Reply Obj. 2: Things which are contrary according to nature are not contrary according as they exist in the mind: for things that are contrary in reality are not contrary in the order of thought; indeed rather is one contrary the reason for knowing the other. Hence one and the same science considers contraries.
Reply Obj. 3: Contemplation, in itself, is never evil, since it is nothing else than the consideration of truth, which is the good of the intellect: it can, however, be evil accidentally, i.e. in so far as the contemplation of a less n.o.ble object hinders the contemplation of a more n.o.ble object; or on the part of the object contemplated, to which the appet.i.te is inordinately attached.
Reply Obj. 4: Sorrow caused by a hindrance to contemplation, is not contrary to the pleasure of contemplation, but is in harmony with it, as stated above.
Reply Obj. 5: Affliction of the flesh affects contemplation accidentally and indirectly, as stated above.
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SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 35, Art. 6]
Whether Sorrow Is to Be Shunned More Than Pleasure Is to Be Sought?
Objection 1: It would seem that sorrow is to be shunned more than pleasure is to be sought. For Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 63): "There is n.o.body that does not shun sorrow more than he seeks pleasure." Now that which all agree in doing, seems to be natural. Therefore it is natural and right for sorrow to be shunned more than pleasure is sought.
Obj. 2: Further, the action of a contrary conduces to rapidity and intensity of movement: for "hot water freezes quicker and harder," as the Philosopher says (Meteor. i, 12). But the shunning of sorrow is due to the contrariety of the cause of sorrow; whereas the desire for pleasure does not arise from any contrariety, but rather from the suitableness of the pleasant object. Therefore sorrow is shunned more eagerly than pleasure is sought.
Obj. 3: Further, the stronger the pa.s.sion which a man resists according to reason, the more worthy is he of praise, and the more virtuous: since "virtue is concerned with the difficult and the good"
(Ethic. ii, 3). But the brave man who resists the movement of shunning sorrow, is more virtuous than the temperate man, who resists the movement of desire for pleasure: since the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "the brave and the just are chiefly praised."
Therefore the movement of shunning sorrow is more eager than the movement of seeking pleasure.
_On the contrary,_ Good is stronger than evil, as Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. iv). But pleasure is desirable for the sake of the good which is its object; whereas the shunning of sorrow is on account of evil. Therefore the desire for pleasure is more eager than the shunning of sorrow.
_I answer that,_ The desire for pleasure is of itself more eager than the shunning of sorrow. The reason of this is that the cause of pleasure is a suitable good; while the cause of pain or sorrow is an unsuitable evil. Now it happens that a certain good is suitable without any repugnance at all: but it is not possible for any evil to be so unsuitable as not to be suitable in some way. Wherefore pleasure can be entire and perfect: whereas sorrow is always partial.
Therefore desire for pleasure is naturally greater than the shunning of sorrow. Another reason is because the good, which is the object of pleasure, is sought for its own sake: whereas the evil, which is the object of sorrow, is to be shunned as being a privation of good: and that which is by reason of itself is stronger than that which is by reason of something else. Moreover we find a confirmation of this in natural movements. For every natural movement is more intense in the end, when a thing approaches the term that is suitable to its nature, than at the beginning, when it leaves the term that is unsuitable to its nature: as though nature were more eager in tending to what is suitable to it, than in shunning what is unsuitable. Therefore the inclination of the appet.i.tive power is, of itself, more eager in tending to pleasure than in shunning sorrow.
But it happens accidentally that a man shuns sorrow more eagerly than he seeks pleasure: and this for three reasons. First, on the part of the apprehension. Because, as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 12), "love is felt more keenly, when we lack that which we love." Now from the lack of what we love, sorrow results, which is caused either by the loss of some loved good, or by the presence of some contrary evil.
But pleasure suffers no lack of the good loved, for it rests in possession of it. Since then love is the cause of pleasure and sorrow, the latter is the more shunned, according as love is the more keenly felt on account of that which is contrary to it. Secondly, on the part of the cause of sorrow or pain, which cause is repugnant to a good that is more loved than the good in which we take pleasure.
For we love the natural well-being of the body more than the pleasure of eating: and consequently we would leave the pleasure of eating and the like, from fear of the pain occasioned by blows or other such causes, which are contrary to the well-being of the body. Thirdly, on the part of the effect: namely, in so far as sorrow hinders not only one pleasure, but all.
Reply Obj. 1: The saying of Augustine that "sorrow is shunned more than pleasure is sought" is true accidentally but not simply. And this is clear from what he says after: "Since we see that the most savage animals are deterred from the greatest pleasures by fear of pain," which pain is contrary to life which is loved above all.
Reply Obj. 2: It is not the same with movement from within and movement from without. For movement from within tends to what is suitable more than it recedes from that which is unsuitable; as we remarked above in regard to natural movement. But movement from without is intensified by the very opposition: because each thing strives in its own way to resist anything contrary to it, as aiming at its own preservation. Hence violent movement is intense at first, and slackens towards the end. Now the movement of the appet.i.tive faculty is from within: since it tends from the soul to the object.
Consequently pleasure is, of itself, more to be sought than sorrow is to be shunned. But the movement of the sensitive faculty is from without, as it were from the object of the soul. Consequently the more contrary a thing is the more it is felt. And then too, accidentally, in so far as the senses are requisite for pleasure and pain, pain is shunned more than pleasure is sought.
Reply Obj. 3: A brave man is not praised because, in accordance with reason, he is not overcome by any kind of sorrow or pain whatever, but because he is not overcome by that which is concerned with the dangers of death. And this kind of sorrow is more shunned, than pleasures of the table or of s.e.xual intercourse are sought, which latter pleasures are the object of temperance: thus life is loved more than food and s.e.xual pleasure. But the temperate man is praised for refraining from pleasures of touch, more than for not shunning the pains which are contrary to them, as is stated in _Ethic._ iii, 11.
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SEVENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 35, Art. 7]
Whether Outward Pain Is Greater Than Interior Sorrow?
Objection 1: It would seem that outward pain is greater than interior sorrow of the heart. Because outward pain arises from a cause repugnant to the well-being of the body in which is life: whereas interior sorrow is caused by some evil in the imagination. Since, therefore, life is loved more than an imagined good, it seems that, according to what has been said above (A. 6), outward pain is greater than interior sorrow.
Obj. 2: Further, the reality moves more than its likeness does. But outward pain arises from the real conjunction of some contrary; whereas inward sorrow arises from the apprehended likeness of a contrary. Therefore outward pain is greater than inward sorrow.
Obj. 3: Further, a cause is known by its effect. But outward pain has more striking effects: since man dies sooner of outward pain than of interior sorrow. Therefore outward pain is greater and is shunned more than interior sorrow.
_On the contrary,_ it is written (Ecclus. 25:17): "The sadness of the heart is every wound [Douay: "plague"], and the wickedness of a woman is all evil." Therefore, just as the wickedness of a woman surpa.s.ses all other wickedness, as the text implies; so sadness of the heart surpa.s.ses every outward wound.
_I answer that,_ Interior and exterior pain agree in one point and differ in two. They agree in this, that each is a movement of the appet.i.tive power, as stated above (A. 1). But they differ in respect of those two things which are requisite for pain and pleasure; namely, in respect of the cause, which is a conjoined good or evil; and in respect of the apprehension. For the cause of outward pain is a conjoined evil repugnant to the body; while the cause of inward pain is a conjoined evil repugnant to the appet.i.te. Again, outward pain arises from an apprehension of sense, chiefly of touch; while inward pain arises from an interior apprehension, of the imagination or of the reason.
If then we compare the cause of inward pain to the cause of outward pain, the former belongs, of itself, to the appet.i.te to which both these pains belong: while the latter belongs to the appet.i.te directly. Because inward pain arises from something being repugnant to the appet.i.te itself, while outward pain arises from something being repugnant to the appet.i.te, through being repugnant to the body.
Now, that which is of itself is always prior to that which is by reason of another. Wherefore, from this point of view, inward pain surpa.s.ses outward pain. In like manner also on the part of apprehension: because the apprehension of reason and imagination is of a higher order than the apprehension of the sense of touch.
Consequently inward pain is, simply and of itself, more keen than outward pain: a sign whereof is that one willingly undergoes outward pain in order to avoid inward pain: and in so far as outward pain is not repugnant to the interior appet.i.te, it becomes in a manner pleasant and agreeable by way of inward joy. Sometimes, however, outward pain is accompanied by inward pain, and then the pain is increased. Because inward pain is not only greater than outward pain, it is also more universal: since whatever is repugnant to the body, can be repugnant to the interior appet.i.te; and whatever is apprehended by sense may be apprehended by imagination and reason, but not conversely. Hence in the pa.s.sage quoted above it is said expressively: "Sadness of the heart is every wound," because even the pains of outward wounds are comprised in the interior sorrows of the heart.
Reply Obj. 1: Inward pain can also arise from things that are destructive of life. And then the comparison of inward to outward pain must not be taken in reference to the various evils that cause pain; but in regard to the various ways in which this cause of pain is compared to the appet.i.te.
Reply Obj. 2: Inward pain is not caused by the apprehended likeness of a thing: for a man is not inwardly pained by the apprehended likeness itself, but by the thing which the likeness represents. And this thing is all the more perfectly apprehended by means of its likeness, as this likeness is more immaterial and abstract.
Consequently inward pain is, of itself, greater, as being caused by a greater evil, forasmuch as evil is better known by an inward apprehension.
Reply Obj. 3: Bodily changes are more liable to be caused by outward pain, both from the fact that outward pain is caused by a corruptive conjoined corporally, which is a necessary condition of the sense of touch; and from the fact that the outward sense is more material than the inward sense, just as the sensitive appet.i.te is more material than the intellective. For this reason, as stated above (Q. 22, A. 3; Q. 31, A. 5), the body undergoes a greater change from the movement of the sensitive appet.i.te: and, in like manner, from outward than from inward pain.
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EIGHTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 35, Art. 8]
Whether There Are Only Four Species of Sorrow?
Objection 1: It would seem that Damascene"s (De Fide Orth. ii, 14) division of sorrow into four species is incorrect; viz. into "torpor, distress," which Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xix.]
calls "anxiety,"--"pity," and "envy." For sorrow is contrary to pleasure. But there are not several species of pleasure. Therefore it is incorrect to a.s.sign different species of sorrow.
Obj. 2: Further, _Repentance_ is a species of sorrow; and so are _indignation_ and _jealousy,_ as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 9, 11). But these are not included in the above species. Therefore this division is insufficient.
Obj. 3: Further, the members of a division should be things that are opposed to one another. But these species are not opposed to one another. For according to Gregory [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xix.]
"torpor is sorrow depriving of speech; anxiety is the sorrow that weighs down; envy is sorrow for another"s good; pity is sorrow for another"s wrongs." But it is possible for one to sorrow for another"s wrongs, and for another"s good, and at the same time to be weighed down inwardly, and outwardly to be speechless. Therefore this division is incorrect.
_On the contrary,_ stands the twofold authority of Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius] and of Damascene.
_I answer that,_ It belongs to the notion of a species that it is something added to the genus. But a thing can be added to a genus in two ways. First, as something belonging of itself to the genus, and virtually contained therein: thus "rational" is added to "animal."
Such an addition makes true species of a genus: as the Philosopher says (Metaph. vii, 12; viii, 2, 3). But, secondly, a thing may be added to a genus, that is, as it were, foreign to the notion conveyed by that genus: thus "white" or something of the kind may be added to "animal." Such an addition does not make true species of the genus, according to the usual sense in which we speak of genera and species.
But sometimes a thing is said to be a species of a certain genus, through having something foreign to that genus indeed, but to which the notion of that genus is applicable: thus a live coal or a flame is said to be a species of fire, because in each of them the nature of fire is applied to a foreign matter. In like manner we speak of astronomy and perspective as being species of mathematics, inasmuch as the principles of mathematics are applied to natural matter.
In accordance with this manner of speaking, the species of sorrow are reckoned by an application of the notion of sorrow to something foreign to it. This foreign matter may be taken on the part of the cause or the object, or of the effect. For the proper object of sorrow is _one"s own evil._ Hence sorrow may be concerned for an object foreign to it either through one"s being sorry for an evil that is not one"s own; and thus we have _pity_ which is sorrow for another"s evil, considered, however, as one"s own: or through one"s being sorry for something that is neither evil nor one"s own, but another"s good, considered, however, as one"s own evil: and thus we have _envy._ The proper effect of sorrow consists in a certain _flight of the appet.i.te._ Wherefore the foreign element in the effect of sorrow, may be taken so as to affect the first part only, by excluding flight: and thus we have _anxiety_ which weighs on the mind, so as to make escape seem impossible: hence it is also called _perplexity._ If, however, the mind be weighed down so much, that even the limbs become motionless, which belongs to _torpor,_ then we have the foreign element affecting both, since there is neither flight, nor is the effect in the appet.i.te. And the reason why torpor especially is said to deprive one of speech is because of all the external movements the voice is the best expression of the inward thought and desire, not only in men, but also in other animals, as is stated in _Polit._ i, 1.
Reply Obj. 1: Pleasure is caused by good, which has only one meaning: and so pleasure is not divided into several species as sorrow is; for the latter is caused by evil, which "happens in many ways," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv).
Reply Obj. 2: Repentance is for one"s own evil, which is the proper object of sorrow: wherefore it does not belong to these species.
Jealousy and indignation are included in envy, as we shall explain later (II-II, Q. 36, A. 2).
Reply Obj. 3: This division is not according to opposite species; but according to the diversity of foreign matter to which the notion of sorrow is applied, as stated above.
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QUESTION 36
OF THE CAUSES OF SORROW OR PAIN (In Four Articles)
We must now consider the causes of sorrow: under which head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether sorrow is caused by the loss of a good or rather by the presence of an evil?