_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 11) that those who are in pain are consoled when their friends sympathize with them.
_I answer that,_ When one is in pain, it is natural that the sympathy of a friend should afford consolation: whereof the Philosopher indicates a twofold reason (Ethic. ix, 11). The first is because, since sorrow has a depressing effect, it is like a weight whereof we strive to unburden ourselves: so that when a man sees others saddened by his own sorrow, it seems as though others were bearing the burden with him, striving, as it were, to lessen its weight; wherefore the load of sorrow becomes lighter for him: something like what occurs in the carrying of bodily burdens. The second and better reason is because when a man"s friends condole with him, he sees that he is loved by them, and this affords him pleasure, as stated above (Q. 32, A. 5). Consequently, since every pleasure a.s.suages sorrow, as stated above (A. 1), it follows that sorrow is mitigated by a sympathizing friend.
Reply Obj. 1: In either case there is a proof of friendship, viz.
when a man rejoices with the joyful, and when he sorrows with the sorrowful. Consequently each becomes an object of pleasure by reason of its cause.
Reply Obj. 2: The friend"s sorrow itself would be a cause of sorrow: but consideration of its cause, viz. his love, gives rise rather to pleasure.
And this suffices for the reply to the Third Objection.
________________________
FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 38, Art. 4]
Whether Pain and Sorrow Are a.s.suaged by the Contemplation of Truth?
Objection 1: It would seem that the contemplation of truth does not a.s.suage sorrow. For it is written (Eccles. 1:18): "He that addeth knowledge addeth also sorrow" [Vulg.: "labor"]. But knowledge pertains to the contemplation of truth. Therefore the contemplation of truth does not a.s.suage sorrow.
Obj. 2: Further, the contemplation of truth belongs to the speculative intellect. But "the speculative intellect is not a principle of movement"; as stated in _De Anima_ iii, 11. Therefore, since joy and sorrow are movements of the soul, it seems that the contemplation of truth does not help to a.s.suage sorrow.
Obj. 3: Further, the remedy for an ailment should be applied to the part which ails. But contemplation of truth is in the intellect.
Therefore it does not a.s.suage bodily pain, which is in the senses.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 12): "It seemed to me that if the light of that truth were to dawn on our minds, either I should not feel that pain, or at least that pain would seem nothing to me."
_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 3, A. 5), the greatest of all pleasures consists in the contemplation of truth. Now every pleasure a.s.suages pain as stated above (A. 1): hence the contemplation of truth a.s.suages pain or sorrow, and the more so, the more perfectly one is a lover of wisdom. And therefore in the midst of tribulations men rejoice in the contemplation of Divine things and of future Happiness, according to James 1:2: "My brethren, count it all joy, when you shall fall into divers temptations": and, what is more, even in the midst of bodily tortures this joy is found; as the "martyr Tiburtius, when he was walking barefoot on the burning coals, said: Methinks, I walk on roses, in the name of Jesus Christ." [*Cf.
Dominican Breviary, August 11th, commemoration of St. Tiburtius.]
Reply Obj. 1: "He that addeth knowledge, addeth sorrow," either on account of the difficulty and disappointment in the search for truth; or because knowledge makes man acquainted with many things that are contrary to his will. Accordingly, on the part of the things known, knowledge causes sorrow: but on the part of the contemplation of truth, it causes pleasure.
Reply Obj. 2: The speculative intellect does not move the mind on the part of the thing contemplated: but on the part of contemplation itself, which is man"s good and naturally pleasant to him.
Reply Obj. 3: In the powers of the soul there is an overflow from the higher to the lower powers: and accordingly, the pleasure of contemplation, which is in the higher part, overflows so as to mitigate even that pain which is in the senses.
________________________
FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 38, Art. 5]
Whether Pain and Sorrow Are a.s.suaged by Sleep and Baths?
Objection 1: It would seem that sleep and baths do not a.s.suage sorrow. For sorrow is in the soul: whereas sleep and baths regard the body. Therefore they do not conduce to the a.s.suaging of sorrow.
Obj. 2: Further, the same effect does not seem to ensue from contrary causes. But these, being bodily things, are incompatible with the contemplation of truth which is a cause of the a.s.suaging of sorrow, as stated above (A. 4). Therefore sorrow is not mitigated by the like.
Obj. 3: Further, sorrow and pain, in so far as they affect the body, denote a certain trans.m.u.tation of the heart. But such remedies as these seem to pertain to the outward senses and limbs, rather than to the interior disposition of the heart. Therefore they do not a.s.suage sorrow.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Confess. ix, 12): "I had heard that the bath had its name [*_Balneum,_ from the Greek _balaneion_]
... from the fact of its driving sadness from the mind." And further on, he says: "I slept, and woke up again, and found my grief not a little a.s.suaged": and quotes the words from the hymn of Ambrose [*Cf. Sarum Breviary: First Sunday after the octave of the Epiphany, Hymn for first Vespers], in which it is said that "Sleep restores the tired limbs to labor, refreshes the weary mind, and banishes sorrow."
_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 37, A. 4), sorrow, by reason of its specific nature, is repugnant to the vital movement of the body; and consequently whatever restores the bodily nature to its due state of vital movement, is opposed to sorrow and a.s.suages it. Moreover such remedies, from the very fact that they bring nature back to its normal state, are causes of pleasure; for this is precisely in what pleasure consists, as stated above (Q. 31, A. 1). Therefore, since every pleasure a.s.suages sorrow, sorrow is a.s.suaged by such like bodily remedies.
Reply Obj. 1: The normal disposition of the body, so far as it is felt, is itself a cause of pleasure, and consequently a.s.suages sorrow.
Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 31, A. 8), one pleasure hinders another; and yet every pleasure a.s.suages sorrow. Consequently it is not unreasonable that sorrow should be a.s.suaged by causes which hinder one another.
Reply Obj. 3: Every good disposition of the body reacts somewhat on the heart, which is the beginning and end of bodily movements, as stated in _De Causa Mot. Animal._ xi.
________________________
QUESTION 39
OF THE GOODNESS AND MALICE OF SORROW OR PAIN (In Four Articles)
We must now consider the goodness and malice of pain or sorrow: under which head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether all sorrow is evil?
(2) Whether sorrow can be a virtuous good?
(3) Whether it can be a useful good?
(4) Whether bodily pain is the greatest evil?
________________________
FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 39, Art. 1]
Whether All Sorrow Is Evil?
Objection 1: It would seem that all sorrow is evil. For Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xix.] says: "All sorrow is evil, from its very nature." Now what is naturally evil, is evil always and everywhere. Therefore, all sorrow is evil.
Obj. 2: Further, that which all, even the virtuous, avoid, is evil.
But all avoid sorrow, even the virtuous, since as stated in _Ethic._ vii, 11, "though the prudent man does not aim at pleasure, yet he aims at avoiding sorrow." Therefore sorrow is evil.
Obj. 3: Further, just as bodily evil is the object and cause of bodily pain, so spiritual evil is the object and cause of sorrow in the soul. But every bodily pain is a bodily evil. Therefore every spiritual sorrow is an evil of the soul.
_On the contrary,_ Sorrow for evil is contrary to pleasure in evil.
But pleasure in evil is evil: wherefore in condemnation of certain men, it is written (Prov. 2:14), that "they were glad when they had done evil." Therefore sorrow for evil is good.
_I answer that,_ A thing may be good or evil in two ways: first considered simply and in itself; and thus all sorrow is an evil, because the mere fact of a man"s appet.i.te being uneasy about a present evil, is itself an evil, because it hinders the response of the appet.i.te in good. Secondly, a thing is said to be good or evil, on the supposition of something else: thus shame is said to be good, on the supposition of a shameful deed done, as stated in _Ethic._ iv, 9. Accordingly, supposing the presence of something saddening or painful, it is a sign of goodness if a man is in sorrow or pain on account of this present evil. For if he were not to be in sorrow or pain, this could only be either because he feels it not, or because he does not reckon it as something unbecoming, both of which are manifest evils. Consequently it is a condition of goodness, that, supposing an evil to be present, sorrow or pain should ensue.
Wherefore Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 14): "It is also a good thing that he sorrows for the good he has lost: for had not some good remained in his nature, he could not be punished by the loss of good." Because, however, in the science of Morals, we consider things individually--for actions are concerned about individuals--that which is good on some supposition, should be considered as good: just as that which is voluntary on some supposition, is judged to be voluntary, as stated in _Ethic._ iii, 1, and likewise above (Q. 6, A.
6).
Reply Obj. 1: Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius] is speaking of sorrow on the part of the evil that causes it, but not on the part of the subject that feels and rejects the evil. And from this point of view, all shun sorrow, inasmuch as they shun evil: but they do not shun the perception and rejection of evil. The same also applies to bodily pain: because the perception and rejection of bodily evil is the proof of the goodness of nature.
This suffices for the Replies to the Second and Third Objections.
________________________
SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 39, Art. 2]
Whether Sorrow Can Be a Virtuous Good?
Objection 1: It would seem that sorrow is not a virtuous good. For that which leads to h.e.l.l is not a virtuous good. But, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 33), "Jacob seems to have feared lest he should be troubled overmuch by sorrow, and so, instead of entering into the rest of the blessed, be consigned to the h.e.l.l of sinners."