Reply Obj. 1: The Apostle speaks, then, not of the glory which is with men, but of the glory which is from G.o.d, with His Angels. Hence it is written (Mk. 8:38): "The Son of Man shall confess him in the glory of His Father, before His angels" [*St. Thomas joins Mk. 8:38 with Luke 12:8 owing to a possible variant in his text, or to the fact that he was quoting from memory].
Reply Obj. 2: A man"s good which, through fame or glory, is in the knowledge of many, if this knowledge be true, must needs be derived from good existing in the man himself: and hence it presupposes perfect or inchoate happiness. But if the knowledge be false, it does not harmonize with the thing: and thus good does not exist in him who is looked upon as famous. Hence it follows that fame can nowise make man happy.
Reply Obj. 3: Fame has no stability; in fact, it is easily ruined by false report. And if sometimes it endures, this is by accident. But happiness endures of itself, and for ever.
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FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 2, Art. 4]
Whether Man"s Happiness Consists in Power?
Objection 1: It would seem that happiness consists in power. For all things desire to become like to G.o.d, as to their last end and first beginning. But men who are in power, seem, on account of the similarity of power, to be most like to G.o.d: hence also in Scripture they are called "G.o.ds" (Ex. 22:28), "Thou shalt not speak ill of the G.o.ds." Therefore happiness consists in power.
Obj. 2: Further, happiness is the perfect good. But the highest perfection for man is to be able to rule others; which belongs to those who are in power. Therefore happiness consists in power.
Obj. 3: Further, since happiness is supremely desirable, it is contrary to that which is before all to be shunned. But, more than aught else, men shun servitude, which is contrary to power. Therefore happiness consists in power.
_On the contrary,_ Happiness is the perfect good. But power is most imperfect. For as Boethius says (De Consol. iii), "the power of man cannot relieve the gnawings of care, nor can it avoid the th.o.r.n.y path of anxiety": and further on: "Think you a man is powerful who is surrounded by attendants, whom he inspires with fear indeed, but whom he fears still more?"
_I answer that,_ It is impossible for happiness to consist in power; and this for two reasons. First because power has the nature of principle, as is stated in _Metaph._ v, 12, whereas happiness has the nature of last end. Secondly, because power has relation to good and evil: whereas happiness is man"s proper and perfect good. Wherefore some happiness might consist in the good use of power, which is by virtue, rather than in power itself.
Now four general reasons may be given to prove that happiness consists in none of the foregoing external goods. First, because, since happiness is man"s supreme good, it is incompatible with any evil. Now all the foregoing can be found both in good and in evil men. Secondly, because, since it is the nature of happiness to "satisfy of itself," as stated in _Ethic._ i, 7, having gained happiness, man cannot lack any needful good. But after acquiring any one of the foregoing, man may still lack many goods that are necessary to him; for instance, wisdom, bodily health, and such like.
Thirdly, because, since happiness is the perfect good, no evil can accrue to anyone therefrom. This cannot be said of the foregoing: for it is written (Eccles. 5:12) that "riches" are sometimes "kept to the hurt of the owner"; and the same may be said of the other three.
Fourthly, because man is ordained to happiness through principles that are in him; since he is ordained thereto naturally. Now the four goods mentioned above are due rather to external causes, and in most cases to fortune; for which reason they are called goods of fortune.
Therefore it is evident that happiness nowise consists in the foregoing.
Reply Obj. 1: G.o.d"s power is His goodness: hence He cannot use His power otherwise than well. But it is not so with men. Consequently it is not enough for man"s happiness, that he become like G.o.d in power, unless he become like Him in goodness also.
Reply Obj. 2: Just as it is a very good thing for a man to make good use of power in ruling many, so is it a very bad thing if he makes a bad use of it. And so it is that power is towards good and evil.
Reply Obj. 3: Servitude is a hindrance to the good use of power: therefore is it that men naturally shun it; not because man"s supreme good consists in power.
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FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 2, Art. 5]
Whether Man"s Happiness Consists in Any Bodily Good?
Objection 1: It would seem that man"s happiness consists in bodily goods. For it is written (Ecclus. 30:16): "There is no riches above the riches of the health of the body." But happiness consists in that which is best. Therefore it consists in the health of the body.
Obj. 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v), that "to be" is better than "to live," and "to live" is better than all that follows. But for man"s being and living, the health of the body is necessary.
Since, therefore, happiness is man"s supreme good, it seems that health of the body belongs more than anything else to happiness.
Obj. 3: Further, the more universal a thing is, the higher the principle from which it depends; because the higher a cause is, the greater the scope of its power. Now just as the causality of the efficient cause consists in its flowing into something, so the causality of the end consists in its drawing the appet.i.te. Therefore, just as the First Cause is that which flows into all things, so the last end is that which attracts the desire of all. But being itself is that which is most desired by all. Therefore man"s happiness consists most of all in things pertaining to his being, such as the health of the body.
_On the contrary,_ Man surpa.s.ses all other animals in regard to happiness. But in bodily goods he is surpa.s.sed by many animals; for instance, by the elephant in longevity, by the lion in strength, by the stag in fleetness. Therefore man"s happiness does not consist in goods of the body.
_I answer that,_ It is impossible for man"s happiness to consist in the goods of the body; and this for two reasons. First, because, if a thing be ordained to another as to its end, its last end cannot consist in the preservation of its being. Hence a captain does not intend as a last end, the preservation of the ship entrusted to him, since a ship is ordained to something else as its end, viz. to navigation. Now just as the ship is entrusted to the captain that he may steer its course, so man is given over to his will and reason; according to Ecclus. 15:14: "G.o.d made man from the beginning and left him in the hand of his own counsel." Now it is evident that man is ordained to something as his end: since man is not the supreme good.
Therefore the last end of man"s reason and will cannot be the preservation of man"s being.
Secondly, because, granted that the end of man"s will and reason be the preservation of man"s being, it could not be said that the end of man is some good of the body. For man"s being consists in soul and body; and though the being of the body depends on the soul, yet the being of the human soul depends not on the body, as shown above (I, Q. 75, A. 2); and the very body is for the soul, as matter for its form, and the instruments for the man that puts them into motion, that by their means he may do his work. Wherefore all goods of the body are ordained to the goods of the soul, as to their end.
Consequently happiness, which is man"s last end, cannot consist in goods of the body.
Reply Obj. 1: Just as the body is ordained to the soul, as its end, so are external goods ordained to the body itself. And therefore it is with reason that the good of the body is preferred to external goods, which are signified by "riches," just as the good of the soul is preferred to all bodily goods.
Reply Obj. 2: Being taken simply, as including all perfection of being, surpa.s.ses life and all that follows it; for thus being itself includes all these. And in this sense Dionysius speaks. But if we consider being itself as partic.i.p.ated in this or that thing, which does not possess the whole perfection of being, but has imperfect being, such as the being of any creature; then it is evident that being itself together with an additional perfection is more excellent. Hence in the same pa.s.sage Dionysius says that things that live are better than things that exist, and intelligent better than living things.
Reply Obj. 3: Since the end corresponds to the beginning; this argument proves that the last end is the first beginning of being, in Whom every perfection of being is: Whose likeness, according to their proportion, some desire as to being only, some as to living being, some as to being which is living, intelligent and happy. And this belongs to few.
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SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 2, Art. 5]
Whether Man"s Happiness Consists in Pleasure?
Objection 1: It would seem that man"s happiness consists in pleasure.
For since happiness is the last end, it is not desired for something else, but other things for it. But this answers to pleasure more than to anything else: "for it is absurd to ask anyone what is his motive in wishing to be pleased" (Ethic. x, 2). Therefore happiness consists princ.i.p.ally in pleasure and delight.
Obj. 2: Further, "the first cause goes more deeply into the effect than the second cause" (De Causis i). Now the causality of the end consists in its attracting the appet.i.te. Therefore, seemingly that which moves most the appet.i.te, answers to the notion of the last end.
Now this is pleasure: and a sign of this is that delight so far absorbs man"s will and reason, that it causes him to despise other goods. Therefore it seems that man"s last end, which is happiness, consists princ.i.p.ally in pleasure.
Obj. 3: Further, since desire is for good, it seems that what all desire is best. But all desire delight; both wise and foolish, and even irrational creatures. Therefore delight is the best of all.
Therefore happiness, which is the supreme good, consists in pleasure.
_On the contrary,_ Boethius says (De Consol. iii): "Any one that chooses to look back on his past excesses, will perceive that pleasures had a sad ending: and if they can render a man happy, there is no reason why we should not say that the very beasts are happy too."
_I answer that,_ Because bodily delights are more generally known, "the name of pleasure has been appropriated to them" (Ethic. vii, 13), although other delights excel them: and yet happiness does not consist in them. Because in every thing, that which pertains to its essence is distinct from its proper accident: thus in man it is one thing that he is a mortal rational animal, and another that he is a risible animal. We must therefore consider that every delight is a proper accident resulting from happiness, or from some part of happiness; since the reason that a man is delighted is that he has some fitting good, either in reality, or in hope, or at least in memory. Now a fitting good, if indeed it be the perfect good, is precisely man"s happiness: and if it is imperfect, it is a share of happiness, either proximate, or remote, or at least apparent.
Therefore it is evident that neither is delight, which results from the perfect good, the very essence of happiness, but something resulting therefrom as its proper accident.
But bodily pleasure cannot result from the perfect good even in that way. For it results from a good apprehended by sense, which is a power of the soul, which power makes use of the body. Now good pertaining to the body, and apprehended by sense, cannot be man"s perfect good. For since the rational soul excels the capacity of corporeal matter, that part of the soul which is independent of a corporeal organ, has a certain infinity in regard to the body and those parts of the soul which are tied down to the body: just as immaterial things are in a way infinite as compared to material things, since a form is, after a fashion, contracted and bounded by matter, so that a form which is independent of matter is, in a way, infinite. Therefore sense, which is a power of the body, knows the singular, which is determinate through matter: whereas the intellect, which is a power independent of matter, knows the universal, which is abstracted from matter, and contains an infinite number of singulars. Consequently it is evident that good which is fitting to the body, and which causes bodily delight through being apprehended by sense, is not man"s perfect good, but is quite a trifle as compared with the good of the soul. Hence it is written (Wis. 7:9) that "all gold in comparison of her, is as a little sand." And therefore bodily pleasure is neither happiness itself, nor a proper accident of happiness.
Reply Obj. 1: It comes to the same whether we desire good, or desire delight, which is nothing else than the appet.i.te"s rest in good: thus it is owing to the same natural force that a weighty body is borne downwards and that it rests there. Consequently just as good is desired for itself, so delight is desired for itself and not for anything else, if the preposition "for" denote the final cause. But if it denote the formal or rather the motive cause, thus delight is desirable for something else, i.e. for the good, which is the object of that delight, and consequently is its principle, and gives it its form: for the reason that delight is desired is that it is rest in the thing desired.
Reply Obj. 2: The vehemence of desire for sensible delight arises from the fact that operations of the senses, through being the principles of our knowledge, are more perceptible. And so it is that sensible pleasures are desired by the majority.
Reply Obj. 3: All desire delight in the same way as they desire good: and yet they desire delight by reason of the good and not conversely, as stated above (ad 1). Consequently it does not follow that delight is the supreme and essential good, but that every delight results from some good, and that some delight results from that which is the essential and supreme good.
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SEVENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 2, Art. 7]
Whether Some Good of the Soul Const.i.tutes Man"s Happiness?
Objection 1: It would seem that some good of the soul const.i.tutes man"s happiness. For happiness is man"s good. Now this is threefold: external goods, goods of the body, and goods of the soul. But happiness does not consist in external goods, nor in goods of the body, as shown above (AA. 4, 5). Therefore it consists in goods of the soul.
Obj. 2: Further, we love that for which we desire good, more than the good that we desire for it: thus we love a friend for whom we desire money, more than we love money. But whatever good a man desires, he desires it for himself. Therefore he loves himself more than all other goods. Now happiness is what is loved above all: which is evident from the fact that for its sake all else is loved and desired. Therefore happiness consists in some good of man himself: not, however, in goods of the body; therefore, in goods of the soul.
Obj. 3: Further, perfection is something belonging to that which is perfected. But happiness is a perfection of man. Therefore happiness is something belonging to man. But it is not something belonging to the body, as shown above (A. 5). Therefore it is something belonging to the soul; and thus it consists in goods of the soul.
_On the contrary,_ As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 22), "that which const.i.tutes the life of happiness is to be loved for its own sake." But man is not to be loved for his own sake, but whatever is in man is to be loved for G.o.d"s sake. Therefore happiness consists in no good of the soul.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 1, A. 8), the end is twofold: namely, the thing itself, which we desire to attain, and the use, namely, the attainment or possession of that thing. If, then, we speak of man"s last end, it is impossible for man"s last end to be the soul itself or something belonging to it. Because the soul, considered in itself, is as something existing in potentiality: for it becomes knowing actually, from being potentially knowing; and actually virtuous, from being potentially virtuous. Now since potentiality is for the sake of act as for its fulfilment, that which in itself is in potentiality cannot be the last end. Therefore the soul itself cannot be its own last end.