Reply Obj. 1: Fear is chiefly required as being the foundation, so to speak, of the perfection of the other gifts, for "the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom" (Ps. 110:10; Ecclus. 1:16), and not as though it were more excellent than the others. Because, in the order of generation, man departs from evil on account of fear (Prov.
16:16), before doing good works, and which result from the other gifts.
Reply Obj. 2: In the words quoted from the Apostle, piety is not compared with all G.o.d"s gifts, but only with "bodily exercise," of which he had said it "is profitable to little."
Reply Obj. 3: Although knowledge stands before counsel by reason of its judgment, yet counsel is more excellent by reason of its matter: for counsel is only concerned with matters of difficulty (Ethic. iii, 3), whereas the judgment of knowledge embraces all matters.
Reply Obj. 4: The directive gifts which pertain to the reason are more excellent than the executive gifts, if we consider them in relation to their acts as proceeding from their powers, because reason transcends the appet.i.te as a rule transcends the thing ruled.
But on the part of the matter, counsel is united to fort.i.tude as the directive power to the executive, and so is knowledge united to piety: because counsel and fort.i.tude are concerned with matters of difficulty, while knowledge and piety are concerned with ordinary matters. Hence counsel together with fort.i.tude, by reason of their matter, are given the preference to knowledge and piety.
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EIGHTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 68, Art. 8]
Whether the Virtues Are More Excellent Than the Gifts?
Objection 1: It would seem that the virtues are more excellent than the gifts. For Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 18) while speaking of charity: "No gift of G.o.d is more excellent than this. It is this alone which divides the children of the eternal kingdom from the children of eternal d.a.m.nation. Other gifts are bestowed by the Holy Ghost, but, without charity, they avail nothing." But charity is a virtue. Therefore a virtue is more excellent than the gifts of the Holy Ghost.
Obj. 2: Further, that which is first naturally, seems to be more excellent. Now the virtues precede the gifts of the Holy Ghost; for Gregory says (Moral. ii, 26) that "the gift of the Holy Ghost in the mind it works on, forms first of all justice, prudence, fort.i.tude, temperance ... and doth afterwards give it a temper in the seven virtues" (viz. the gifts), so "as against folly to bestow wisdom; against dullness, understanding; against rashness, counsel; against fear, fort.i.tude; against ignorance, knowledge; against hardness of heart, piety; against piety, fear." Therefore the virtues are more excellent than the gifts.
Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19) that "the virtues cannot be used to evil purpose." But it is possible to make evil use of the gifts, for Gregory says (Moral. i, 18): "We offer up the sacrifice of prayer ... lest wisdom may uplift; or understanding, while it runs nimbly, deviate from the right path; or counsel, while it multiplies itself, grow into confusion; that fort.i.tude, while it gives confidence, may not make us rash; lest knowledge, while it knows and yet loves not, may swell the mind; lest piety, while it swerves from the right line, may become distorted; and lest fear, while it is unduly alarmed, may plunge us into the pit of despair." Therefore the virtues are more excellent than the gifts of the Holy Ghost.
_On the contrary,_ The gifts are bestowed to a.s.sist the virtues and to remedy certain defects, as is shown in the pa.s.sage quoted (Obj.
2), so that, seemingly, they accomplish what the virtues cannot.
Therefore the gifts are more excellent than the virtues.
_I answer that,_ As was shown above (Q. 58, A. 3; Q. 62, A. 1), there are three kinds of virtues: for some are theological, some intellectual, and some moral. The theological virtues are those whereby man"s mind is united to G.o.d; the intellectual virtues are those whereby reason itself is perfected; and the moral virtues are those which perfect the powers of appet.i.te in obedience to the reason. On the other hand the gifts of the Holy Ghost dispose all the powers of the soul to be amenable to the Divine motion.
Accordingly the gifts seem to be compared to the theological virtues, by which man is united to the Holy Ghost his Mover, in the same way as the moral virtues are compared to the intellectual virtues, which perfect the reason, the moving principle of the moral virtues.
Wherefore as the intellectual virtues are more excellent than the moral virtues and control them, so the theological virtues are more excellent than the gifts of the Holy Ghost and regulate them. Hence Gregory says (Moral. i, 12) that "the seven sons," i.e. the seven gifts, "never attain the perfection of the number ten, unless all they do be done in faith, hope, and charity."
But if we compare the gifts to the other virtues, intellectual and moral, then the gifts have the precedence of the virtues. Because the gifts perfect the soul"s powers in relation to the Holy Ghost their Mover; whereas the virtues perfect, either the reason itself, or the other powers in relation to reason: and it is evident that the more exalted the mover, the more excellent the disposition whereby the thing moved requires to be disposed. Therefore the gifts are more perfect than the virtues.
Reply Obj. 1: Charity is a theological virtue; and such we grant to be more perfect than the gifts.
Reply Obj. 2: There are two ways in which one thing precedes another.
One is in order of perfection and dignity, as love of G.o.d precedes love of our neighbor: and in this way the gifts precede the intellectual and moral virtues, but follow the theological virtues.
The other is the order of generation or disposition: thus love of one"s neighbor precedes love of G.o.d, as regards the act: and in this way moral and intellectual virtues precede the gifts, since man, through being well subordinate to his own reason, is disposed to be rightly subordinate to G.o.d.
Reply Obj. 3: Wisdom and understanding and the like are gifts of the Holy Ghost, according as they are quickened by charity, which "dealeth not perversely" (1 Cor. 13:4). Consequently wisdom and understanding and the like cannot be used to evil purpose, in so far as they are gifts of the Holy Ghost. But, lest they depart from the perfection of charity, they a.s.sist one another. This is what Gregory means to say.
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QUESTION 69
OF THE BEAt.i.tUDES (In Four Articles)
We must now consider the beat.i.tudes: under which head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the beat.i.tudes differ from the gifts and virtues?
(2) Of the rewards of the beat.i.tudes: whether they refer to this life?
(3) Of the number of the beat.i.tudes;
(4) Of the fittingness of the rewards ascribed to the beat.i.tudes.
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FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 69, Art. 1]
Whether the Beat.i.tudes Differ from the Virtues and Gifts?
Objection 1: It would seem that the beat.i.tudes do not differ from the virtues and gifts. For Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4) a.s.signs the beat.i.tudes recited by Matthew (v 3, seqq.) to the gifts of the Holy Ghost; and Ambrose in his commentary on Luke 6:20, seqq., ascribes the beat.i.tudes mentioned there, to the four cardinal virtues. Therefore the beat.i.tudes do not differ from the virtues and gifts.
Obj. 2: Further, there are but two rules of the human will: the reason and the eternal law, as stated above (Q. 19, A. 3; Q. 21, A.
1). Now the virtues perfect man in relation to reason; while the gifts perfect him in relation to the eternal law of the Holy Ghost, as is clear from what has been said (Q. 68, AA. 1, 3, seqq.).
Therefore there cannot be anything else pertaining to the rect.i.tude of the human will, besides the virtues and gifts. Therefore the beat.i.tudes do not differ from them.
Obj. 3: Further, among the beat.i.tudes are included meekness, justice, and mercy, which are said to be virtues. Therefore the beat.i.tudes do not differ from the virtues and gifts.
_On the contrary,_ Certain things are included among the beat.i.tudes, that are neither virtues nor gifts, e.g. poverty, mourning, and peace. Therefore the beat.i.tudes differ from the virtues and gifts.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 2, A. 7; Q. 3, A. 1), happiness is the last end of human life. Now one is said to possess the end already, when one hopes to possess it; wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 9) that "children are said to be happy because they are full of hope"; and the Apostle says (Rom. 8:24): "We are saved by hope." Again, we hope to obtain an end, because we are suitably moved towards that end, and approach thereto; and this implies some action.
And a man is moved towards, and approaches the happy end by works of virtue, and above all by the works of the gifts, if we speak of eternal happiness, for which our reason is not sufficient, since we need to be moved by the Holy Ghost, and to be perfected with His gifts that we may obey and follow him. Consequently the beat.i.tudes differ from the virtues and gifts, not as habit from habit, but as act from habit.
Reply Obj. 1: Augustine and Ambrose a.s.sign the beat.i.tudes to the gifts and virtues, as acts are ascribed to habits. But the gifts are more excellent than the cardinal virtues, as stated above (Q. 68, A.
8). Wherefore Ambrose, in explaining the beat.i.tudes propounded to the throng, a.s.signs them to the cardinal virtues, whereas Augustine, who is explaining the beat.i.tudes delivered to the disciples on the mountain, and so to those who were more perfect, ascribes them to the gifts of the Holy Ghost.
Reply Obj. 2: This argument proves that no other habits, besides the virtues and gifts, rectify human conduct.
Reply Obj. 3: Meekness is to be taken as denoting the act of meekness: and the same applies to justice and mercy. And though these might seem to be virtues, they are nevertheless ascribed to gifts, because the gifts perfect man in all matters wherein the virtues perfect him, as stated above (Q. 68, A. 2).
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SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 69, Art. 2]
Whether the Rewards a.s.signed to the Beat.i.tudes Refer to This Life?
Objection 1: It would seem that the rewards a.s.signed to the beat.i.tudes do not refer to this life. Because some are said to be happy because they hope for a reward, as stated above (A. 1). Now the object of hope is future happiness. Therefore these rewards refer to the life to come.
Obj. 2: Further, certain punishments are set down in opposition to the beat.i.tudes, Luke 6:25, where we read: "Woe to you that are filled; for you shall hunger. Woe to you that now laugh, for you shall mourn and weep." Now these punishments do not refer to this life, because frequently men are not punished in this life, according to Job 21:13: "They spend their days in wealth." Therefore neither do the rewards of the beat.i.tudes refer to this life.
Obj. 3: Further, the kingdom of heaven which is set down as the reward of poverty is the happiness of heaven, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix) [*Cf. De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 1]. Again, abundant fullness is not to be had save in the life to come, according to Ps.
16:15: "I shall be filled [Douay: "satisfied"] when Thy glory shall appear." Again, it is only in the future life that we shall see G.o.d, and that our Divine sonship will be made manifest, according to 1 John 3:2: "We are now the sons of G.o.d; and it hath not yet appeared what we shall be. We know that, when He shall appear, we shall be like to Him, because we shall see Him as He is." Therefore these rewards refer to the future life.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4): "These promises can be fulfilled in this life, as we believe them to have been fulfilled in the apostles. For no words can express that complete change into the likeness even of an angel, which is promised to us after this life."
_I answer that,_ Expounders of Holy Writ are not agreed in speaking of these rewards. For some, with Ambrose (Super Luc. v), hold that all these rewards refer to the life to come; while Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4) holds them to refer to the present life; and Chrysostom in his homilies (In Matth. xv) says that some refer to the future, and some to the present life.
In order to make the matter clear we must take note that hope of future happiness may be in us for two reasons. First, by reason of our having a preparation for, or a disposition to future happiness; and this is by way of merit; secondly, by a kind of imperfect inchoation of future happiness in holy men, even in this life. For it is one thing to hope that the tree will bear fruit, when the leaves begin to appear, and another, when we see the first signs of the fruit.
Accordingly, those things which are set down as merits in the beat.i.tudes, are a kind of preparation for, or disposition to happiness, either perfect or inchoate: while those that are a.s.signed as rewards, may be either perfect happiness, so as to refer to the future life, or some beginning of happiness, such as is found in those who have attained perfection, in which case they refer to the present life. Because when a man begins to make progress in the acts of the virtues and gifts, it is to be hoped that he will arrive at perfection, both as a wayfarer, and as a citizen of the heavenly kingdom.