Obj. 2: Further, every sin of omission seems to be due to negligence.
But sins of omission are not opposed to prudence, but to the executive moral virtues. Therefore negligence is not opposed to prudence.
Obj. 3: Further, imprudence relates to some act of reason. But negligence does not imply a defect of counsel, for that is _precipitation,_ nor a defect of judgment, since that is _thoughtlessness,_ nor a defect of command, because that is _inconstancy._ Therefore negligence does not pertain to imprudence.
Obj. 4: Further, it is written (Eccles. 7:19): "He that feareth G.o.d, neglecteth nothing." But every sin is excluded by the opposite virtue. Therefore negligence is opposed to fear rather than to prudence.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ecclus. 20:7): "A babbler and a fool (_imprudens_) will regard no time." Now this is due to negligence. Therefore negligence is opposed to prudence.
_I answer that,_ Negligence is directly opposed to solicitude. Now solicitude pertains to the reason, and rect.i.tude of solicitude to prudence. Hence, on the other hand, negligence pertains to imprudence. This appears from its very name, because, as Isidore observes (Etym. x) "a negligent man is one who fails to choose (_nec eligens_)": and the right choice of the means belongs to prudence.
Therefore negligence pertains to imprudence.
Reply Obj. 1: Negligence is a defect in the internal act, to which choice also belongs: whereas idleness and laziness denote slowness of execution, yet so that idleness denotes slowness in setting about the execution, while laziness denotes remissness in the execution itself. Hence it is becoming that laziness should arise from sloth, which is "an oppressive sorrow," i.e. hindering, the mind from action [*Cf. Q. 35, A. 1; I-II, Q. 35, A. 8].
Reply Obj. 2: Omission regards the external act, for it consists in failing to perform an act which is due. Hence it is opposed to justice, and is an effect of negligence, even as the execution of a just deed is the effect of right reason.
Reply Obj. 3: Negligence regards the act of command, which solicitude also regards. Yet the negligent man fails in regard to this act otherwise than the inconstant man: for the inconstant man fails in commanding, being hindered as it were, by something, whereas the negligent man fails through lack of a prompt will.
Reply Obj. 4: The fear of G.o.d helps us to avoid all sins, because according to Prov. 15:27, "by the fear of the Lord everyone declineth from evil." Hence fear makes us avoid negligence, yet not as though negligence were directly opposed to fear, but because fear incites man to acts of reason. Wherefore also it has been stated above (I-II, Q. 44, A. 2) when we were treating of the pa.s.sions, that "fear makes us take counsel."
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THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 54, Art. 3]
Whether Negligence Can Be a Mortal Sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that negligence cannot be a mortal sin.
For a gloss of Gregory [*Moral. ix. 34] on Job 9:28, "I feared all my works," etc. says that "too little love of G.o.d aggravates the former," viz. negligence. But wherever there is mortal sin, the love of G.o.d is done away with altogether. Therefore negligence is not a mortal sin.
Obj. 2: Further, a gloss on Ecclus. 7:34, "For thy negligences purify thyself with a few," says: "Though the offering be small it cleanses the negligences of many sins." Now this would not be, if negligence were a mortal sin. Therefore negligence is not a mortal sin.
Obj. 3: Further, under the law certain sacrifices were prescribed for mortal sins, as appears from the book of Leviticus. Yet no sacrifice was prescribed for negligence. Therefore negligence is not a mortal sin.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Prov. 19:16): "He that neglecteth his own life [Vulg.: "way"] shall die."
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2, ad 3), negligence arises out of a certain remissness of the will, the result being a lack of solicitude on the part of the reason in commanding what it should command, or as it should command. Accordingly negligence may happen to be a mortal sin in two ways. First on the part of that which is omitted through negligence. If this be either an act or a circ.u.mstance necessary for salvation, it will be a mortal sin.
Secondly on the part of the cause: for if the will be so remiss about Divine things, as to fall away altogether from the charity of G.o.d, such negligence is a mortal sin, and this is the case chiefly when negligence is due to contempt.
But if negligence consists in the omission of an act or circ.u.mstance that is not necessary for salvation, it is not a mortal but a venial sin, provided the negligence arise, not from contempt, but from some lack of fervor, to which venial sin is an occasional obstacle.
Reply Obj. 1: Man may be said to love G.o.d less in two ways. First through lack of the fervor of charity, and this causes the negligence that is a venial sin: secondly through lack of charity itself, in which sense we say that a man loves G.o.d less when he loves Him with a merely natural love; and this causes the negligence that is a mortal sin.
Reply Obj. 2: According to the same authority (gloss), a small offering made with a humble mind and out of pure love, cleanses man not only from venial but also from mortal sin.
Reply Obj. 3: When negligence consists in the omission of that which is necessary for salvation, it is drawn to the other more manifest genus of sin. Because those sins that consist of inward actions, are more hidden, wherefore no special sacrifices were prescribed for them in the Law, since the offering of sacrifices was a kind of public confession of sin, whereas hidden sins should not be confessed in public.
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QUESTION 55
OF VICES OPPOSED TO PRUDENCE BY WAY OF RESEMBLANCE (In Eight Articles)
We must now consider those vices opposed to prudence, which have a resemblance thereto. Under this head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether prudence of the flesh is a sin?
(2) Whether it is a mortal sin?
(3) Whether craftiness is a special sin?
(4) Of guile;
(5) Of fraud;
(6) Of solicitude about temporal things;
(7) Of solicitude about the future;
(8) Of the origin of these vices.
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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 55, Art. 1]
Whether Prudence of the Flesh Is a Sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that prudence of the flesh is not a sin.
For prudence is more excellent than the other moral virtues, since it governs them all. But no justice or temperance is sinful. Neither therefore is any prudence a sin.
Obj. 2: Further, it is not a sin to act prudently for an end which it is lawful to love. But it is lawful to love the flesh, "for no man ever hated his own flesh" (Eph. 5:29). Therefore prudence of the flesh is not a sin.
Obj. 3: Further, just as man is tempted by the flesh, so too is he tempted by the world and the devil. But no prudence of the world, or of the devil is accounted a sin. Therefore neither should any prudence of the flesh be accounted among sins.
_On the contrary,_ No man is an enemy to G.o.d save for wickedness according to Wis. 14:9, "To G.o.d the wicked and his wickedness are hateful alike." Now it is written (Rom. 8:7): "The prudence [Vulg.: "wisdom"] of the flesh is an enemy to G.o.d." Therefore prudence of the flesh is a sin.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 47, A. 13), prudence regards things which are directed to the end of life as a whole. Hence prudence of the flesh signifies properly the prudence of a man who looks upon carnal goods as the last end of his life. Now it is evident that this is a sin, because it involves a disorder in man with respect to his last end, which does not consist in the goods of the body, as stated above (I-II, Q. 2, A. 5). Therefore prudence of the flesh is a sin.
Reply Obj. 1: Justice and temperance include in their very nature that which ranks them among the virtues, viz. equality and the curbing of concupiscence; hence they are never taken in a bad sense.
On the other hand prudence is so called from foreseeing (_providendo_), as stated above (Q. 47, A. 1; Q. 49, A. 6), which can extend to evil things also. Therefore, although prudence is taken simply in a good sense, yet, if something be added, it may be taken in a bad sense: and it is thus that prudence of the flesh is said to be a sin.
Reply Obj. 2: The flesh is on account of the soul, as matter is on account of the form, and the instrument on account of the princ.i.p.al agent. Hence the flesh is loved lawfully, if it be directed to the good of the soul as its end. If, however, a man place his last end in a good of the flesh, his love will be inordinate and unlawful, and it is thus that the prudence of the flesh is directed to the love of the flesh.
Reply Obj. 3: The devil tempts us, not through the good of the appetible object, but by way of suggestion. Wherefore, since prudence implies direction to some appetible end, we do not speak of "prudence of the devil," as of a prudence directed to some evil end, which is the aspect under which the world and the flesh tempt us, in so far as worldly or carnal goods are proposed to our appet.i.te. Hence we speak of "carnal" and again of "worldly" prudence, according to Luke 16:8, "The children of this world are more prudent [Douay: "wiser"] in their generation," etc. The Apostle includes all in the "prudence of the flesh," because we covet the external things of the world on account of the flesh.
We may also reply that since prudence is in a certain sense called "wisdom," as stated above (Q. 47, A. 2, ad 1), we may distinguish a threefold prudence corresponding to the three kinds of temptation.
Hence it is written (James 3:15) that there is a wisdom which is "earthly, sensual and devilish," as explained above (Q. 45, A. 1, ad 1), when we were treating of wisdom.
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SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 55, Art. 2]
Whether Prudence of the Flesh Is a Mortal Sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that prudence of the flesh is a mortal sin. For it is a mortal sin to rebel against the Divine law, since this implies contempt of G.o.d. Now "the prudence [Douay: "wisdom"] of the flesh ... is not subject to the law of G.o.d" (Rom. 8:7).