QUESTION 17
OF THE ACTS COMMANDED BY THE WILL (In Nine Articles)
We must now consider the acts commanded by the will; under which head there are nine points of inquiry:
(1) Whether command is an act of the will or of the reason?
(2) Whether command belongs to irrational animals?
(3) Of the order between command and use;
(4) Whether command and the commanded act are one act or distinct?
(5) Whether the act of the will is commanded?
(6) Whether the act of the reason is commanded?
(7) Whether the act of the sensitive appet.i.te is commanded?
(8) Whether the act of the vegetal soul is commanded?
(9) Whether the acts of the external members are commanded?
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FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 17, Art. 1]
Whether Command Is an Act of the Reason or of the Will?
Objection 1: It would seem that command is not an act of the reason but of the will. For command is a kind of motion; because Avicenna says that there are four ways of moving, "by perfecting, by disposing, by commanding, and by counselling." But it belongs to the will to move all the other powers of the soul, as stated above (Q. 9, A. 1). Therefore command is an act of the will.
Obj. 2: Further, just as to be commanded belongs to that which is subject, so, seemingly, to command belongs to that which is most free. But the root of liberty is especially in the will. Therefore to command belongs to the will.
Obj. 3: Further, command is followed at once by act. But the act of the reason is not followed at once by act: for he who judges that a thing should be done, does not do it at once. Therefore command is not an act of the reason, but of the will.
_On the contrary,_ Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xvi.]
and the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 13) say that "the appet.i.te obeys reason." Therefore command is an act of the reason.
_I answer that,_ Command is an act of the reason presupposing, however, an act of the will. In proof of this, we must take note that, since the acts of the reason and of the will can be brought to bear on one another, in so far as the reason reasons about willing, and the will wills to reason, the result is that the act of the reason precedes the act of the will, and conversely. And since the power of the preceding act continues in the act that follows, it happens sometimes that there is an act of the will in so far as it retains in itself something of an act of the reason, as we have stated in reference to use and choice; and conversely, that there is an act of the reason in so far as it retains in itself something of an act of the will.
Now, command is essentially indeed an act of the reason: for the commander orders the one commanded to do something, by way of intimation or declaration; and to order thus by intimating or declaring is an act of the reason. Now the reason can intimate or declare something in two ways. First, absolutely: and this intimation is expressed by a verb in the indicative mood, as when one person says to another: "This is what you should do." Sometimes, however, the reason intimates something to a man by moving him thereto; and this intimation is expressed by a verb in the imperative mood; as when it is said to someone: "Do this." Now the first mover, among the powers of the soul, to the doing of an act is the will, as stated above (Q. 9, A. 1). Since therefore the second mover does not move, save in virtue of the first mover, it follows that the very fact that the reason moves by commanding, is due to the power of the will.
Consequently it follows that command is an act of the reason, presupposing an act of the will, in virtue of which the reason, by its command, moves (the power) to the execution of the act.
Reply Obj. 1: To command is to move, not anyhow, but by intimating and declaring to another; and this is an act of the reason.
Reply Obj. 2: The root of liberty is the will as the subject thereof; but it is the reason as its cause. For the will can tend freely towards various objects, precisely because the reason can have various perceptions of good. Hence philosophers define the free-will as being "a free judgment arising from reason," implying that reason is the root of liberty.
Reply Obj. 3: This argument proves that command is an act of reason not absolutely, but with a kind of motion as stated above.
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SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 17, Art. 2]
Whether Command Belongs to Irrational Animals?
Objection 1: It would seem that command belongs to irrational animals. Because, according to Avicenna, "the power that commands movement is the appet.i.te; and the power that executes movement is in the muscles and nerves." But both powers are in irrational animals.
Therefore command is to be found in irrational animals.
Obj. 2: Further, the condition of a slave is that of one who receives commands. But the body is compared to the soul as a slave to his master, as the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2). Therefore the body is commanded by the soul, even in irrational animals, since they are composed of soul and body.
Obj. 3: Further, by commanding, man has an impulse towards an action.
But impulse to action is to be found in irrational animals, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22). Therefore command is to be found in irrational animals.
_On the contrary,_ Command is an act of reason, as stated above (A.
1). But in irrational animals there is no reason. Neither, therefore, is there command.
_I answer that,_ To command is nothing else than to direct someone to do something, by a certain motion of intimation. Now to direct is the proper act of reason. Wherefore it is impossible that irrational animals should command in any way, since they are devoid of reason.
Reply Obj. 1: The appet.i.tive power is said to command movement, in so far as it moves the commanding reason. But this is only in man. In irrational animals the appet.i.tive power is not, properly speaking, a commanding faculty, unless command be taken loosely for motion.
Reply Obj. 2: The body of the irrational animal is competent to obey; but its soul is not competent to command, because it is not competent to direct. Consequently there is no ratio there of commander and commanded; but only of mover and moved.
Reply Obj. 3: Impulse to action is in irrational animals otherwise than in man. For the impulse of man to action arises from the directing reason; wherefore his impulse is one of command. On the other hand, the impulse of the irrational animal arises from natural instinct; because as soon as they apprehend the fitting or the unfitting, their appet.i.te is moved naturally to pursue or to avoid.
Wherefore they are directed by another to act; and they themselves do not direct themselves to act. Consequently in them is impulse but not command.
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THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 17, Art. 3]
Whether Use Precedes Command?
Objection 1: It would seem that use precedes command. For command is an act of the reason presupposing an act of the will, as stated above (A. 1). But, as we have already shown (Q. 16, A. 1), use is an act of the will. Therefore use precedes command.
Obj. 2: Further, command is one of those things that are ordained to the end. But use is of those things that are ordained to the end.
Therefore it seems that use precedes command.
Obj. 3: Further, every act of a power moved by the will is called use; because the will uses the other powers, as stated above (Q. 16, A. 1). But command is an act of the reason as moved by the will, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore command is a kind of use. Now the common precedes the proper. Therefore use precedes command.
_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that impulse to action precedes use. But impulse to operation is given by command.
Therefore command precedes use.
_I answer that,_ use of that which is directed to the end, in so far as it is in the reason referring this to the end, precedes choice, as stated above (Q. 16, A. 4). Wherefore still more does it precede command. On the other hand, use of that which is directed to the end, in so far as it is subject to the executive power, follows command; because use in the user is united to the act of the thing used; for one does not use a stick before doing something with the stick. But command is not simultaneous with the act of the thing to which the command is given: for it naturally precedes its fulfilment, sometimes, indeed, by priority of time. Consequently it is evident that command precedes use.
Reply Obj. 1: Not every act of the will precedes this act of the reason which is command; but an act of the will precedes, viz.
choice; and an act of the will follows, viz. use. Because after counsel"s decision, which is reason"s judgment, the will chooses; and after choice, the reason commands that power which has to do what was chosen; and then, last of all, someone"s will begins to use, by executing the command of reason; sometimes it is another"s will, when one commands another; sometimes the will of the one that commands, when he commands himself to do something.
Reply Obj. 2: Just as act ranks before power, so does the object rank before the act. Now the object of use is that which is directed to the end. Consequently, from the fact that command [itself is directed to the end, it may be concluded that command] precedes, rather than that it follows use.
Reply Obj. 3: Just as the act of the will in using the reason for the purpose of command, precedes the command; so also we may say that this act whereby the will uses the reason, is preceded by a command of reason; since the acts of these powers react on one another.
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FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 17, Art. 4]