THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q, 80, Art. 3]
Whether the Devil Can Induce Man to Sin of Necessity?
Objection 1: It would seem that the devil can induce man to sin of necessity. Because the greater can compel the lesser. Now it is said of the devil (Job 41:24) that "there is no power on earth that can compare with him." Therefore he can compel man to sin, while he dwells on the earth.
Obj. 2: Further, man"s reason cannot be moved except in respect of things that are offered outwardly to the senses, or are represented to the imagination: because "all our knowledge arises from the senses, and we cannot understand without a phantasm" (De Anima iii, text. 30. 39). Now the devil can move man"s imagination, as stated above (A. 2); and also the external senses, for Augustine says (Qq.
lx.x.xiii, qu. 12) that "this evil," of which, to wit, the devil is the cause, "extends gradually through all the approaches to the senses, it adapts itself to shapes, blends with colors, mingles with sounds, seasons every flavor." Therefore it can incline man"s reason to sin of necessity.
Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 4) that "there is some sin when the flesh l.u.s.teth against the spirit." Now the devil can cause concupiscence of the flesh, even as other pa.s.sions, in the way explained above (A. 2). Therefore he can induce man to sin of necessity.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (1 Pet. 5:8): "Your adversary the devil, as a roaring lion, goeth about seeking whom he may devour."
Now it would be useless to admonish thus, if it were true that man were under the necessity of succ.u.mbing to the devil. Therefore he cannot induce man to sin of necessity.
Further, it is likewise written (Jam. 4:7): "Be subject ... to G.o.d, but resist the devil, and he will fly from you," which would be said neither rightly nor truly, if the devil were able to compel us, in any way whatever, to sin; for then neither would it be possible to resist him, nor would he fly from those who do. Therefore he does not compel to sin.
_I answer that,_ The devil, by his own power, unless he be restrained by G.o.d, can compel anyone to do an act which, in its genus, is a sin; but he cannot bring about the necessity of sinning. This is evident from the fact that man does not resist that which moves him to sin, except by his reason; the use of which the devil is able to impede altogether, by moving the imagination and the sensitive appet.i.te; as is the case with one who is possessed. But then, the reason being thus fettered, whatever man may do, it is not imputed to him as a sin. If, however, the reason is not altogether fettered, then, in so far as it is free, it can resist sin, as stated above (Q. 77, A. 7).
It is consequently evident that the devil can nowise compel man to sin.
Reply Obj. 1: Not every power that is greater than man, can move man"s will; G.o.d alone can do this, as stated above (Q. 9, A. 6).
Reply Obj. 2: That which is apprehended by the senses or the imagination does not move the will, of necessity, so long as man has the use of reason; nor does such an apprehension always fetter the reason.
Reply Obj. 3: The l.u.s.ting of the flesh against the spirit, when the reason actually resists it, is not a sin, but is matter for the exercise of virtue. That reason does not resist, is not in the devil"s power; wherefore he cannot bring about the necessity of sinning.
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FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 80, Art. 4]
Whether All the Sins of Men Are Due to the Devil"s Suggestion?
Objection 1: It would seem that all the sins of men are due to the devil"s suggestion. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that the "crowd of demons are the cause of all evils, both to themselves and to others."
Obj. 2: Further, whoever sins mortally, becomes the slave of the devil, according to John 8:34: "Whosoever committeth sin is the slave [Douay: "servant"] of sin." Now "by whom a man is overcome, of the same also he is the slave" (2 Pet. 2:19). Therefore whoever commits a sin, has been overcome by the devil.
Obj. 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. iv, 10) the sin of the devil is irreparable, because he sinned at no other"s suggestion. Therefore, if any men were to sin of their own free-will and without suggestion from any other, their sin would be irremediable: which is clearly false. Therefore all the sins of men are due to the devil"s suggestion.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (De Eccl. Dogm. lx.x.xii): "Not all our evil thoughts are incited by the devil; sometimes they are due to a movement of the free-will."
_I answer that,_ the devil is the occasional and indirect cause of all our sins, in so far as he induced the first man to sin, by reason of whose sin human nature is so infected, that we are all p.r.o.ne to sin: even as the burning of wood might be imputed to the man who dried the wood so as to make it easily inflammable. He is not, however, the direct cause of all the sins of men, as though each were the result of his suggestion. Origen proves this (Peri Archon iii, 2) from the fact that even if the devil were no more, men would still have the desire for food, s.e.xual pleasures and the like; which desire might be inordinate, unless it were subordinate to reason, a matter that is subject to the free-will.
Reply Obj. 1: The crowd of demons are the cause of all our evils, as regards their original cause, as stated.
Reply Obj. 2: A man becomes another"s slave not only by being overcome by him, but also by subjecting himself to him spontaneously: it is thus that one who sins of his own accord, becomes the slave of the devil.
Reply Obj. 3: The devil"s sin was irremediable, not only because he sinned without another"s suggestion; but also because he was not already p.r.o.ne to sin, on account of any previous sin; which can be said of no sin of man.
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QUESTION 81
OF THE CAUSE OF SIN, ON THE PART OF MAN (In Five Articles)
We must now consider the cause of sin, on the part of man. Now, while man, like the devil, is the cause of another"s sin, by outward suggestion, he has a certain special manner of causing sin, by way of origin. Wherefore we must speak about original sin, the consideration of which will be three-fold: (1) Of its transmission; (2) of its essence; (3) of its subject.
Under the first head there are five points of inquiry:
(1) Whether man"s first sin is transmitted, by way of origin to his descendants?
(2) Whether all the other sins of our first parent, or of any other parents, are transmitted to their descendants, by way of origin?
(3) Whether original sin is contracted by all those who are begotten of Adam by way of seminal generation?
(4) Whether it would be contracted by anyone formed miraculously from some part of the human body?
(5) Whether original sin would have been contracted if the woman, and not the man, had sinned?
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FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 81, Art. 1]
Whether the First Sin of Our First Parent Is Contracted by His Descendants, by Way of Origin?
Objection 1: It would seem that the first sin of our first parent is not contracted by others, by way of origin. For it is written (Ezech.
18:20): "The son shall not bear the iniquity of the father." But he would bear the iniquity if he contracted it from him. Therefore no one contracts any sin from one of his parents by way of origin.
Obj. 2: Further, an accident is not transmitted by way of origin, unless its subject be also transmitted, since accidents do not pa.s.s from one subject to another. Now the rational soul which is the subject of sin, is not transmitted by way of origin, as was shown in the First Part (Q. 118, A. 2). Therefore neither can any sin be transmitted by way of origin.
Obj. 3: Further, whatever is transmitted by way of human origin, is caused by the s.e.m.e.n. But the s.e.m.e.n cannot cause sin, because it lacks the rational part of the soul, which alone can be a cause of sin.
Therefore no sin can be contracted by way of origin.
Obj. 4: Further, that which is more perfect in nature, is more powerful in action. Now perfect flesh cannot infect the soul united to it, else the soul could not be cleansed of original sin, so long as it is united to the body. Much less, therefore, can the s.e.m.e.n infect the soul.
Obj. 5: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5): "No one finds fault with those who are ugly by nature, but only those who are so through want of exercise and through carelessness." Now those are said to be "naturally ugly," who are so from their origin. Therefore nothing which comes by way of origin is blameworthy or sinful.
_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Rom. 5:12): "By one man sin entered into this world, and by sin death." Nor can this be understood as denoting imitation or suggestion, since it is written (Wis. 2:24): "By the envy of the devil, death came into this world."
It follows therefore that through origin from the first man sin entered into the world.
_I answer that,_ According to the Catholic Faith we are bound to hold that the first sin of the first man is transmitted to his descendants, by way of origin. For this reason children are taken to be baptized soon after their birth, to show that they have to be washed from some uncleanness. The contrary is part of the Pelagian heresy, as is clear from Augustine in many of his books [*For instance, Retract. i, 9; De Pecc. Merit. et Remiss. ix; Contra Julian. iii, 1; De Dono Persev. xi, xii.]
In endeavoring to explain how the sin of our first parent could be transmitted by way of origin to his descendants, various writers have gone about it in various ways. For some, considering that the subject of sin is the rational soul, maintained that the rational soul is transmitted with the s.e.m.e.n, so that thus an infected soul would seem to produce other infected souls. Others, rejecting this as erroneous, endeavored to show how the guilt of the parent"s soul can be transmitted to the children, even though the soul be not transmitted, from the fact that defects of the body are transmitted from parent to child--thus a leper may beget a leper, or a gouty man may be the father of a gouty son, on account of some seminal corruption, although this corruption is not leprosy or gout. Now since the body is proportionate to the soul, and since the soul"s defects redound into the body, and vice versa, in like manner, say they, a culpable defect of the soul is pa.s.sed on to the child, through the transmission of the s.e.m.e.n, albeit the s.e.m.e.n itself is not the subject of the guilt.
But all these explanations are insufficient. Because, granted that some bodily defects are transmitted by way of origin from parent to child, and granted that even some defects of the soul are transmitted in consequence, on account of a defect in the bodily habit, as in the case of idiots begetting idiots; nevertheless the fact of having a defect by the way of origin seems to exclude the notion of guilt, which is essentially something voluntary. Wherefore granted that the rational soul were transmitted, from the very fact that the stain on the child"s soul is not in its will, it would cease to be a guilty stain binding its subject to punishment; for, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5), "no one reproaches a man born blind; one rather takes pity on him."
Therefore we must explain the matter otherwise by saying that all men born of Adam may be considered as one man, inasmuch as they have one common nature, which they receive from their first parents; even as in civil matters, all who are members of one community are reputed as one body, and the whole community as one man. Indeed Porphyry says (Praedic., De Specie) that "by sharing the same species, many men are one man." Accordingly the mult.i.tude of men born of Adam, are as so many members of one body. Now the action of one member of the body, of the hand for instance, is voluntary not by the will of that hand, but by the will of the soul, the first mover of the members.
Wherefore a murder which the hand commits would not be imputed as a sin to the hand, considered by itself as apart from the body, but is imputed to it as something belonging to man and moved by man"s first moving principle. In this way, then, the disorder which is in this man born of Adam, is voluntary, not by his will, but by the will of his first parent, who, by the movement of generation, moves all who originate from him, even as the soul"s will moves all the members to their actions. Hence the sin which is thus transmitted by the first parent to his descendants is called "original," just as the sin which flows from the soul into the bodily members is called "actual." And just as the actual sin that is committed by a member of the body, is not the sin of that member, except inasmuch as that member is a part of the man, for which reason it is called a "human sin"; so original sin is not the sin of this person, except inasmuch as this person receives his nature from his first parent, for which reason it is called the "sin of nature," according to Eph. 2:3: "We ... were by nature children of wrath."
Reply Obj. 1: The son is said not to bear the iniquity of his father, because he is not punished for his father"s sin, unless he share in his guilt. It is thus in the case before us: because guilt is transmitted by the way of origin from father to son, even as actual sin is transmitted through being imitated.
Reply Obj. 2: Although the soul is not transmitted, because the power in the s.e.m.e.n is not able to cause the rational soul, nevertheless the motion of the s.e.m.e.n is a disposition to the transmission of the rational soul: so that the s.e.m.e.n by its own power transmits the human nature from parent to child, and with that nature, the stain which infects it: for he that is born is a.s.sociated with his first parent in his guilt, through the fact that he inherits his nature from him by a kind of movement which is that of generation.
Reply Obj. 3: Although the guilt is not actually in the s.e.m.e.n, yet human nature is there virtually accompanied by that guilt.