Summa Theologica

Chapter 462

Reply Obj. 3: The common good is the end of each individual member of a community, just as the good of the whole is the end of each part. On the other hand the good of one individual is not the end of another individual: wherefore legal justice which is directed to the common good, is more capable of extending to the internal pa.s.sions whereby man is disposed in some way or other in himself, than particular justice which is directed to the good of another individual: although legal justice extends chiefly to other virtues in the point of their external operations, in so far, to wit, as "the law commands us to perform the actions of a courageous person ... the actions of a temperate person ... and the actions of a gentle person" (Ethic. v, 5).

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TENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 58, Art. 10]

Whether the Mean of Justice Is the Real Mean?

Objection 1: It would seem that the mean of justice is not the real mean. For the generic nature remains entire in each species. Now moral virtue is defined (Ethic. ii, 6) to be "an elective habit which observes the mean fixed, in our regard, by reason." Therefore justice observes the rational and not the real mean.

Obj. 2: Further, in things that are good simply, there is neither excess nor defect, and consequently neither is there a mean; as is clearly the case with the virtues, according to _Ethic._ ii, 6. Now justice is about things that are good simply, as stated in _Ethic._ v. Therefore justice does not observe the real mean.

Obj. 3: Further, the reason why the other virtues are said to observe the rational and not the real mean, is because in their case the mean varies according to different persons, since what is too much for one is too little for another (Ethic. ii, 6). Now this is also the case in justice: for one who strikes a prince does not receive the same punishment as one who strikes a private individual. Therefore justice also observes, not the real, but the rational mean.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6; v, 4) that the mean of justice is to be taken according to "arithmetical"

proportion, so that it is the real mean.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 9; I-II, Q. 59, A. 4), the other moral virtues are chiefly concerned with the pa.s.sions, the regulation of which is gauged entirely by a comparison with the very man who is the subject of those pa.s.sions, in so far as his anger and desire are vested with their various due circ.u.mstances. Hence the mean in such like virtues is measured not by the proportion of one thing to another, but merely by comparison with the virtuous man himself, so that with them the mean is only that which is fixed by reason in our regard.

On the other hand, the matter of justice is external operation, in so far as an operation or the thing used in that operation is duly proportionate to another person, wherefore the mean of justice consists in a certain proportion of equality between the external thing and the external person. Now equality is the real mean between greater and less, as stated in _Metaph._ x [*Didot ed., ix, 5; Cf.

_Ethic._ v, 4]: wherefore justice observes the real mean.

Reply Obj. 1: This real mean is also the rational mean, wherefore justice satisfies the conditions of a moral virtue.

Reply Obj. 2: We may speak of a thing being good simply in two ways.

First a thing may be good in every way: thus the virtues are good; and there is neither mean nor extremes in things that are good simply in this sense. Secondly a thing is said to be good simply through being good absolutely i.e. in its nature, although it may become evil through being abused. Such are riches and honors; and in the like it is possible to find excess, deficiency and mean, as regards men who can use them well or ill: and it is in this sense that justice is about things that are good simply.

Reply Obj. 3: The injury inflicted bears a different proportion to a prince from that which it bears to a private person: wherefore each injury requires to be equalized by vengeance in a different way: and this implies a real and not merely a rational diversity.

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ELEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 58, Art. 11]

Whether the Act of Justice Is to Render to Each One His Own?

Objection 1: It would seem that the act of justice is not to render to each one his own. For Augustine (De Trin. xiv, 9) ascribes to justice the act of succoring the needy. Now in succoring the needy we give them what is not theirs but ours. Therefore the act of justice does not consist in rendering to each one his own.

Obj. 2: Further, Tully says (De Offic. i, 7) that "beneficence which we may call kindness or liberality, belongs to justice." Now it pertains to liberality to give to another of one"s own, not of what is his. Therefore the act of justice does not consist in rendering to each one his own.

Obj. 3: Further, it belongs to justice not only to distribute things duly, but also to repress injurious actions, such as murder, adultery and so forth. But the rendering to each one of what is his seems to belong solely to the distribution of things. Therefore the act of justice is not sufficiently described by saying that it consists in rendering to each one his own.

_On the contrary,_ Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 24): "It is justice that renders to each one what is his, and claims not another"s property; it disregards its own profit in order to preserve the common equity."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 8, 10), the matter of justice is an external operation in so far as either it or the thing we use by it is made proportionate to some other person to whom we are related by justice. Now each man"s own is that which is due to him according to equality of proportion. Therefore the proper act of justice is nothing else than to render to each one his own.

Reply Obj. 1: Since justice is a cardinal virtue, other secondary virtues, such as mercy, liberality and the like are connected with it, as we shall state further on (Q. 80, A. 1). Wherefore to succor the needy, which belongs to mercy or pity, and to be liberally beneficent, which pertains to liberality, are by a kind of reduction ascribed to justice as to their princ.i.p.al virtue.

This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.

Reply Obj. 3: As the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 4), in matters of justice, the name of "profit" is extended to whatever is excessive, and whatever is deficient is called "loss." The reason for this is that justice is first of all and more commonly exercised in voluntary interchanges of things, such as buying and selling, wherein those expressions are properly employed; and yet they are transferred to all other matters of justice. The same applies to the rendering to each one of what is his own.

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TWELFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 58, Art. 12]

Whether Justice Stands Foremost Among All Moral Virtues?

Objection 1: It would seem that justice does not stand foremost among all the moral virtues. Because it belongs to justice to render to each one what is his, whereas it belongs to liberality to give of one"s own, and this is more virtuous. Therefore liberality is a greater virtue than justice.

Obj. 2: Further, nothing is adorned by a less excellent thing than itself. Now magnanimity is the ornament both of justice and of all the virtues, according to _Ethic._ iv, 3. Therefore magnanimity is more excellent than justice.

Obj. 3: Further, virtue is about that which is "difficult" and "good," as stated in _Ethic._ ii, 3. But fort.i.tude is about more difficult things than justice is, since it is about dangers of death, according to _Ethic._ iii, 6. Therefore fort.i.tude is more excellent than justice.

_On the contrary,_ Tully says (De Offic. i, 7): "Justice is the most resplendent of the virtues, and gives its name to a good man."

_I answer that,_ If we speak of legal justice, it is evident that it stands foremost among all the moral virtues, for as much as the common good transcends the individual good of one person. In this sense the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 1) that "the most excellent of the virtues would seem to be justice, and more glorious than either the evening or the morning star." But, even if we speak of particular justice, it excels the other moral virtues for two reasons. The first reason may be taken from the subject, because justice is in the more excellent part of the soul, viz. the rational appet.i.te or will, whereas the other moral virtues are in the sensitive appet.i.te, whereunto appertain the pa.s.sions which are the matter of the other moral virtues. The second reason is taken from the object, because the other virtues are commendable in respect of the sole good of the virtuous person himself, whereas justice is praiseworthy in respect of the virtuous person being well disposed towards another, so that justice is somewhat the good of another person, as stated in _Ethic._ v, 1. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet.

i, 9): "The greatest virtues must needs be those which are most profitable to other persons, because virtue is a faculty of doing good to others. For this reason the greatest honors are accorded the brave and the just, since bravery is useful to others in warfare, and justice is useful to others both in warfare and in time of peace."

Reply Obj. 1: Although the liberal man gives of his own, yet he does so in so far as he takes into consideration the good of his own virtue, while the just man gives to another what is his, through consideration of the common good. Moreover justice is observed towards all, whereas liberality cannot extend to all. Again liberality which gives of a man"s own is based on justice, whereby one renders to each man what is his.

Reply Obj. 2: When magnanimity is added to justice it increases the latter"s goodness; and yet without justice it would not even be a virtue.

Reply Obj. 3: Although fort.i.tude is about the most difficult things, it is not about the best, for it is only useful in warfare, whereas justice is useful both in war and in peace, as stated above.

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QUESTION 59

OF INJUSTICE (In Four Articles)

We must now consider injustice, under which head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether injustice is a special vice?

(2) Whether it is proper to the unjust man to do unjust deeds?

(3) Whether one can suffer injustice willingly?

(4) Whether injustice is a mortal sin according to its genus?

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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 59, Art. 1]

Whether Injustice Is a Special Virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that injustice is not a special vice. For it is written (1 John 3:4): "All sin is iniquity [*Vulg.: "Whosoever committeth sin, committeth also iniquity; and sin is iniquity"]." Now iniquity would seem to be the same as injustice, because justice is a kind of equality, so that injustice is apparently the same as inequality or iniquity. Therefore injustice is not a special sin.

Obj. 2: Further, no special sin is contrary to all the virtues. But injustice is contrary to all the virtues: for as regards adultery it is opposed to chast.i.ty, as regards murder it is opposed to meekness, and in like manner as regards the other sins. Therefore injustice is not a special sin.

Obj. 3: Further, injustice is opposed to justice which is in the will. But every sin is in the will, as Augustine declares (De Duabus Anim. x). Therefore injustice is not a special sin.

_On the contrary,_ Injustice is contrary to justice. But justice is a special virtue. Therefore injustice is a special vice.

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