Objection 1: It would seem that theft is not always a sin. For no sin is commanded by G.o.d, since it is written (Ecclus. 15:21): "He hath commanded no man to do wickedly." Yet we find that G.o.d commanded theft, for it is written (Ex. 12:35, 36): "And the children of Israel did as the Lord had commanded Moses [Vulg.: "as Moses had commanded"]... and they stripped the Egyptians." Therefore theft is not always a sin.
Obj. 2: Further, if a man finds a thing that is not his and takes it, he seems to commit a theft, for he takes another"s property. Yet this seems lawful according to natural equity, as the jurists hold. [*See loc. cit. in Reply.] Therefore it seems that theft is not always a sin.
Obj. 3: Further, he that takes what is his own does not seem to sin, because he does not act against justice, since he does not destroy its equality. Yet a man commits a theft even if he secretly take his own property that is detained by or in the safe-keeping of another.
Therefore it seems that theft is not always a sin.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ex. 20:15): "Thou shalt not steal."
_I answer that,_ If anyone consider what is meant by theft, he will find that it is sinful on two counts. First, because of its opposition to justice, which gives to each one what is his, so that for this reason theft is contrary to justice, through being a taking of what belongs to another. Secondly, because of the guile or fraud committed by the thief, by laying hands on another"s property secretly and cunningly. Wherefore it is evident that every theft is a sin.
Reply Obj. 1: It is no theft for a man to take another"s property either secretly or openly by order of a judge who has commanded him to do so, because it becomes his due by the very fact that it is adjudicated to him by the sentence of the court. Hence still less was it a theft for the Israelites to take away the spoils of the Egyptians at the command of the Lord, Who ordered this to be done on account of the ill-treatment accorded to them by the Egyptians without any cause: wherefore it is written significantly (Wis.
10:19): "The just took the spoils of the wicked."
Reply Obj. 2: With regard to treasure-trove a distinction must be made. For some there are that were never in anyone"s possession, for instance precious stones and jewels, found on the seash.o.r.e, and such the finder is allowed to keep [*Dig. I, viii, De divis. rerum: Inst.
II, i, De rerum divis.]. The same applies to treasure hidden underground long since and belonging to no man, except that according to civil law the finder is bound to give half to the owner of the land, if the treasure trove be in the land of another person [*Inst.
II, i, 39: Cod. X, xv, De Thesauris]. Hence in the parable of the Gospel (Matt. 13:44) it is said of the finder of the treasure hidden in a field that he bought the field, as though he purposed thus to acquire the right of possessing the whole treasure. On the other Land the treasure-trove may be nearly in someone"s possession: and then if anyone take it with the intention, not of keeping it but of returning it to the owner who does not look upon such things as unappropriated, he is not guilty of theft. In like manner if the thing found appears to be unappropriated, and if the finder believes it to be so, although he keep it, he does not commit a theft [*Inst. II, i, 47].
In any other case the sin of theft is committed [*Dig. XLI, i, De acquirend. rerum dominio, 9: Inst. II, i, 48]: wherefore Augustine says in a homily (Serm. clxxviii; De Verb. Apost.): "If thou hast found a thing and not returned it, thou hast stolen it" (Dig. xiv, 5, can. Si quid invenisti).
Reply Obj. 3: He who by stealth takes his own property which is deposited with another man burdens the depositary, who is bound either to rest.i.tution, or to prove himself innocent. Hence he is clearly guilty of sin, and is bound to ease the depositary of his burden. On the other hand he who, by stealth, takes his own property, if this be unjustly detained by another, he sins indeed; yet not because he burdens the retainer, and so he is not bound to rest.i.tution or compensation: but he sins against general justice by disregarding the order of justice and usurping judgment concerning his own property. Hence he must make satisfaction to G.o.d and endeavor to allay whatever scandal he may have given his neighbor by acting this way.
_______________________
SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 66, Art. 6]
Whether Theft Is a Mortal Sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that theft is not a mortal sin. For it is written (Prov. 6:30): "The fault is not so great when a man hath stolen." But every mortal sin is a great fault. Therefore theft is not a mortal sin.
Obj. 2: Further, mortal sin deserves to be punished with death. But in the Law theft is punished not by death but by indemnity, according to Ex. 22:1, "If any man steal an ox or a sheep ... he shall restore have oxen for one ox, and four sheep for one sheep."
Therefore theft is not a mortal sin.
Obj. 3: Further, theft can be committed in small even as in great things. But it seems unreasonable for a man to be punished with eternal death for the theft of a small thing such as a needle or a quill. Therefore theft is not a mortal sin.
_On the contrary,_ No man is condemned by the Divine judgment save for a mortal sin. Yet a man is condemned for theft, according to Zech. 5:3, "This is the curse that goeth forth over the face of the earth; for every thief shall be judged as is there written."
Therefore theft is a mortal sin.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 59, A. 4; I-II, Q. 72, A. 5), a mortal sin is one that is contrary to charity as the spiritual life of the soul. Now charity consists princ.i.p.ally in the love of G.o.d, and secondarily in the love of our neighbor, which is shown in our wishing and doing him well. But theft is a means of doing harm to our neighbor in his belongings; and if men were to rob one another habitually, human society would be undone. Therefore theft, as being opposed to charity, is a mortal sin.
Reply Obj. 1: The statement that theft is not a great fault is in view of two cases. First, when a person is led to thieve through necessity. This necessity diminishes or entirely removes sin, as we shall show further on (A. 7). Hence the text continues: "For he stealeth to fill his hungry soul." Secondly, theft is stated not to be a great fault in comparison with the guilt of adultery, which is punished with death. Hence the text goes on to say of the thief that "if he be taken, he shall restore sevenfold ... but he that is an adulterer ... shall destroy his own soul."
Reply Obj. 2: The punishments of this life are medicinal rather than retributive. For retribution is reserved to the Divine judgment which is p.r.o.nounced against sinners "according to truth" (Rom. 2:2).
Wherefore, according to the judgment of the present life the death punishment is inflicted, not for every mortal sin, but only for such as inflict an irreparable harm, or again for such as contain some horrible deformity. Hence according to the present judgment the pain of death is not inflicted for theft which does not inflict an irreparable harm, except when it is aggravated by some grave circ.u.mstance, as in the case of sacrilege which is the theft of a sacred thing, of peculation, which is theft of common property, as Augustine states (Tract. 1, Super Joan.), and of kidnaping which is stealing a man, for which the pain of death is inflicted (Ex. 21:16).
Reply Obj. 3: Reason accounts as nothing that which is little: so that a man does not consider himself injured in very little matters: and the person who takes such things can presume that this is not against the will of the owner. And if a person take such like very little things, he may be proportionately excused from mortal sin. Yet if his intention is to rob and injure his neighbor, there may be a mortal sin even in these very little things, even as there may be through consent in a mere thought.
_______________________
SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 66, Art. 7]
Whether It Is Lawful to Steal Through Stress of Need?
Objection 1: It would seem unlawful to steal through stress of need.
For penance is not imposed except on one who has sinned. Now it is stated (Extra, De furtis, Cap. Si quis): "If anyone, through stress of hunger or nakedness, steal food, clothing or beast, he shall do penance for three weeks." Therefore it is not lawful to steal through stress of need.
Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that "there are some actions whose very name implies wickedness," and among these he reckons theft. Now that which is wicked in itself may not be done for a good end. Therefore a man cannot lawfully steal in order to remedy a need.
Obj. 3: Further, a man should love his neighbor as himself. Now, according to Augustine (Contra Mendac. vii), it is unlawful to steal in order to succor one"s neighbor by giving him an alms. Therefore neither is it lawful to steal in order to remedy one"s own needs.
_On the contrary,_ In cases of need all things are common property, so that there would seem to be no sin in taking another"s property, for need has made it common.
_I answer that,_ Things which are of human right cannot derogate from natural right or Divine right. Now according to the natural order established by Divine Providence, inferior things are ordained for the purpose of succoring man"s needs by their means. Wherefore the division and appropriation of things which are based on human law, do not preclude the fact that man"s needs have to be remedied by means of these very things. Hence whatever certain people have in superabundance is due, by natural law, to the purpose of succoring the poor. For this reason Ambrose [*Loc. cit., A. 2, Obj. 3] says, and his words are embodied in the Decretals (Dist. xlvii, can. Sicut ii): "It is the hungry man"s bread that you withhold, the naked man"s cloak that you store away, the money that you bury in the earth is the price of the poor man"s ransom and freedom."
Since, however, there are many who are in need, while it is impossible for all to be succored by means of the same thing, each one is entrusted with the stewardship of his own things, so that out of them he may come to the aid of those who are in need.
Nevertheless, if the need be so manifest and urgent, that it is evident that the present need must be remedied by whatever means be at hand (for instance when a person is in some imminent danger, and there is no other possible remedy), then it is lawful for a man to succor his own need by means of another"s property, by taking it either openly or secretly: nor is this properly speaking theft or robbery.
Reply Obj. 1: This decretal considers cases where there is no urgent need.
Reply Obj. 2: It is not theft, properly speaking, to take secretly and use another"s property in a case of extreme need: because that which he takes for the support of his life becomes his own property by reason of that need.
Reply Obj. 3: In a case of a like need a man may also take secretly another"s property in order to succor his neighbor in need.
_______________________
EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 66, Art. 8]
Whether Robbery May Be Committed Without Sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that robbery may be committed without sin.
For spoils are taken by violence, and this seems to belong to the essence of robbery, according to what has been said (A. 4). Now it is lawful to take spoils from the enemy; for Ambrose says (De Patriarch.
4 [*De Abraham i, 3]): "When the conqueror has taken possession of the spoils, military discipline demands that all should be reserved for the sovereign," in order, to wit, that he may distribute them.
Therefore in certain cases robbery is lawful.
Obj. 2: Further, it is lawful to take from a man what is not his. Now the things which unbelievers have are not theirs, for Augustine says (Ep. ad Vincent. Donat. xciii.): "You falsely call things your own, for you do not possess them justly, and according to the laws of earthly kings you are commanded to forfeit them." Therefore it seems that one may lawfully rob unbelievers.
Obj. 3: Further, earthly princes violently extort many things from their subjects: and this seems to savor of robbery. Now it would seem a grievous matter to say that they sin in acting thus, for in that case nearly every prince would be d.a.m.ned. Therefore in some cases robbery is lawful.
_On the contrary,_ Whatever is taken lawfully may be offered to G.o.d in sacrifice and oblation. Now this cannot be done with the proceeds of robbery, according to Isa. 61:8, "I am the Lord that love judgment, and hate robbery in a holocaust." Therefore it is not lawful to take anything by robbery.
_I answer that,_ Robbery implies a certain violence and coercion employed in taking unjustly from a man that which is his. Now in human society no man can exercise coercion except through public authority: and, consequently, if a private individual not having public authority takes another"s property by violence, he acts unlawfully and commits a robbery, as burglars do. As regards princes, the public power is entrusted to them that they may be the guardians of justice: hence it is unlawful for them to use violence or coercion, save within the bounds of justice--either by fighting against the enemy, or against the citizens, by punishing evil-doers: and whatever is taken by violence of this kind is not the spoils of robbery, since it is not contrary to justice. On the other hand to take other people"s property violently and against justice, in the exercise of public authority, is to act unlawfully and to be guilty of robbery; and whoever does so is bound to rest.i.tution.
Reply Obj. 1: A distinction must be made in the matter of spoils. For if they who take spoils from the enemy, are waging a just war, such things as they seize in the war become their own property. This is no robbery, so that they are not bound to rest.i.tution. Nevertheless even they who are engaged in a just war may sin in taking spoils through cupidity arising from an evil intention, if, to wit, they fight chiefly not for justice but for spoil. For Augustine says (De Verb.
Dom. xix; Serm. lx.x.xii) that "it is a sin to fight for booty." If, however, those who take the spoil, are waging an unjust war, they are guilty of robbery, and are bound to rest.i.tution.
Reply Obj. 2: Unbelievers possess their goods unjustly in so far as they are ordered by the laws of earthly princes to forfeit those goods. Hence these may be taken violently from them, not by private but by public authority.
Reply Obj. 3: It is no robbery if princes exact from their subjects that which is due to them for the safe-guarding of the common good, even if they use violence in so doing: but if they extort something unduly by means of violence, it is robbery even as burglary is. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei iv, 4): "If justice be disregarded, what is a king but a mighty robber? since what is a robber but a little king?" And it is written (Ezech. 22:27): "Her princes in the midst of her, are like wolves ravening the prey." Wherefore they are bound to rest.i.tution, just as robbers are, and by so much do they sin more grievously than robbers, as their actions are fraught with greater and more universal danger to public justice whose wardens they are.
_______________________
NINTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 66, Art. 9]
Whether Theft Is a More Grievous Sin Than Robbery?