_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) "some are hopeful, through having been victorious often and over many opponents": which seems to pertain to experience. Therefore experience is a cause of hope.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), the object of hope is a future good, difficult but possible to obtain. Consequently a thing may be a cause of hope, either because it makes something possible to a man: or because it makes him think something possible. In the first way hope is caused by everything that increases a man"s power; e.g.
riches, strength, and, among others, experience: since by experience man acquires the faculty of doing something easily, and the result of this is hope. Wherefore Vegetius says (De Re Milit. i): "No one fears to do that which he is sure of having learned well."
In the second way, hope is caused by everything that makes man think that he can obtain something: and thus both teaching and persuasion may be a cause of hope. And then again experience is a cause of hope, in so far as it makes him reckon something possible, which before his experience he looked upon as impossible. However, in this way, experience can cause a lack of hope: because just as it makes a man think possible what he had previously thought impossible; so, conversely, experience makes a man consider as impossible that which hitherto he had thought possible. Accordingly experience causes hope in two ways, despair in one way: and for this reason we may say rather that it causes hope.
Reply Obj. 1: Experience in matters pertaining to action not only produces knowledge; it also causes a certain habit, by reason of custom, which renders the action easier. Moreover, the intellectual virtue itself adds to the power of acting with ease: because it shows something to be possible; and thus is a cause of hope.
Reply Obj. 2: The old are wanting in hope because of their experience, in so far as experience makes them think something impossible. Hence he adds (Rhet. ii, 13) that "many evils have befallen them."
Reply Obj. 3: Folly and inexperience can be a cause of hope accidentally as it were, by removing the knowledge which would help one to judge truly a thing to be impossible. Wherefore inexperience is a cause of hope, for the same reason as experience causes lack of hope.
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SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 40, Art. 6]
Whether Hope Abounds in Young Men and Drunkards?
Objection 1: It would seem that youth and drunkenness are not causes of hope. Because hope implies certainty and steadiness; so much so that it is compared to an anchor (Heb. 6:19). But young men and drunkards are wanting in steadiness; since their minds are easily changed. Therefore youth and drunkenness are not causes of hope.
Obj. 2: Further, as stated above (A. 5), the cause of hope is chiefly whatever increases one"s power. But youth and drunkenness are united to weakness. Therefore they are not causes of hope.
Obj. 3: Further, experience is a cause of hope, as stated above (A.
5). But youth lacks experience. Therefore it is not a cause of hope.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that "drunken men are hopeful": and (Rhet. ii, 12) that "the young are full of hope."
_I answer that,_ Youth is a cause of hope for three reasons, as the Philosopher states in _Rhet._ ii, 12: and these three reasons may be gathered from the three conditions of the good which is the object of hope--namely, that it is future, arduous and possible, as stated above (A. 1). For youth has much of the future before it, and little of the past: and therefore since memory is of the past, and hope of the future, it has little to remember and lives very much in hope.
Again, youths, on account of the heat of their nature, are full of spirit; so that their heart expands: and it is owing to the heart being expanded that one tends to that which is arduous; wherefore youths are spirited and hopeful. Likewise they who have not suffered defeat, nor had experience of obstacles to their efforts, are p.r.o.ne to count a thing possible to them. Wherefore youths, through inexperience of obstacles and of their own shortcomings, easily count a thing possible; and consequently are of good hope. Two of these causes are also in those who are in drink--viz. heat and high spirits, on account of wine, and heedlessness of dangers and shortcomings. For the same reason all foolish and thoughtless persons attempt everything and are full of hope.
Reply Obj. 1: Although youths and men in drink lack steadiness in reality, yet they are steady in their own estimation, for they think that they will steadily obtain that which they hope for.
In like manner, in reply to the Second Objection, we must observe that young people and men in drink are indeed unsteady in reality: but, in their own estimation, they are capable, for they know not their shortcomings.
Reply Obj. 3: Not only experience, but also lack of experience, is, in some way, a cause of hope, as explained above (A. 5, ad 3).
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SEVENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 40, Art. 7]
Whether Hope Is a Cause of Love?
Objection 1: It would seem that hope is not a cause of love. Because, according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7, 9), love is the first of the soul"s emotions. But hope is an emotion of the soul. Therefore love precedes hope, and consequently hope does not cause love.
Obj. 2: Further, desire precedes hope. But desire is caused by love, as stated above (Q. 25, A. 2). Therefore hope, too, follows love, and consequently is not its cause.
Obj. 3: Further, hope causes pleasure, as stated above (Q. 32, A. 3).
But pleasure is only of the good that is loved. Therefore love precedes hope.
_On the contrary,_ The gloss commenting on Matt. 1:2, "Abraham begot Isaac, and Isaac begot Jacob," says, i.e. "faith begets hope, and hope begets charity." But charity is love. Therefore love is caused by hope.
_I answer that,_ Hope can regard two things. For it regards as its object, the good which one hopes for. But since the good we hope for is something difficult but possible to obtain; and since it happens sometimes that what is difficult becomes possible to us, not through ourselves but through others; hence it is that hope regards also that by which something becomes possible to us.
In so far, then, as hope regards the good we hope to get, it is caused by love: since we do not hope save for that which we desire and love. But in so far as hope regards one through whom something becomes possible to us, love is caused by hope, and not vice versa.
Because by the very fact that we hope that good will accrue to us through someone, we are moved towards him as to our own good; and thus we begin to love him. Whereas from the fact that we love someone we do not hope in him, except accidentally, that is, in so far as we think that he returns our love. Wherefore the fact of being loved by another makes us hope in him; but our love for him is caused by the hope we have in him.
Wherefore the Replies to the Objections are evident.
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EIGHTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 40, Art. 8]
Whether Hope Is a Help or a Hindrance to Action?
Objection 1: It would seem that hope is not a help but a hindrance to action. Because hope implies security. But security begets negligence which hinders action. Therefore hope is a hindrance to action.
Obj. 2: Further, sorrow hinders action, as stated above (Q. 37, A.
3). But hope sometimes causes sorrow: for it is written (Prov.
13:12): "Hope that is deferred afflicteth the soul." Therefore hope hinders action.
Obj. 3: Further, despair is contrary to hope, as stated above (A. 4).
But despair, especially in matters of war, conduces to action; for it is written (2 Kings 2:26), that "it is dangerous to drive people to despair." Therefore hope has a contrary effect, namely, by hindering action.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (1 Cor. 9:10) that "he that plougheth should plough in hope ... to receive fruit": and the same applies to all other actions.
_I answer that,_ Hope of its very nature is a help to action by making it more intense: and this for two reasons. First, by reason of its object, which is a good, difficult but possible. For the thought of its being difficult arouses our attention; while the thought that it is possible is no drag on our effort. Hence it follows that by reason of hope man is intent on his action. Secondly, on account of its effect. Because hope, as stated above (Q. 32, A. 3), causes pleasure; which is a help to action, as stated above (Q. 33, A. 4).
Therefore hope is conducive to action.
Reply Obj. 1: Hope regards a good to be obtained; security regards an evil to be avoided. Wherefore security seems to be contrary to fear rather than to belong to hope. Yet security does not beget negligence, save in so far as it lessens the idea of difficulty: whereby it also lessens the character of hope: for the things in which a man fears no hindrance, are no longer looked upon as difficult.
Reply Obj. 2: Hope of itself causes pleasure; it is by accident that it causes sorrow, as stated above (Q. 32, A. 3, ad 2).
Reply Obj. 3: Despair threatens danger in war, on account of a certain hope that attaches to it. For they who despair of flight, strive less to fly, but hope to avenge their death: and therefore in this hope they fight the more bravely, and consequently prove dangerous to the foe.
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QUESTION 41
OF FEAR, IN ITSELF (In Four Articles)
We must now consider, in the first place, fear; and, secondly, daring.
With regard to fear, four things must be considered: (1) Fear, in itself; (2) Its object; (3) Its cause; (4) Its effect. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether fear is a pa.s.sion of the soul?
(2) Whether fear is a special pa.s.sion?
(3) Whether there is a natural fear?
(4) Of the species of fear.
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FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 41, Art. 1]