Reply Obj. 2: The virtue or art which is concerned about the last end, commands the virtues or arts which are concerned about other ends which are secondary, thus the military art commands the art of horse-riding (Ethic. i). Accordingly since charity has for its object the last end of human life, viz. everlasting happiness, it follows that it extends to the acts of a man"s whole life, by commanding them, not by eliciting immediately all acts of virtue.
Reply Obj. 3: The precept of love is said to be a general command, because all other precepts are reduced thereto as to their end, according to 1 Tim. 1:5: "The end of the commandment is charity."
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FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 23, Art. 5]
Whether Charity Is One Virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that charity is not one virtue. For habits are distinct according to their objects. Now there are two objects of charity--G.o.d and our neighbor--which are infinitely distant from one another. Therefore charity is not one virtue.
Obj. 2: Further, different aspects of the object diversify a habit, even though that object be one in reality, as shown above (Q. 17, A.
6; I-II, Q. 54, A. 2, ad 1). Now there are many aspects under which G.o.d is an object of love, because we are debtors to His love by reason of each one of His favors. Therefore charity is not one virtue.
Obj. 3: Further, charity comprises friendship for our neighbor. But the Philosopher reckons several species of friendship (Ethic. viii, 3, 11, 12). Therefore charity is not one virtue, but is divided into a number of various species.
_On the contrary,_ Just as G.o.d is the object of faith, so is He the object of charity. Now faith is one virtue by reason of the unity of the Divine truth, according to Eph. 4:5: "One faith." Therefore charity also is one virtue by reason of the unity of the Divine goodness.
_I answer that,_ Charity, as stated above (A. 1) is a kind of friendship of man for G.o.d. Now the different species of friendship are differentiated, first of all, in respect of a diversity of end, and in this way there are three species of friendship, namely friendship for the useful, for the delightful, and for the virtuous; secondly, in respect of the different kinds of communion on which friendships are based; thus there is one species of friendship between kinsmen, and another between fellow citizens or fellow travellers, the former being based on natural communion, the latter on civil communion or on the comradeship of the road, as the Philosopher explains (Ethic. viii, 12).
Now charity cannot be differentiated in either of these ways: for its end is one, namely, the goodness of G.o.d; and the fellowship of everlasting happiness, on which this friendship is based, is also one. Hence it follows that charity is simply one virtue, and not divided into several species.
Reply Obj. 1: This argument would hold, if G.o.d and our neighbor were equally objects of charity. But this is not true: for G.o.d is the princ.i.p.al object of charity, while our neighbor is loved out of charity for G.o.d"s sake.
Reply Obj. 2: G.o.d is loved by charity for His own sake: wherefore charity regards princ.i.p.ally but one aspect of lovableness, namely G.o.d"s goodness, which is His substance, according to Ps. 105:1: "Give glory to the Lord for He is good." Other reasons that inspire us with love for Him, or which make it our duty to love Him, are secondary and result from the first.
Reply Obj. 3: Human friendship of which the Philosopher treats has various ends and various forms of fellowship. This does not apply to charity, as stated above: wherefore the comparison fails.
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SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 23, Art. 6]
Whether Charity Is the Most Excellent of the Virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that charity is not the most excellent of the virtues. Because the higher power has the higher virtue even as it has a higher operation. Now the intellect is higher than the will, since it directs the will. Therefore, faith, which is in the intellect, is more excellent than charity which is in the will.
Obj. 2: Further, the thing by which another works seems the less excellent of the two, even as a servant, by whom his master works, is beneath his master. Now "faith ... worketh by charity," according to Gal. 5:6. Therefore faith is more excellent than charity.
Obj. 3: Further, that which is by way of addition to another seems to be the more perfect of the two. Now hope seems to be something additional to charity: for the object of charity is good, whereas the object of hope is an arduous good. Therefore hope is more excellent than charity.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (1 Cor. 13:13): "The greater of these is charity."
_I answer that,_ Since good, in human acts, depends on their being regulated by the due rule, it must needs be that human virtue, which is a principle of good acts, consists in attaining the rule of human acts. Now the rule of human acts is twofold, as stated above (A. 3), namely, human reason and G.o.d: yet G.o.d is the first rule, whereby, even human reason must be regulated. Consequently the theological virtues, which consist in attaining this first rule, since their object is G.o.d, are more excellent than the moral, or the intellectual virtues, which consist in attaining human reason: and it follows that among the theological virtues themselves, the first place belongs to that which attains G.o.d most.
Now that which is of itself always ranks before that which is by another. But faith and hope attain G.o.d indeed in so far as we derive from Him the knowledge of truth or the acquisition of good, whereas charity attains G.o.d Himself that it may rest in Him, but not that something may accrue to us from Him. Hence charity is more excellent than faith or hope, and, consequently, than all the other virtues, just as prudence, which by itself attains reason, is more excellent than the other moral virtues, which attain reason in so far as it appoints the mean in human operations or pa.s.sions.
Reply Obj. 1: The operation of the intellect is completed by the thing understood being in the intellectual subject, so that the excellence of the intellectual operation is a.s.sessed according to the measure of the intellect. On the other hand, the operation of the will and of every appet.i.tive power is completed in the tendency of the appet.i.te towards a thing as its term, wherefore the excellence of the appet.i.tive operation is gauged according to the thing which is the object of the operation. Now those things which are beneath the soul are more excellent in the soul than they are in themselves, because a thing is contained according to the mode of the container (De Causis xii). On the other hand, things that are above the soul, are more excellent in themselves than they are in the soul.
Consequently it is better to know than to love the things that are beneath us; for which reason the Philosopher gave the preference to the intellectual virtues over the moral virtues (Ethic. x, 7, 8): whereas the love of the things that are above us, especially of G.o.d, ranks before the knowledge of such things. Therefore charity is more excellent than faith.
Reply Obj. 2: Faith works by love, not instrumentally, as a master by his servant, but as by its proper form: hence the argument does not prove.
Reply Obj. 3: The same good is the object of charity and of hope: but charity implies union with that good, whereas hope implies distance therefrom. Hence charity does not regard that good as being arduous, as hope does, since what is already united has not the character of arduous: and this shows that charity is more perfect than hope.
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SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 23, Art. 7]
Whether Any True Virtue Is Possible Without Charity?
Objection 1: It would seem that there can be true virtue without charity. For it is proper to virtue to produce a good act. Now those who have not charity, do some good actions, as when they clothe the naked, or feed the hungry and so forth. Therefore true virtue is possible without charity.
Obj. 2: Further, charity is not possible without faith, since it comes of "an unfeigned faith," as the Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:5). Now, in unbelievers, there can be true chast.i.ty, if they curb their concupiscences, and true justice, if they judge rightly. Therefore true virtue is possible without charity.
Obj. 3: Further, science and art are virtues, according to _Ethic._ vi. But they are to be found in sinners who lack charity. Therefore true virtue can be without charity.
_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:3): "If I should distribute all my goods to the poor, and if I should deliver my body to be burned, and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing." And yet true virtue is very profitable, according to Wis. 8:7: "She teacheth temperance, and prudence, and justice, and fort.i.tude, which are such things as men can have nothing more profitable in life." Therefore no true virtue is possible without charity.
_I answer that,_ Virtue is ordered to the good, as stated above (I-II, Q. 55, A. 4). Now the good is chiefly an end, for things directed to the end are not said to be good except in relation to the end. Accordingly, just as the end is twofold, the last end, and the proximate end, so also, is good twofold, one, the ultimate and universal good, the other proximate and particular. The ultimate and princ.i.p.al good of man is the enjoyment of G.o.d, according to Ps.
72:28: "It is good for me to adhere to G.o.d," and to this good man is ordered by charity. Man"s secondary and, as it were, particular good may be twofold: one is truly good, because, considered in itself, it can be directed to the princ.i.p.al good, which is the last end; while the other is good apparently and not truly, because it leads us away from the final good. Accordingly it is evident that simply true virtue is that which is directed to man"s princ.i.p.al good; thus also the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, text. 17) that "virtue is the disposition of a perfect thing to that which is best": and in this way no true virtue is possible without charity.
If, however, we take virtue as being ordered to some particular end, then we speak of virtue being where there is no charity, in so far as it is directed to some particular good. But if this particular good is not a true, but an apparent good, it is not a true virtue that is ordered to such a good, but a counterfeit virtue. Even so, as Augustine says (Contra Julian. iv, 3), "the prudence of the miser, whereby he devises various roads to gain, is no true virtue; nor the miser"s justice, whereby he scorns the property of another through fear of severe punishment; nor the miser"s temperance, whereby he curbs his desire for expensive pleasures; nor the miser"s fort.i.tude, whereby as Horace, says, "he braves the sea, he crosses mountains, he goes through fire, in order to avoid poverty"" (Epis. lib, 1; Ep. i, 45). If, on the other hand, this particular good be a true good, for instance the welfare of the state, or the like, it will indeed be a true virtue, imperfect, however, unless it be referred to the final and perfect good. Accordingly no strictly true virtue is possible without charity.
Reply Obj. 1: The act of one lacking charity may be of two kinds; one is in accordance with his lack of charity, as when he does something that is referred to that whereby he lacks charity. Such an act is always evil: thus Augustine says (Contra Julian. iv, 3) that the actions which an unbeliever performs as an unbeliever, are always sinful, even when he clothes the naked, or does any like thing, and directs it to his unbelief as end.
There is, however, another act of one lacking charity, not in accordance with his lack of charity, but in accordance with his possession of some other gift of G.o.d, whether faith, or hope, or even his natural good, which is not completely taken away by sin, as stated above (Q. 10, A. 4; I-II, Q. 85, A. 2). In this way it is possible for an act, without charity, to be generically good, but not perfectly good, because it lacks its due order to the last end.
Reply Obj. 2: Since the end is in practical matters, what the principle is in speculative matters, just as there can be no strictly true science, if a right estimate of the first indemonstrable principle be lacking, so, there can be no strictly true justice, or chast.i.ty, without that due ordering to the end, which is effected by charity, however rightly a man may be affected about other matters.
Reply Obj. 3: Science and art of their very nature imply a relation to some particular good, and not to the ultimate good of human life, as do the moral virtues, which make man good simply, as stated above (I-II, Q. 56, A. 3). Hence the comparison fails.
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EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 23, Art. 8]
Whether Charity Is the Form of the Virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that charity is not the true form of the virtues. Because the form of a thing is either exemplar or essential.
Now charity is not the exemplar form of the other virtues, since it would follow that the other virtues are of the same species as charity: nor is it the essential form of the other virtues, since then it would not be distinct from them. Therefore it is in no way the form of the virtues.
Obj. 2: Further, charity is compared to the other virtues as their root and foundation, according to Eph. 3:17: "Rooted and founded in charity." Now a root or foundation is not the form, but rather the matter of a thing, since it is the first part in the making.
Therefore charity is not the form of the virtues.
Obj. 3: Further, formal, final, and efficient causes do not coincide with one another (Phys. ii, 7). Now charity is called the end and the mother of the virtues. Therefore it should not be called their form.
_On the contrary,_ Ambrose [*Lombard, Sent. iii, D, 23] says that charity is the form of the virtues.
_I answer that,_ In morals the form of an act is taken chiefly from the end. The reason of this is that the princ.i.p.al of moral acts is the will, whose object and form, so to speak, are the end. Now the form of an act always follows from a form of the agent. Consequently, in morals, that which gives an act its order to the end, must needs give the act its form. Now it is evident, in accordance with what has been said (A. 7), that it is charity which directs the acts of all other virtues to the last end, and which, consequently, also gives the form to all other acts of virtue: and it is precisely in this sense that charity is called the form of the virtues, for these are called virtues in relation to "informed" acts.
Reply Obj. 1: Charity is called the form of the other virtues not as being their exemplar or their essential form, but rather by way of efficient cause, in so far as it sets the form on all, in the aforesaid manner.
Reply Obj. 2: Charity is compared to the foundation or root in so far as all other virtues draw their sustenance and nourishment therefrom, and not in the sense that the foundation and root have the character of a material cause.
Reply Obj. 3: Charity is said to be the end of other virtues, because it directs all other virtues to its own end. And since a mother is one who conceives within herself and by another, charity is called the mother of the other virtues, because, by commanding them, it conceives the acts of the other virtues, by the desire of the last end.