_I answer that,_ In the natural order, perfection comes before imperfection, as act precedes potentiality; for whatever is in potentiality is made actual only by something actual. And since G.o.d created things not only for their own existence, but also that they might be the principles of other things; so creatures were produced in their perfect state to be the principles as regards others. Now man can be the principle of another man, not only by generation of the body, but also by instruction and government. Hence, as the first man was produced in his perfect state, as regards his body, for the work of generation, so also was his soul established in a perfect state to instruct and govern others.
Now no one can instruct others unless he has knowledge, and so the first man was established by G.o.d in such a manner as to have knowledge of all those things for which man has a natural apt.i.tude. And such are whatever are virtually contained in the first self-evident principles, that is, whatever truths man is naturally able to know. Moreover, in order to direct his own life and that of others, man needs to know not only those things which can be naturally known, but also things surpa.s.sing natural knowledge; because the life of man is directed to a supernatural end: just as it is necessary for us to know the truths of faith in order to direct our own lives. Wherefore the first man was endowed with such a knowledge of these supernatural truths as was necessary for the direction of human life in that state. But those things which cannot be known by merely human effort, and which are not necessary for the direction of human life, were not known by the first man; such as the thoughts of men, future contingent events, and some individual facts, as for instance the number of pebbles in a stream; and the like.
Reply Obj. 1: The first man had knowledge of all things by divinely infused species. Yet his knowledge was not different from ours; as the eyes which Christ gave to the man born blind were not different from those given by nature.
Reply Obj. 2: To Adam, as being the first man, was due a degree of perfection which was not due to other men, as is clear from what is above explained.
Reply Obj. 3: Adam would have advanced in natural knowledge, not in the number of things known, but in the manner of knowing; because what he knew speculatively he would subsequently have known by experience. But as regards supernatural knowledge, he would also have advanced as regards the number of things known, by further revelation; as the angels advance by further enlightenment. Moreover there is no comparison between advance in knowledge and advance in merit; since one man cannot be a principle of merit to another, although he can be to another a principle of knowledge.
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FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 94, Art. 4]
Whether Man in His First State Could Be Deceived?
Objection 1: It would seem that man in his primitive state could have been deceived. For the Apostle says (1 Tim. 2:14) that "the woman being seduced was in the transgression."
Obj. 2: Further, the Master says (Sent. ii, D, xxi) that, "the woman was not frightened at the serpent speaking, because she thought that he had received the faculty of speech from G.o.d." But this was untrue.
Therefore before sin the woman was deceived.
Obj. 3: Further, it is natural that the farther off anything is from us, the smaller it seems to be. Now, the nature of the eyes is not changed by sin. Therefore this would have been the case in the state of innocence. Wherefore man would have been deceived in the size of what he saw, just as he is deceived now.
Obj. 4: Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 2) that, in sleep the soul adheres to the images of things as if they were the things themselves. But in the state of innocence man would have eaten and consequently have slept and dreamed. Therefore he would have been deceived, adhering to images as to realities.
Obj. 5: Further, the first man would have been ignorant of other men"s thoughts, and of future contingent events, as stated above (A. 3). So if anyone had told him what was false about these things, he would have been deceived.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18): "To regard what is true as false, is not natural to man as created; but is a punishment of man condemned."
_I answer that,_ in the opinion of some, deception may mean two things; namely, any slight surmise, in which one adheres to what is false, as though it were true, but without the a.s.sent of belief--or it may mean a firm belief. Thus before sin Adam could not be deceived in either of these ways as regards those things to which his knowledge extended; but as regards things to which his knowledge did not extend, he might have been deceived, if we take deception in the wide sense of the term for any surmise without a.s.sent of belief. This opinion was held with the idea that it is not derogatory to man to entertain a false opinion in such matters, and that provided he does not a.s.sent rashly, he is not to be blamed.
Such an opinion, however, is not fitting as regards the integrity of the primitive state of life; because, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 10), in that state of life "sin was avoided without struggle, and while it remained so, no evil could exist." Now it is clear that as truth is the good of the intellect, so falsehood is its evil, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 2). So that, as long as the state of innocence continued, it was impossible for the human intellect to a.s.sent to falsehood as if it were truth. For as some perfections, such as clarity, were lacking in the bodily members of the first man, though no evil could be therein; so there could be in his intellect the absence of some knowledge, but no false opinion.
This is clear also from the very rect.i.tude of the primitive state, by virtue of which, while the soul remained subject to G.o.d, the lower faculties in man were subject to the higher, and were no impediment to their action. And from what has preceded (Q. 85, A. 6), it is clear that as regards its proper object the intellect is ever true; and hence it is never deceived of itself; but whatever deception occurs must be ascribed to some lower faculty, such as the imagination or the like. Hence we see that when the natural power of judgment is free we are not deceived by such images, but only when it is not free, as is the case in sleep. Therefore it is clear that the rect.i.tude of the primitive state was incompatible with deception of the intellect.
Reply Obj. 1: Though the woman was deceived before she sinned in deed, still it was not till she had already sinned by interior pride.
For Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 30) that "the woman could not have believed the words of the serpent, had she not already acquiesced in the love of her own power, and in a presumption of self-conceit."
Reply Obj. 2: The woman thought that the serpent had received this faculty, not as acting in accordance with nature, but by virtue of some supernatural operation. We need not, however, follow the Master of the Sentences in this point.
Reply Obj. 3: Were anything presented to the imagination or sense of the first man, not in accordance with the nature of things, he would not have been deceived, for his reason would have enabled him to judge the truth.
Reply Obj. 4: A man is not accountable for what occurs during sleep; as he has not then the use of his reason, wherein consists man"s proper action.
Reply Obj. 5: If anyone had said something untrue as regards future contingencies, or as regards secret thoughts, man in the primitive state would not have believed it was so: but he might have believed that such a thing was possible; which would not have been to entertain a false opinion.
It might also be said that he would have been divinely guided from above, so as not to be deceived in a matter to which his knowledge did not extend.
If any object, as some do, that he was not guided, when tempted, though he was then most in need of guidance, we reply that man had already sinned in his heart, and that he failed to have recourse to the Divine aid.
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QUESTION 95
OF THINGS PERTAINING TO THE FIRST MAN"S WILL--NAMELY, GRACE AND RIGHTEOUSNESS (In Four Articles)
We next consider what belongs to the will of the first man; concerning which there are two points of treatment:
(1) the grace and righteousness of the first man;
(2) the use of righteousness as regards his dominion over other things.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the first man was created in grace?
(2) Whether in the state of innocence he had pa.s.sions of the soul?
(3) Whether he had all virtues?
(4) Whether what he did would have been as meritorious as now?
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FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 95, Art. 1]
Whether the First Man Was Created in Grace?
Objection 1: It would seem that the first man was not created in grace. For the Apostle, distinguishing between Adam and Christ, says (1 Cor. 15:45): "The first Adam was made into a living soul; the last Adam into a quickening spirit." But the spirit is quickened by grace.
Therefore Christ alone was made in grace.
Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (QQ. Vet. et Nov. Test., qu. 123) [*Work of an anonymous author, among the supposit.i.tious works of St.
Augustine] that "Adam did not possess the Holy Ghost." But whoever possesses grace has the Holy Ghost. Therefore Adam was not created in grace.
Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Correp. et Grat. x) that "G.o.d so ordered the life of the angels and men, as to show first what they could do by free-will, then what they could do by His grace, and by the discernment of righteousness." G.o.d thus first created men and angels in the state of natural free-will only; and afterwards bestowed grace on them.
Obj. 4: Further, the Master says (Sent. ii, D, xxiv): "When man was created he was given sufficient help to stand, but not sufficient to advance." But whoever has grace can advance by merit. Therefore the first man was not created in grace.
Obj. 5: Further, the reception of grace requires the consent of the recipient, since thereby a kind of spiritual marriage takes place between G.o.d and the soul. But consent presupposes existence.
Therefore man did not receive grace in the first moment of his creation.
Obj. 6: Further, nature is more distant from grace than grace is from glory, which is but grace consummated. But in man grace precedes glory. Therefore much more did nature precede grace.
_On the contrary,_ Man and angel are both ordained to grace. But the angels were created in grace, for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii, 9): "G.o.d at the same time fashioned their nature and endowed them with grace." Therefore man also was created in grace.
_I answer that,_ Some say that man was not created in grace; but that it was bestowed on him subsequently before sin: and many authorities of the Saints declare that man possessed grace in the state of innocence.
But the very rect.i.tude of the primitive state, wherewith man was endowed by G.o.d, seems to require that, as others say, he was created in grace, according to Eccles. 7:30, "G.o.d made man right." For this rect.i.tude consisted in his reason being subject to G.o.d, the lower powers to reason, and the body to the soul: and the first subjection was the cause of both the second and the third; since while reason was subject to G.o.d, the lower powers remained subject to reason, as Augustine says [*Cf. De Civ. Dei xiii, 13; De Pecc. Merit. et Remiss.
i, 16]. Now it is clear that such a subjection of the body to the soul and of the lower powers to reason, was not from nature; otherwise it would have remained after sin; since even in the demons the natural gifts remained after sin, as Dionysius declared (Div. Nom. iv). Hence it is clear that also the primitive subjection by virtue of which reason was subject to G.o.d, was not a merely natural gift, but a supernatural endowment of grace; for it is not possible that the effect should be of greater efficiency than the cause. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii, 13) that, "as soon as they disobeyed the Divine command, and forfeited Divine grace, they were ashamed of their nakedness, for they felt the impulse of disobedience in the flesh, as though it were a punishment corresponding to their own disobedience."
Hence if the loss of grace dissolved the obedience of the flesh to the soul, we may gather that the inferior powers were subjected to the soul through grace existing therein.
Reply Obj. 1: The Apostle in these words means to show that there is a spiritual body, if there is an animal body, inasmuch as the spiritual life of the body began in Christ, who is "the firstborn of the dead," as the body"s animal life began in Adam. From the Apostle"s words, therefore, we cannot gather that Adam had no spiritual life in his soul; but that he had not spiritual life as regards the body.