(2) Whether its object is eternal happiness?
(3) Whether, by the virtue of hope, one man may hope for another"s happiness?
(4) Whether a man may lawfully hope in man?
(5) Whether hope is a theological virtue?
(6) Of its distinction from the other theological virtues?
(7) Of its relation to faith;
(8) Of its relation to charity.
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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 17, Art. 1]
Whether Hope Is a Virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that hope is not a virtue. For "no man makes ill use of a virtue," as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. ii, 18). But one may make ill use of hope, since the pa.s.sion of hope, like the other pa.s.sions, is subject to a mean and extremes. Therefore hope is not a virtue.
Obj. 2: Further, no virtue results from merits, since "G.o.d works virtue in us without us," as Augustine states (De Grat. et Lib. Arb.
xvii). But hope is caused by grace and merits, according to the Master (Sent. iii, D, 26). Therefore hope is not a virtue.
Obj. 3: Further, "virtue is the disposition of a perfect thing"
(Phys. vii, text. 17, 18). But hope is the disposition of an imperfect thing, of one, namely, that lacks what it hopes to have.
Therefore hope is not a virtue.
_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. i, 33) that the three daughters of Job signify these three virtues, faith, hope and charity. Therefore hope is a virtue.
_I answer that,_ According to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6) "the virtue of a thing is that which makes its subject good, and its work good likewise." Consequently wherever we find a good human act, it must correspond to some human virtue. Now in all things measured and ruled, the good is that which attains its proper rule: thus we say that a coat is good if it neither exceeds nor falls short of its proper measurement. But, as we stated above (Q. 8, A. 3, ad 3) human acts have a twofold measure; one is proximate and h.o.m.ogeneous, viz.
the reason, while the other is remote and excelling, viz. G.o.d: wherefore every human act is good, which attains reason or G.o.d Himself. Now the act of hope, whereof we speak now, attains G.o.d. For, as we have already stated (I-II, Q. 40, A. 1), when we were treating of the pa.s.sion of hope, the object of hope is a future good, difficult but possible to obtain. Now a thing is possible to us in two ways: first, by ourselves; secondly, by means of others, as stated in _Ethic._ iii. Wherefore, in so far as we hope for anything as being possible to us by means of the Divine a.s.sistance, our hope attains G.o.d Himself, on Whose help it leans. It is therefore evident that hope is a virtue, since it causes a human act to be good and to attain its due rule.
Reply Obj. 1: In the pa.s.sions, the mean of virtue depends on right reason being attained, wherein also consists the essence of virtue.
Wherefore in hope too, the good of virtue depends on a man"s attaining, by hoping, the due rule, viz. G.o.d. Consequently man cannot make ill use of hope which attains G.o.d, as neither can he make ill use of moral virtue which attains the reason, because to attain thus is to make good use of virtue. Nevertheless, the hope of which we speak now, is not a pa.s.sion but a habit of the mind, as we shall show further on (A. 5; Q. 18, A. 1).
Reply Obj. 2: Hope is said to arise from merits, as regards the thing hoped for, in so far as we hope to obtain happiness by means of grace and merits; or as regards the act of living hope. The habit itself of hope, whereby we hope to obtain happiness, does not flow from our merits, but from grace alone.
Reply Obj. 3: He who hopes is indeed imperfect in relation to that which he hopes to obtain, but has not as yet; yet he is perfect, in so far as he already attains his proper rule, viz. G.o.d, on Whose help he leans.
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SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 17, Art. 2]
Whether Eternal Happiness Is the Proper Object of Hope?
Objection 1: It would seem that eternal happiness is not the proper object of hope. For a man does not hope for that which surpa.s.ses every movement of the soul, since hope itself is a movement of the soul. Now eternal happiness surpa.s.ses every movement of the human soul, for the Apostle says (1 Cor. 2:9) that it hath not "entered into the heart of man." Therefore happiness is not the proper object of hope.
Obj. 2: Further, prayer is an expression of hope, for it is written (Ps. 36:5): "Commit thy way to the Lord, and trust in Him, and He will do it." Now it is lawful for man to pray G.o.d not only for eternal happiness, but also for the goods, both temporal and spiritual, of the present life, and, as evidenced by the Lord"s Prayer, to be delivered from evils which will no longer be in eternal happiness. Therefore eternal happiness is not the proper object of hope.
Obj. 3: Further, the object of hope is something difficult. Now many things besides eternal happiness are difficult to man. Therefore eternal happiness is not the proper object of hope.
_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Heb. 6:19) that we have hope "which entereth in," i.e. maketh us to enter ... "within the veil,"
i.e. into the happiness of heaven, according to the interpretation of a gloss on these words. Therefore the object of hope is eternal happiness.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), the hope of which we speak now, attains G.o.d by leaning on His help in order to obtain the hoped for good. Now an effect must be proportionate to its cause. Wherefore the good which we ought to hope for from G.o.d properly and chiefly is the infinite good, which is proportionate to the power of our divine helper, since it belongs to an infinite power to lead anyone to an infinite good. Such a good is eternal life, which consists in the enjoyment of G.o.d Himself. For we should hope from Him for nothing less than Himself, since His goodness, whereby He imparts good things to His creature, is no less than His Essence. Therefore the proper and princ.i.p.al object of hope is eternal happiness.
Reply Obj. 1: Eternal happiness does not enter into the heart of man perfectly, i.e. so that it be possible for a wayfarer to know its nature and quality; yet, under the general notion of the perfect good, it is possible for it to be apprehended by a man, and it is in this way that the movement of hope towards it arises. Hence the Apostle says pointedly (Heb. 6:19) that hope "enters in, even within the veil," because that which we hope for is as yet veiled, so to speak.
Reply Obj. 2: We ought not to pray G.o.d for any other goods, except in reference to eternal happiness. Hence hope regards eternal happiness chiefly, and other things, for which we pray G.o.d, it regards secondarily and as referred to eternal happiness: just as faith regards G.o.d princ.i.p.ally, and, secondarily, those things which are referred to G.o.d, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 1).
Reply Obj. 3: To him that longs for something great, all lesser things seem small; wherefore to him that hopes for eternal happiness, nothing else appears arduous, as compared with that hope; although, as compared with the capability of the man who hopes, other things besides may be arduous to him, so that he may have hope for such things in reference to its princ.i.p.al object.
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THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 17, Art. 3]
Whether One Man May Hope for Another"s Eternal Happiness?
Objection 1: It would seem that one may hope for another"s eternal happiness. For the Apostle says (Phil. 1:6): "Being confident of this very thing, that He Who hath begun a good work in you, will perfect it unto the day of Jesus Christ." Now the perfection of that day will be eternal happiness. Therefore one man may hope for another"s eternal happiness.
Obj. 2: Further, whatever we ask of G.o.d, we hope to obtain from Him.
But we ask G.o.d to bring others to eternal happiness, according to James 5:16: "Pray for one another that you may be saved." Therefore we can hope for another"s eternal happiness.
Obj. 3: Further, hope and despair are about the same object. Now it is possible to despair of another"s eternal happiness, else Augustine would have no reason for saying (De Verb. Dom., Serm. lxxi) that we should not despair of anyone so long as he lives. Therefore one can also hope for another"s eternal salvation.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Enchiridion viii) that "hope is only of such things as belong to him who is supposed to hope for them."
_I answer that,_ We can hope for something in two ways: first, absolutely, and thus the object of hope is always something arduous and pertaining to the person who hopes. Secondly, we can hope for something, through something else being presupposed, and in this way its object can be something pertaining to someone else. In order to explain this we must observe that love and hope differ in this, that love denotes union between lover and beloved, while hope denotes a movement or a stretching forth of the appet.i.te towards an arduous good. Now union is of things that are distinct, wherefore love can directly regard the other whom a man unites to himself by love, looking upon him as his other self: whereas movement is always towards its own term which is proportionate to the subject moved.
Therefore hope regards directly one"s own good, and not that which pertains to another. Yet if we presuppose the union of love with another, a man can hope for and desire something for another man, as for himself; and, accordingly, he can hope for another"s eternal life, inasmuch as he is united to him by love, and just as it is the same virtue of charity whereby a man loves G.o.d, himself, and his neighbor, so too it is the same virtue of hope, whereby a man hopes for himself and for another.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
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FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 17, Art. 4]
Whether a Man Can Lawfully Hope in Man?
Objection 1: It would seem that one may lawfully hope in man. For the object of hope is eternal happiness. Now we are helped to obtain eternal happiness by the patronage of the saints, for Gregory says (Dial. i, 8) that "predestination is furthered by the saints"
prayers." Therefore one may hope in man.
Obj. 2: Further, if a man may not hope in another man, it ought not to be reckoned a sin in a man, that one should not be able to hope in him. Yet this is reckoned a vice in some, as appears from Jer. 9:4: "Let every man take heed of his neighbor, and let him not trust in any brother of his." Therefore it is lawful to trust in a man.
Obj. 3: Further, prayer is the expression of hope, as stated above (A. 2, Obj. 2). But it is lawful to pray to a man for something.
Therefore it is lawful to trust in him.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Jer. 17:5): "Cursed be the man that trusteth in man."
_I answer that,_ Hope, as stated above (A. 1; I-II, Q. 40, A. 7), regards two things, viz. the good which it intends to obtain, and the help by which that good is obtained. Now the good which a man hopes to obtain, has the aspect of a final cause, while the help by which one hopes to obtain that good, has the character of an efficient cause. Now in each of these kinds of cause we find a princ.i.p.al and a secondary cause. For the princ.i.p.al end is the last end, while the secondary end is that which is referred to an end. In like manner the princ.i.p.al efficient cause is the first agent, while the secondary efficient cause is the secondary and instrumental agent. Now hope regards eternal happiness as its last end, and the Divine a.s.sistance as the first cause leading to happiness.
Accordingly, just as it is not lawful to hope for any good save happiness, as one"s last end, but only as something referred to final happiness, so too, it is unlawful to hope in any man, or any creature, as though it were the first cause of movement towards happiness. It is, however, lawful to hope in a man or a creature as being the secondary and instrumental agent through whom one is helped to obtain any goods that are ordained to happiness. It is in this way that we turn to the saints, and that we ask men also for certain things; and for this reason some are blamed in that they cannot be trusted to give help.