Reply Obj. 2: Faith, which is a gift of grace, inclines man to believe, by giving him a certain affection for the good, even when that faith is lifeless. Consequently the faith which the demons have, is not a gift of grace. Rather are they compelled to believe through their natural intellectual ac.u.men.
Reply Obj. 3: The very fact that the signs of faith are so evident, that the demons are compelled to believe, is displeasing to them, so that their malice is by no means diminished by their belief.
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THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 5, Art. 3]
Whether a Man Who Disbelieves One Article of Faith, Can Have Lifeless Faith in the Other Articles?
Objection 1: It would seem that a heretic who disbelieves one article of faith, can have lifeless faith in the other articles. For the natural intellect of a heretic is not more able than that of a catholic. Now a catholic"s intellect needs the aid of the gift of faith in order to believe any article whatever of faith. Therefore it seems that heretics cannot believe any articles of faith without the gift of lifeless faith.
Obj. 2: Further, just as faith contains many articles, so does one science, viz. geometry, contain many conclusions. Now a man may possess the science of geometry as to some geometrical conclusions, and yet be ignorant of other conclusions. Therefore a man can believe some articles of faith without believing the others.
Obj. 3: Further, just as man obeys G.o.d in believing the articles of faith, so does he also in keeping the commandments of the Law. Now a man can obey some commandments, and disobey others. Therefore he can believe some articles, and disbelieve others.
_On the contrary,_ Just as mortal sin is contrary to charity, so is disbelief in one article of faith contrary to faith. Now charity does not remain in a man after one mortal sin. Therefore neither does faith, after a man disbelieves one article.
_I answer that,_ Neither living nor lifeless faith remains in a heretic who disbelieves one article of faith.
The reason of this is that the species of every habit depends on the formal aspect of the object, without which the species of the habit cannot remain. Now the formal object of faith is the First Truth, as manifested in Holy Writ and the teaching of the Church, which proceeds from the First Truth. Consequently whoever does not adhere, as to an infallible and Divine rule, to the teaching of the Church, which proceeds from the First Truth manifested in Holy Writ, has not the habit of faith, but holds that which is of faith otherwise than by faith. Even so, it is evident that a man whose mind holds a conclusion without knowing how it is proved, has not scientific knowledge, but merely an opinion about it. Now it is manifest that he who adheres to the teaching of the Church, as to an infallible rule, a.s.sents to whatever the Church teaches; otherwise, if, of the things taught by the Church, he holds what he chooses to hold, and rejects what he chooses to reject, he no longer adheres to the teaching of the Church as to an infallible rule, but to his own will. Hence it is evident that a heretic who obstinately disbelieves one article of faith, is not prepared to follow the teaching of the Church in all things; but if he is not obstinate, he is no longer in heresy but only in error.
Therefore it is clear that such a heretic with regard to one article has no faith in the other articles, but only a kind of opinion in accordance with his own will.
Reply Obj. 1: A heretic does not hold the other articles of faith, about which he does not err, in the same way as one of the faithful does, namely by adhering simply to the Divine Truth, because in order to do so, a man needs the help of the habit of faith; but he holds the things that are of faith, by his own will and judgment.
Reply Obj. 2: The various conclusions of a science have their respective means of demonstration, one of which may be known without another, so that we may know some conclusions of a science without knowing the others. On the other hand faith adheres to all the articles of faith by reason of one mean, viz. on account of the First Truth proposed to us in Scriptures, according to the teaching of the Church who has the right understanding of them. Hence whoever abandons this mean is altogether lacking in faith.
Reply Obj. 3: The various precepts of the Law may be referred either to their respective proximate motives, and thus one can be kept without another; or to their primary motive, which is perfect obedience to G.o.d, in which a man fails whenever he breaks one commandment, according to James 2:10: "Whosoever shall ... offend in one point is become guilty of all."
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FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 5, Art. 4]
Whether Faith Can Be Greater in One Man Than in Another?
Objection 1: It would seem that faith cannot be greater in one man than in another. For the quant.i.ty of a habit is taken from its object. Now whoever has faith believes everything that is of faith, since by failing in one point, a man loses his faith altogether, as stated above (A. 3). Therefore it seems that faith cannot be greater in one than in another.
Obj. 2: Further, those things which consist in something supreme cannot be "more" or "less." Now faith consists in something supreme, because it requires that man should adhere to the First Truth above all things. Therefore faith cannot be "more" or "less."
Obj. 3: Further, faith is to knowledge by grace, as the understanding of principles is to natural knowledge, since the articles of faith are the first principles of knowledge by grace, as was shown above (Q. 1, A. 7). Now the understanding of principles is possessed in equal degree by all men. Therefore faith is possessed in equal degree by all the faithful.
_On the contrary,_ Wherever we find great and little, there we find more or less. Now in the matter of faith we find great and little, for Our Lord said to Peter (Matt. 14:31): "O thou of little faith, why didst thou doubt?" And to the woman he said (Matt. 15: 28): "O woman, great is thy faith!" Therefore faith can be greater in one than in another.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 52, AA. 1, 2; I-II, Q. 112, A. 4), the quant.i.ty of a habit may be considered from two points of view: first, on the part of the object; secondly, on the part of its partic.i.p.ation by the subject.
Now the object of faith may be considered in two ways: first, in respect of its formal aspect; secondly, in respect of the material object which is proposed to be believed. Now the formal object of faith is one and simple, namely the First Truth, as stated above (Q.
1, A. 1). Hence in this respect there is no diversity of faith among believers, but it is specifically one in all, as stated above (Q. 4, A. 6). But the things which are proposed as the matter of our belief are many and can be received more or less explicitly; and in this respect one man can believe explicitly more things than another, so that faith can be greater in one man on account of its being more explicit.
If, on the other hand, we consider faith from the point of view of its partic.i.p.ation by the subject, this happens in two ways, since the act of faith proceeds both from the intellect and from the will, as stated above (Q. 2, AA. 1, 2; Q. 4, A. 2). Consequently a man"s faith may be described as being greater, in one way, on the part of his intellect, on account of its greater cert.i.tude and firmness, and, in another way, on the part of his will, on account of his greater prompt.i.tude, devotion, or confidence.
Reply Obj. 1: A man who obstinately disbelieves a thing that is of faith, has not the habit of faith, and yet he who does not explicitly believe all, while he is prepared to believe all, has that habit. In this respect, one man has greater faith than another, on the part of the object, in so far as he believes more things, as stated above.
Reply Obj. 2: It is essential to faith that one should give the first place to the First Truth. But among those who do this, some submit to it with greater cert.i.tude and devotion than others; and in this way faith is greater in one than in another.
Reply Obj. 3: The understanding of principles results from man"s very nature, which is equally shared by all: whereas faith results from the gift of grace, which is not equally in all, as explained above (I-II, Q. 112, A. 4). Hence the comparison fails.
Nevertheless the truth of principles is more known to one than to another, according to the greater capacity of intellect.
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QUESTION 6
OF THE CAUSE OF FAITH (In Two Articles)
We must now consider the cause of faith, under which head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether faith is infused into man by G.o.d?
(2) Whether lifeless faith is a gift of G.o.d?
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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 6, Art. 1]
Whether Faith Is Infused into Man by G.o.d?
Objection 1: It would seem that faith is not infused into man by G.o.d.
For Augustine says (De Trin. xiv) that "science begets faith in us, and nourishes, defends and strengthens it." Now those things which science begets in us seem to be acquired rather than infused.
Therefore faith does not seem to be in us by Divine infusion.
Obj. 2: Further, that to which man attains by hearing and seeing, seems to be acquired by him. Now man attains to belief, both by seeing miracles, and by hearing the teachings of faith: for it is written (John 4:53): "The father ... knew that it was at the same hour, that Jesus said to him, Thy son liveth; and himself believed, and his whole house"; and (Rom. 10:17) it is said that "faith is through hearing." Therefore man attains to faith by acquiring it.
Obj. 3: Further, that which depends on a man"s will can be acquired by him. But "faith depends on the believer"s will," according to Augustine (De Praedest. Sanct. v). Therefore faith can be acquired by man.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Eph. 2:8, 9): "By grace you are saved through faith, and that not of yourselves ... that no man may glory ... for it is the gift of G.o.d."
_I answer that,_ Two things are requisite for faith. First, that the things which are of faith should be proposed to man: this is necessary in order that man believe anything explicitly. The second thing requisite for faith is the a.s.sent of the believer to the things which are proposed to him. Accordingly, as regards the first of these, faith must needs be from G.o.d. Because those things which are of faith surpa.s.s human reason, hence they do not come to man"s knowledge, unless G.o.d reveal them. To some, indeed, they are revealed by G.o.d immediately, as those things which were revealed to the apostles and prophets, while to some they are proposed by G.o.d in sending preachers of the faith, according to Rom. 10:15: "How shall they preach, unless they be sent?"
As regards the second, viz. man"s a.s.sent to the things which are of faith, we may observe a twofold cause, one of external inducement, such as seeing a miracle, or being persuaded by someone to embrace the faith: neither of which is a sufficient cause, since of those who see the same miracle, or who hear the same sermon, some believe, and some do not. Hence we must a.s.sert another internal cause, which moves man inwardly to a.s.sent to matters of faith.
The Pelagians held that this cause was nothing else than man"s free-will: and consequently they said that the beginning of faith is from ourselves, inasmuch as, to wit, it is in our power to be ready to a.s.sent to things which are of faith, but that the consummation of faith is from G.o.d, Who proposes to us the things we have to believe.
But this is false, for, since man, by a.s.senting to matters of faith, is raised above his nature, this must needs accrue to him from some supernatural principle moving him inwardly; and this is G.o.d.
Therefore faith, as regards the a.s.sent which is the chief act of faith, is from G.o.d moving man inwardly by grace.
Reply Obj. 1: Science begets and nourishes faith, by way of external persuasion afforded by science; but the chief and proper cause of faith is that which moves man inwardly to a.s.sent.
Reply Obj. 2: This argument again refers to the cause that proposes outwardly the things that are of faith, or persuades man to believe by words or deeds.
Reply Obj. 3: To believe does indeed depend on the will of the believer: but man"s will needs to be prepared by G.o.d with grace, in order that he may be raised to things which are above his nature, as stated above (Q. 2, A. 3).
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SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 6, Art. 2]