_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3): "G.o.d sometimes does things which are contrary to the ordinary course of nature."
_I answer that,_ From each cause there results a certain order to its effects, since every cause is a principle; and so, according to the multiplicity of causes, there results a multiplicity of orders, subjected one to the other, as cause is subjected to cause. Wherefore a higher cause is not subjected to a cause of a lower order; but conversely. An example of this may be seen in human affairs. On the father of a family depends the order of the household; which order is contained in the order of the city; which order again depends on the ruler of the city; while this last order depends on that of the king, by whom the whole kingdom is ordered.
If therefore we consider the order of things depending on the first cause, G.o.d cannot do anything against this order; for, if He did so, He would act against His foreknowledge, or His will, or His goodness.
But if we consider the order of things depending on any secondary cause, thus G.o.d can do something outside such order; for He is not subject to the order of secondary causes; but, on the contrary, this order is subject to Him, as proceeding from Him, not by a natural necessity, but by the choice of His own will; for He could have created another order of things. Wherefore G.o.d can do something outside this order created by Him, when He chooses, for instance by producing the effects of secondary causes without them, or by producing certain effects to which secondary causes do not extend. So Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3): "G.o.d acts against the wonted course of nature, but by no means does He act against the supreme law; because He does not act against Himself."
Reply Obj. 1: In natural things something may happen outside this natural order, in two ways. It may happen by the action of an agent which did not give them their natural inclination; as, for example, when a man moves a heavy body upwards, which does not owe to him its natural inclination to move downwards; and that would be against nature. It may also happen by the action of the agent on whom the natural inclination depends; and this is not against nature, as is clear in the ebb and flow of the tide, which is not against nature; although it is against the natural movement of water in a downward direction; for it is owing to the influence of a heavenly body, on which the natural inclination of lower bodies depends. Therefore since the order of nature is given to things by G.o.d; if He does anything outside this order, it is not against nature. Wherefore Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3): "That is natural to each thing which is caused by Him from Whom is all mode, number, and order in nature."
Reply Obj. 2: The order of justice arises by relation to the First Cause, Who is the rule of all justice; and therefore G.o.d can do nothing against such order.
Reply Obj. 3: G.o.d fixed a certain order in things in such a way that at the same time He reserved to Himself whatever he intended to do otherwise than by a particular cause. So when He acts outside this order, He does not change.
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SEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 105, Art. 7]
Whether Whatever G.o.d Does Outside the Natural Order Is Miraculous?
Objection 1: It would seem that not everything which G.o.d does outside the natural order of things, is miraculous. For the creation of the world, and of souls, and the justification of the unrighteous, are done by G.o.d outside the natural order; as not being accomplished by the action of any natural cause. Yet these things are not called miracles. Therefore not everything that G.o.d does outside the natural order is a miracle.
Obj. 2: Further, a miracle is "something difficult, which seldom occurs, surpa.s.sing the faculty of nature, and going so far beyond our hopes as to compel our astonishment" [*St. Augustine, De utilitate credendi xvi.]. But some things outside the order of nature are not arduous; for they occur in small things, such as the recovery and healing of the sick. Nor are they of rare occurrence, since they happen frequently; as when the sick were placed in the streets, to be healed by the shadow of Peter (Acts 5:15). Nor do they surpa.s.s the faculty of nature; as when people are cured of a fever. Nor are they beyond our hopes, since we all hope for the resurrection of the dead, which nevertheless will be outside the course of nature. Therefore not all things are outside the course of nature are miraculous.
Obj. 3: Further, the word miracle is derived from admiration. Now admiration concerns things manifest to the senses. But sometimes things happen outside the order of nature, which are not manifest to the senses; as when the Apostles were endowed with knowledge without studying or being taught. Therefore not everything that occurs outside the order of nature is miraculous.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3): "Where G.o.d does anything against that order of nature which we know and are accustomed to observe, we call it a miracle."
_I answer that,_ The word miracle is derived from admiration, which arises when an effect is manifest, whereas its cause is hidden; as when a man sees an eclipse without knowing its cause, as the Philosopher says in the beginning of his _Metaphysics._ Now the cause of a manifest effect may be known to one, but unknown to others.
Wherefore a thing is wonderful to one man, and not at all to others: as an eclipse is to a rustic, but not to an astronomer. Now a miracle is so called as being full of wonder; as having a cause absolutely hidden from all: and this cause is G.o.d. Wherefore those things which G.o.d does outside those causes which we know, are called miracles.
Reply Obj. 1: Creation, and the justification of the unrighteous, though done by G.o.d alone, are not, properly speaking, miracles, because they are not of a nature to proceed from any other cause; so they do not occur outside the order of nature, since they do not belong to that order.
Reply Obj. 2: An arduous thing is called a miracle, not on account of the excellence of the thing wherein it is done, but because it surpa.s.ses the faculty of nature: likewise a thing is called unusual, not because it does not often happen, but because it is outside the usual natural course of things. Furthermore, a thing is said to be above the faculty of nature, not only by reason of the substance of the thing done, but also on account of the manner and order in which it is done. Again, a miracle is said to go beyond the hope "of nature," not above the hope "of grace," which hope comes from faith, whereby we believe in the future resurrection.
Reply Obj. 3: The knowledge of the Apostles, although not manifest in itself, yet was made manifest in its effect, from which it was shown to be wonderful.
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EIGHTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 105, Art. 8]
Whether One Miracle Is Greater Than Another?
Objection 1: It would seem that one miracle is not greater than another. For Augustine says (Epist. ad Volusian. cx.x.xvii): "In miraculous deeds, the whole measure of the deed is the power of the doer." But by the same power of G.o.d all miracles are done. Therefore one miracle is not greater than another.
Obj. 2: Further, the power of G.o.d is infinite. But the infinite exceeds the finite beyond all proportion; and therefore no more reason exists to wonder at one effect thereof than at another.
Therefore one miracle is not greater than another.
_On the contrary,_ The Lord says, speaking of miraculous works (John 14:12): "The works that I do, he also shall do, and greater than these shall he do."
_I answer that,_ Nothing is called a miracle by comparison with the Divine Power; because no action is of any account compared with the power of G.o.d, according to Isa. 40:15: "Behold the Gentiles are as a drop from a bucket, and are counted as the smallest grain of a balance." But a thing is called a miracle by comparison with the power of nature which it surpa.s.ses. So the more the power of nature is surpa.s.sed, the greater the miracle. Now the power of nature is surpa.s.sed in three ways: firstly, in the substance of the deed, for instance, if two bodies occupy the same place, or if the sun goes backwards; or if a human body is glorified: such things nature is absolutely unable to do; and these hold the highest rank among miracles. Secondly, a thing surpa.s.ses the power of nature, not in the deed, but in that wherein it is done; as the raising of the dead, and giving sight to the blind, and the like; for nature can give life, but not to the dead; and such hold the second rank in miracles.
Thirdly, a thing surpa.s.ses nature"s power in the measure and order in which it is done; as when a man is cured of a fever suddenly, without treatment or the usual process of nature; or as when the air is suddenly condensed into rain, by Divine power without a natural cause, as occurred at the prayers of Samuel and Elias; and these hold the lowest place in miracles. Moreover, each of these kinds has various degrees, according to the different ways in which the power of nature is surpa.s.sed.
From this is clear how to reply to the objections, arguing as they do from the Divine power.
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QUESTION 106
HOW ONE CREATURE MOVES ANOTHER (In Four Articles)
We next consider how one creature moves another. This consideration will be threefold:
(1) How the angels move, who are purely spiritual creatures;
(2) How bodies move;
(3) How man moves, who is composed of a spiritual and a corporeal nature.
Concerning the first point, there are three things to be considered:
(1) How an angel acts on an angel;
(2) How an angel acts on a corporeal nature;
(3) How an angel acts on man.
The first of these raises the question of the enlightenment and speech of the angels; and of their mutual coordination, both of the good and of the bad angels.
Concerning their enlightenment there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether one angel moves the intellect of another by enlightenment?
(2) Whether one angel moves the will of another?
(3) Whether an inferior angel can enlighten a superior angel?
(4) Whether a superior angel enlightens an inferior angel in all that he knows himself?
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FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 106, Art. 1]
Whether One Angel Enlightens Another?
Objection 1: It would seem that one angel does not enlighten another.
For the angels possess now the same beat.i.tude which we hope to obtain.
But one man will not then enlighten another, according to Jer. 31:34: "They shall teach no more every man his neighbor, and every man his brother." Therefore neither does an angel enlighten another now.
Obj. 2: Further, light in the angels is threefold; of nature, of grace, and of glory. But an angel is enlightened in the light of nature by the Creator; in the light of grace by the Justifier; in the light of glory by the Beatifier; all of which comes from G.o.d.
Therefore one angel does not enlighten another.
Obj. 3: Further, light is a form in the mind. But the rational mind is "informed by G.o.d alone, without created intervention," as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 51). Therefore one angel does not enlighten the mind of another.