Whether Sin Is Fittingly Divided into Sin Against G.o.d, Against Oneself, and Against One"s Neighbor?
Objection 1: It would seem that sin is unfittingly divided into sin against G.o.d, against one"s neighbor, and against oneself. For that which is common to all sins should not be reckoned as a part in the division of sin. But it is common to all sins to be against G.o.d: for it is stated in the definition of sin that it is "against G.o.d"s law,"
as stated above (Q. 66, A. 6). Therefore sin against G.o.d should not be reckoned a part of the division of sin.
Obj. 2: Further, every division should consist of things in opposition to one another. But these three kinds of sin are not opposed to one another: for whoever sins against his neighbor, sins against himself and against G.o.d. Therefore sin is not fittingly divided into these three.
Obj. 3: Further, specification is not taken from things external. But G.o.d and our neighbor are external to us. Therefore sins are not distinguished specifically with regard to them: and consequently sin is unfittingly divided according to these three.
_On the contrary,_ Isidore (De Summo Bono), in giving the division of sins, says that "man is said to sin against himself, against G.o.d, and against his neighbor."
_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 71, AA. 1, 6), sin is an inordinate act. Now there should be a threefold order in man: one in relation to the rule of reason, in so far as all our actions and pa.s.sions should be commensurate with the rule of reason: another order is in relation to the rule of the Divine Law, whereby man should be directed in all things: and if man were by nature a solitary animal, this twofold order would suffice. But since man is naturally a civic and social animal, as is proved in _Polit._ i, 2, hence a third order is necessary, whereby man is directed in relation to other men among whom he has to dwell. Of these orders the second contains the first and surpa.s.ses it. For whatever things are comprised under the order of reason, are comprised under the order of G.o.d Himself. Yet some things are comprised under the order of G.o.d, which surpa.s.s the human reason, such as matters of faith, and things due to G.o.d alone. Hence he that sins in such matters, for instance, by heresy, sacrilege, or blasphemy, is said to sin against G.o.d. In like manner, the first order includes the third and surpa.s.ses it, because in all things wherein we are directed in reference to our neighbor, we need to be directed according to the order of reason.
Yet in some things we are directed according to reason, in relation to ourselves only, and not in reference to our neighbor; and when man sins in these matters, he is said to sin against himself, as is seen in the glutton, the l.u.s.tful, and the prodigal. But when man sins in matters concerning his neighbor, he is said to sin against his neighbor, as appears in the thief and murderer. Now the things whereby man is directed to G.o.d, his neighbor, and himself are diverse. Wherefore this distinction of sins is in respect of their objects, according to which the species of sins are diversified: and consequently this distinction of sins is properly one of different species of sins: because the virtues also, to which sins are opposed, differ specifically in respect of these three. For it is evident from what has been said (Q. 62, AA. 1, 2, 3) that by the theological virtues man is directed to G.o.d; by temperance and fort.i.tude, to himself; and by justice to his neighbor.
Reply Obj. 1: To sin against G.o.d is common to all sins, in so far as the order to G.o.d includes every human order; but in so far as order to G.o.d surpa.s.ses the other two orders, sin against G.o.d is a special kind of sin.
Reply Obj. 2: When several things, of which one includes another, are distinct from one another, this distinction is understood to refer, not to the part contained in another, but to that in which one goes beyond another. This may be seen in the division of numbers and figures: for a triangle is distinguished from a four-sided figure not in respect of its being contained thereby, but in respect of that in which it is surpa.s.sed thereby: and the same applies to the numbers three and four.
Reply Obj. 3: Although G.o.d and our neighbor are external to the sinner himself, they are not external to the act of sin, but are related to it as to its object.
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FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 72, Art. 5]
Whether the Division of Sins According to Their Debt of Punishment Diversifies Their Species?
Objection 1: It would seem that the division of sins according to their debt of punishment diversifies their species; for instance, when sin is divided into "mortal" and "venial." For things which are infinitely apart, cannot belong to the same species, nor even to the same genus. But venial and mortal sin are infinitely apart, since temporal punishment is due to venial sin, and eternal punishment to mortal sin; and the measure of the punishment corresponds to the gravity of the fault, according to Deut. 25:2: "According to the measure of the sin shall the measure be also of the stripes be."
Therefore venial and mortal sins are not of the same genus, nor can they be said to belong to the same species.
Obj. 2: Further, some sins are mortal in virtue of their species [*_Ex genere,_ genus in this case denoting the species], as murder and adultery; and some are venial in virtue of their species, as in an idle word, and excessive laughter. Therefore venial and mortal sins differ specifically.
Obj. 3: Further, just as a virtuous act stands in relation to its reward, so does sin stand in relation to punishment. But the reward is the end of the virtuous act. Therefore punishment is the end of sin. Now sins differ specifically in relation to their ends, as stated above (A. 1, ad 1). Therefore they are also specifically distinct according to the debt of punishment.
_On the contrary,_ Those things that const.i.tute a species are prior to the species, e.g. specific differences. But punishment follows sin as the effect thereof. Therefore sins do not differ specifically according to the debt of punishment.
_I answer that,_ In things that differ specifically we find a twofold difference: the first causes the diversity of species, and is not to be found save in different species, e.g. "rational" and "irrational,"
"animate," and "inanimate": the other difference is consequent to specific diversity; and though, in some cases, it may [follow from the diversity of species], yet, in others, it may be found within the same species; thus "white" and "black" are consequent to the specific diversity of crow and swan, and yet this difference is found within the one species of man.
We must therefore say that the difference between venial and mortal sin, or any other difference is respect of the debt of punishment, cannot be a difference const.i.tuting specific diversity. For what is accidental never const.i.tutes a species; and what is outside the agent"s intention is accidental (Phys. ii, text. 50). Now it is evident that punishment is outside the intention of the sinner, wherefore it is accidentally referred to sin on the part of the sinner. Nevertheless it is referred to sin by an extrinsic principle, viz. the justice of the judge, who imposes various punishments according to the various manners of sin. Therefore the difference derived from the debt of punishment, may be consequent to the specific diversity of sins, but cannot const.i.tute it.
Now the difference between venial and mortal sin is consequent to the diversity of that inordinateness which const.i.tutes the notion of sin.
For inordinateness is twofold, one that destroys the principle of order, and another which, without destroying the principle of order, implies inordinateness in the things which follow the principle: thus, in an animal"s body, the frame may be so out of order that the vital principle is destroyed; this is the inordinateness of death; while, on the other hand, saving the vital principle, there may be disorder in the bodily humors; and then there is sickness. Now the principle of the entire moral order is the last end, which stands in the same relation to matters of action, as the indemonstrable principle does to matters of speculation (Ethic. vii, 8). Therefore when the soul is so disordered by sin as to turn away from its last end, viz. G.o.d, to Whom it is united by charity, there is mortal sin; but when it is disordered without turning away from G.o.d, there is venial sin. For even as in the body, the disorder of death which results from the destruction of the principle of life, is irreparable according to nature, while the disorder of sickness can be repaired by reason of the vital principle being preserved, so it is in matters concerning the soul. Because, in speculative matters, it is impossible to convince one who errs in the principles, whereas one who errs, but retains the principles, can be brought back to the truth by means of the principles. Likewise in practical matters, he who, by sinning, turns away from his last end, if we consider the nature of his sin, falls irreparably, and therefore is said to sin mortally and to deserve eternal punishment: whereas when a man sins without turning away from G.o.d, by the very nature of his sin, his disorder can be repaired, because the principle of the order is not destroyed; wherefore he is said to sin venially, because, to wit, he does not sin so as to deserve to be punished eternally.
Reply Obj. 1: Mortal and venial sins are infinitely apart as regards what they _turn away from,_ not as regards what they _turn to,_ viz.
the object which specifies them. Hence nothing hinders the same species from including mortal and venial sins; for instance, in the species "adultery" the first movement is a venial sin; while an idle word, which is, generally speaking, venial, may even be a mortal sin.
Reply Obj. 2: From the fact that one sin is mortal by reason of its species, and another venial by reason of its species, it follows that this difference is consequent to the specific difference of sins, not that it is the cause thereof. And this difference may be found even in things of the same species, as stated above.
Reply Obj. 3: The reward is intended by him that merits or acts virtu[ous]ly; whereas the punishment is not intended by the sinner, but, on the contrary, is against his will. Hence the comparison fails.
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SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 72, Art. 6]
Whether Sins of Commission and Omission Differ Specifically?
Objection 1: It would seem that sins of commission and omission differ specifically. For "offense" and "sin" are condivided with one another (Eph. 2:1), where it is written: "When you were dead in your offenses and sins," which words a gloss explains, saying: ""Offenses," by omitting to do what was commanded, and "sins," by doing what was forbidden." Whence it is evident that "offenses" here denotes sins of omission; while "sin" denotes sins of commission.
Therefore they differ specifically, since they are contrasted with one another as different species.
Obj. 2: Further, it is essential to sin to be against G.o.d"s law, for this is part of its definition, as is clear from what has been said (Q. 71, A. 6). Now in G.o.d"s law, the affirmative precepts, against which is the sin of omission, are different from the negative precepts, against which is the sin of omission. Therefore sins of omission and commission differ specifically.
Obj. 3: Further, omission and commission differ as affirmation and negation. Now affirmation and negation cannot be in the same species, since negation has no species; for "there is neither species nor difference of non-being," as the Philosopher states (Phys. iv, text.
67). Therefore omission and commission cannot belong to the same species.
_On the contrary,_ Omission and commission are found in the same species of sin. For the covetous man both takes what belongs to others, which is a sin of commission; and gives not of his own to whom he should give, which is a sin of omission. Therefore omission and commission do not differ specifically.
_I answer that,_ There is a twofold difference in sins; a material difference and a formal difference: the material difference is to be observed in the natural species of the sinful act; while the formal difference is gathered from their relation to one proper end, which is also their proper object. Hence we find certain acts differing from one another in the material specific difference, which are nevertheless formally in the same species of sin, because they are directed to the one same end: thus strangling, stoning, and stabbing come under the one species of murder, although the actions themselves differ specifically according to the natural species. Accordingly, if we refer to the material species in sins of omission and commission, they differ specifically, using species in a broad sense, in so far as negation and privation may have a species. But if we refer to the formal species of sins of omission and commission, they do not differ specifically, because they are directed to the same end, and proceed from the same motive. For the covetous man, in order to h.o.a.rd money, both robs, and omits to give what he ought, and in like manner, the glutton, to satiate his appet.i.te, both eats too much and omits the prescribed fasts. The same applies to other sins: for in things, negation is always founded on affirmation, which, in a manner, is its cause. Hence in the physical order it comes under the same head, that fire gives forth heat, and that it does not give forth cold.
Reply Obj. 1: This division in respect of commission and omission, is not according to different formal species, but only according to material species, as stated.
Reply Obj. 2: In G.o.d"s law, the necessity for various affirmative and negative precepts, was that men might be gradually led to virtue, first by abstaining from evil, being induced to this by the negative precepts, and afterwards by doing good, to which we are induced by the affirmative precepts. Wherefore the affirmative and negative precepts do not belong to different virtues, but to different degrees of virtue; and consequently they are not, of necessity, opposed to sins of different species. Moreover sin is not specified by that from which it turns away, because in this respect it is a negation or privation, but by that to which it turns, in so far as sin is an act.
Consequently sins do not differ specifically according to the various precepts of the Law.
Reply Obj. 3: This objection considers the material diversity of sins. It must be observed, however, that although, properly speaking, negation is not in a species, yet it is allotted to a species by reduction to the affirmation on which it is based.
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SEVENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 72, Art. 7]
Whether Sins Are Fittingly Divided into Sins of Thought, Word, and Deed?
Objection 1: It would seem that sins are unfittingly divided into sins of thought, word, and deed. For Augustine (De Trin. xii, 12) describes three stages of sin, of which the first is "when the carnal sense offers a bait," which is the sin of thought; the second stage is reached "when one is satisfied with the mere pleasure of thought"; and the third stage, "when consent is given to the deed." Now these three belong to the sin of thought. Therefore it is unfitting to reckon sin of thought as one kind of sin.
Obj. 2: Further, Gregory (Moral. iv, 25) reckons four degrees of sin; the first of which is "a fault hidden in the heart"; the second, "when it is done openly"; the third, "when it is formed into a habit"; and the fourth, "when man goes so far as to presume on G.o.d"s mercy or to give himself up to despair": where no distinction is made between sins of deed and sins of word, and two other degrees of sin are added. Therefore the first division was unfitting.
Obj. 3: Further, there can be no sin of word or deed unless there precede sin of thought. Therefore these sins do not differ specifically. Therefore they should not be condivided with one another.
_On the contrary,_ Jerome in commenting on Ezech. 43:23, says: "The human race is subject to three kinds of sin, for when we sin, it is either by thought, or word, or deed."
_I answer that,_ Things differ specifically in two ways: first, when each has the complete species; thus a horse and an ox differ specifically: secondly, when the diversity of species is derived from diversity of degree in generation or movement: thus the building is the complete generation of a house, while the laying of the foundations, and the setting up of the walls are incomplete species, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. x, 4); and the same can apply to the generation of animals. Accordingly sins are divided into these three, viz. sins of thought, word, and deed, not as into various complete species: for the consummation of sin is in the deed, wherefore sins of deed have the complete species; but the first beginning of sin is its foundation, as it were, in the sin of thought; the second degree is the sin of word, in so far as man is ready to break out into a declaration of his thought; while the third degree consists in the consummation of the deed. Consequently these three differ in respect of the various degrees of sin. Nevertheless it is evident that these three belong to the one complete species of sin, since they proceed from the same motive. For the angry man, through desire of vengeance, is at first disturbed in thought, then he breaks out into words of abuse, and lastly he goes on to wrongful deeds; and the same applies to l.u.s.t and to any other sin.
Reply Obj. 1: All sins of thought have the common note of secrecy, in respect of which they form one degree, which is, however, divided into three stages, viz. of cogitation, pleasure, and consent.
Reply Obj. 2: Sins of words and deed are both done openly, and for this reason Gregory (Moral. iv, 25) reckons them under one head: whereas Jerome (in commenting on Ezech. 43:23) distinguishes between them, because in sins of word there is nothing but manifestation which is intended princ.i.p.ally; while in sins of deed, it is the consummation of the inward thought which is princ.i.p.ally intended, and the outward manifestation is by way of sequel. Habit and despair are stages following the complete species of sin, even as boyhood and youth follow the complete generation of a man.
Reply Obj. 3: Sin of thought and sin of word are not distinct from the sin of deed when they are united together with it, but when each is found by itself: even as one part of a movement is not distinct from the whole movement, when the movement is continuous, but only when there is a break in the movement.
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EIGHTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 72, Art. 8]
Whether Excess and Deficiency Diversify the Species of Sins?
Objection 1: It would seem that excess and deficiency do not diversify the species of sins. For excess and deficiency differ in respect of more and less. Now "more" and "less" do not diversify a species. Therefore excess and deficiency do not diversify the species of sins.