Secondly, a man of counsel means one who is apt for giving good counsel: and in this sense, neither fear nor any pa.s.sion makes men of counsel. Because when a man is affected by a pa.s.sion, things seem to him greater or smaller than they really are: thus to a lover, what he loves seems better; to him that fears, what he fears seems more dreadful. Consequently owing to the want of right judgment, every pa.s.sion, considered in itself, hinders the faculty of giving good counsel.
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Reply Obj. 2: The stronger a pa.s.sion is, the greater the hindrance is it to the man who is swayed by it. Consequently, when fear is intense, man does indeed wish to take counsel, but his thoughts are so disturbed, that he can find no counsel. If, however, the fear be slight, so as to make a man wish to take counsel, without gravely disturbing the reason; it may even make it easier for him to take good counsel, by reason of his ensuing carefulness.
Reply Obj. 3: Hope also makes man a good counsellor: because, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), "no man takes counsel in matters he despairs of," nor about impossible things, as he says in _Ethic._ iii, 3. But fear incites to counsel more than hope does. Because hope is of good things, as being possible of attainment; whereas fear is of evil things, as being difficult to repel, so that fear regards the aspect of difficulty more than hope does. And it is in matters of difficulty, especially when we distrust ourselves, that we take counsel, as stated above.
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THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 44, Art. 3]
Whether Fear Makes One Tremble?
Objection 1: It would seem that trembling is not an effect of fear.
Because trembling is occasioned by cold; thus we observe that a cold person trembles. Now fear does not seem to make one cold, but rather to cause a parching heat: a sign whereof is that those who fear are thirsty, especially if their fear be very great, as in the case of those who are being led to execution. Therefore fear does not cause trembling.
Obj. 2: Further, faecal evacuation is occasioned by heat; hence laxative medicines are generally warm. But these evacuations are often caused by fear. Therefore fear apparently causes heat; and consequently does not cause trembling.
Obj. 3: Further, in fear, the heat is withdrawn from the outer to the inner parts of the body. If, therefore, man trembles in his outward parts, through the heat being withdrawn thus; it seems that fear should cause this trembling in all the external members. But such is not the case. Therefore trembling of the body is not caused by fear.
_On the contrary,_ Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 8) that "fear is followed by trembling, pallor and chattering of the teeth."
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), in fear there takes place a certain contraction from the outward to the inner parts of the body, the result being that the outer parts become cold; and for this reason trembling is occasioned in these parts, being caused by a lack of power in controlling the members: which lack of power is due to the want of heat, which is the instrument whereby the soul moves those members, as stated in _De Anima_ ii, 4.
Reply Obj. 1: When the heat withdraws from the outer to the inner parts, the inward heat increases, especially in the inferior or nutritive parts. Consequently the humid element being spent, thirst ensues; sometimes indeed the result is a loosening of the bowels, and urinary or even seminal evacuation. Or else such like evacuations are due to contraction of the abdomen and t.e.s.t.i.c.l.es, as the Philosopher says (De Problem. xxii, 11).
This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.
Reply Obj. 3: In fear, heat abandons the heart, with a downward movement: hence in those who are afraid the heart especially trembles, as also those members which are connected with the breast where the heart resides. Hence those who fear tremble especially in their speech, on account of the tracheal artery being near the heart.
The lower lip, too, and the lower jaw tremble, through their connection with the heart; which explains the chattering of the teeth. For the same reason the arms and hands tremble. Or else because the aforesaid members are more mobile. For which reason the knees tremble in those who are afraid, according to Isa. 35:3: "Strengthen ye the feeble hands, and confirm the trembling [Vulg.: "weak"] knees."
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FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 44, Art. 4]
Whether Fear Hinders Action?
Objection 1: It would seem that fear hinders action. For action is hindered chiefly by a disturbance in the reason, which directs action. But fear disturbs reason, as stated above (A. 2). Therefore fear hinders action.
Obj. 2: Further, those who fear while doing anything, are more apt to fail: thus a man who walks on a plank placed aloft, easily falls through fear; whereas, if he were to walk on the same plank down below, he would not fall, through not being afraid. Therefore fear hinders action.
Obj. 3: Further, laziness or sloth is a kind of fear. But laziness hinders action. Therefore fear does too.
_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Phil. 2:12): "With fear and trembling work out your salvation": and he would not say this if fear were a hindrance to a good work. Therefore fear does not hinder a good action.
_I answer that,_ Man"s exterior actions are caused by the soul as first mover, but by the bodily members as instruments. Now action may be hindered both by defect of the instrument, and by defect of the princ.i.p.al mover. On the part of the bodily instruments, fear, considered in itself, is always apt to hinder exterior action, on account of the outward members being deprived, through fear, of their heat. But on the part of the soul, if the fear be moderate, without much disturbance of the reason, it conduces to working well, in so far as it causes a certain solicitude, and makes a man take counsel and work with greater attention. If, however, fear increases so much as to disturb the reason, it hinders action even on the part of the soul. But of such a fear the Apostle does not speak.
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Reply Obj. 2: He that falls from a plank placed aloft, suffers a disturbance of his imagination, through fear of the fall that is pictured to his imagination.
Reply Obj. 3: Everyone in fear shuns that which he fears: and therefore, since laziness is a fear of work itself as being toilsome, it hinders work by withdrawing the will from it. But fear of other things conduces to action, in so far as it inclines the will to do that whereby a man escapes from what he fears.
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QUESTION 45
OF DARING (In Four Articles)
We must now consider daring: under which head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether daring is contrary to fear?
(2) How is daring related to hope?
(3) Of the cause of daring;
(4) Of its effect.
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FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 45, Art. 1]
Whether Daring Is Contrary to Fear?
Objection 1: It would seem that daring is not contrary to fear. For Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 31) that "daring is a vice." Now vice is contrary to virtue. Since, therefore, fear is not a virtue but a pa.s.sion, it seems that daring is not contrary to fear.
Obj. 2: Further, to one thing there is one contrary. But hope is contrary to fear. Therefore daring is not contrary to fear.
Obj. 3: Further, every pa.s.sion excludes its opposite. But fear excludes safety; for Augustine says (Confess. ii, 6) that "fear takes forethought for safety." Therefore safety is contrary to fear.
Therefore daring is not contrary to fear.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "daring is contrary to fear."
_I answer that,_ It is of the essence of contraries to be "farthest removed from one another," as stated in _Metaph._ x, 4. Now that which is farthest removed from fear, is daring: since fear turns away from the future hurt, on account of its victory over him that fears it; whereas daring turns on threatened danger because of its own victory over that same danger. Consequently it is evident that daring is contrary to fear.
Reply Obj. 1: Anger, daring and all the names of the pa.s.sions can be taken in two ways. First, as denoting absolutely movements of the sensitive appet.i.te in respect of some object, good or bad: and thus they are names of pa.s.sions. Secondly, as denoting besides this movement, a straying from the order of reason: and thus they are names of vices. It is in this sense that Augustine speaks of daring: but we are speaking of it in the first sense.
Reply Obj. 2: To one thing, in the same respect, there are not several contraries; but in different respects nothing prevents one thing having several contraries. Accordingly it has been said above (Q. 23, A. 2; Q. 40, A. 4) that the irascible pa.s.sions admit of a twofold contrariety: one, according to the opposition of good and evil, and thus fear is contrary to hope: the other, according to the opposition of approach and withdrawal, and thus daring is contrary to fear, and despair contrary to hope.
Reply Obj. 3: Safety does not denote something contrary to fear, but merely the exclusion of fear: for he is said to be safe, who fears not. Wherefore safety is opposed to fear, as a privation: while daring is opposed thereto as a contrary. And as contrariety implies privation, so daring implies safety.
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SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 45, Art. 2]
Whether Daring Ensues from Hope?
Objection 1: It would seem that daring does not ensue from hope.
Because daring regards evil and fearful things, as stated in _Ethic._ iii, 7. But hope regards good things, as stated above (Q. 40, A. 1).
Therefore they have different objects and are not in the same order.
Therefore daring does not ensue from hope.