Consequently the Divine intellect is true in itself; and its type is truth itself.
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SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 93, Art. 2]
Whether the Eternal Law Is Known to All?
Objection 1: It would seem that the eternal law is not known to all.
Because, as the Apostle says (1 Cor. 2:11), "the things that are of G.o.d no man knoweth, but the Spirit of G.o.d." But the eternal law is a type existing in the Divine mind. Therefore it is unknown to all save G.o.d alone.
Obj. 2: Further, as Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) "the eternal law is that by which it is right that all things should be most orderly." But all do not know how all things are most orderly.
Therefore all do not know the eternal law.
Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. x.x.xi) that "the eternal law is not subject to the judgment of man." But according to _Ethic._ i, "any man can judge well of what he knows." Therefore the eternal law is not known to us.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) that "knowledge of the eternal law is imprinted on us."
_I answer that,_ A thing may be known in two ways: first, in itself; secondly, in its effect, wherein some likeness of that thing is found: thus someone not seeing the sun in its substance, may know it by its rays. So then no one can know the eternal law, as it is in itself, except the blessed who see G.o.d in His Essence. But every rational creature knows it in its reflection, greater or less. For every knowledge of truth is a kind of reflection and partic.i.p.ation of the eternal law, which is the unchangeable truth, as Augustine says (De Vera Relig. x.x.xi). Now all men know the truth to a certain extent, at least as to the common principles of the natural law: and as to the others, they partake of the knowledge of truth, some more, some less; and in this respect are more or less cognizant of the eternal law.
Reply Obj. 1: We cannot know the things that are of G.o.d, as they are in themselves; but they are made known to us in their effects, according to Rom. 1:20: "The invisible things of G.o.d ... are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made."
Reply Obj. 2: Although each one knows the eternal law according to his own capacity, in the way explained above, yet none can comprehend it: for it cannot be made perfectly known by its effects. Therefore it does not follow that anyone who knows the eternal law in the way aforesaid, knows also the whole order of things, whereby they are most orderly.
Reply Obj. 3: To judge a thing may be understood in two ways. First, as when a cognitive power judges of its proper object, according to Job 12:11: "Doth not the ear discern words, and the palate of him that eateth, the taste?" It is to this kind of judgment that the Philosopher alludes when he says that "anyone can judge well of what he knows," by judging, namely, whether what is put forward is true.
In another way we speak of a superior judging of a subordinate by a kind of practical judgment, as to whether he should be such and such or not. And thus none can judge of the eternal law.
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THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 93, Art. 3]
Whether Every Law Is Derived from the Eternal Law?
Objection 1: It would seem that not every law is derived from the eternal law. For there is a law of the _fomes,_ as stated above (Q.
91, A. 6), which is not derived from that Divine law which is the eternal law, since thereunto pertains the "prudence of the flesh," of which the Apostle says (Rom. 8:7), that "it cannot be subject to the law of G.o.d." Therefore not every law is derived from the eternal law.
Obj. 2: Further, nothing unjust can be derived from the eternal law, because, as stated above (A. 2, Obj. 2), "the eternal law is that, according to which it is right that all things should be most orderly." But some laws are unjust, according to Isa. 10:1: "Woe to them that make wicked laws." Therefore not every law is derived from the eternal law.
Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 5) that "the law which is framed for ruling the people, rightly permits many things which are punished by Divine providence." But the type of Divine providence is the eternal law, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore not even every good law is derived from the eternal law.
_On the contrary,_ Divine Wisdom says (Prov. 8:15): "By Me kings reign, and lawgivers decree just things." But the type of Divine Wisdom is the eternal law, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore all laws proceed from the eternal law.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 90, AA. 1, 2), the law denotes a kind of plan directing acts towards an end. Now wherever there are movers ordained to one another, the power of the second mover must needs be derived from the power of the first mover; since the second mover does not move except in so far as it is moved by the first.
Wherefore we observe the same in all those who govern, so that the plan of government is derived by secondary governors from the governor in chief; thus the plan of what is to be done in a state flows from the king"s command to his inferior administrators: and again in things of art the plan of whatever is to be done by art flows from the chief craftsman to the under-craftsmen, who work with their hands. Since then the eternal law is the plan of government in the Chief Governor, all the plans of government in the inferior governors must be derived from the eternal law. But these plans of inferior governors are all other laws besides the eternal law.
Therefore all laws, in so far as they partake of right reason, are derived from the eternal law. Hence Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) that "in temporal law there is nothing just and lawful, but what man has drawn from the eternal law."
Reply Obj. 1: The _fomes_ has the nature of law in man, in so far as it is a punishment resulting from Divine justice; and in this respect it is evident that it is derived from the eternal law. But in so far as it denotes a p.r.o.neness to sin, it is contrary to the Divine law, and has not the nature of law, as stated above (Q. 91, A. 6).
Reply Obj. 2: Human law has the nature of law in so far as it partakes of right reason; and it is clear that, in this respect, it is derived from the eternal law. But in so far as it deviates from reason, it is called an unjust law, and has the nature, not of law but of violence. Nevertheless even an unjust law, in so far as it retains some appearance of law, though being framed by one who is in power, is derived from the eternal law; since all power is from the Lord G.o.d, according to Rom. 13:1.
Reply Obj. 3: Human law is said to permit certain things, not as approving them, but as being unable to direct them. And many things are directed by the Divine law, which human law is unable to direct, because more things are subject to a higher than to a lower cause.
Hence the very fact that human law does not meddle with matters it cannot direct, comes under the ordination of the eternal law. It would be different, were human law to sanction what the eternal law condemns. Consequently it does not follow that human law is not derived from the eternal law, but that it is not on a perfect equality with it.
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FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 93, Art. 4]
Whether Necessary and Eternal Things Are Subject to the Eternal Law?
Objection 1: It would seem that necessary and eternal things are subject to the eternal law. For whatever is reasonable is subject to reason. But the Divine will is reasonable, for it is just. Therefore it is subject to (the Divine) reason. But the eternal law is the Divine reason. Therefore G.o.d"s will is subject to the eternal law.
But G.o.d"s will is eternal. Therefore eternal and necessary things are subject to the eternal law.
Obj. 2: Further, whatever is subject to the King, is subject to the King"s law. Now the Son, according to 1 Cor. 15:28, 24, "shall be subject ... to G.o.d and the Father ... when He shall have delivered up the Kingdom to Him." Therefore the Son, Who is eternal, is subject to the eternal law.
Obj. 3: Further, the eternal law is Divine providence as a type. But many necessary things are subject to Divine providence: for instance, the stability of incorporeal substances and of the heavenly bodies.
Therefore even necessary things are subject to the eternal law.
_On the contrary,_ Things that are necessary cannot be otherwise, and consequently need no restraining. But laws are imposed on men, in order to restrain them from evil, as explained above (Q. 92, A. 2).
Therefore necessary things are not subject to the eternal law.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), the eternal law is the type of the Divine government. Consequently whatever is subject to the Divine government, is subject to the eternal law: while if anything is not subject to the Divine government, neither is it subject to the eternal law. The application of this distinction may be gathered by looking around us. For those things are subject to human government, which can be done by man; but what pertains to the nature of man is not subject to human government; for instance, that he should have a soul, hands, or feet. Accordingly all that is in things created by G.o.d, whether it be contingent or necessary, is subject to the eternal law: while things pertaining to the Divine Nature or Essence are not subject to the eternal law, but are the eternal law itself.
Reply Obj. 1: We may speak of G.o.d"s will in two ways. First, as to the will itself: and thus, since G.o.d"s will is His very Essence, it is subject neither to the Divine government, nor to the eternal law, but is the same thing as the eternal law. Secondly, we may speak of G.o.d"s will, as to the things themselves that G.o.d wills about creatures; which things are subject to the eternal law, in so far as they are planned by Divine Wisdom. In reference to these things G.o.d"s will is said to be reasonable (_rationalis_): though regarded in itself it should rather be called their type (_ratio_).
Reply Obj. 2: G.o.d the Son was not made by G.o.d, but was naturally born of G.o.d. Consequently He is not subject to Divine providence or to the eternal law: but rather is Himself the eternal law by a kind of appropriation, as Augustine explains (De Vera Relig. x.x.xi). But He is said to be subject to the Father by reason of His human nature, in respect of which also the Father is said to be greater than He.
The third objection we grant, because it deals with those necessary things that are created.
Reply Obj. 4: As the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 6), some necessary things have a cause of their necessity: and thus they derive from something else the fact that they cannot be otherwise.
And this is in itself a most effective restraint; for whatever is restrained, is said to be restrained in so far as it cannot do otherwise than it is allowed to.
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FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 93, Art. 5]
Whether Natural Contingents Are Subject to the Eternal Law?
Objection 1: It would seem that natural contingents are not subject to the eternal law. Because promulgation is essential to law, as stated above (Q. 90, A. 4). But a law cannot be promulgated except to rational creatures, to whom it is possible to make an announcement.
Therefore none but rational creatures are subject to the eternal law; and consequently natural contingents are not.
Obj. 2: Further, "Whatever obeys reason partakes somewhat of reason,"
as stated in _Ethic._ i. But the eternal law is the supreme type, as stated above (A. 1). Since then natural contingents do not partake of reason in any way, but are altogether void of reason, it seems that they are not subject to the eternal law.
Obj. 3: Further, the eternal law is most efficient. But in natural contingents defects occur. Therefore they are not subject to the eternal law.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Prov. 8:29): "When He compa.s.sed the sea with its bounds, and set a law to the waters, that they should not pa.s.s their limits."
_I answer that,_ We must speak otherwise of the law of man, than of the eternal law which is the law of G.o.d. For the law of man extends only to rational creatures subject to man. The reason of this is because law directs the actions of those that are subject to the government of someone: wherefore, properly speaking, none imposes a law on his own actions. Now whatever is done regarding the use of irrational things subject to man, is done by the act of man himself moving those things, for these irrational creatures do not move themselves, but are moved by others, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 2).
Consequently man cannot impose laws on irrational beings, however much they may be subject to him. But he can impose laws on rational beings subject to him, in so far as by his command or p.r.o.nouncement of any kind, he imprints on their minds a rule which is a principle of action.
Now just as man, by such p.r.o.nouncement, impresses a kind of inward principle of action on the man that is subject to him, so G.o.d imprints on the whole of nature the principles of its proper actions.
And so, in this way, G.o.d is said to command the whole of nature, according to Ps. 148:6: "He hath made a decree, and it shall not pa.s.s away." And thus all actions and movements of the whole of nature are subject to the eternal law. Consequently irrational creatures are subject to the eternal law, through being moved by Divine providence; but not, as rational creatures are, through understanding the Divine commandment.
Reply Obj. 1: The impression of an inward active principle is to natural things, what the promulgation of law is to men: because law, by being promulgated, imprints on man a directive principle of human actions, as stated above.