Reply Obj. 5: A judge renders to each one what belongs to him, by way of command and direction, because a judge is the "personification of justice," and "the sovereign is its guardian" (Ethic. v, 4). On the other hand, the subjects render to each one what belongs to him, by way of execution.
Reply Obj. 6: Just as love of G.o.d includes love of our neighbor, as stated above (Q. 25, A. 1), so too the service of G.o.d includes rendering to each one his due.
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SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 58, Art. 2]
Whether Justice Is Always Towards Another?
Objection 1: It would seem that justice is not always towards another. For the Apostle says (Rom. 3:22) that "the justice of G.o.d is by faith of Jesus Christ." Now faith does not concern the dealings of one man with another. Neither therefore does justice.
Obj. 2: Further, according to Augustine (De Moribus Eccl. xv), "it belongs to justice that man should direct to the service of G.o.d his authority over the things that are subject to him." Now the sensitive appet.i.te is subject to man, according to Gen. 4:7, where it is written: "The l.u.s.t thereof," viz. of sin, "shall be under thee, and thou shalt have dominion over it." Therefore it belongs to justice to have dominion over one"s own appet.i.te: so that justice is towards oneself.
Obj. 3: Further, the justice of G.o.d is eternal. But nothing else is co-eternal with G.o.d. Therefore justice is not essentially towards another.
Obj. 4: Further, man"s dealings with himself need to be rectified no less than his dealings with another. Now man"s dealings are rectified by justice, according to Prov. 11:5, "The justice of the upright shall make his way prosperous." Therefore justice is about our dealings not only with others, but also with ourselves.
_On the contrary,_ Tully says (De Officiis i, 7) that "the object of justice is to keep men together in society and mutual intercourse."
Now this implies relationship of one man to another. Therefore justice is concerned only about our dealings with others.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 57, A. 1) since justice by its name implies equality, it denotes essentially relation to another, for a thing is equal, not to itself, but to another. And forasmuch as it belongs to justice to rectify human acts, as stated above (Q. 57, A. 1; I-II, Q. 113, A. 1) this otherness which justice demands must needs be between beings capable of action. Now actions belong to supposits [*Cf. I, Q. 29, A. 2] and wholes and, properly speaking, not to parts and forms or powers, for we do not say properly that the hand strikes, but a man with his hand, nor that heat makes a thing hot, but fire by heat, although such expressions may be employed metaphorically. Hence, justice properly speaking demands a distinction of supposits, and consequently is only in one man towards another. Nevertheless in one and the same man we may speak metaphorically of his various principles of action such as the reason, the irascible, and the concupiscible, as though they were so many agents: so that metaphorically in one and the same man there is said to be justice in so far as the reason commands the irascible and concupiscible, and these obey reason; and in general in so far as to each part of man is ascribed what is becoming to it. Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 11) calls this "metaphorical justice."
Reply Obj. 1: The justice which faith works in us, is that whereby the unG.o.dly is justified: it consists in the due coordination of the parts of the soul, as stated above (I-II, Q. 113, A. 1) where we were treating of the justification of the unG.o.dly. Now this belongs to metaphorical justice, which may be found even in a man who lives all by himself.
This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.
Reply Obj. 3: G.o.d"s justice is from eternity in respect of the eternal will and purpose (and it is chiefly in this that justice consists); although it is not eternal as regards its effect, since nothing is co-eternal with G.o.d.
Reply Obj. 4: Man"s dealings with himself are sufficiently rectified by the rectification of the pa.s.sions by the other moral virtues. But his dealings with others need a special rectification, not only in relation to the agent, but also in relation to the person to whom they are directed. Hence about such dealings there is a special virtue, and this is justice.
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THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 58, Art. 3]
Whether Justice Is a Virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that justice is not a virtue. For it is written (Luke 17:10): "When you shall have done all these things that are commanded you, say: We are unprofitable servants; we have done that which we ought to do." Now it is not unprofitable to do a virtuous deed: for Ambrose says (De Officiis ii, 6): "We look to a profit that is estimated not by pecuniary gain but by the acquisition of G.o.dliness." Therefore to do what one ought to do, is not a virtuous deed. And yet it is an act of justice. Therefore justice is not a virtue.
Obj. 2: Further, that which is done of necessity, is not meritorious.
But to render to a man what belongs to him, as justice requires, is of necessity. Therefore it is not meritorious. Yet it is by virtuous actions that we gain merit. Therefore justice is not a virtue.
Obj. 3: Further, every moral virtue is about matters of action. Now those things which are wrought externally are not things concerning behavior but concerning handicraft, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. ix) [*Didot ed., viii, 8]. Therefore since it belongs to justice to produce externally a deed that is just in itself, it seems that justice is not a moral virtue.
_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. ii, 49) that "the entire structure of good works is built on four virtues," viz. temperance, prudence, fort.i.tude and justice.
_I answer that,_ A human virtue is one "which renders a human act and man himself good" [*Ethic. ii, 6], and this can be applied to justice.
For a man"s act is made good through attaining the rule of reason, which is the rule whereby human acts are regulated. Hence, since justice regulates human operations, it is evident that it renders man"s operations good, and, as Tully declares (De Officiis i, 7), good men are so called chiefly from their justice, wherefore, as he says again (De Officiis i, 7) "the l.u.s.ter of virtue appears above all in justice."
Reply Obj. 1: When a man does what he ought, he brings no gain to the person to whom he does what he ought, but only abstains from doing him a harm. He does however profit himself, in so far as he does what he ought, spontaneously and readily, and this is to act virtuously.
Hence it is written (Wis. 8:7) that Divine wisdom "teacheth temperance, and prudence, and justice, and fort.i.tude, which are such things as men (i.e. virtuous men) can have nothing more profitable in life."
Reply Obj. 2: Necessity is twofold. One arises from _constraint,_ and this removes merit, since it runs counter to the will. The other arises from the obligation of a _command,_ or from the necessity of obtaining an end, when, to wit, a man is unable to achieve the end of virtue without doing some particular thing. The latter necessity does not remove merit, when a man does voluntarily that which is necessary in this way. It does however exclude the credit of supererogation, according to 1 Cor. 9:16, "If I preach the Gospel, it is no glory to me, for a necessity lieth upon me."
Reply Obj. 3: Justice is concerned about external things, not by making them, which pertains to art, but by using them in our dealings with other men.
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FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 58, Art. 4]
Whether Justice Is in the Will As Its Subject?
Objection 1: It would seem that justice is not in the will as its subject. For justice is sometimes called truth. But truth is not in the will, but in the intellect. Therefore justice is not in the will as its subject.
Obj. 2: Further, justice is about our dealings with others. Now it belongs to the reason to direct one thing in relation to another.
Therefore justice is not in the will as its subject but in the reason.
Obj. 3: Further, justice is not an intellectual virtue, since it is not directed to knowledge; wherefore it follows that it is a moral virtue. Now the subject of moral virtue is the faculty which is "rational by partic.i.p.ation," viz. the irascible and the concupiscible, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. i, 13). Therefore justice is not in the will as its subject, but in the irascible and concupiscible.
_On the contrary,_ Anselm says (De Verit. xii) that "justice is rect.i.tude of the will observed for its own sake."
_I answer that,_ The subject of a virtue is the power whose act that virtue aims at rectifying. Now justice does not aim at directing an act of the cognitive power, for we are not said to be just through knowing something aright. Hence the subject of justice is not the intellect or reason which is a cognitive power. But since we are said to be just through doing something aright, and because the proximate principle of action is the appet.i.tive power, justice must needs be in some appet.i.tive power as its subject.
Now the appet.i.te is twofold; namely, the will which is in the reason and the sensitive appet.i.te which follows on sensitive apprehension, and is divided into the irascible and the concupiscible, as stated in the First Part (Q. 81, A. 2). Again the act of rendering his due to each man cannot proceed from the sensitive appet.i.te, because sensitive apprehension does not go so far as to be able to consider the relation of one thing to another; but this is proper to the reason. Therefore justice cannot be in the irascible or concupiscible as its subject, but only in the will: hence the Philosopher (Ethic.
v, 1) defines justice by an act of the will, as may be seen above (A.
1).
Reply Obj. 1: Since the will is the rational appet.i.te, when the rect.i.tude of the reason which is called truth is imprinted on the will on account of its nighness to the reason, this imprint retains the name of truth; and hence it is that justice sometimes goes by the name of truth.
Reply Obj. 2: The will is borne towards its object consequently on the apprehension of reason: wherefore, since the reason directs one thing in relation to another, the will can will one thing in relation to another, and this belongs to justice.
Reply Obj. 3: Not only the irascible and concupiscible parts are _rational by partic.i.p.ation,_ but the entire _appet.i.tive_ faculty, as stated in _Ethic._ i, 13, because all appet.i.te is subject to reason.
Now the will is contained in the appet.i.tive faculty, wherefore it can be the subject of moral virtue.
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FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 58, Art. 5]
Whether Justice Is a General Virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that justice is not a general virtue. For justice is specified with the other virtues, according to Wis. 8:7, "She teacheth temperance and prudence, and justice, and fort.i.tude."
Now the "general" is not specified or reckoned together with the species contained under the same "general." Therefore justice is not a general virtue.
Obj. 2: Further, as justice is accounted a cardinal virtue, so are temperance and fort.i.tude. Now neither temperance nor fort.i.tude is reckoned to be a general virtue. Therefore neither should justice in any way be reckoned a general virtue.
Obj. 3: Further, justice is always towards others, as stated above (A. 2). But a sin committed against one"s neighbor cannot be a general sin, because it is condivided with sin committed against oneself. Therefore neither is justice a general virtue.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that "justice is every virtue."
_I answer that,_ Justice, as stated above (A. 2) directs man in his relations with other men. Now this may happen in two ways: first as regards his relation with individuals, secondly as regards his relations with others in general, in so far as a man who serves a community, serves all those who are included in that community.
Accordingly justice in its proper acceptation can be directed to another in both these senses. Now it is evident that all who are included in a community, stand in relation to that community as parts to a whole; while a part, as such, belongs to a whole, so that whatever is the good of a part can be directed to the good of the whole. It follows therefore that the good of any virtue, whether such virtue direct man in relation to himself, or in relation to certain other individual persons, is referable to the common good, to which justice directs: so that all acts of virtue can pertain to justice, in so far as it directs man to the common good. It is in this sense that justice is called a general virtue. And since it belongs to the law to direct to the common good, as stated above (I-II, Q. 90, A.
2), it follows that the justice which is in this way styled general, is called "legal justice," because thereby man is in harmony with the law which directs the acts of all the virtues to the common good.