Buller"s turning movement had now driven the Boers into the mountainous country between Colenso and Ladysmith, west of the bend in the Tugela. Here, when his campaign opened in December, had been the strength of their position. Its general character has been already mentioned, as well as some particular features-Grobler"s Kloof, two miles above Colenso, the kopjes behind Fort Wylie commanding the bridge, etc. Between Grobler"s and the northerly stretch of the river ran the railroad to Ladysmith, threading a maze of hills which a stay of three months had made intimately familiar to the Boers, both men and officers. The accidents of the ground, and their mutual influence from the military point of view, had been carefully studied and artificially improved, by men whose natural apt.i.tudes for defensive warfare and choice of positions is of the highest. In nothing do they seem to have shown more skill than in the preparation of traps, whereby success, won with just sufficient difficulty to seem plausibly brilliant, turns at the very moment of apparent victory into hopeless disaster, entailing either destruction or retreat.
Into this tangle of obstacles the British forces were now about to enter. Colenso, found to be evacuated on February 19, was occupied on the 20th. A reconnaissance pushed across the bridge showed that the kopjes about Fort Wylie, now rendered untenable by the loss of Hlangwane, were but weakly held and their guns gone. On the morning of February 21, the second day after the occupation of Hlangwane, a pontoon bridge was thrown at a point between that hill and Colenso. By midday of the 22nd nearly five brigades of infantry had crossed, and immediately afterwards the advance began. That day and the two following were marked by extremely severe fighting, attended with alternate success and repulse, but the end was failure after very heavy losses. The series of incidents is instructive as a military lesson on warfare in an intricate mountain region; but to follow it would require care and attention, with elaborate maps, and even so would possess sustained interest only for the professional reader.
On the afternoon of February 20, Buller had telegraphed the fall of Hlangwane, adding, "the enemy seem to be in full retreat, and are apparently only holding a position which they occupy across the Colenso-Ladysmith railway, where it is close to the angle of the Tugela, with a weak rear-guard." The mention of the railroad shows that this impression of retreat concerned the enemy west of the bend and north of the river, but it proved to be entirely mistaken. On the 24th of February, it is true, the Boers packed their wagons and moved them north of Ladysmith.[39] The fact testifies to the vigour of the a.s.sault and their consequent anxiety; but in the evening of that same day it had become apparent to the British that the resistance was still so strong that they could not get through by the direction taken, which, speaking generally, was that of the railroad. Sunday the 25th was pa.s.sed in inaction, removing the wounded and the dead, and on Monday the whole force was withdrawn across the Tugela at Colenso, to try another movement from further down stream, to the north and east of Hlangwane, and again directed against the enemy"s left.
This retreat, though not certainly known, was vaguely suspected in Ladysmith, where the silence of Sunday sounded ominous. The spirits of the now famishing garrison sank accordingly. One among them writes: "The ending has been strange. On Monday, February 26, the garrison was sunk in a slough of despondency. On the previous Thursday General Buller had signalled from below in such confident language that the force had been placed upon full rations. Then, day by day, we had watched for some sign of the promised relief. Daily the guns had boomed, and occasionally we had caught a glimpse of the burst of an "accidental," but nothing more. Heavy weather had settled upon us and had blinded the little winking reflector on Monte Cristo Hill. On Sunday the relieving force must have been engaged in a night attack, for the sound of volley firing was distinctly audible in Ladysmith. Then came a day of silence. The helio was veiled in cloud, and there were no sounds of war. The spirits of the garrison fell. Grave rumours circulated. Men even said that for the third time the relief column had recrossed the Tugela. Monday brought a wave of hope, for at midday there was a gleam of sunshine, and we learned the news that Cronje had been surrounded in the Free State. Still there was no news from Buller"s column. It was evident that the staff were also becoming anxious, for although the following day brought the news that Cronje had surrendered, yet the evening saw the garrison again reduced to quarter rations. This was only a precautionary measure, for Buller had helioed "everything progressing favourably." But the man in the street was sceptical. If favourable, why reduce the ration? Thus it was that Tuesday, Majuba Day-although on that date the tide of fortune had turned in our favour-marked the lowest pitch of despondency into which the garrison was ever plunged during the 118 days of its investment."[40]
The end of their sufferings, however, was really at hand. Buller"s telegram of February 28 announcing the success of the next operation, states also its character. "Finding that the pa.s.sage of Langewachte Spruit (the scene of the fighting on the 23rd and 24th) was commanded by strong entrenchments, I reconnoitred for another pa.s.sage of the Tugela. One was found for me below the cataract by Colonel Sandbach, Royal Engineers.... On the 26th, finding that I could make a practicable approach, I crossed the guns and baggage back to the south side of the Tugela, took up the pontoon bridge on the night of the 26th, and relaid it at the new site.... On the 27th General Barton, with two battalions 6th Brigade and the Royal Dublin Fusiliers, crept about one and a half miles down the banks of the river, and, ascending an almost precipitous cliff of about 500 feet, a.s.saulted and carried the top of Pieter"s Hill. This hill to a certain extent turned the enemy"s left, and the 4th Brigade, under Colonel Norcott, and the 11th Brigade, under Colonel Kitchener, the whole under General Warren, a.s.sailed the enemy"s main position, which was magnificently carried by the South Lancashire Regiment about sunset."
This handsome operation, which finally loosed the bonds in which Ladysmith was held, should perhaps be described in more detail than a telegram commonly admits. At the lower end of the northerly stretch of the Tugela, below Colenso, where the river again turns east, the railroad, which has kept close to the west bank, also inclines east for a mile and a half, constrained still to cling to the stream by hills to the northward. The more conspicuous of these had been named Terrace Hill and Railway Hill, and there it was that the British attacks of the 24th had been baffled. After pa.s.sing them the road leaves the river, runs north, and in another mile reaches Pieter"s Station. A mile to the eastward of this is Pieter"s Hill, which the river nears by a northerly bend in its course. The Boer position north of this section of the river stretched from Railway Hill, three-quarters of a mile west of the road, to Pieter"s Hill. The British occupied the heights on the opposite side, between one and two miles distant, and 200 feet above the bed of the Tugela. Along these crests they mounted heavy guns, a sustained fire from which, as is usual, preceded the attack.
On February 27-Majuba Day-as the troops detailed for the a.s.sault were about to step on to the bridge, there was communicated to them the news of Cronje"s surrender at an earlier hour of the same day, flashed by the wires around from the Modder by way of the sea. Under this inspiring intelligence they went into action. The crossing was made near the angle of the river, where it turns the second time and resumes its easterly direction. Barton"s brigade, which was to carry Pieter"s Hill-the enemy"s left-crossed first, and inclining to the right kept along the river a mile and a half to its appointed place, followed successively by Kitchener"s and Norcott"s brigades, which thus, when the line was formed, const.i.tuted respectively the centre and left of the British front of a.s.sault.
The attack on Pieter"s was first made, beginning about 1 P.M. By the capture of this the Boer left was turned, after which by a.s.saults progressing successively from the British right to the left, in continuous mutual support, all the works on Railway and Terrace Hills were carried by sunset, the enemy being, in many cases, driven out at the point of the bayonet. The British entrenched themselves that night in their new gains, but next morning, February 28, the Boers were found to have retreated from all the positions from which they had not been expelled. There was no defensive line remaining south of Ladysmith in which they could make a further stand, and the relief of the place followed as a matter of course. An advance party under Lord Dundonald entered the town that evening, and Buller himself followed the next day, March 1.
In these final operations for the relief of Ladysmith, the British loss in the Official Table of Casualties is given under two heads: 1, Monte Cristo, February 15-18, being those on the Boer left, south of the Tugela, ending in the capture of Hlangwane Hill; 2, Relief of Ladysmith, February 19-27. In the first there were: Killed 14, Wounded 188, Missing 4; Total 206. In the second: Killed 263, Wounded 1621, Missing 12; Total 1896. These losses are most suggestive of thought as to the character of the operations in which they were respectively incurred. The second total exceeds considerably that reported for any other action, or series of actions, during the war. Spion Kop, with 1733, is the nearest approach.
The advance of Lord Roberts to Bloemfontein after Cronje"s surrender met with little resistance. The first position taken by the Boers to contest his progress appears to have been four or five miles east of Koodoosrand Drift. In his telegram their line is described as extending four miles north and eleven miles south of the Modder, a length which evidently required a pretty large force to man it. Its extremities, however, received no protection from natural obstacles of ground, and on the 7th of March French"s Cavalry Division, pa.s.sing south, turned their left flank. The Boers then retreated without serious fighting, the British having only fifty casualties. Three days later, at Driefontein, between forty and fifty miles from Bloemfontein, a stand was made which required a severe struggle to overcome. "The enemy opposed us throughout yesterday"s march," Roberts telegraphed; "and from their intimate knowledge of the country gave us considerable trouble.... The brunt of the fighting fell upon Kelly-Kenny"s division, two battalions of which, the Welsh and the Ess.e.x, turned the Boers out of two strong positions at the point of the bayonet." The British here lost 63 killed, 361 wounded. The defenders, contrary to their habit, failed to carry away their dead, of whom the victors buried 127. In the Boer papers their loss was reported to be seven killed and eighteen wounded-a suggestive discrepancy. No further opposition of consequence was encountered, and on March 13 Roberts entered Bloemfontein.
The occupation of Bloemfontein and the relief of Ladysmith closed for a time the British operations, and were followed by a period of suspended advance. This was imposed in part by the fatigue of the soldiery, a cause, however, which would not have lasted more than a few days-except in the case of the hunger-weakened defenders of Ladysmith. A prolonged stop was required for several reasons. The conduct of the war had now reverted to the original plan of an invasion in force through the Free State by the great ma.s.s of the British army. To this, all other movements were subsidiary, including those of even such a great corps as that of Buller, upon a line so important as the Natal railroad. But the central ma.s.s under the Commander-in-Chief had momentarily exhausted itself, not in organic vitality but in function power of movement, owing to the excessive strain upon the transport service and the expenditure of animal life in the forced marches and severe privations in the past month under conditions always most trying to unacclimated horses. The British a.s.sistant Secretary of War said in Parliament that Lord Roberts arrived at Bloemfontein with his horses wholly starved and his men half-starved. The "wreck of an army," wrote a correspondent present, "lies scattered in and about Bloemfontein." Paralysing as such a condition is under any circ.u.mstances it was trebly so in a force which by a sudden rush, a leap rather than a march, had projected itself a hundred miles from any solid base of operations, and had not yet its communications secured. How much more was this true when a great further advance of 250 miles was intended. In short, before moving forward, it was necessary to insure that the connection behind was established, and the provision for transport ahead adequately developed. This involved not only an immense acc.u.mulation of animals, to allow for a waste always extreme, but also large reinforcements of troops; for every step forward in an enemy"s country requires a detachment left behind to secure it.
"At each remove the lengthening chain" demands its group of guards, and these wisely disposed for quick mutual a.s.sistance; for with any enemy, and especially with one so mobile, it is impossible to be everywhere in sufficient force, superior to an unexpected attack. Communications are ever on the defensive, the most embarra.s.sing of military att.i.tudes. To the scattered units of such a system, all that can be provided is power to hold out until succoured. Moreover, there must be not merely a steady stream of supply from some far distant source, but the establishment of intermediate reservoirs-secondary depots-well stored with the manifold requirements of an army in campaign; advanced bases, capable by themselves of supporting for an appreciable time the existence and activity of forces dependent upon them alone. The importance of these to the army make them ever an object of attack to the enemy. Provision against accident or interruption, casual or hostile, has therefore to be elaborate in framework and solid in joint. "Lord Roberts had 45,000 men when he arrived at Bloemfontein, and he increased that number to 75,000 by April 30." Six thousand horses, besides mules, were at the same time sent up. To supply men and animals with daily food, and to acc.u.mulate on the spot twenty-five days" provisions and supplies of military stores for the further advance to the Vaal, there had to be brought daily to Bloemfontein, besides the reinforcements of men, 1020 tons by a single-track railroad on which many bridges had been destroyed.[41] And Bloemfontein was 750 miles from Cape Town, and 250 from De Aar, the nearest secondary base so far established.
The good effect of Roberts"s advance upon the general fortune of the war, and the correct military principle of the original plan, by him resumed, were clearly and quickly evident. Men from the Boer forces before Ladysmith were a.s.sembling already around Paardeberg before Cronje surrendered, seeking to relieve him, and Roberts on his march to Bloemfontein fought not only them but others from Colesberg and Stormberg, and generally from the regions over which French and Gatacre had vainly striven to advance. How far this helped Buller in his actual fighting before Ladysmith cannot certainly be said. The comparative ease with which Hlangwane Hill was carried was probably due chiefly to the correct direction given to the attack, while the heavy loss of the following days, February 22-24, may also be a.s.signed to a frontal a.s.sault undertaken under a mistaken impression as to the enemy"s force. The Boers did not then fight like men who were merely a rear guard covering a retreat. Nevertheless, there are indications that their numbers had been materially weakened, and the consciousness that Roberts"s success would necessitate the abandonment of the siege may have affected the fighting, especially after Cronje"s surrender became known.
The effect at Colesberg and in the Stormberg region is less doubtful. The imminence of Roberts"s advance, when his purpose became apparent, drew away so many of the enemy to oppose him that the task of Clements and Gatacre became relatively easy and rapid. On March 15, two days after the occupation of Bloemfontein, Clements, whose temporary retirement has been noted, reached and held Norval"s Pont, where the line from Naauwport to Bloemfontein crossed the Orange; while Gatacre, so long at a standstill, the same day occupied Bethulie, where the road from East London bridges the river. These two points are only about thirty miles apart, the converging roads meeting thirty miles beyond, at Springfontein. This junction was occupied next day, March 16, by a brigade sent back by Roberts. By the holding of these points, railroad communication was restored, in a military sense, from Bloemfontein to Cape Town and to East London. To a.s.sure it in practice as well, there was needed only certain repairs, and adequate guards disposed round these central positions.
Coincidently with the forward movement of Clements and Gatacre, a similar advance upon the latter"s right flank, and, in a sense, covering it, was made by a colonial division of 2,000 men under a colonial officer, General Brabant. This took its direction to the eastward of the easternmost railway system, midway between it and the Basutoland boundary, traversing the mountainous region in which lay the districts of Cape Colony, Herschel, Aliwal North, etc., that early in the war had been annexed by proclamation of the President of the Free State. After crossing the Orange, this division continued to skirt the Basuto line by Rouxville and Wepener, thus entering the region south and east of Bloemfontein, which shortly became the scene of the enemy"s movements threatening Roberts"s communications with Cape Colony-movements characterised by a certain daring in conception and execution, but to which the customary caution of the Boers gave a direction too eccentric to const.i.tute a home-thrust.
From February 11, when Roberts left the Modder, to March 13, when Bloemfontein was occupied, his operations and forward movement had been practically continuous. The subsequent halt, imperative as it was for the reasons stated, gave the Boers breathing time in which to recover themselves. Advance in force by the British main body was not resumed until May 2, but detachments were moved about in various directions on the near front, and on flank and rear, to occupy necessary outposts, to secure the communications, and to insure quiet among the inhabitants. During this prolonged period of recuperation and preparation the enemy resumed activity, scouring the country with their mounted men, seeking to cut off exposed parties, and by menacing the communications, to embarra.s.s and r.e.t.a.r.d the British commander in his new arrangements. In the first of these measures the Boers attained some successes; but in the second, either their numbers were too few for their object, or their habitual caution prevented resort to action in such force and at such risk as is absolutely necessary either seriously to "interrupt" communications-in the military sense of the phrase-or to produce any deterrent impression upon a commander of the experience and sound judgment of the one with whom they were dealing. Not only did they not materially threaten the communications, but it was perfectly evident that, whatever their reasons, they dared not attempt to do so.
As regards the cutting off of British detachments, of which the affairs of Reddersburg and of Koorn Spruit, near Thaba Nchu, were the most conspicuous ill.u.s.trations, the only thing essential to be remarked is that such reverses on a small scale are always to be expected in war, in even the most successful campaigns. This does not mean that no blame attaches to them. Very probably in most such cases there has been carelessness or miscalculation, for which somebody merits either punishment or censure. But the Commander-in-Chief and the nation concerned have to reckon upon such mishaps; and, without affecting indifference, or neglecting to exact responsibility, they are to be regarded merely as the bruises and the barked limbs that men get in any rough sport. These they are, and usually they are nothing more. The player does not bleed to death in consequence; he simply goes on with the game. Military men, of course, understand this, but nations are too apt to be fretful as though some strange thing had happened to them.
It is not by such affairs that contests are decided-on the playground or in strategy. Lord Roberts proceeded with his preparations undisturbed by the mosquito buzzings about his ears or on his trail. At last, when ready, a second long leap was made. The British army, leaving Bloemfontein on the 2nd of May, was on the 12th at Kroonstad, over 100 miles distant. On the 24th the Vaal was crossed, and on the 31st Roberts entered Johannesburg. Five days later, on the 5th of June, the British flag was hoisted in Pretoria, the capital of the Transvaal, 250 miles from Bloemfontein. The sustained momentum of this advance, achieved in very little over a month, testifies at once to the solidity of the preparations of the British leader, and to the fruitlessness of such disseminated operations, by small bodies, as were conducted by the Boers during the British halt at Bloemfontein, and are now being carried on by Botha and De Wet. Subsidiary to the greater plan of a campaign by ma.s.sed forces, they have their advantage; as a main dependence, they merely protract the agony of endurance and suffering.
Sir Redvers Buller had to await in Natal the movement of the central ma.s.s of the British force in the Orange Free State. Towards the middle of May his advance began, directed against the positions which the Boers had taken upon the Biggarsberg mountains, and on the 15th he reoccupied Dundee and Glencoe. Into the detail of these movements it is not proposed to enter. The retirement of the Boer forces before Roberts, in the Free State, uncovered the flank and endangered the communications of their brethren on the other side of the mountains. There was therefore for these nothing to do but to fall back, abandoning with a show of opposition positions whence otherwise they might have inflicted considerable loss upon the superior force a.s.saulting them.
At the present moment, July 26, the British have communication from Johannesburg and Pretoria to the sea-coast by two routes-to Cape Town and to Durban. The actions of the Boers show that it is not in their power seriously to incommode either the one or the other. The trivial raids performed by their mounted men under De Wet and Botha may protract the sufferings of the war, and add to the close of the struggle a certain l.u.s.tre of persistent resistance; but, barring events now unforeseen and scarcely to be antic.i.p.ated, they cannot change the issue, which has become simply a question of endurance between combatants immeasurably unequal in resources.
INDEX
Admiralty, the British, utmost credit due to its efforts in transporting troops and material, 86.
American colonies, the, action of, in the old wars contrasted with colonial action of to-day, 77.
Army Reserve, 25,000 men called out, 32.
Army Service Corps, the, 103.
Australasia and the war, 75.
Australia supplies wheat to the Transvaal, 16.
Barbed-Wire obstacles at battle of Elandslaagte, 54; defences at Magersfontein, 163.
Barter"s, Colonel, brave deed at Modder River, 158.
Barton, Major-General, advances to Chieveley, 217.
Beira, port of, 11.
Belmont, battle of, 148-150.
Bethlehem, 15.
Biggarsberg Range, 39, 48.
Black week of the war for the British, 168.
Bloemfontein, 11; occupied by the British, 305.
Boers, original plan of campaign of the, 9, 26; helped by nature of the country, 21; their decided superiority in numbers at the beginning of hostilities, 25, 36; ultimatum, the, 31; guns, position of, betrayed by their flashes, 52; procrastination, 58, 123, 129; forces, estimation of the, 116; trenches and tactics, 133, 144, 163; losses in battle, difficulty of arriving at the truth respecting, 202.
Bonaparte, 111.
Brabant, General, 311.
British Army, first order to mobilize issued, 32; gallantry and skill of the, at the opening of the campaign, 27; officers" "stupidity," Captain Mahan"s striking question on it, 201.
British Columbia and the war, 77.
British Cabinet decides to send 2,000 men to Natal, 29.
British Navy and transport service, splendid tribute to, 86 et seq.
Buffalo River, 37, 40.
Buller, General Sir Redvers, arrives at Cape Town to take chief command, 68; a.s.sumes the command in Natal, 195.
Buluwayo, 11.
Campaign, the, compared with that of 1881, 117; its enormous difficulties unforeseen by the British Government and people, 73; the question as to its future conduct at the time of General Buller"s arrival, 132.
Canada and the war, 75.
Canadian Regiment, gallant conduct of the, at Paardeberg, 289.
Cape, the, 4; seized by the British 1795, again in 1806, 5.
Cape Police, the, and the defence of Kimberley, 137.
Cape Route, the, may not be equal to carrying the traffic of the Suez Ca.n.a.l in war time, 100.
Cattle and sheep the chief wealth of the Boer farmers, 8.
Chamberlain, Mr. Joseph, 28; and the Colonies, 83.
Clark, Rear-Admiral Bouverie, great credit due to, as Director of Transports, 86.
Clements, General, takes Colesberg, 176.
Clery, Lieut.-Gen. Sir Francis, 195.
Codrington, Colonel, at Modder River battle, 156.
Colenso, effect of reverses at, 81; battle of, 220-232; occupied by Buller"s army, February 19, 296.
Colesberg taken by General Clements, 176.
Colonial Government of Natal calls for Imperial aid, 29.
Colonies, the, and the transports, 71; splendid response of the, 74 et seq.
"Communications dominate war," 73.
Congestion at docks, wharves, and railroads in South Africa and its cause, 99.
Country, its nature favours defence, 20.
Cronje, General, and President Kruger, anecdote of, 122; recalled from Kimberley to oppose Methuen"s advance, 147; leaves his entrenchments at Magersfontein, and commences his retreat towards Bloemfontein, 275; surrounded and captured at Paardeberg, 275-291
De Aar Junction, strategic importance of, 11, 33, 104.
"Defence exhausts quicker than offence," 44.
Delagoa Bay, a thorn in the side of the British, 3.
Denniss, Lieut., gallant conduct and death of-"not in vain," 245.
Devonshire Regiment, the, "save Ladysmith," 247.
Diaz, Bartholomew, 3.
Driefontein, battle of, 304.
Dundee, 22; battle of Talana Hill, near, 43.
Dundonald, Lord, enters Ladysmith, 303.
Durban, 9.