Hence the Replies to the Objections are clear.
_______________________
FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 63, Art. 4]
Whether the Sin of Respect of Persons Takes Place in Judicial Sentences?
Objection 1: It would seem that the sin of respect of persons does not take place in judicial sentences. For respect of persons is opposed to distributive justice, as stated above (A. 1): whereas judicial sentences seem to pertain chiefly to commutative justice.
Therefore respect of persons does not take place in judicial sentences.
Obj. 2: Further, penalties are inflicted according to a sentence. Now it is not a sin to respect persons in p.r.o.nouncing penalties, since a heavier punishment is inflicted on one who injures the person of a prince than on one who injures the person of others. Therefore respect of persons does not take place in judicial sentences.
Obj. 3: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 4:10): "In judging be merciful to the fatherless." But this seems to imply respect of the person of the needy. Therefore in judicial sentences respect of persons is not a sin.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Prov. 18:5): "It is not good to accept the person in judgment [*Vulg.: "It is not good to accept the person of the wicked, to decline from the truth of judgment."]."
_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 60, A. 1), judgment is an act of justice, in as much as the judge restores to the equality of justice, those things which may cause an opposite inequality. Now respect of persons involves a certain inequality, in so far as something is allotted to a person out of that proportion to him in which the equality of justice consists. Wherefore it is evident that judgment is rendered corrupt by respect of persons.
Reply Obj. 1: A judgment may be looked at in two ways. First, in view of the thing judged, and in this way judgment is common to commutative and distributive justice: because it may be decided by judgment how some common good is to be distributed among many, and how one person is to restore to another what he has taken from him.
Secondly, it may be considered in view of the form of judgment, in as much as, even in commutative justice, the judge takes from one and gives to another, and this belongs to distributive justice. In this way respect of persons may take place in any judgment.
Reply Obj. 2: When a person is more severely punished on account of a crime committed against a greater person, there is no respect of persons, because the very difference of persons causes, in that case, a diversity of things, as stated above (Q. 58, A. 10, ad 3; Q. 61, A.
2, ad 3).
Reply Obj. 3: In p.r.o.nouncing judgment one ought to succor the needy as far as possible, yet without prejudice to justice: else the saying of Ex. 23:3 would apply: "Neither shalt thou favor a poor man in judgment."
_______________________
QUESTION 64
OF MURDER (In Eight Articles)
In due sequence we must consider the vices opposed to commutative justice. We must consider (1) those sins that are committed in relation to involuntary commutations; (2) those that are committed with regard to voluntary commutations. Sins are committed in relation to involuntary commutations by doing an injury to one"s neighbor against his will: and this can be done in two ways, namely by deed or by word. By deed when one"s neighbor is injured either in his own person, or in a person connected with him, or in his possessions.
We must therefore consider these points in due order, and in the first place we shall consider murder whereby a man inflicts the greatest injury on his neighbor. Under this head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is a sin to kill dumb animals or even plants?
(2) Whether it is lawful to kill a sinner?
(3) Whether this is lawful to a private individual, or to a public person only?
(4) Whether this is lawful to a cleric?
(5) Whether it is lawful to kill oneself?
(6) Whether it is lawful to kill a just man?
(7) Whether it is lawful to kill a man in self-defense?
(8) Whether accidental homicide is a mortal sin?
_______________________
FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 64, Art. 1]
Whether It Is Unlawful to Kill Any Living Thing?
Objection 1: It would seem unlawful to kill any living thing. For the Apostle says (Rom. 13:2): "They that resist the ordinance of G.o.d purchase to themselves d.a.m.nation [*Vulg.: "He that resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of G.o.d: and they that resist, purchase themselves d.a.m.nation."]." Now Divine providence has ordained that all living things should be preserved, according to Ps. 146:8, 9, "Who maketh gra.s.s to grow on the mountains ... Who giveth to beasts their food." Therefore it seems unlawful to take the life of any living thing.
Obj. 2: Further, murder is a sin because it deprives a man of life.
Now life is common to all animals and plants. Hence for the same reason it is apparently a sin to slay dumb animals and plants.
Obj. 3: Further, in the Divine law a special punishment is not appointed save for a sin. Now a special punishment had to be inflicted, according to the Divine law, on one who killed another man"s ox or sheep (Ex. 22:1). Therefore the slaying of dumb animals is a sin.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 20): "When we hear it said, "Thou shalt not kill," we do not take it as referring to trees, for they have no sense, nor to irrational animals, because they have no fellowship with us. Hence it follows that the words, "Thou shalt not kill" refer to the killing of a man."
_I answer that,_ There is no sin in using a thing for the purpose for which it is. Now the order of things is such that the imperfect are for the perfect, even as in the process of generation nature proceeds from imperfection to perfection. Hence it is that just as in the generation of a man there is first a living thing, then an animal, and lastly a man, so too things, like the plants, which merely have life, are all alike for animals, and all animals are for man.
Wherefore it is not unlawful if man use plants for the good of animals, and animals for the good of man, as the Philosopher states (Polit. i, 3).
Now the most necessary use would seem to consist in the fact that animals use plants, and men use animals, for food, and this cannot be done unless these be deprived of life: wherefore it is lawful both to take life from plants for the use of animals, and from animals for the use of men. In fact this is in keeping with the commandment of G.o.d Himself: for it is written (Gen. 1:29, 30): "Behold I have given you every herb ... and all trees ... to be your meat, and to all beasts of the earth": and again (Gen. 9:3): "Everything that moveth and liveth shall be meat to you."
Reply Obj. 1: According to the Divine ordinance the life of animals and plants is preserved not for themselves but for man. Hence, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 20), "by a most just ordinance of the Creator, both their life and their death are subject to our use."
Reply Obj. 2: Dumb animals and plants are devoid of the life of reason whereby to set themselves in motion; they are moved, as it were by another, by a kind of natural impulse, a sign of which is that they are naturally enslaved and accommodated to the uses of others.
Reply Obj. 3: He that kills another"s ox, sins, not through killing the ox, but through injuring another man in his property. Wherefore this is not a species of the sin of murder but of the sin of theft or robbery.
_______________________
SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 64, Art. 2]
Whether It Is Lawful to Kill Sinners?
Objection 1: It would seem unlawful to kill men who have sinned. For our Lord in the parable (Matt. 13) forbade the uprooting of the c.o.c.kle which denotes wicked men according to a gloss. Now whatever is forbidden by G.o.d is a sin. Therefore it is a sin to kill a sinner.
Obj. 2: Further, human justice is conformed to Divine justice. Now according to Divine justice sinners are kept back for repentance, according to Ezech. 33:11, "I desire not the death of the wicked, but that the wicked turn from his way and live." Therefore it seems altogether unjust to kill sinners.
Obj. 3: Further, it is not lawful, for any good end whatever, to do that which is evil in itself, according to Augustine (Contra Mendac.
vii) and the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6). Now to kill a man is evil in itself, since we are bound to have charity towards all men, and "we wish our friends to live and to exist," according to _Ethic._ ix, 4.
Therefore it is nowise lawful to kill a man who has sinned.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ex. 22:18): "Wizards thou shalt not suffer to live"; and (Ps. 100:8): "In the morning I put to death all the wicked of the land."
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), it is lawful to kill dumb animals, in so far as they are naturally directed to man"s use, as the imperfect is directed to the perfect. Now every part is directed to the whole, as imperfect to perfect, wherefore every part is naturally for the sake of the whole. For this reason we observe that if the health of the whole body demands the excision of a member, through its being decayed or infectious to the other members, it will be both praiseworthy and advantageous to have it cut away. Now every individual person is compared to the whole community, as part to whole. Therefore if a man be dangerous and infectious to the community, on account of some sin, it is praiseworthy and advantageous that he be killed in order to safeguard the common good, since "a little leaven corrupteth the whole lump" (1 Cor. 5:6).
Reply Obj. 1: Our Lord commanded them to forbear from uprooting the c.o.c.kle in order to spare the wheat, i.e. the good. This occurs when the wicked cannot be slain without the good being killed with them, either because the wicked lie hidden among the good, or because they have many followers, so that they cannot be killed without danger to the good, as Augustine says (Contra Parmen. iii, 2). Wherefore our Lord teaches that we should rather allow the wicked to live, and that vengeance is to be delayed until the last judgment, rather than that the good be put to death together with the wicked. When, however, the good incur no danger, but rather are protected and saved by the slaying of the wicked, then the latter may be lawfully put to death.
Reply Obj. 2: According to the order of His wisdom, G.o.d sometimes slays sinners forthwith in order to deliver the good, whereas sometimes He allows them time to repent, according as He knows what is expedient for His elect. This also does human justice imitate according to its powers; for it puts to death those who are dangerous to others, while it allows time for repentance to those who sin without grievously harming others.
Reply Obj. 3: By sinning man departs from the order of reason, and consequently falls away from the dignity of his manhood, in so far as he is naturally free, and exists for himself, and he falls into the slavish state of the beasts, by being disposed of according as he is useful to others. This is expressed in Ps. 48:21: "Man, when he was in honor, did not understand; he hath been compared to senseless beasts, and made like to them," and Prov. 11:29: "The fool shall serve the wise." Hence, although it be evil in itself to kill a man so long as he preserve his dignity, yet it may be good to kill a man who has sinned, even as it is to kill a beast. For a bad man is worse than a beast, and is more harmful, as the Philosopher states (Polit.
i, 1 and _Ethic._ vii, 6).