Because human acts produce an inclination to like acts, as stated above (Q. 50, A. 1). Now from the very fact that thing becomes inclined to one of two contraries, its inclination to the other contrary must needs be diminished. Wherefore as sin is opposed to virtue, from the very fact that a man sins, there results a diminution of that good of nature, which is the inclination to virtue.
Reply Obj. 1: Dionysius is speaking of the first-mentioned good of nature, which consists in "being, living and understanding," as anyone may see who reads the context.
Reply Obj. 2: Although nature precedes the voluntary action, it has an inclination to a certain voluntary action. Wherefore nature is not changed in itself, through a change in the voluntary action: it is the inclination that is changed in so far as it is directed to its term.
Reply Obj. 3: A voluntary action proceeds from various powers, active and pa.s.sive. The result is that through voluntary actions something is caused or taken away in the man who acts, as we have stated when treating of the production of habits (Q. 51, A. 2).
Reply Obj. 4: An accident does not act effectively on its subject, but it acts on it formally, in the same sense as when we say that whiteness makes a thing white. In this way there is nothing to hinder sin from diminishing the good of nature; but only in so far as sin is itself a diminution of the good of nature, through being an inordinateness of action. But as regards the inordinateness of the agent, we must say that such like inordinateness is caused by the fact that in the acts of the soul, there is an active, and a pa.s.sive element: thus the sensible object moves the sensitive appet.i.te, and the sensitive appet.i.te inclines the reason and will, as stated above (Q. 77, AA. 1, 2). The result of this is the inordinateness, not as though an accident acted on its own subject, but in so far as the object acts on the power, and one power acts on another and puts it out of order.
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SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 85, Art. 2]
Whether the Entire Good of Human Nature Can Be Destroyed by Sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that the entire good of human nature can be destroyed by sin. For the good of human nature is finite, since human nature itself is finite. Now any finite thing is entirely taken away, if the subtraction be continuous. Since therefore the good of nature can be continually diminished by sin, it seems that in the end it can be entirely taken away.
Obj. 2: Further, in a thing of one nature, the whole and the parts are uniform, as is evidently the case with air, water, flesh and all bodies with similar parts. But the good of nature is wholly uniform.
Since therefore a part thereof can be taken away by sin, it seems that the whole can also be taken away by sin.
Obj. 3: Further, the good of nature, that is weakened by sin, is apt.i.tude for virtue. Now this apt.i.tude is destroyed entirely in some on account of sin: thus the lost cannot be restored to virtue any more than the blind can to sight. Therefore sin can take away the good of nature entirely.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Enchiridion xiv) that "evil does not exist except in some good." But the evil of sin cannot be in the good of virtue or of grace, because they are contrary to it.
Therefore it must be in the good of nature, and consequently it does not destroy it entirely.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), the good of nature, that is diminished by sin, is the natural inclination to virtue, which is befitting to man from the very fact that he is a rational being; for it is due to this that he performs actions in accord with reason, which is to act virtuously. Now sin cannot entirely take away from man the fact that he is a rational being, for then he would no longer be capable of sin. Wherefore it is not possible for this good of nature to be destroyed entirely.
Since, however, this same good of nature may be continually diminished by sin, some, in order to ill.u.s.trate this, have made use of the example of a finite thing being diminished indefinitely, without being entirely destroyed. For the Philosopher says (Phys. i, text. 37) that if from a finite magnitude a continual subtraction be made in the same quant.i.ty, it will at last be entirely destroyed, for instance if from any finite length I continue to subtract the length of a span. If, however, the subtraction be made each time in the same proportion, and not in the same quant.i.ty, it may go on indefinitely, as, for instance, if a quant.i.ty be halved, and one half be diminished by half, it will be possible to go on thus indefinitely, provided that what is subtracted in each case be less than what was subtracted before. But this does not apply to the question at issue, since a subsequent sin does not diminish the good of nature less than a previous sin, but perhaps more, if it be a more grievous sin.
We must, therefore, explain the matter otherwise by saying that the aforesaid inclination is to be considered as a middle term between two others: for it is based on the rational nature as on its root, and tends to the good of virtue, as to its term and end. Consequently its diminution may be understood in two ways: first, on the part of its root, secondly, on the part of its term. In the first way, it is not diminished by sin, because sin does not diminish nature, as stated above (A. 1). But it is diminished in the second way, in so far as an obstacle is placed against its attaining its term. Now if it were diminished in the first way, it would needs be entirely destroyed at last by the rational nature being entirely destroyed.
Since, however, it is diminished on the part of the obstacle which is placed against its attaining its term, it is evident that it can be diminished indefinitely, because obstacles can be placed indefinitely, inasmuch as man can go on indefinitely adding sin to sin: and yet it cannot be destroyed entirely, because the root of this inclination always remains. An example of this may be seen in a transparent body, which has an inclination to receive light, from the very fact that it is transparent; yet this inclination or apt.i.tude is diminished on the part of supervening clouds, although it always remains rooted in the nature of the body.
Reply Obj. 1: This objection avails when diminution is made by subtraction. But here the diminution is made by raising obstacles, and this neither diminishes nor destroys the root of the inclination, as stated above.
Reply Obj. 2: The natural inclination is indeed wholly uniform: nevertheless it stands in relation both to its principle and to its term, in respect of which diversity of relation, it is diminished on the one hand, and not on the other.
Reply Obj. 3: Even in the lost the natural inclination to virtue remains, else they would have no remorse of conscience. That it is not reduced to act is owing to their being deprived of grace by Divine justice. Thus even in a blind man the apt.i.tude to see remains in the very root of his nature, inasmuch as he is an animal naturally endowed with sight: yet this apt.i.tude is not reduced to act, for the lack of a cause capable of reducing it, by forming the organ requisite for sight.
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THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 85, Art. 3]
Whether Weakness, Ignorance, Malice and Concupiscence Are Suitably Reckoned As the Wounds of Nature Consequent Upon Sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that weakness, ignorance, malice and concupiscence are not suitably reckoned as the wounds of nature consequent upon sin. For one same thing is not both effect and cause of the same thing. But these are reckoned to be causes of sin, as appears from what has been said above (Q. 76, A. 1; Q. 77, AA. 3, 5; Q. 78, A. 1). Therefore they should not be reckoned as effects of sin.
Obj. 2: Further, malice is the name of a sin. Therefore it should have no place among the effects of sin.
Obj. 3: Further, concupiscence is something natural, since it is an act of the concupiscible power. But that which is natural should not be reckoned a wound of nature. Therefore concupiscence should not be reckoned a wound of nature.
Obj. 4: Further, it has been stated (Q. 77, A. 3) that to sin from weakness is the same as to sin from pa.s.sion. But concupiscence is a pa.s.sion. Therefore it should not be condivided with weakness.
Obj. 5: Further, Augustine (De Nat. et Grat. lxvii, 67) reckons "two things to be punishments inflicted on the soul of the sinner, viz.
ignorance and difficulty," from which arise "error and vexation,"
which four do not coincide with the four in question. Therefore it seems that one or the other reckoning is incomplete.
_On the contrary,_ The authority of Bede suffices [*Reference not known].
_I answer that,_ As a result of original justice, the reason had perfect hold over the lower parts of the soul, while reason itself was perfected by G.o.d, and was subject to Him. Now this same original justice was forfeited through the sin of our first parent, as already stated (Q. 81, A. 2); so that all the powers of the soul are left, as it were, dest.i.tute of their proper order, whereby they are naturally directed to virtue; which dest.i.tution is called a wounding of nature.
Again, there are four of the soul"s powers that can be subject of virtue, as stated above (Q. 61, A. 2), viz. the reason, where prudence resides, the will, where justice is, the irascible, the subject of fort.i.tude, and the concupiscible, the subject of temperance. Therefore in so far as the reason is deprived of its order to the true, there is the wound of ignorance; in so far as the will is deprived of its order of good, there is the wound of malice; in so far as the irascible is deprived of its order to the arduous, there is the wound of weakness; and in so far as the concupiscible is deprived of its order to the delectable, moderated by reason, there is the wound of concupiscence.
Accordingly these are the four wounds inflicted on the whole of human nature as a result of our first parent"s sin. But since the inclination to the good of virtue is diminished in each individual on account of actual sin, as was explained above (AA. 1, 2), these four wounds are also the result of other sins, in so far as, through sin, the reason is obscured, especially in practical matters, the will hardened to evil, good actions become more difficult and concupiscence more impetuous.
Reply Obj. 1: There is no reason why the effect of one sin should not be the cause of another: because the soul, through sinning once, is more easily inclined to sin again.
Reply Obj. 2: Malice is not to be taken here as a sin, but as a certain p.r.o.neness of the will to evil, according to the words of Gen.
8:21: "Man"s senses are p.r.o.ne to evil from his youth" [*Vulgate: "The imagination and thought of man"s heart are p.r.o.ne to evil from his youth."].
Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (Q. 82, A. 3, ad 1), concupiscence is natural to man, in so far as it is subject to reason: whereas, in so far as it is goes beyond the bounds of reason, it is unnatural to man.
Reply Obj. 4: Speaking in a general way, every pa.s.sion can be called a weakness, in so far as it weakens the soul"s strength and clogs the reason. Bede, however, took weakness in the strict sense, as contrary to fort.i.tude which pertains to the irascible.
Reply Obj. 5: The "difficulty" which is mentioned in this book of Augustine, includes the three wounds affecting the appet.i.tive powers, viz. "malice," "weakness" and "concupiscence," for it is owing to these three that a man finds it difficult to tend to the good.
"Error" and "vexation" are consequent wounds, since a man is vexed through being weakened in respect of the objects of his concupiscence.
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FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 85, Art. 4]
Whether Privation of Mode, Species and Order Is the Effect of Sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that privation of mode, species and order is not the effect of sin. For Augustine says (De Natura Boni iii) that "where these three abound, the good is great; where they are less, there is less good; where they are not, there is no good at all." But sin does not destroy the good of nature. Therefore it does not destroy mode, species and order.
Obj. 2: Further, nothing is its own cause. But sin itself is the "privation of mode, species and order," as Augustine states (De Natura Boni iv). Therefore privation of mode, species and order is not the effect of sin.
Obj. 3: Further, different effects result from different sins. Now since mode, species and order are diverse, their corresponding privations must be diverse also, and, consequently, must be the result of different sins. Therefore privation of mode, species and order is not the effect of each sin.
_On the contrary,_ Sin is to the soul what weakness is to the body, according to Ps. 6:3, "Have mercy on me, O Lord, for I am weak." Now weakness deprives the body of mode, species and order.
_I answer that,_ As stated in the First Part, Q. 5, A. 5, mode, species and order are consequent upon every created good, as such, and also upon every being. Because every being and every good as such depends on its form from which it derives its species. Again, any kind of form, whether substantial or accidental, of anything whatever, is according to some measure, wherefore it is stated in _Metaph._ viii, that "the forms of things are like numbers," so that a form has a certain _mode_ corresponding to its measure. Lastly owing to its form, each thing has a relation of _order_ to something else.
Accordingly there are different grades of mode, species and order, corresponding to the different degrees of good. For there is a good belonging to the very substance of nature, which good has its mode, species and order, and is neither destroyed nor diminished by sin.
There is again the good of the natural inclination, which also has its mode, species and order; and this is diminished by sin, as stated above (AA. 1, 2), but is not entirely destroyed. Again, there is the good of virtue and grace: this too has its mode, species and order, and is entirely taken away by sin. Lastly, there is a good consisting in the ordinate act itself, which also has its mode, species and order, the privation of which is essentially sin. Hence it is clear both how sin is privation of mode, species and order, and how it destroys or diminishes mode, species and order.
This suffices for the Replies to the first two Objections.
Reply Obj. 3: Mode, species and order follow one from the other, as explained above: and so they are destroyed or diminished together.
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FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 85, Art. 5]