On the left, between Chancellorsville and the river, where a young Federal colonel, named Miles,* (* Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Army, 1898.) handled his troops with conspicuous skill, Lee"s continuous attacks had been successfully repulsed, and at dawn on the morning of May 3 the situation of the Union army was far from unpromising. A gap of nearly two miles intervened between the Confederate wings, and within this gap, on the commanding heights of Hazel Grove and Fairview, the Federals were strongly intrenched. An opportunity for dealing a crushing counterblow--for holding one portion of Lee"s army in check while the other was overwhelmed--appeared to present itself.
The only question was whether the morale of the general and the men could be depended upon.
In Stuart, however, Hooker had to deal with a soldier who was no unworthy successor of Stonewall Jackson. Reluctantly abandoning the idea of a night attack, the cavalry general, fully alive to the exigencies of the situation, had determined to reduce the interval between himself and Lee; and during the night the artillery was brought up to the front, and the batteries deployed wherever they could find room. Just before the darkness began to lift, orders were received from Lee that the a.s.sault was to be made as early as possible; and the right wing, swinging round in order to come abreast of the centre,
became hotly engaged. Away to the south-east, across the hills held by the Federals, came the responding thunder of Lee"s guns; and 40,000 infantry, advancing through the woods against front and flank, enveloped in a circle of fire a stronghold which was held by over 60,000 muskets.
It is unnecessary to describe minutely the events of the morning. The Federal troops, such as were brought into action, fought well; but Jackson"s tremendous attack had already defeated Hooker. Before Sickles made his night attack from Hazel Grove he had sent orders for Sedgwick to move at once, occupy Fredericksburg, seize the heights, and march westward by the plank road; and, at the same time, he had instructed his engineers to select and fortify a position about a mile in rear of Chancellorsville. So, when Stuart pressed forward, not only had this new position been occupied by the First and Fifth Army Corps, but the troops. .h.i.therto in possession of Hazel Grove were already evacuating their intrenchments.
These dispositions sufficiently attest the demoralisation of the Federal commander. As the historian of the Army of the Potomac puts it: "The movement to be executed by Sedgwick was precisely one of those movements which, according as they are wrought out, may be either the height of wisdom or the height of folly. Its successful accomplishment certainly promised very brilliant results. It is easy to see how seriously Lee"s safety would be compromised if, while engaged with Hooker in front, he should suddenly find a powerful force a.s.sailing his rear, and grasping already his direct line of communication with Richmond. But if, on the other hand, Lee should be able by any slackness on the part of his opponent to engage him in front with a part of his force, while he should turn swiftly round to a.s.sail the isolated moving column, it is obvious that he would be able to repulse or destroy that column, and then by a vigorous return, meet or attack his antagonist"s main body. In the successful execution of this plan not only was Sedgwick bound to the most energetic action, but Hooker also was engaged by every consideration of honour and duty to so act as to make the dangerous task he had a.s.signed to Sedgwick possible."* (1 Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac, pages 241 to 242.)
But so far from aiding his subordinate by a heavy counter-attack on Lee"s front, Hooker deliberately abandoned the Hazel Grove salient, which, keeping asunder the Confederate wings, strongly facilitated such a manoeuvre; and more than this, he divided his own army into two portions, of which the rear, occupying the new position, was actually forbidden to reinforce the front.
It is possible that Hooker contemplated an early retreat of his whole force to the second position. If so, Lee and Stuart were too quick for him. The cavalry commander, as soon as it became light, and the hills and undulations of the Wilderness emerged from the shadows, immediately recognised the importance of Hazel Grove. The hill was quickly seized; thirty pieces of artillery, established on the crest, enfiladed the Federal batteries, facing west, on the heights of Fairview; and the brigade on Stuart"s extreme right was soon in touch with the troops directed by General Lee. Then against the three sides of the Federal position the battle raged. From the south and south-east came Anderson and McLaws, the batteries unlimbering on every eminence, and the infantry, hitherto held back, attacking with the vigour which their gallant commanders knew so well how to inspire. And from the west, formed in three lines, Hill"s division to the front, came the Second Army Corps. The men knew by this time that the leader whom they trusted beyond all others had been struck down, that he was lying wounded, helpless, far away in rear. Yet his spirit was still with them. Stuart, galloping along the ranks, recalled him with ringing words to their memories, and as the bugles sounded the onset, it was with a cry of "Remember Jackson!" that his soldiers rushed fiercely upon the Federal breastworks.
The advanced line, within the forest, was taken at the first rush; the second, at the foot of the Fairview heights, protected by a swampy stream, a broad belt of abattis, and with thirty guns on the hill behind, proved far more formidable, and Hill"s division was forced back. But Rodes and Colston were in close support. The fight was speedily renewed; and then came charge and counter-charge; the storm of the parapets; the rally of the defenders; the rush with the bayonet; and, mowing down men like gra.s.s, the fearful sweep of case and canister. Twice the Confederates were repulsed. Twice they reformed, brigade mingled with brigade, regiment with regiment, and charged again in the teeth of the thirty guns.
On both sides ammunition began to fail; the brushwood took fire, the ground became hot beneath the foot, and many wounded perished miserably in the flames. Yet still, with the tangled abattis dividing the opposing lines, the fight went on; both sides struggling fiercely, the Federals with the advantage of position, the Confederates of numbers, for Hooker refused to reinforce his gallant troops. At length the guns which Stuart had established on Hazel Grove, crossing their fire with those of McLaws and Anderson, gained the upper hand over the Union batteries. The storm of sh.e.l.l, sweeping the Fairview plateau, took the breastworks in reverse; the Northern infantry, after five hours of such hot battle as few fields have witnessed, began sullenly to yield, and as Stuart, leading the last charge, leapt his horse over the parapet, the works were evacuated, and the tattered colours of the Confederates waved in triumph on the hill.
"The scene," says a staff-officer, "can never be effaced from the minds of those that witnessed it. The troops were pressing forward with all the ardour and enthusiasm of combat. The white smoke of musketry fringed the front of battle, while the artillery on the hills in rear shook the earth with its thunder and filled the air with the wild shrieking of the sh.e.l.ls that plunged into the ma.s.ses of the retreating foe. To add greater horror and sublimity to the scene, the Chancellorsville House and the woods surrounding it were wrapped in flames. It was then that General Lee rode to the front of his advancing battalions. His presence was the signal for one of those uncontrollable out-bursts of enthusiasm which none can appreciate who have not witnessed them.
"The fierce soldiers, with their faces blackened with the smoke of battle, the wounded, crawling with feeble limbs from the fury of the devouring flames, all seemed possessed of a common impulse. One long, unbroken cheer, in which the feeble cry of those who lay helpless on the earth blended with the strong voices of those who still fought, hailed the presence of the victorious chief.
"His first care was for the wounded of both armies, and he was among the foremost at the burning mansion, where some of them lay. But at that moment, when the transports of his troops were drowning the roar of battle with acclamations, a note was brought to him from General Jackson. It was handed to him as he sat on his horse near the Chancellorsville House, and unable to open it with his gauntleted hands, he pa.s.sed it to me with directions to read it to him. I shall never forget the look of pain and anguish that pa.s.sed over his face as he listened. In a voice broken with emotion he bade me say to General Jackson that the victory was his. I do not know how others may regard this incident, but for myself, as I gave expression to the thoughts of his exalted mind, I forgot the genius that won the day in my reverence for the generosity that refused its glory."
Lee"s reply ran:--
"General,--I have just received your note, informing me that you were wounded. I cannot express my regret at the occurrence. Could I have directed events, I should have chosen for the good of the country to be disabled in your stead.
"I congratulate you upon the victory, which is due to your skill and energy.
"Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
"R. E. LEE, General."
Such was the tribute, not the less valued that it was couched in no exaggerated terms, which was brought to the bedside in the quiet hospital. Jackson was almost alone. As the sound of cannon and musketry, borne across the forest, grew gradually louder, he had ordered all those who had remained with him, except Mr. Smith, to return to the battle-field and attend to their different duties.
His side, injured by his fall from the litter, gave him much pain, but his thoughts were still clear, and his speech coherent. "General Lee," he said, when his aide-de-camp read to him the Commander-in-Chief"s brief words, "is very kind, but he should give the praise to G.o.d."
During the day the pain gradually ceased; the general grew brighter, and from those who visited the hospital he inquired minutely about the battle and the troops engaged. When conspicuous instances of courage were related his face lit up with enthusiasm, and he uttered his usual "Good, good," with unwonted energy when the gallant behaviour of his old command was alluded to. "Some day," he said, "the men of that brigade will be proud to say to their children, "I was one of the Stonewall Brigade." He disclaimed all right of his own to the name Stonewall: "It belongs to the brigade and not to me.""
That night he slept well, and was free from pain.
Meanwhile the Confederate army, resting on the heights of Chancellorsville, preparatory to an attack upon Hooker"s second stronghold, had received untoward news. Sedgwick, at eleven o"clock in the morning, had carried Marye"s Hill, and, driving Early before him, was moving up the plank road. Wilc.o.x" brigade of Anderson"s division, then at Banks" Ford, was ordered to r.e.t.a.r.d the advance of the hostile column. McLaws was detached to Salem Church. The Second Army Corps and the rest of Anderson"s division remained to hold Hooker in check, and for the moment operations at Chancellorsville were suspended.
McLaws, deploying his troops in the forest, two hundred and fifty yards from a wide expanse of cleared ground, pushed his skirmishers forward to the edge, and awaited the attack of a superior force.
Reserving his fire to close quarters, its effect was fearful. But the Federals pushed forward; a school-house occupied as an advanced post was captured, and at this point Sedgwick was within an ace of breaking through. His second line, however, had not yet deployed, and a vigorous counterstroke, delivered by two brigades, drove back the whole of his leading division in great disorder. As night fell the Confederates, careful not to expose themselves to the Union reserves, retired to the forest, and Sedgwick, like Hooker, abandoned all further idea of offensive action.
The next morning Lee himself, with the three remaining brigades of Anderson, arrived upon the scene. Sedgwick, who had lost 5000 men the preceding day, May had fortified a position covering Banks" Ford, and occupied it with over 20,000 muskets. Lee, with the divisions of McLaws, Anderson, and Early, was slightly stronger. The attack was delayed, for the Federals held strong ground, difficult to reconnoitre; but once begun the issue was soon decided. a.s.sailed in front and flanks, with no help coming from Hooker, and only a single bridge at Banks" Ford in rear, the Federals rapidly gave ground.
Darkness, however, intensified by a thick fog, made pursuit difficult, and Sedgwick re-crossed the river with many casualties but in good order. During these operations, that is, from four o"clock on Sunday afternoon until after midnight on Monday, Hooker had not moved a single man to his subordinate"s a.s.sistance.* (* It is but fair, however, to state that Hooker, during the cannonade which preceded the final a.s.sault at Chancellorsville, had been severely bruised by a fall of masonry.) So extraordinary a situation has seldom been seen in war: an army of 60,000 men, strongly fortified, was held in check for six-and-thirty hours by 20,000; while not seven miles away raged a battle on which the whole fate of the campaign depended.
Lee and Jackson had made no false estimate of Hooker"s incapacity.
Sedgwick"s army corps had suffered so severely in men and in moral that it was not available for immediate service, even had it been transferred to Chancellorsville; and Lee was now free to concentrate his whole force against the main body of the Federal army. His men, notwithstanding their extraordinary exertions, were confident of victory.
May 5.
"As I sheltered myself," says an eye-witness, "in a little farmhouse on the plank road the brigades of Anderson"s division came splashing through the mud, in wild tumultuous spirits, singing, shouting, jesting, heedless of soaking rags, drenched to the skin, and burning again to mingle in the mad revelry of battle."* (* Hon. Francis Lawley, the Times, June 16, 1863.) But it was impossible to push forward, for a violent rain-storm burst upon the Wilderness, and the spongy soil, saturated with the deluge, absolutely precluded all movement across country. Hooker, who had already made preparations for retreat, took advantage of the weather, and as soon as darkness set in put his army in motion for the bridges.
May 6.
By eight o"clock on the morning of the 6th the whole force had crossed; and when the Confederate patrols pushed forward, Lee found that his victim had escaped.
The Army of the Potomac returned to its old camp on the hills above Fredericksburg, and Lee reoccupied his position on the opposite ridge. Stoneman, who had scoured the whole country to within a few miles of Richmond, returned to Kelly"s Ford on May 8. The raid had effected nothing. The damage done to the railroads and ca.n.a.ls was repaired by the time the raiders had regained the Rappahannock. Lee"s operations at Chancellorsville had not been affected in the very slightest degree by their presence in his rear, while Stoneman"s absence had proved the ruin of the Federal army. Jackson, who had been removed by the Commander-in-Chief"s order to Mr. Chandler"s house, near Gurney"s Station, on the morning of May 5, was asked what he thought of Hooker"s plan of campaign. His reply was: "It was in the main a good conception, an excellent plan. But he should not have sent away his cavalry; that was his great blunder. It was that which enabled me to turn him without his being aware of it, and to take him in the rear. Had he kept his cavalry with him, his plan would have been a very good one." This was not his only comment on the great battle. Among other things, he said that he intended to cut the Federals off from the United States Ford, and, taking a position between them and the river, oblige them to attack him, adding, with a smile, "My men sometimes fail to drive the enemy from a position, but they always fail to drive us away." He spoke of General Rodes, and alluded in high terms to his splendid behaviour in the attack on Howard. He hoped he would be promoted, and he said that promotion should be made at once, upon the field, so as to act as an incentive to gallantry in others. He spoke of Colonel Willis, who had commanded the skirmishers, and praised him very highly, and referred most feelingly to the death of Paxton, the commander of the Stonewall Brigade, and of Captain Boswell, his chief engineer. In speaking of his own share in the victory he said: "Our movement was a great success; I think the most successful military movement of my life.
But I expect to receive far more credit for it than I deserve. Most men will think I planned it all from the first; but it was not so. I simply took advantage of circ.u.mstances as they were presented to me in the providence of G.o.d. I feel that His hand led me--let us give Him the glory."
It must always be an interesting matter of speculation what the result would have been had Jackson accomplished his design, on the night he fell, of moving a large part of his command up the White House road, and barring the only line of retreat left open to the Federals.
Hooker, it is argued, had two corps in position which had been hardly engaged, the Second and the Fifth; and another, the First, under Reynolds, was coming up. Of these, 25,000 men might possibly, could they have been manoeuvred in the forest, have been sent to drive Jackson back. And, undoubtedly, to those who think more of numbers than of human nature, of the momentum of the ma.s.s rather than the mental equilibrium of the general, the fact that a superior force of comparatively fresh troops was at Hooker"s disposal will be sufficient to put the success of the Confederates out of court. Yet the question will always suggest itself, would not the report that a victorious enemy, of unknown strength, was pressing forward, in the darkness of the night, towards the only line of retreat, have so demoralised the Federal commander and the Federal soldiers, already shaken by the overthrow of the Eleventh Army Corps, that they would have thought only of securing their own safety? Would Hooker, whose tactics the next day, after he had had the night given him in which to recover his senses, were so inadequate, have done better if he had received no respite? Would the soldiers of the three army corps not yet engaged, who had been witnesses of the rout of Howard"s divisions, have fared better, when they heard the triumphant yells of the advancing Confederates, than the hapless Germans? "The wounding of Jackson," says a most careful historian of the battle, himself a partic.i.p.ator in the Union disaster, "was a most fortunate circ.u.mstance for the Army of the Potomac. At nine o"clock the capture or destruction of a large part of the army seemed inevitable. There was, at the time, great uncertainty and a feeling akin to panic prevailing among the Union forces round Chancellorsville; and when we consider the position of the troops at this moment, and how many important battles have been won by trivial flank attacks--how Richepanse (attacking through the forest) with a single brigade ruined the Austrians at Hohenlinden--we must admit that the Northern army was in great peril when Jackson arrived within one thousand yards of its vital point (the White House) with 20,000 men and 50 cannon."* (*
Chancellorsville, Lt.-Colonel A.C. Hamlin.) He must be a great leader indeed who, when his flank is suddenly rolled up and his line of retreat threatened, preserves sufficient coolness to devise a general counterstroke. Jackson had proved himself equal to such a situation at Cedar Run, but it is seldom in these circ.u.mstances that Providence sides with the "big battalions."
The Federal losses in the six days" battles were heavy: over 12,000 at Chancellorsville, and 4700 at Fredericksburg, Salem Church, and Banks" Ford; a total of 17,287. The army lost 13 guns, and nearly 6000 officers and men were reported either captured or missing.
The casualties were distributed as follows:--
First Army Corps. 185 Second ,, 1,925 Third, ,, 4,119 Fifth ,, 700 Sixth ,, 4,590 Eleventh ,, 2,412 Twelfth ,, 2,822 Pleasonton"s Cavalry Brigade 141 ------ 16,844
The Confederate losses were hardly less severe. The killed and wounded were as under:--
SECOND ARMY CORPS.
A.P. Hill"s Division 2,583 Rodes" ,, 2,178 Colston"s ,, 1,868 Early"s ,, 851 Anderson"s ,, 1,180 McLaws" ,, 1,879 Artillery 227 Cavalry 11 Prisoners (estimated) 2,000 ------ 12,277
But a mere statement of the casualties by no means represents the comparative loss of the opposing forces. Victory does not consist in merely killing and maiming a few thousand men. This is the visible result; it is the invisible that tells. The Army of the Potomac, when it retreated across the Rappahannock, was far stronger in mere numbers than the Army of Northern Virginia; but in reality it was far weaker, for the moral of the survivors, and of the general who led them, was terribly affected. That of the Confederates, on the other hand, had been sensibly elevated, and it is moral, not numbers, which is the strength of armies. What, after all, was the loss of 12,200 soldiers to the Confederacy? In that first week of May there were probably 20,000 conscripts in different camps of instruction, more than enough to recruit the depleted regiments to full strength. Nor did the slaughter of Chancellorsville diminish to any appreciable degree the vast hosts of the Union.
And yet the Army of the Potomac had lost more than all the efforts of the Government could replace. The Army of Virginia, on the other hand, had acquired a superiority of spirit which was ample compensation for the sacrifice which had been made. It is hardly too much to say that Lee"s force had gained from the victory an increase of strength equivalent to a whole army corps of 80,000 men, while that of his opponent had been proportionately diminished. Why, then, was there no pursuit?
It has been a.s.serted that Lee was so crippled by his losses at Chancellorsville that he was unable to resume operations against Hooker for a whole month. This explanation of his inactivity can hardly be accepted.
On June 16 and 18, 1815, at Quatre-Bras and Waterloo, the Anglo-Dutch army, little larger than that of Northern Virginia, lost 17,000 men; and yet on the 19th Wellington was marching in pursuit of the French; nor did he halt until he arrived within sight of Paris. And on August 28, 29, and 30, 1862, at Groveton and the Second Mana.s.sas, Stonewall Jackson lost 4000 officers and men, one-fifth of his force, but he was not left in rear when Lee invaded Maryland. Moreover, after he had defeated Sedgwick, on the same night that Hooker was recrossing the Rappahannock, Lee was planning a final attack on the Federal intrenchments, and his disappointment was bitter when he learned that his enemy had escaped. If his men were capable of further efforts on the night of May 5, they were capable of them the next day; and it was neither the ravages of battle nor the disorganisation of the army that held the Confederates fast, but the deficiency of supplies, the damage done to the railways by Stoneman"s hors.e.m.e.n, the weakness of the cavalry, and, princ.i.p.ally, the hesitation of the Government.
After the victory of Chancellorsville, strong hopes of peace were entertained in the South. Before Hooker advanced, a large section of the Northern Democrats, despairing of ultimate success, had once more raised the cry that immediate separation was better, than a hopeless contest, involving such awful sacrifices, and it needed all Lincoln"s strength to stem the tide of disaffection.
The existence of this despondent feeling was well known to the Southern statesmen; and to such an extent did they count upon its growth and increase that they had overlooked altogether the importance of improving a victory, should the army be successful; so now, when the chance had come, they were neither ready to forward such an enterprise, nor could they make up their minds to depart from their pa.s.sive att.i.tude. But to postpone all idea of counterstroke until some indefinite period is as fatal in strategy as in tactics.
By no means an uncommon policy, it has been responsible for the loss of a thousand opportunities.
Had not politics intervened, a vigorous pursuit--not necessarily involving an immediate attack, but drawing Hooker, as Pope had been drawn in the preceding August, into an unfavourable situation, before his army had had time to recover--would have probably been initiated.
It may be questioned, however, whether General Lee, even when Longstreet and his divisions joined him, would have been so strong as he had been at the end of April. None felt more deeply than the Commander-in-Chief that the absence of Jackson was an irreparable misfortune. "Give him my affectionate regards," he said to an aide-de-camp who was riding to the hospital; "tell him to make haste and get well, and come back to me as soon as he can. He has lost his left arm, but I have lost my right." "Any victory," he wrote privately, "would be dear at such a price. I know not how to replace him."
His words were prophetic. Exactly two months after Chancellorsville the armies met once more in the clash of battle. During the first two days, on the rolling plain round Gettysburg, a village of Pennsylvania, four Federal army corps were beaten in succession, but ere the sun set on the third Lee had to admit defeat.