Obj. 2: Further, Anselm says (Cur Deus h.o.m.o i, 18): "If our first parents had lived so as not to yield to temptation, they would have been confirmed in grace, so that with their offspring they would have been unable to sin any more." Therefore the children would have been born confirmed in righteousness.
Obj. 3: Further, good is stronger than evil. But by the sin of the first man there resulted, in those born of him, the necessity of sin.
Therefore, if the first man had persevered in righteousness, his descendants would have derived from him the necessity of preserving righteousness.
Obj. 4: Further, the angels who remained faithful to G.o.d, while the others sinned, were at once confirmed in grace, so as to be unable henceforth to sin. In like manner, therefore, man would have been confirmed in grace if he had persevered. But he would have begotten children like himself. Therefore they also would have been born confirmed in righteousness.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 10): "Happy would have been the whole human race if neither they--that is our first parents--had committed any evil to be transmitted to their descendants, nor any of their race had committed any sin for which they would have been condemned." From which words we gather that even if our first parents had not sinned, any of their descendants might have done evil; and therefore they would not have been born confirmed in righteousness.
_I answer that,_ It does not seem possible that in the state of innocence children would have been born confirmed in righteousness.
For it is clear that at their birth they would not have had greater perfection than their parents at the time of begetting. Now the parents, as long as they begot children, would not have been confirmed in righteousness. For the rational creature is confirmed in righteousness through the beat.i.tude given by the clear vision of G.o.d; and when once it has seen G.o.d, it cannot but cleave to Him Who is the essence of goodness, wherefrom no one can turn away, since nothing is desired or loved but under the aspect of good. I say this according to the general law; for it may be otherwise in the case of special privilege, such as we believe was granted to the Virgin Mother of G.o.d.
And as soon as Adam had attained to that happy state of seeing G.o.d in His Essence, he would have become spiritual in soul and body; and his animal life would have ceased, wherein alone there is generation.
Hence it is clear that children would not have been born confirmed in righteousness.
Reply Obj. 1: If Adam had not sinned, he would not have begotten "children of h.e.l.l" in the sense that they would contract from him sin which is the cause of h.e.l.l: yet by sinning of their own free-will they could have become "children of h.e.l.l." If, however, they did not become "children of h.e.l.l" by falling into sin, this would not have been owing to their being confirmed in righteousness, but to Divine Providence preserving them free from sin.
Reply Obj. 2: Anselm does not say this by way of a.s.sertion, but only as an opinion, which is clear from his mode of expression as follows: "It seems that if they had lived, etc."
Reply Obj. 3: This argument is not conclusive, though Anselm seems to have been influenced by it, as appears from his words above quoted.
For the necessity of sin incurred by the descendants would not have been such that they could not return to righteousness, which is the case only with the d.a.m.ned. Wherefore neither would the parents have transmitted to their descendants the necessity of not sinning, which is only in the blessed.
Reply Obj. 4: There is no comparison between man and the angels; for man"s free-will is changeable, both before and after choice; whereas the angel"s is not changeable, as we have said above in treating of the angels (Q. 64, A. 2).
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QUESTION 101
OF THE CONDITION OF THE OFFSPRING AS REGARDS KNOWLEDGE (In Two Articles)
We next consider the condition of the offspring as to knowledge.
Under this head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether in the state of innocence children would have been born with perfect knowledge?
(2) Whether they would have had perfect use of reason at the moment of birth?
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FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 101, Art. 1]
Whether in the State of Innocence Children Would Have Been Born with Perfect Knowledge?
Objection 1: It would seem that in the state of innocence children would have been born with perfect knowledge. For Adam would have begotten children like himself. But Adam was gifted with perfect knowledge (Q. 94, A. 3). Therefore children would have been born of him with perfect knowledge.
Obj. 2: Further, ignorance is a result of sin, as Bede says (Cf.
I-II, Q. 85, A. 3). But ignorance is privation of knowledge.
Therefore before sin children would have had perfect knowledge as soon as they were born.
Obj. 3: Further, children would have been gifted with righteousness from birth. But knowledge is required for righteousness, since it directs our actions. Therefore they would also have been gifted with knowledge.
_On the contrary,_ The human soul is naturally "like a blank tablet on which nothing is written," as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4). But the nature of the soul is the same now as it would have been in the state of innocence. Therefore the souls of children would have been without knowledge at birth.
_I answer that,_ As above stated (Q. 99, A. 1), as regards belief in matters which are above nature, we rely on authority alone; and so, when authority is wanting, we must be guided by the ordinary course of nature. Now it is natural for man to acquire knowledge through the senses, as above explained (Q. 55, A. 2; Q. 84, A. 6); and for this reason is the soul united to the body, that it needs it for its proper operation; and this would not be so if the soul were endowed at birth with knowledge not acquired through the sensitive powers. We must conclude then, that, in the state of innocence, children would not have been born with perfect knowledge; but in course of time they would have acquired knowledge without difficulty by discovery or learning.
Reply Obj. 1: The perfection of knowledge was an individual accident of our first parent, so far as he was established as the father and instructor of the whole human race. Therefore he begot children like himself, not in that respect, but only in those accidents which were natural or conferred gratuitously on the whole nature.
Reply Obj. 2: Ignorance is privation of knowledge due at some particular time; and this would not have been in children from their birth, for they would have possessed the knowledge due to them at that time. Hence, no ignorance would have been in them, but only nescience in regard to certain matters. Such nescience was even in the holy angels, according to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii).
Reply Obj. 3: Children would have had sufficient knowledge to direct them to deeds of righteousness, in which men are guided by universal principles of right; and this knowledge of theirs would have been much more complete than what we have now by nature, as likewise their knowledge of other universal principles.
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SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 101, Art. 2]
Whether Children Would Have Had Perfect Use of Reason at Birth?
Objection 1: It would seem that children would have had perfect use of reason at birth. For that children have not perfect use of reason in our present state, is due to the soul being weighed down by the body; which was not the case in paradise, because, as it is written, "The corruptible body is a load upon the soul" (Wis. 9:15).
Therefore, before sin and the corruption which resulted therefrom, children would have had the perfect use of reason at birth.
Obj. 2: Further, some animals at birth have the use of their natural powers, as the lamb at once flees from the wolf. Much more, therefore, would men in the state of innocence have had perfect use of reason at birth.
_On the contrary,_ In all things produced by generation nature proceeds from the imperfect to the perfect. Therefore children would not have had the perfect use of reason from the very outset.
_I answer that,_ As above stated (Q. 84, A. 7), the use of reason depends in a certain manner on the use of the sensitive powers; wherefore, while the senses are tired and the interior sensitive powers hampered, man has not the perfect use of reason, as we see in those who are asleep or delirious. Now the sensitive powers are situate in corporeal organs; and therefore, so long as the latter are hindered, the action of the former is of necessity hindered also; and likewise, consequently, the use of reason. Now children are hindered in the use of these powers on account of the humidity of the brain; wherefore they have perfect use neither of these powers nor of reason. Therefore, in the state of innocence, children would not have had the perfect use of reason, which they would have enjoyed later on in life. Yet they would have had a more perfect use than they have now, as to matters regarding that particular state, as explained above regarding the use of their limbs (Q. 99, A. 1).
Reply Obj. 1: The corruptible body is a load upon the soul, because it hinders the use of reason even in those matters which belong to man at all ages.
Reply Obj. 2: Even other animals have not at birth such a perfect use of their natural powers as they have later on. This is clear from the fact that birds teach their young to fly; and the like may be observed in other animals. Moreover a special impediment exists in man from the humidity of the brain, as we have said above (Q. 99, A.
1).
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QUESTION 102
OF MAN"S ABODE, WHICH IS PARADISE (In Four Articles)
We next consider man"s abode, which is paradise. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether paradise is a corporeal place?
(2) Whether it is a place apt for human habitation?
(3) For what purpose was man placed in paradise?
(4) Whether he should have been created in paradise?
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FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 102, Art. 1]
Whether Paradise Is a Corporeal Place?
Objection 1: It would seem that paradise is not a corporeal place.
For Bede [*Strabus, Gloss on Gen. 2:8] says that "paradise reaches to the lunar circle." But no earthly place answers that description, both because it is contrary to the nature of the earth to be raised up so high, and because beneath the moon is the region of fire, which would consume the earth. Therefore paradise is not a corporeal place.