Reply Obj. 3: This very good or evil, which a man does to himself by his action, redounds to the community, as stated above.
________________________
FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 21, Art. 4]
Whether a Human Action Is Meritorious or Demeritorious Before G.o.d, According As It Is Good or Evil?
Objection 1: It would seem that man"s actions, good or evil, are not meritorious or demeritorious in the sight of G.o.d. Because, as stated above (A. 3), merit and demerit imply relation to retribution for good or harm done to another. But a man"s action, good or evil, does no good or harm to G.o.d; for it is written (Job 35:6, 7): "If thou sin, what shalt thou hurt Him? ... And if thou do justly, what shalt thou give Him?" Therefore a human action, good or evil, is not meritorious or demeritorious in the sight of G.o.d.
Obj. 2: Further, an instrument acquires no merit or demerit in the sight of him that uses it; because the entire action of the instrument belongs to the user. Now when man acts he is the instrument of the Divine power which is the princ.i.p.al cause of his action; hence it is written (Isa. 10:15): "Shall the axe boast itself against him that cutteth with it? Or shall the saw exalt itself against him by whom it is drawn?" where man while acting is evidently compared to an instrument. Therefore man merits or demerits nothing in G.o.d"s sight, by good or evil deeds.
Obj. 3: Further, a human action acquires merit or demerit through being ordained to someone else. But not all human actions are ordained to G.o.d. Therefore not every good or evil action acquires merit or demerit in G.o.d"s sight.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Eccles. 12:14): "All things that are done, G.o.d will bring into judgment ... whether it be good or evil." Now judgment implies retribution, in respect of which we speak of merit and demerit. Therefore every human action, both good and evil, acquires merit or demerit in G.o.d"s sight.
_I answer that,_ A human action, as stated above (A. 3), acquires merit or demerit, through being ordained to someone else, either by reason of himself, or by reason of the community: and in each way, our actions, good and evil, acquire merit or demerit, in the sight of G.o.d. On the part of G.o.d Himself, inasmuch as He is man"s last end; and it is our duty to refer all our actions to the last end, as stated above (Q. 19, A. 10). Consequently, whoever does an evil deed, not referable to G.o.d, does not give G.o.d the honor due to Him as our last end. On the part of the whole community of the universe, because in every community, he who governs the community, cares, first of all, for the common good; wherefore it is his business to award retribution for such things as are done well or ill in the community.
Now G.o.d is the governor and ruler of the whole universe, as stated in the First Part (Q. 103, A. 5): and especially of rational creatures.
Consequently it is evident that human actions acquire merit or demerit in reference to Him: else it would follow that human actions are no business of G.o.d"s.
Reply Obj. 1: G.o.d in Himself neither gains nor loses anything by the action of man: but man, for his part, takes something from G.o.d, or offers something to Him, when he observes or does not observe the order inst.i.tuted by G.o.d.
Reply Obj. 2: Man is so moved, as an instrument, by G.o.d, that, at the same time, he moves himself by his free-will, as was explained above (Q. 9, A. 6, ad 3). Consequently, by his action, he acquires merit or demerit in G.o.d"s sight.
Reply Obj. 3: Man is not ordained to the body politic, according to all that he is and has; and so it does not follow that every action of his acquires merit or demerit in relation to the body politic. But all that man is, and can, and has, must be referred to G.o.d: and therefore every action of man, whether good or bad, acquires merit or demerit in the sight of G.o.d, as far as the action itself is concerned.
________________________
TREATISE ON THE Pa.s.sIONS (QQ. 22-48) ________________________
QUESTION 22
OF THE SUBJECT OF THE SOUL"S Pa.s.sIONS (In Three Articles)
We must now consider the pa.s.sions of the soul: first, in general; secondly, in particular. Taking them in general, there are four things to be considered: (1) Their subject: (2) The difference between them: (3) Their mutual relationship: (4) Their malice and goodness.
Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there is any pa.s.sion in the soul?
(2) Whether pa.s.sion is in the appet.i.tive rather than in the apprehensive part?
(3) Whether pa.s.sion is in the sensitive appet.i.te rather than in the intellectual appet.i.te, which is called the will?
________________________
FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 22, Art. 1]
Whether Any Pa.s.sion Is in the Soul?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is no pa.s.sion in the soul.
Because pa.s.sivity belongs to matter. But the soul is not composed of matter and form, as stated in the First Part (Q. 75, A. 5). Therefore there is no pa.s.sion in the soul.
Obj. 2: Further, pa.s.sion is movement, as is stated in _Phys._ iii, 3.
But the soul is not moved, as is proved in _De Anima_ i, 3. Therefore pa.s.sion is not in the soul.
Obj. 3: Further, pa.s.sion is the road to corruption; since "every pa.s.sion, when increased, alters the substance," as is stated in _Topic._ vi, 6. But the soul is incorruptible. Therefore no pa.s.sion is in the soul.
_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Rom. 7:5): "When we were in the flesh, the pa.s.sions of sins which were by the law, did the work in our members." Now sins are, properly speaking, in the soul. Therefore pa.s.sions also, which are described as being "of sins," are in the soul.
_I answer that,_ The word "pa.s.sive" is used in three ways. First, in a general way, according as whatever receives something is pa.s.sive, although nothing is taken from it: thus we may say that the air is pa.s.sive when it is lit up. But this is to be perfected rather than to be pa.s.sive. Secondly, the word "pa.s.sive" is employed in its proper sense, when something is received, while something else is taken away: and this happens in two ways. For sometimes that which is lost is unsuitable to the thing: thus when an animal"s body is healed, and loses sickness. At other times the contrary occurs: thus to ail is to be pa.s.sive; because the ailment is received and health is lost. And here we have pa.s.sion in its most proper acceptation. For a thing is said to be pa.s.sive from its being drawn to the agent: and when a thing recedes from what is suitable to it, then especially does it appear to be drawn to something else. Moreover in _De Generat._ i, 3 it is stated that when a more excellent thing is generated from a less excellent, we have generation simply, and corruption in a particular respect: whereas the reverse is the case, when from a more excellent thing, a less excellent is generated. In these three ways it happens that pa.s.sions are in the soul. For in the sense of mere reception, we speak of "feeling and understanding as being a kind of pa.s.sion" (De Anima i, 5). But pa.s.sion, accompanied by the loss of something, is only in respect of a bodily trans.m.u.tation; wherefore pa.s.sion properly so called cannot be in the soul, save accidentally, in so far, to wit, as the _composite_ is pa.s.sive. But here again we find a difference; because when this trans.m.u.tation is for the worse, it has more of the nature of a pa.s.sion, than when it is for the better: hence sorrow is more properly a pa.s.sion than joy.
Reply Obj. 1: It belongs to matter to be pa.s.sive in such a way as to lose something and to be trans.m.u.ted: hence this happens only in those things that are composed of matter and form. But pa.s.sivity, as implying mere reception, need not be in matter, but can be in anything that is in potentiality. Now, though the soul is not composed of matter and form, yet it has something of potentiality, in respect of which it is competent to receive or to be pa.s.sive, according as the act of understanding is a kind of pa.s.sion, as stated in _De Anima_ iii, 4.
Reply Obj. 2: Although it does not belong to the soul in itself to be pa.s.sive and to be moved, yet it belongs accidentally as stated in _De Anima_ i, 3.
Reply Obj. 3: This argument is true of pa.s.sion accompanied by trans.m.u.tation to something worse. And pa.s.sion, in this sense, is not found in the soul, except accidentally: but the composite, which is corruptible, admits of it by reason of its own nature.
________________________
SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 22, Art. 2]
Whether Pa.s.sion Is in the Appet.i.tive Rather Than in the Apprehensive Part?
Objection 1: It would seem that pa.s.sion is in the apprehensive part of the soul rather than in the appet.i.tive. Because that which is first in any genus, seems to rank first among all things that are in that genus, and to be their cause, as is stated in _Metaph._ ii, 1.
Now pa.s.sion is found to be in the apprehensive, before being in the appet.i.tive part: for the appet.i.tive part is not affected unless there be a previous pa.s.sion in the apprehensive part. Therefore pa.s.sion is in the apprehensive part more than in the appet.i.tive.
Obj. 2: Further, what is more active is less pa.s.sive; for action is contrary to pa.s.sion. Now the appet.i.tive part is more active than the apprehensive part. Therefore it seems that pa.s.sion is more in the apprehensive part.
Obj. 3: Further, just as the sensitive appet.i.te is the power of a corporeal organ, so is the power of sensitive apprehension. But pa.s.sion in the soul occurs, properly speaking, in respect of a bodily trans.m.u.tation. Therefore pa.s.sion is not more in the sensitive appet.i.tive than in the sensitive apprehensive part.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 4) that "the movement of the soul, which the Greeks called _pathe_, are styled by some of our writers, Cicero [*"Those things which the Greeks call _pathe_, we prefer to call disturbances rather than diseases" (Tusc.
iv. 5)] for instance, disturbances; by some, affections or emotions; while others rendering the Greek more accurately, call them pa.s.sions." From this it is evident that the pa.s.sions of the soul are the same as affections. But affections manifestly belong to the appet.i.tive, and not to the apprehensive part. Therefore the pa.s.sions are in the appet.i.tive rather than in the apprehensive part.
_I answer that,_ As we have already stated (A. 1) the word "pa.s.sion"
implies that the patient is drawn to that which belongs to the agent.
Now the soul is drawn to a thing by the appet.i.tive power rather than by the apprehensive power: because the soul has, through its appet.i.tive power, an order to things as they are in themselves: hence the Philosopher says (Metaph. vi, 4) that "good and evil," i.e. the objects of the appet.i.tive power, "are in things themselves." On the other hand the apprehensive power is not drawn to a thing, as it is in itself; but knows it by reason of an "intention" of the thing, which "intention" it has in itself, or receives in its own way. Hence we find it stated (Metaph. vi, 4) that "the true and the false,"
which pertain to knowledge, "are not in things, but in the mind."
Consequently it is evident that the nature of pa.s.sion is consistent with the appet.i.tive, rather than with the apprehensive part.
Reply Obj. 1: In things relating to perfection the case is the opposite, in comparison to things that pertain to defect. Because in things relating to perfection, intensity is in proportion to the approach to one first principle; to which the nearer a thing approaches, the more intense it is. Thus the intensity of a thing possessed of light depends on its approach to something endowed with light in a supreme degree, to which the nearer a thing approaches the more light it possesses. But in things that relate to defect, intensity depends, not on approach to something supreme, but [o]n receding from that which is perfect; because therein consists the very notion of privation and defect. Wherefore the less a thing recedes from that which stands first, the less intense it is: and the result is that at first we always find some small defect, which afterwards increases as it goes on. Now pa.s.sion pertains to defect, because it belongs to a thing according as it is in potentiality.
Wherefore in those things that approach to the Supreme Perfection, i.e. to G.o.d, there is but little potentiality and pa.s.sion: while in other things, consequently, there is more. Hence also, in the supreme, i.e. the apprehensive, power of the soul, pa.s.sion is found less than in the other powers.
Reply Obj. 2: The appet.i.tive power is said to be more active, because it is, more than the apprehensive power, the principle of the exterior action: and this for the same reason that it is more pa.s.sive, namely, its being related to things as existing in themselves: since it is through the external action that we come into contact with things.
Reply Obj. 3: As stated in the First Part (Q. 78, A. 3) the organs of the soul can be changed in two ways. First, by a spiritual change, in respect of which the organ receives an "intention" of the object. And this is essential to the act of the sensitive apprehension: thus is the eye changed by the object visible, not by being colored, but by receiving an intention of color. But the organs are receptive of another and natural change, which affects their natural disposition; for instance, when they become hot or cold, or undergo some similar change. And whereas this kind of change is accidental to the act of the sensitive apprehension; for instance, if the eye be wearied through gazing intently at something or be overcome by the intensity of the object: on the other hand, it is essential to the act of the sensitive appet.i.te; wherefore the material element in the definitions of the movements of the appet.i.tive part, is the natural change of the organ; for instance, "anger is" said to be "a kindling of the blood about the heart." Hence it is evident that the notion of pa.s.sion is more consistent with the act of the sensitive appet.i.te, than with that of the sensitive apprehension, although both are actions of a corporeal organ.
________________________
THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 22, Art. 3]
Whether Pa.s.sion Is in the Sensitive Appet.i.te Rather Than in the Intellectual Appet.i.te, Which Is Called the Will?
Objection 1: It would seem that pa.s.sion is not more in the sensitive than in the intellectual appet.i.te. For Dionysius declares (Div. Nom.