johnson"s regiments were sent to him."
Jackson had no intention of delivering a direct a.s.sault on the Federal position. The ground was altogether unfavourable for attack.
The hill on which his advanced guard was now established was more than two miles broad from east to west. But it was no plateau. Rugged and precipitous ridges towered high above the level, and numerous ravines, hidden by thick timber, seamed the surface of the spur. To the front a slope of smooth unbroken greensward dropped sharply down; and five hundred feet below, behind a screen of woods, the Bull Pasture River ran swiftly through its narrow valley. On the river banks were the Federals; and beyond the valley the wooded mountains, a very labyrinth of hills, rose high and higher to the west. To the right was a deep gorge, nearly half a mile across from cliff to cliff, dividing Sitlington"s Hill from the heights to northward; and through this dangerous defile ran the turnpike, eventually debouching on a bridge which was raked by the Federal guns. To the left the country presented exactly the same features. Mountain after mountain, ridge after ridge, cleft by shadowy creva.s.ses, and clothed with great tracts of forest, rolled back in tortuous ma.s.ses to the backbone of the Alleghanies; a narrow pa.s.s, leading due westward, marking the route to Monterey and the Ohio River.
Although commanded by Sitlington"s Hill, the Federal position was difficult to reach. The river, swollen by rain, protected it in front. The bridge could only be approached by a single road, with inaccessible heights on either hand. The village of M"Dowell was crowded with troops and guns. A low hill five hundred yards beyond the bridge was occupied by infantry and artillery; long lines of tents were ranged on the level valley, and the hum of many voices, excited by the appearance of the enemy, was borne upwards to the heights. Had the Confederate artillery been brought to the brow of Sitlington"s Hill, the valley would doubtless soon have become untenable, and the enemy have been compelled to retire through the mountains. It was by no means easy, however, to prevent them from getting away unscathed. But Jackson was not the man to leave the task untried, and to content himself with a mere cannonade. He had reason to hope that Milroy was ignorant of his junction with General Johnson, and that he would suppose he had only the six regiments of the latter with which to deal. The day was far spent, and the Valley brigades, toiling through the mountains, were still some miles behind. He proposed, therefore, while his staff explored the mountains for a track which might lead him the next day to the rear of the Federal position, merely to hold his ground on Sitlington"s Hill.
His immediate opponent, however, was a general of more resource and energy than Banks. Milroy was at least able to supply himself with information. On May 7 he had been advised by his scouts and spies that Jackson and Johnson had combined, and that they were advancing to attack him at M"Dowell. At 10 A.M. the next day Schenck"s brigade arrived from Franklin, after a march of thirty-four miles in twenty-three hours, and a little later the enemy"s scouts were observed on the lofty crest of Sitlington"s Hill. The day wore on.
The Federal battery, with muzzles elevated and the trails thrust into trenches, threw occasional sh.e.l.ls upon the heights, and parties of skirmishers were sent across the river to develop the Confederate strength. Johnson, to whom Jackson had confided the defence of the position, kept his troops carefully concealed, merely exposing sufficient numbers to repel the Federal patrols. Late in the afternoon a staff officer reported to Jackson that he had discovered a rough mountain track, which, pa.s.sing through the mountains to the north-west, crossed the Bull Pasture River and came out upon the road between M"Dowell and Franklin. Orders had just been issued to move a strong detachment of artillery and infantry by this track during the night, when the Federal infantry, who had crossed the bridge under shelter of the woods, advanced in a strong line of battle up the slopes. Their scouts had observed what they believed to be preparations for establishing a battery on the heights, and Milroy and Schenck, with a view of gaining time for retreat, had determined on attack. Johnson had six regiments concealed behind the crest, in all about 2800 men. Two regiments of the enemy, under 1000 strong, advanced against his front; and shortly afterwards three regiments, bringing the numbers of the attack up to 2500 rifles, a.s.sailed his left.
The Ohio and West Virginia Regiments, of which the Federal force was composed, fought with the vigour which always characterised the Western troops.* (* Jackson fully recognised the fine fighting qualities of his compatriots. "As Shields" brigade (division)," he wrote on April 5, "is composed princ.i.p.ally of Western troops, who are familiar with the use of arms, we must calculate on hard fighting to oust Banks if attacked only in front, and may meet with obstinate resistance, however the attack may be made.") The lofty heights held by the Confederates were but an illusory advantage. So steep were the slopes in front that the men, for the most part, had to stand on the crest to deliver their fire, and their line stood out in bold relief against the evening sky. "On the other hand," says Dabney, "though the Federal troops had to scale the steep acclivity of the hill, they reaped the usual advantage in such cases, resulting from the high firing of the Confederates." The 12th Georgia, holding the centre of Johnson"s line, displayed more valour than judgment. Having been advanced at first in front of the crest, they could not be persuaded to retire to the reverse of the ridge, where other regiments found partial protection without sacrificing the efficiency of their fire.
Their commander, perceiving their useless exposure, endeavoured again and again to withdraw them; but amidst the roar of the musketry his voice was lifted up in vain, and when by pa.s.sing along the ranks he persuaded one wing of the regiment to recede, they rushed again to the front while he was gone to expostulate with the other. A tall Georgia youth expressed the spirit of his comrades when he replied the next day to the question why they did not retreat to the shelter of the ridge: "We did not come all this way to Virginia to run before Yankees."* (* Dabney volume 2 page 73.) Nor was the courage of the other troops less ardent. The 44th Virginia was placed in reserve, thirty paces in rear of the centre. "After the battle became animated," says the brigadier, "and my attention was otherwise directed, a large number of the 44th quit their position, and, rushing forward, joined the 58th and engaged in the fight, while the balance of the regiment joined some other brigade."* (* Report of Colonel Scott, 44th Virginia Infantry. O.R. volume 12 part 1 page 486.)
The action gradually became so fierce that Jackson sent his Third Brigade to support the advanced guard. These nine regiments now engaged sufficed to hold the enemy in check; the Second Brigade, which moved towards them as darkness fell, was not engaged, and the Stonewall regiments were still in rear. No counterstroke was delivered. Johnson himself was wounded, and had to hand over the command; and after four hours" fighting the Federals fell back in perfect order under cover of the night. Nor was there any endeavour to pursue. The Confederate troops were superior in numbers, but there was much confusion in their ranks; the cavalry could not act on the steep and broken ground, and there were other reasons which rendered a night attack undesirable.
The enemy had been repulsed at every point. The tale of casualties, nevertheless, was by no means small. 498 Confederates, including 54 officers, had fallen. The 12th Georgia paid the penalty for its useless display of valour with the loss of 156 men and 19 officers.
The Federals, on the other hand, favoured by the ground, had no more than 256 killed, wounded, and missing. Only three pieces of artillery took part in the engagement. These were Federal guns; but so great was the angle of elevation that but one man on Sitlington"s Hill was struck by a piece of sh.e.l.l. Jackson, in order to conceal his actual strength, had declined to order up his artillery. The approach to the position, a narrow steep ravine, wooded, and filled with boulders, forbade the use of horses, and the guns must have been dragged up by hand with great exertion. Moreover, the artillery was destined to form part of the turning column, and had a long night march before it.
(MAP. BATTLE OF McDOWELL, VIRGINIA. Thursday, May 8th, 1862. Showing West: Crab Run, North: Hull"s Ridge, South: Stuart"s Run, East: Bull Pasture Mountain.)
"By nine o"clock," says Dabney, "the roar of the struggle had pa.s.sed away, and the green battle-field reposed under the starlight as calmly as when it had been occupied only by its peaceful herds.
Detachments of soldiers were silently exploring the ground for their wounded comrades, while, the tired troops were slowly filing off to their bivouac. At midnight the last sufferer had been removed and the last picket posted; and then only did Jackson turn to seek a few hours" repose in a neighbouring farmhouse. The valley of M"Dowell lay in equal quiet. The camp-fires of the Federals blazed ostentatiously in long and regular lines, and their troops seemed wrapped in sleep.
At one o"clock the general reached his quarters, and threw himself upon a bed. When his mulatto servant, knowing that he had eaten nothing since morning, came in with food, he said, "I want none; nothing but sleep," and in a few minutes he was slumbering like a healthy child."
It seems, however, that the march of the turning column had already been countermanded. Putting himself in his enemy"s place, Jackson had foreseen Milroy"s movements. If the one could move by night, so could the other; and when he rode out at dawn, the Federals, as he antic.i.p.ated, had disappeared. The next day he sent a laconic despatch to Richmond: "G.o.d blessed our arms with victory at M"Dowell yesterday."
This announcement was doubtless received by the people of Virginia, as Dabney declares, with peculiar delight. On May 4 Johnston had evacuated Yorktown. On the 5th he had checked the pursuit at Williamsburg, inflicting heavy losses, but had continued his retreat.
On the 9th Norfolk was abandoned; and on the 11th the "Merrimac,"
grounding in the James, was destroyed by her commander. "The victory of M"Dowell was the one gleam of brightness athwart all these clouds." It must be admitted, however, that the victory was insignificant. The repulse of 2500 men by 4000 was not a remarkable feat; and it would even appear that M"Dowell might be ranked with the battles of lost opportunities. A vigorous counterstroke would probably have destroyed the whole of the attacking force. The riflemen of the West, however, were not made of the stuff that yields readily to superior force. The fight for the bridge would have been fierce and b.l.o.o.d.y. Twilight had fallen before the Confederate reinforcements arrived upon the scene; and under such conditions the losses must have been very heavy. But to lose men was exactly what Jackson wished to avoid. The object of his manoeuvres was the destruction not of Fremont"s advanced guard, but of Banks" army; and if his numbers were seriously reduced it would be impossible to attain that end. Fremont"s brigades, moreover, protected no vital point. A decisive victory at M"Dowell would have produced but little effect at Washington. No great results were to be expected from operations in so distant a section of the strategic theatre; and Jackson aimed at nothing more than driving the enemy so far back as to isolate him from Banks.
May 9.
The next morning the small force of cavalry crossed the bridge and rode cautiously through the mountain pa.s.ses. The infantry halted for some hours in M"Dowell in order that rations might be issued, but the Federals made three-and-twenty miles, and were already too far ahead to be overtaken. On the 10th and the 11th the Confederates made forced marches, but the enemy set fire to the forests on the mountain-side, and this desperate measure proved eminently successful. "The sky was overcast with volumes of smoke, which wrapped every distant object in a veil, impenetrable alike to the eyes and telescopes of the officers. Through this sultry canopy the pursuing army felt its way cautiously, cannonaded by the enemy from every advantageous position, while it was protected from ambuscades only by detachments of skirmishers, who scoured the burning woods on either side of the highway. The general, often far in advance of the column in his eagerness to overtake the foe, declared that this was the most adroit expedient to which a retreating army could resort, and that it entailed upon him all the disadvantages of a night attack. By slow approaches, and with constant skirmishing, the Federals were driven back to Franklin village, and the double darkness of the night and the smoke arrested the pursuit."* (* Dabney volume 2 page 77.)
May 12.
On May 12 Jackson resolved to return to the Valley. Fremont, with Blenker"s division, was at hand. It was impossible to outflank the enemy"s position, and time was precious, "for he knew not how soon a new emergency at Fredericksburg or at Richmond might occasion the recall of Ewell, and deprive him of the power of striking an effective blow at Banks."* (* Ibid page 78. On May 9, in antic.i.p.ation of a movement down the Valley, he had ordered thirty days" forage, besides other supplies, to be acc.u.mulated at Staunton. Harman Ma.n.u.script.) Half the day was granted to the soldiers as a day of rest, to compensate for the Sunday spent in the pursuit, and the following order was issued to the command:--
"I congratulate you on your recent victory at M"Dowell. I request you to unite with me in thanksgiving to Almighty G.o.d for thus having crowned your arms with success; and in praying that He will continue to lead you on from victory to victory, until our independence shall be established; and make us that people whose G.o.d is the Lord. The chaplains will hold divine service at 10 A.M. on this day, in their respective regiments."
Shortly after noon the march to M"Dowell was resumed.
May 15.
On the 15th the army left the mountains and encamped at Lebanon Springs, on the road to Harrisonburg. The 16th was spent in camp, the Confederate President having appointed a day of prayer and fasting.
On the 17th a halt was made at Mount Solon, and here Jackson was met by Ewell, who had ridden over from Elk Run Valley. Banks had fallen back to Strasburg, and he was now completely cut off from Fremont. On the night of the engagement at M"Dowell Captain Hotchkiss had been ordered back to the Valley, and, accompanied by a squadron of Ashby"s cavalry, had blocked the pa.s.ses by which Fremont could cross the mountains and support his colleague. "Bridges and culverts were destroyed, rocks rolled down, and in one instance trees were felled along the road for nearly a mile."* (* Fremont"s Report, O.R. volume 12 part 1 page 11.) Jackson"s object was thus thoroughly achieved.
All combination between the Federal columns, except by long and devious routes, had now been rendered impracticable; and there was little fear that in any operations down the Valley his own communications would be endangered. The M"Dowell expedition had neutralised, for the time being, Fremont"s 20,000 men; and Banks was now isolated, exposed to the combined attack of Jackson, Ewell, and Edward Johnson.
One incident remains to be mentioned. During the march to Mount Solon some companies of the 27th Virginia, who had volunteered for twelve months, and whose time had expired, demanded their discharge. On this being refused, as the Conscription Act was now in force, they threw down their arms, and refused to serve another day. Colonel Grigsby referred to the General for instructions. Jackson"s face, when the circ.u.mstances were explained, set hard as flint. "Why," he said, "does Colonel Grigsby refer to me to learn how to deal with mutineers? He should shoot them where they stand." The rest of the regiment was ordered to parade with loaded muskets; the insubordinate companies were offered the choice of instant death or instant submission. The men knew their commander, and at once surrendered.
"This," says Dabney, "was the last attempt at organised disobedience in the Valley army."
CHAPTER 1.10. WINCHESTER.
1862. May.
That week in May when the Army of the Valley marched back to the Shenandoah was almost the darkest in the Confederate annals. The Northern armies, improving daily in discipline and in efficiency, had attained an ascendency which it seemed impossible to withstand. In every quarter of the theatre of war success inclined to the Stars and Stripes. At the end of April New Orleans, the commercial metropolis of the South, had fallen to the Federal navy. Earlier in the month a great battle had been fought at Shiloh, in Tennessee; one of the most trusted of the Confederate commanders had been killed;* (* General A.S. Johnston.) his troops, after a gallant struggle, had been repulsed with fearful losses; and the upper portion of the Mississippi, from the source to Memphis, had fallen under the control of the invader. The wave of conquest, vast and irresistible, swept up every navigable river of the South; and if in the West only the outskirts of her territory were threatened with destruction, in Virginia the roar of the rising waters was heard at the very gates of Richmond. McClellan, with 112,000 men, had occupied West Point at the head of the York River; and on May 16 his advance reached the White House, on the Pamunkey, twenty miles from the Confederate capital.
McDowell, with 40,000 men, although still north of the Rappahannock, was but five short marches distant.* (* Directly McClellan closed in on Richmond, McDowell was ordered, as soon as Shields should join him, to march from Mana.s.sas to his a.s.sistance. Lincoln and Stanton had recovered confidence when Jackson returned to the Valley from Mechum"s Station.) The Federal gunboats were steaming up the James; and Johnston"s army, encamped outside the city, was menaced by thrice its numbers.
So black was the situation that military stores had already been removed from the capital, the archives of the Confederacy had been packed, and Mr. Davis had made arrangements for the departure of his family. In spite of the protests of the Virginia people the Government had decided to abandon Richmond. The General a.s.sembly addressed a resolution to the President requiring him to defend the city, if necessary, "until not a stone was left upon another." The City Council, enthusiastically supported by the citizens, seconded the appeal. A deputation was sent to Mr. Davis; but while they conferred together, a messenger rode in with the news that the mastheads of the Federal fleet could be seen from the neighbouring hills. Davis dismissed the committee, saying: "This manifestly concludes the matter."
The gunboats, however, had still to feel their way up the winding reaches of the James. Their progress was very slow; there was time to obstruct the pa.s.sage, and batteries were hastily improvised. The people made a mighty effort; and on the commanding heights of Drewry"s Bluff, six miles below the city, might be seen senators and merchants, bankers and clergymen, digging parapets and hauling timber, in company with parties of soldiers and gangs of slaves.
Heavy guns were mounted. A great boom was constructed across the stream. When the ships approached they were easily driven back, and men once more breathed freely in the streets of Richmond. The example of the "Unterrified Commonwealth," as Virginia has been proudly named, inspired the Government, and it was determined, come what might, that Richmond should be held. On the land side it was already fortified. But Lee was unwilling to resign himself to a siege.
McClellan had still to cross the Chickahominy, a stream which oozes by many channels through treacherous swamps and an unwholesome jungle; and despite the overwhelming numbers of the invading armies, it was still possible to strike an effective blow.
Few would have seen the opportunity, or, with a great army thundering at the gates of Richmond, have dared to seize it; but it was not McClellan and McDowell whom Lee was fighting, not the enormous hosts which they commanded, nor the vast resources of the North. The power which gave life and motion to the mighty mechanism of the attack lay not within the camps that could be seen from the housetops of Richmond and from the hills round Fredericksburg. Far away to the north, beyond the Potomac, beneath the shadow of the Capitol at Washington, was the mainspring of the invader"s strength. The mult.i.tudes of armed men that overran Virginia were no more the inanimate pieces of the chess-board. The power which controlled them was the Northern President. It was at Lincoln that Lee was about to strike, at Lincoln and the Northern people, and an effective blow at the point which people and President deemed vital might arrest the progress of their armies as surely as if the Confederates had been reinforced by a hundred thousand men.
May 16.
On May 16 Lee wrote to Jackson: "Whatever movement you make against Banks, do it speedily, and if successful drive him back towards the Potomac, and create the impression, as far as possible, that you design threatening that line." For this purpose, in addition to Ewell and Johnson"s forces, the Army of the Valley was to be reinforced by two brigades, Branch"s and Mahone"s, of which the former had already reached Gordonsville.
In this letter the idea of playing on the fears of Lincoln for the safety of his capital first sees the light, and it is undoubtedly to be attributed to the brain of Lee. That the same idea had been uppermost in Jackson"s mind during the whole course of the campaign is proved not only by the evidence of his chief of the staff, but by his correspondence with headquarters. "If Banks is defeated," he had written on April 5, "it may directly r.e.t.a.r.d McClellan"s movements."
It is true that nowhere in his correspondence is the idea of menacing Washington directly mentioned, nor is there the slightest evidence that he suggested it to Lee. But in his letters to his superiors he confines himself strictly to the immediate subject, and on no single occasion does he indulge in speculation on possible results. In the ability of the Commander-in-Chief he had the most implicit confidence. "Lee," he said, "is the only man I know whom I would follow blindfold," and he was doubtless a.s.sured that the embarra.s.sments of the Federal Government were as apparent to Lee as to himself. That the same idea should have suggested itself independently to both is hardly strange. Both looked further than the enemy"s camps; both studied the situation in its broadest bearings; both understood the importance of introducing a disturbing element into the enemy"s plans; and both were aware that the surest means of winning battles is to upset the mental equilibrium of the opposing leader.
Before he reached Mount Solon Jackson had instructed Ewell to call up Branch"s brigade from Gordonsville. He intended to follow Banks with the whole force at his disposal, and in these dispositions Lee had acquiesced. Johnston, however, now at Richmond, had once more resumed charge of the detached forces, and a good deal of confusion ensued.
Lee, intent on threatening Washington, was of opinion that Banks should be attacked. Johnston, although at first he favoured such a movement, does not appear to have realised the effect that might be produced by an advance to the Potomac. Information had been received that Banks was constructing intrenchments at Strasburg, and Johnston changed his mind. He thought the attack too hazardous, and Ewell was directed to cross the Blue Ridge and march eastward, while Jackson "observed" Banks.
These orders placed Ewell in a dilemma. Under instructions from Lee he was to remain with Jackson. Under instructions from Jackson he was already moving on Luray. Johnston"s orders changed his destination.
Taking horse in haste he rode across the Valley from Swift Run Gap to Jackson"s camp at Mount Solon. Jackson at once telegraphed to Lee: "I am of opinion that an attempt should be made to defeat Banks, but under instructions from General Johnston I do not feel at liberty to make an attack. Please answer by telegraph at once." To Ewell he gave orders that he should suspend his movement until a reply was received. "As you are in the Valley district," he wrote, "you const.i.tute part of my command...You will please move so as to encamp between New Market and Mount Jackson on next Wednesday night, unless you receive orders from a superior officer and of a date subsequent to the 16th instant."
This order was written at Ewell"s own suggestion. It was for this he had ridden through the night to Jackson"s camp.
(MAP. SITUATION, MAY 18, 1862. Showing West: McDowell, North: Martinsburg, South: Richmond, East: West Point.)
May 18.
Lee"s reply was satisfactory. Johnston had already summoned Branch to Richmond, but Ewell was to remain; and the next morning, May 18, the Confederates moved forward down the Valley. The two days" rest which had been granted to Jackson"s troops had fallen at a useful time.
They had marches to look back on which had tried their endurance to the utmost. In three days, before and after Kernstown, they had covered fifty-six miles, and had fought a severe engagement. The struggle with the mud on the Port Republic was only surpa.s.sed by the hardships of the march to Romney. From Elk Run to Franklin, and from Franklin to Mount Solon, is just two hundred miles, and these they had traversed in eighteen days. But the exertions which had been then demanded from them were trifling in comparison with those which were to come. From Mount Solon to Winchester is eighty miles by the Valley pike; to Harper"s Ferry one hundred and ten miles. And Jackson had determined that before many days had pa.s.sed the Confederate colours should be carried in triumph through the streets of Winchester, and that the gleam of his camp-fires should be reflected in the waters of the Potomac.
Johnston believed that Banks, behind the earthworks at Strasburg, was securely sheltered. Jackson saw that his enemy had made a fatal mistake, and that his earthworks, skilfully and strongly constructed as they were, were no more than a snare and a delusion.
Ashby had already moved to New Market; and a strong cordon of pickets extended along Pugh"s Run near Woodstock, within sight of the Federal outposts, and cutting off all communication between Strasburg and the Upper Valley. Ewell"s cavalry regiments, the 2nd and 6th Virginia, held the Luray Valley, with a detachment east of the Blue Ridge.