But there is a power in war more potent than mere numbers. The moral difficulties of a situation may render the proudest display of physical force of no avail. Uncertainty and apprehension engender timidity and hesitation, and if the commander is ill at ease the movements of his troops become slow and halting. And when several armies, converging on a single point, are separated by distance or by the enemy, when communication is tedious, and each general is ignorant of his colleagues" movements, uncertainty and apprehension are inevitable. More than ever is this the case when the enemy has a character for swiftness and audacity, and some unfortunate detachment is still reeling under the effects of a crushing and unexpected blow.
Regarding, then, like Napoleon, the difficulties rather than the numbers of his enemies, Jackson held fast to his purpose, and the capture of Front Royal disturbed him little. "What news?" he asked briefly as the staff officer rode up to the carriage door. "Colonel Connor has been driven back from Front Royal." Jackson smiled grimly, but made no reply. His eyes fixed themselves apparently upon some distant object. Then his preoccupation suddenly disappeared. He read the dispatch which he held in his hand, tore it in pieces, after his accustomed fashion, and, leaning forward, rested his head upon his hands and apparently fell asleep. He soon roused himself, however, and turning to Mr. Boteler, who tells the story, said: "I am going to send you to Richmond for reinforcements. Banks has halted at Williamsport, and is being reinforced from Pennsylvania. Dix (Saxton) is in my front, and is being reinforced by the Baltimore and Ohio Railway. I have just received a dispatch informing me of the advance of the enemy upon Front Royal, which is captured, and Fremont is now advancing towards Wardensville. Thus, you see, I am nearly surrounded by a very large force."
"What is your own, General?" asked his friend.
"I will tell you, but you must not repeat what I say, except at Richmond. To meet this attack I have only 15,000 effective men."
"What will you do if they cut you off, General?"
A moment"s hesitation, and then the cool reply: "I will fall back upon Maryland for reinforcements."
"Jackson," says Cooke, "was in earnest. If his retreat was cut off he intended to advance into Maryland, and doubtless make his way straight to Baltimore and Washington, depending on the Southern sentiment in that portion of the State to bring him reinforcements."
That the Federal Government was apprehensive of some such movement is certain. The wildest rumours were everywhere prevalent. Men throughout the North wore anxious faces, and it is said that one question, "Where is Jackson? Has he taken Washington?" was on every lip. The best proof, however, that a movement on Washington was actually antic.i.p.ated by the Federals is the dispatch of the Secretary of War to the Governors of the different States: "Send forward all the troops that you can, immediately. Banks completely routed.
Intelligence from various quarters leaves no doubt that the enemy, in great force, are advancing on Washington. You will please organise and forward immediately all the volunteer and militia force in your State." Further, on receiving the news of Banks" defeat, the President had called King"s division of McDowell"s army corps to defend the capital; and his telegram of May 25 to McClellan, already alluded to, in which that general was warned that he might have to return to Washington, is significant of what would have happened had the Confederates entered Maryland.* (* O.R. volume 11 part 1 page 81.
King"s division, when it was found that Jackson had halted near Winchester, was ordered to Front Royal. The fourth division, McCall"s, was left to defend Fredericksburg.) McClellan"s vast army, in all human probability, would have been hurriedly re-embarked, and Johnston have been free to follow Jackson.
May 31.
On the night of the 30th the whole Army of the Valley was ordered back to Strasburg; and early next morning the prisoners, escorted by the 21st Virginia, and followed by the convoy of waggons in double column, covering seven miles of road, led the way. Captain Hotchkiss was sent with orders to Winder to hasten back to Winchester, and not to halt till he had made some distance between that place and Strasburg. "I want you to go to Charlestown," were Jackson"s instructions to his staff officer, "and bring up the First Brigade. I will stay in Winchester until you get here, if I can, but if I cannot, and the enemy gets here first, you must conduct it around through the mountains."
The march, however, as the general had expected, was made without molestation, and during the afternoon the main body reached Strasburg, and camped there for the night. The Stonewall Brigade, meanwhile, had pa.s.sed through Winchester, halting near Newtown; the 2nd Virginia Regiment having marched thirty-five miles, and all the remainder twenty-eight. Little had been seen of the enemy. Fremont had pa.s.sed Wardensville, and, marching through heavy rain, had halted after nightfall at Cedar Creek, six miles west of Strasburg. On the road to Front Royal, only a few scouts had been encountered by the Confederate patrols, for Shields, deceived by a demonstration which the Louisiana Brigade had made from Winchester, had let the day pa.s.s by without a decisive movement. The difficulties on which Jackson had counted had weighted the feet of his adversaries with lead.* (* Up to the time that they arrived within striking distance of Jackson they had acted vigorously, Shields marching eighty miles in five days, and Fremont seventy over a mountain road.) Fremont, with two-and-twenty miles to march, had suffered Ashby to delay his progress; and although he had promised Lincoln that he would be in Strasburg at five o"clock that evening, he had halted on the mountains six miles distant. Shields, far ahead of the next division, had done nothing more than push a brigade towards Winchester, and place strong pickets on every road by which the enemy might approach. Neither Federal general could communicate with the other, for the country between them was held by the enemy. Both had been informed of the other"s whereabouts, but both were uncertain as to the other"s movements; and the dread of encountering, unsupported, the terrible weight of Jackson"s onset had sapped their resolution. Both believed the enemy far stronger than he really was. The fugitives from Winchester had spread exaggerated reports of the Confederate numbers, and the prisoners captured at Front Royal had by no means minimised them.* (*
According to the Official Records, 156 men were taken by General Shields. It is said that when Colonel Connor, in command of the 12th Georgia Regiment, reported to Jackson at Winchester, and gave rather a sensational account of his defeat, the General looked up, and asked in his abrupt manner: "Colonel, how many men had you killed?" "None, I am glad to say, General." "How many wounded?" "Few or none, sir."
"Do you call that fighting, sir?" said Jackson, and immediately placed him under arrest, from which he was not released for several months.) Banks, impressed by the long array of bayonets that had crowned the ridge at Winchester, rated them at 20,000 infantry, with cavalry and artillery in addition. Geary, who had retired in hot haste from Rectortown, burning his tents and stores, had learned, he reported, from numerous sources that 10,000 cavalry were pa.s.sing through Mana.s.sas Gap. There were constant rumours that strong reinforcements were coming up from Richmond, and even McDowell believed that the army of invasion consisted of 25,000 to 30,000 men.
Fremont"s scouts, as he approached Strasburg, represented the Confederate force at 30,000 to 60,000. Shields, before he crossed the Blue Ridge and found himself in the vicinity of his old opponent, had condemned the panic that had seized his brother generals, and had told McDowell that he would clear the Valley with his own division.
But when he reached Front Royal the force that he had scornfully described as insignificant had swelled to 20,000 men. Troops from Richmond, he telegraphed, were marching down the Luray Valley; and he urged that he should be at once supported by two divisions. It cannot be said that Lincoln and Stanton were to blame for the indecision of the generals. They had urged Fremont forward to Strasburg, and Shields to Front Royal. They had informed them, by the telegraph, of each other"s situation, and had pa.s.sed on such intelligence of the enemy"s movements as had been acquired at Harper"s Ferry; and yet, although the information was sufficiently exact, both Shields and Fremont, just as Jackson antic.i.p.ated, held back at the decisive moment. The waters had been held back, and the Confederates had pa.s.sed through them dry-shod. Such is the effect of uncertainty in war; a mighty power in the hands of a general who understands its scope.
June 1.
On the morning of June 1, Jackson"s only remaining anxiety was to bring Winder back, and to expedite the retreat of the convoy. Ewell was therefore ordered to support Ashby, and to hold Fremont in check until the Stonewall Brigade had pa.s.sed through Strasburg. The task was easily accomplished. At seven in the morning the Confederate pickets were driven in. As they fell back on their supports, the batteries on both sides came rapidly into action, and the Federal infantry pressed forward. But musketry replied to musketry, and finding the road blocked by a line of riflemen, Fremont ordered his troops to occupy a defensive position on Cedar Creek. "I was entirely ignorant," he says, "of what had taken place in the Valley beyond, and it was now evident that Jackson, in superior force, was at or near Strasburg." His men, also, appear to have caught the spirit of irresolution, for a forward movement on the part of the Confederates drove in Blenker"s Germans with the greatest ease. "Sheep," says General Taylor, "would have made as much resistance as we met. Men decamped without firing, or threw down their arms and surrendered.
Our whole skirmish line was, advancing briskly. I sought Ewell and reported. We had a fine game before us, and the temptation to play it was great; but Jackson"s orders were imperative and wise. He had his stores to save, Shields to guard against, Lee"s grand strategy to promote. He could not waste time chasing Fremont."* (* Destruction and Reconstruction page 78.)
Winder reached Strasburg about noon. The troops that had been facing Fremont were then withdrawn; and the whole force, now reunited, fell back on Woodstock; Ashby, with the cavalry, holding his old position on Tom"s Brook. The retreat was made in full view of the Federal scouts. On the Confederates retiring from before him, Fremont had pushed forward a reconnaissance, and Bayard"s cavalry brigade, of McDowell"s army, came up in the evening on the other flank. But attack was useless. The Confederate trains were disappearing in the distance, and heavy ma.s.ses of all arms were moving slowly south. The Federal hors.e.m.e.n were unsupported save by a single battery. McDowell, who had reached Front Royal with part of his Second Division in the morning, had endeavoured to push Shields forward upon Strasburg. But Shields, fearing attack, had dispersed his troops to guard the various roads; and when at last they were a.s.sembled, misled by erroneous information, he had directed them on Winchester. Before the mistake was discovered the day had pa.s.sed away. It was not until the next morning that the Federal columns came into communication, and then Jackson was already south of Woodstock.
On Friday morning, May 29, says Allan, "Jackson was in front of Harper"s Ferry, fifty miles from Strasburg. Fremont was at Fabius, twenty miles from Strasburg; and Shields was not more than twenty miles from Strasburg, for his advance entered Front Royal, which is but twelve miles distant, before mid-day, while McDowell was following with two divisions. Yet by Sunday night Jackson had marched between fifty and sixty miles, though enc.u.mbered with prisoners and captured stores, had reached Strasburg before either of his adversaries, and had pa.s.sed safely between their armies, while he held Fremont at bay by a show of force, and blinded and bewildered Shields by the rapidity of his movements."
From the morning of May 19 to the night of June 1, a period of fourteen days, the Army of the Valley had marched one hundred and seventy miles, had routed a force of 12,500 men, had threatened the North with invasion, had drawn off McDowell from Fredericksburg, had seized the hospitals and supply depots at Front Royal, Winchester,*
(* Quartermaster"s stores, to the value of 25,000 pounds, were captured at Winchester alone, and 9,354 small arms, besides two guns, were carried back to Staunton.) and Martinsburg, and finally, although surrounded on three sides by 60,000 men, had brought off a huge convoy without losing a single waggon.
This remarkable achievement, moreover, had been comparatively bloodless. The loss of 618 officers and men was a small price to pay for such results.* (* 68 killed; 386 wounded; 3 missing; 156 captured.)
That Jackson"s lucky star was in the ascendant there can be little doubt. But fortune had far less to do with his success than skill and insight; and in two instances--the misconduct of his cavalry, and the surprise of the 12th Georgia--the blind G.o.ddess played him false. Not that he trusted to her favours. "Every movement throughout the whole period," says one of his staff officers, "was the result of profound calculation. He knew what his men could do, and to whom he could entrust the execution of important orders."* (* Letter from Major Hotchkiss.) Nor was his danger of capture, on his retreat from Harper"s Ferry, so great as it appeared.
May 31 was the crisis of his operations. On that morning, when the prisoners and the convoy marched out of Winchester, Shields was at Front Royal. But Shields was unsupported; Ord"s division was fifteen miles in rear, and Bayard"s cavalry still further east. Even had he moved boldly on Strasburg he could hardly have seized the town. The ground was in Jackson"s favour. The only road available for the Federals was that which runs south of the North Fork and the bridges had been destroyed. At that point, three miles east of Strasburg, a small flank-guard might have blocked the way until the main body of the Confederates had got up. And had Fremont, instead of halting that evening at Cedar Creek, swept Ashby aside and pushed forward to join his colleague, the Valley army might easily have effected its retreat. Winder alone would have been cut off, and Jackson had provided for that emergency.
When the embarra.s.sments under which the Federals laboured are laid bare, the pa.s.sage of the Confederates between the converging armies loses something of its extraordinary character. Nevertheless, the defeat of the Front Royal garrison and the loss of the bridges was enough to have shaken the strongest nerves. Had Jackson then burnt his convoy, and released his prisoners, few would have blamed him; and the tenacity with which he held to his original purpose, the skill with which he imposed on both Shields and Fremont, are no less admirable than his perception of his opponents" difficulties. Well has it been said: "What gross ignorance of human nature do those declaimers display who a.s.sert that the employing of brute force is the highest qualification of a general!"
NOTE
POSITION OF THE TROOPS, MAY 29 TO JUNE 1
Night of May 29
FEDERALS
McDowell (Shields, 10,200, Rectorstown.
(Ord, 9000, Thoroughfare Gap.
(Bayard, 2000. Catlett"s Station.
Fremont, 15,000, Fabius.
Saxton, 7000, Harper"s Ferry.
Banks, 7000, Williamsport.
Geary, 2000, Middleburg.
CONFEDERATES
Jackson"s Division, 7200, Halltown.
Ewell"s Division, 5000, Halltown Ashby. 300, Wardensville road.
Taylor"s Brigade, 8000, Berryville.
12th Georgia Regiment, 450, Front Royal.
2nd Virginia Regiment, 350, Loudoun Heights.
Night of May 30
FEDERALS
McDowell (Shields, 10,200, Front Royal.
(Ord, 9000, Piedmont.
(Bayard, 2000, Thoroughfare Gap.
(King, 10,000, near Catlett"s Station.
Saxton, 7000, Harper"s Ferry.
Banks, 8,600, Williamsport.
Fremont, 15,000, Wardensville.
Geary, 2000, Upperville.
CONFEDERATES
Army of Valley, 13,850, Winchester.
Stonewall Brigade, 1600, Halltown.
2nd Virginia Regiment, 380, Loudoun Heights.
Ashby, 300, Wardensville Road.
Night of May 31
CONFEDERATES
McDowell (Shields, Front Royal.
(Ord, Mana.s.sas Gap.
(King, Catlett"s Station.