Whether This Name "G.o.d" Is Applied to G.o.d Univocally by Nature, by Partic.i.p.ation, and According to Opinion?
Objection 1: It seems that this name "G.o.d" is applied to G.o.d univocally by nature, by partic.i.p.ation, and according to opinion. For where a diverse signification exists, there is no contradiction of affirmation and negation; for equivocation prevents contradiction. But a Catholic who says: "An idol is not G.o.d," contradicts a pagan who says: "An idol is G.o.d." Therefore "G.o.d" in both senses is spoken of univocally.
Obj. 2: Further, as an idol is G.o.d in opinion, and not in truth, so the enjoyment of carnal pleasures is called happiness in opinion, and not in truth. But this name "beat.i.tude" is applied univocally to this supposed happiness, and also to true happiness. Therefore also this name "G.o.d" is applied univocally to the true G.o.d, and to G.o.d also in opinion.
Obj. 3: Further, names are called univocal because they contain one idea. Now when a Catholic says: "There is one G.o.d," he understands by the name G.o.d an omnipotent being, and one venerated above all; while the heathen understands the same when he says: "An idol is G.o.d."
Therefore this name "G.o.d" is applied univocally to both.
_On the contrary,_ The idea in the intellect is the likeness of what is in the thing as is said in Peri Herm. i. But the word "animal" applied to a true animal, and to a picture of one, is equivocal. Therefore this name "G.o.d" applied to the true G.o.d and to G.o.d in opinion is applied equivocally.
Further, No one can signify what he does not know. But the heathen does not know the divine nature. So when he says an idol is G.o.d, he does not signify the true Deity. On the other hand, a Catholic signifies the true Deity when he says that there is one G.o.d. Therefore this name "G.o.d" is not applied univocally, but equivocally to the true G.o.d, and to G.o.d according to opinion.
_I answer that,_ This name "G.o.d" in the three aforesaid significations is taken neither univocally nor equivocally, but a.n.a.logically. This is apparent from this reason: Univocal terms mean absolutely the same thing, but equivocal terms absolutely different; whereas in a.n.a.logical terms a word taken in one signification must be placed in the definition of the same word taken in other senses; as, for instance, "being" which is applied to "substance" is placed in the definition of being as applied to "accident"; and "healthy" applied to animal is placed in the definition of healthy as applied to urine and medicine.
For urine is the sign of health in the animal, and medicine is the cause of health.
The same applies to the question at issue. For this name "G.o.d," as signifying the true G.o.d, includes the idea of G.o.d when it is used to denote G.o.d in opinion, or partic.i.p.ation. For when we name anyone G.o.d by partic.i.p.ation, we understand by the name of G.o.d some likeness of the true G.o.d. Likewise, when we call an idol G.o.d, by this name G.o.d we understand and signify something which men think is G.o.d; thus it is manifest that the name has different meanings, but that one of them is comprised in the other significations. Hence it is manifestly said a.n.a.logically.
Reply Obj. 1: The multiplication of names does not depend on the predication of the name, but on the signification: for this name "man," of whomsoever it is predicated, whether truly or falsely, is predicated in one sense. But it would be multiplied if by the name "man" we meant to signify different things; for instance, if one meant to signify by this name "man" what man really is, and another meant to signify by the same name a stone, or something else. Hence it is evident that a Catholic saying that an idol is not G.o.d contradicts the pagan a.s.serting that it is G.o.d; because each of them uses this name "G.o.d" to signify the true G.o.d. For when the pagan says an idol is G.o.d, he does not use this name as meaning G.o.d in opinion, for he would then speak the truth, as also Catholics sometimes use the name in that sense, as in the Psalm, "All the G.o.ds of the Gentiles are demons" (Ps. 95:5).
The same remark applies to the Second and Third Objections. For these reasons proceed from the different predication of the name, and not from its various significations.
Reply Obj. 4 ["On the contrary," par. 1]: The term "animal" applied to a true and a pictured animal is not purely equivocal; for the Philosopher takes equivocal names in a large sense, including a.n.a.logous names; because also being, which is predicated a.n.a.logically, is sometimes said to be predicated equivocally of different predicaments.
Reply Obj. 5 ["On the contrary," par. 2] : Neither a Catholic nor a pagan knows the very nature of G.o.d as it is in itself; but each one knows it according to some idea of causality, or excellence, or remotion (Q. 12, A. 12). So a pagan can take this name "G.o.d" in the same way when he says an idol is G.o.d, as the Catholic does in saying an idol is not G.o.d. But if anyone should be quite ignorant of G.o.d altogether, he could not even name Him, unless, perhaps, as we use names the meaning of which we know not.
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ELEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 13, Art. 11]
Whether This Name, HE WHO IS, Is the Most Proper Name of G.o.d?
Objection 1: It seems that this name HE WHO IS is not the most proper name of G.o.d. For this name "G.o.d" is an incommunicable name. But this name HE WHO IS, is not an incommunicable name. Therefore this name HE WHO IS is not the most proper name of G.o.d.
Obj. 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iii) that "the name of good excellently manifests all the processions of G.o.d." But it especially belongs to G.o.d to be the universal principle of all things.
Therefore this name "good" is supremely proper to G.o.d, and not this name HE WHO IS.
Obj. 3: Further, every divine name seems to imply relation to creatures, for G.o.d is known to us only through creatures. But this name HE WHO IS imports no relation to creatures. Therefore this name HE WHO IS is not the most applicable to G.o.d.
_On the contrary,_ It is written that when Moses asked, "If they should say to me, What is His name? what shall I say to them?" The Lord answered him, "Thus shalt thou say to them, HE WHO IS hath sent me to you" (Ex. 3:13, 14). Therefore this name HE WHO IS most properly belongs to G.o.d.
_I answer that,_ This name HE WHO IS is most properly applied to G.o.d, for three reasons:
First, because of its signification. For it does not signify form, but simply existence itself. Hence since the existence of G.o.d is His essence itself, which can be said of no other (Q. 3, A. 4), it is clear that among other names this one specially denominates G.o.d, for everything is denominated by its form.
Secondly, on account of its universality. For all other names are either less universal, or, if convertible with it, add something above it at least in idea; hence in a certain way they inform and determine it. Now our intellect cannot know the essence of G.o.d itself in this life, as it is in itself, but whatever mode it applies in determining what it understands about G.o.d, it falls short of the mode of what G.o.d is in Himself. Therefore the less determinate the names are, and the more universal and absolute they are, the more properly they are applied to G.o.d. Hence Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i) that, "HE WHO IS, is the princ.i.p.al of all names applied to G.o.d; for comprehending all in itself, it contains existence itself as an infinite and indeterminate sea of substance." Now by any other name some mode of substance is determined, whereas this name HE WHO IS, determines no mode of being, but is indeterminate to all; and therefore it denominates the "infinite ocean of substance."
Thirdly, from its consignification, for it signifies present existence; and this above all properly applies to G.o.d, whose existence knows not past or future, as Augustine says (De Trin. v).
Reply Obj. 1: This name HE WHO IS is the name of G.o.d more properly than this name "G.o.d," as regards its source, namely, existence; and as regards the mode of signification and consignification, as said above. But as regards the object intended by the name, this name "G.o.d" is more proper, as it is imposed to signify the divine nature; and still more proper is the Tetragrammaton, imposed to signify the substance of G.o.d itself, incommunicable and, if one may so speak, singular.
Reply Obj. 2: This name "good" is the princ.i.p.al name of G.o.d in so far as He is a cause, but not absolutely; for existence considered absolutely comes before the idea of cause.
Reply Obj. 3: It is not necessary that all the divine names should import relation to creatures, but it suffices that they be imposed from some perfections flowing from G.o.d to creatures. Among these the first is existence, from which comes this name, HE WHO IS.
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TWELFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 13, Art. 12]
Whether Affirmative Propositions Can Be Formed About G.o.d?
Objection 1: It seems that affirmative propositions cannot be formed about G.o.d. For Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ii) that "negations about G.o.d are true; but affirmations are vague."
Obj. 2: Further, Boethius says (De Trin. ii) that "a simple form cannot be a subject." But G.o.d is the most absolutely simple form, as shown (Q. 3): therefore He cannot be a subject. But everything about which an affirmative proposition is made is taken as a subject.
Therefore an affirmative proposition cannot be formed about G.o.d.
Obj. 3: Further, every intellect is false which understands a thing otherwise than as it is. But G.o.d has existence without any composition as shown above (Q. 3, A. 7). Therefore since every affirmative intellect understands something as compound, it follows that a true affirmative proposition about G.o.d cannot be made.
_On the contrary,_ What is of faith cannot be false. But some affirmative propositions are of faith; as that G.o.d is Three and One; and that He is omnipotent. Therefore true affirmative propositions can be formed about G.o.d.
_I answer that,_ True affirmative propositions can be formed about G.o.d.
To prove this we must know that in every true affirmative proposition the predicate and the subject signify in some way the same thing in reality, and different things in idea. And this appears to be the case both in propositions which have an accidental predicate, and in those which have an essential predicate. For it is manifest that "man" and "white" are the same in subject, and different in idea; for the idea of man is one thing, and that of whiteness is another. The same applies when I say, "man is an animal"; since the same thing which is man is truly animal; for in the same _suppositum_ there is sensible nature by reason of which he is called animal, and the rational nature by reason of which he is called man; hence here again predicate and subject are the same as to _suppositum,_ but different as to idea. But in propositions where one same thing is predicated of itself, the same rule in some way applies, inasmuch as the intellect draws to the _suppositum_ what it places in the subject; and what it places in the predicate it draws to the nature of the form existing in the _suppositum_; according to the saying that "predicates are to be taken formally, and subjects materially." To this diversity in idea corresponds the plurality of predicate and subject, while the intellect signifies the ident.i.ty of the thing by the composition itself.
G.o.d, however, as considered in Himself, is altogether one and simple, yet our intellect knows Him by different conceptions because it cannot see Him as He is in Himself. Nevertheless, although it understands Him under different conceptions, it knows that one and the same simple object corresponds to its conceptions. Therefore the plurality of predicate and subject represents the plurality of idea; and the intellect represents the unity by composition.
Reply Obj. 1: Dionysius says that the affirmations about G.o.d are vague or, according to another translation, "incongruous,"
inasmuch as no name can be applied to G.o.d according to its mode of signification.
Reply Obj. 2: Our intellect cannot comprehend simple subsisting forms, as they really are in themselves; but it apprehends them as compound things in which there is something taken as subject and something that is inherent. Therefore it apprehends the simple form as a subject, and attributes something else to it.
Reply Obj. 3: This proposition, "The intellect understanding anything otherwise than it is, is false," can be taken in two senses, accordingly as this adverb "otherwise" determines the word "understanding" on the part of the thing understood, or on the part of the one who understands. Taken as referring to the thing understood, the proposition is true, and the meaning is: Any intellect which understands that the thing is otherwise than it is, is false. But this does not hold in the present case; because our intellect, when forming a proposition about G.o.d, does not affirm that He is composite, but that He is simple. But taken as referring to the one who understands, the proposition is false. For the mode of the intellect in understanding is different from the mode of the thing in its essence. Since it is clear that our intellect understands material things below itself in an immaterial manner; not that it understands them to be immaterial things; but its manner of understanding is immaterial. Likewise, when it understands simple things above itself, it understands them according to its own mode, which is in a composite manner; yet not so as to understand them to be composite things. And thus our intellect is not false in forming composition in its ideas concerning G.o.d.
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QUESTION 14
OF G.o.d"S KNOWLEDGE (In Sixteen Articles)
Having considered what belongs to the divine substance, we have now to treat of G.o.d"s operation. And since one kind of operation is immanent, and another kind of operation proceeds to the exterior effect, we treat first of knowledge and of will (for understanding abides in the intelligent agent, and will is in the one who wills); and afterwards of the power of G.o.d, the principle of the divine operation as proceeding to the exterior effect. Now because to understand is a kind of life, after treating of the divine knowledge, we consider the divine life. And as knowledge concerns truth, we consider truth and falsehood. Further, as everything known is in the knower, and the types of things as existing in the knowledge of G.o.d are called ideas, to the consideration of knowledge will be added the treatment of ideas.
Concerning knowledge, there are sixteen points for inquiry:
(1) Whether there is knowledge in G.o.d?
(2) Whether G.o.d understands Himself?
(3) Whether He comprehends Himself?
(4) Whether His understanding is His substance?
(5) Whether He understands other things besides Himself?