Objection 1: It would seem that derision is not a special sin distinct from those mentioned above. For laughing to scorn is apparently the same as derision. But laughing to scorn pertains to reviling. Therefore derision would seem not to differ from reviling.
Obj. 2: Further, no man is derided except for something reprehensible which puts him to shame. Now such are sins; and if they be imputed to a person publicly, it is a case of reviling, if privately, it amounts to backbiting or tale-bearing. Therefore derision is not distinct from the foregoing vices.
Obj. 3: Further, sins of this kind are distinguished by the injury they inflict on one"s neighbor. Now the injury inflicted on a man by derision affects either his honor, or his good name, or is detrimental to his friendship. Therefore derision is not a sin distinct from the foregoing.
_On the contrary,_ Derision is done in jest, wherefore it is described as "making fun." Now all the foregoing are done seriously and not in jest. Therefore derision differs from all of them.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 72, A. 2), sins of word should be weighed chiefly by the intention of the speaker, wherefore these sins are differentiated according to the various intentions of those who speak against another. Now just as the railer intends to injure the honor of the person he rails, the backbiter to depreciate a good name, and the tale-bearer to destroy friendship, so too the derider intends to shame the person he derides. And since this end is distinct from the others, it follows that the sin of derision is distinct from the foregoing sins.
Reply Obj. 1: Laughing to scorn and derision agree as to the end but differ in mode, because derision is done with the "mouth," i.e. by words and laughter, while laughing to scorn is done by wrinkling the nose, as a gloss says on Ps. 2:4, "He that dwelleth in heaven shall laugh at them": and such a distinction does not differentiate the species. Yet they both differ from reviling, as being shamed differs from being dishonored: for to be ashamed is "to fear dishonor," as Damascene states (De Fide Orth. ii, 15).
Reply Obj. 2: For doing a virtuous deed a man deserves both respect and a good name in the eyes of others, and in his own eyes the glory of a good conscience, according to 2 Cor. 1:12, "Our glory is this, the testimony of our conscience." Hence, on the other hand, for doing a reprehensible, i.e. a vicious action, a man forfeits his honor and good name in the eyes of others--and for this purpose the reviler and the backbiter speak of another person--while in his own eyes, he loses the glory of his conscience through being confused and ashamed at reprehensible deeds being imputed to him--and for this purpose the derider speaks ill of him. It is accordingly evident that derision agrees with the foregoing vices as to the matter but differs as to the end.
Reply Obj. 3: A secure and calm conscience is a great good, according to Prov. 15:15, "A secure mind is like a continual feast." Wherefore he that disturbs another"s conscience by confounding him inflicts a special injury on him: hence derision is a special kind of sin.
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SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 75, Art. 2]
Whether Derision Can Be a Mortal Sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that derision cannot be a mortal sin.
Every mortal sin is contrary to charity. But derision does not seem contrary to charity, for sometimes it takes place in jest among friends, wherefore it is known as "making fun." Therefore derision cannot be a mortal sin.
Obj. 2: Further, the greatest derision would appear to be that which is done as an injury to G.o.d. But derision is not always a mortal sin when it tends to the injury of G.o.d: else it would be a mortal sin to relapse into a venial sin of which one has repented. For Isidore says (De Sum. Bon. ii, 16) that "he who continues to do what he has repented of, is a derider and not a penitent." It would likewise follow that all hypocrisy is a mortal sin, because, according to Gregory (Moral. x.x.xi, 15) "the ostrich signifies the hypocrite, who derides the horse, i.e. the just man, and his rider, i.e. G.o.d."
Therefore derision is not a mortal sin.
Obj. 3: Further, reviling and backbiting seem to be graver sins than derision, because it is more to do a thing seriously than in jest.
But not all backbiting or reviling is a mortal sin. Much less therefore is derision a mortal sin.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Prov. 3:34): "He derideth [Vulg.: "shall scorn"] the scorners." But G.o.d"s derision is eternal punishment for mortal sin, as appears from the words of Ps. 2:4, "He that dwelleth in heaven shall laugh at them." Therefore derision is a mortal sin.
_I answer that,_ The object of derision is always some evil or defect. Now when an evil is great, it is taken, not in jest, but seriously: consequently if it is taken in jest or turned to ridicule (whence the terms "derision" and "jesting"), this is because it is considered to be slight. Now an evil may be considered to be slight in two ways: first, in itself, secondly, in relation to the person.
When anyone makes game or fun of another"s evil or defect, because it is a slight evil in itself, this is a venial sin by reason of its genus. On the other hand this defect may be considered as a slight evil in relation to the person, just as we are wont to think little of the defects of children and imbeciles: and then to make game or fun of a person, is to scorn him altogether, and to think him so despicable that his misfortune troubles us not one whit, but is held as an object of derision. In this way derision is a mortal sin, and more grievous than reviling, which is also done openly: because the reviler would seem to take another"s evil seriously; whereas the derider does so in fun, and so would seem the more to despise and dishonor the other man. Wherefore, in this sense, derision is a grievous sin, and all the more grievous according as a greater respect is due to the person derided.
Consequently it is an exceedingly grievous sin to deride G.o.d and the things of G.o.d, according to Isa. 37:23, "Whom hast thou reproached, and whom hast thou blasphemed, and against whom hast thou exalted thy voice?" and he replies: "Against the Holy One of Israel." In the second place comes derision of one"s parents, wherefore it is written (Prov. 30:17): "The eye that mocketh at his father, and that despiseth the labor of his mother in bearing him, let the ravens of the brooks pick it out, and the young eagles eat it." Further, the derision of good persons is grievous, because honor is the reward of virtue, and against this it is written (Job 12:4): "The simplicity of the just man is laughed to scorn." Such like derision does very much harm: because it turns men away from good deeds, according to Gregory (Moral. xx, 14), "Who when they perceive any good points appearing in the acts of others, directly pluck them up with the hand of a mischievous reviling."
Reply Obj. 1: Jesting implies nothing contrary to charity in relation to the person with whom one jests, but it may imply something against charity in relation to the person who is the object of the jest, on account of contempt, as stated above.
Reply Obj. 2: Neither he that relapses into a sin of which he has repented, nor a hypocrite, derides G.o.d explicitly, but implicitly, in so far as either"s behavior is like a derider"s. Nor is it true that to commit a venial sin is to relapse or dissimulate altogether, but only dispositively and imperfectly.
Reply Obj. 3: Derision considered in itself is less grievous than backbiting or reviling, because it does not imply contempt, but jest.
Sometimes however it includes greater contempt than reviling does, as stated above, and then it is a grave sin.
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QUESTION 76
OF CURSING (In Four Articles)
We must now consider cursing. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether one may lawfully curse another?
(2) Whether one may lawfully curse an irrational creature?
(3) Whether cursing is a mortal sin?
(4) Of its comparison with other sins.
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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 76, Art. 1]
Whether It Is Lawful to Curse Anyone?
Objection 1: It would seem unlawful to curse anyone. For it is unlawful to disregard the command of the Apostle in whom Christ spoke, according to 2 Cor. 13:3. Now he commanded (Rom. 12:14), "Bless and curse not." Therefore it is not lawful to curse anyone.
Obj. 2: Further, all are bound to bless G.o.d, according to Dan. 3:82, "O ye sons of men, bless the Lord." Now the same mouth cannot both bless G.o.d and curse man, as proved in the third chapter of James.
Therefore no man may lawfully curse another man.
Obj. 3: Further, he that curses another would seem to wish him some evil either of fault or of punishment, since a curse appears to be a kind of imprecation. But it is not lawful to wish ill to anyone, indeed we are bound to pray that all may be delivered from evil.
Therefore it is unlawful for any man to curse.
Obj. 4: Further, the devil exceeds all in malice on account of his obstinacy. But it is not lawful to curse the devil, as neither is it lawful to curse oneself; for it is written (Ecclus. 21:30): "While the unG.o.dly curseth the devil, he curseth his own soul." Much less therefore is it lawful to curse a man.
Obj. 5: Further, a gloss on Num. 23:8, "How shall I curse whom G.o.d hath not cursed?" says: "There cannot be a just cause for cursing a sinner if one be ignorant of his sentiments." Now one man cannot know another man"s sentiments, nor whether he is cursed by G.o.d. Therefore no man may lawfully curse another.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 27:26): "Cursed be he that abideth not in the words of this law." Moreover Eliseus cursed the little boys who mocked him (4 Kings 2:24).
_I answer that,_ To curse (_maledicere_) is the same as to speak ill (_malum dicere_). Now "speaking" has a threefold relation to the thing spoken. First, by way of a.s.sertion, as when a thing is expressed in the indicative mood: in this way _maledicere_ signifies simply to tell someone of another"s evil, and this pertains to backbiting, wherefore tellers of evil (_maledici_) are sometimes called backbiters. Secondly, speaking is related to the thing spoken, by way of cause, and this belongs to G.o.d first and foremost, since He made all things by His word, according to Ps. 32:9, "He spoke and they were made"; while secondarily it belongs to man, who, by his word, commands others and thus moves them to do something: it is for this purpose that we employ verbs in the imperative mood. Thirdly, "speaking" is related to the thing spoken by expressing the sentiments of one who desires that which is expressed in words; and for this purpose we employ the verb in the optative mood.
Accordingly we may omit the first kind of evil speaking which is by way of simple a.s.sertion of evil, and consider the other two kinds.
And here we must observe that to do something and to will it are consequent on one another in the matter of goodness and wickedness, as shown above (I-II, Q. 20, A. 3). Hence in these two ways of evil speaking, by way of command and by way of desire, there is the same aspect of lawfulness and unlawfulness, for if a man commands or desires another"s evil, as evil, being intent on the evil itself, then evil speaking will be unlawful in both ways, and this is what is meant by cursing. On the other hand if a man commands or desires another"s evil under the aspect of good, it is lawful; and it may be called cursing, not strictly speaking, but accidentally, because the chief intention of the speaker is directed not to evil but to good.
Now evil may be spoken, by commanding or desiring it, under the aspect of a twofold good. Sometimes under the aspect of just, and thus a judge lawfully curses a man whom he condemns to a just penalty: thus too the Church curses by p.r.o.nouncing anathema. In the same way the prophets in the Scriptures sometimes call down evils on sinners, as though conforming their will to Divine justice, although such like imprecation may be taken by way of foretelling. Sometimes evil is spoken under the aspect of useful, as when one wishes a sinner to suffer sickness or hindrance of some kind, either that he may himself reform, or at least that he may cease from harming others.
Reply Obj. 1: The Apostle forbids cursing strictly so called with an evil intent: and the same answer applies to the Second Objection.
Reply Obj. 3: To wish another man evil under the aspect of good, is not opposed to the sentiment whereby one wishes him good simply, in fact rather is it in conformity therewith.
Reply Obj. 4: In the devil both nature and guilt must be considered.
His nature indeed is good and is from G.o.d nor is it lawful to curse it. On the other hand his guilt is deserving of being cursed, according to Job 3:8, "Let them curse it who curse the day." Yet when a sinner curses the devil on account of his guilt, for the same reason he judges himself worthy of being cursed; and in this sense he is said to curse his own soul.
Reply Obj. 5: Although the sinner"s sentiments cannot be perceived in themselves, they can be perceived through some manifest sin, which has to be punished. Likewise although it is not possible to know whom G.o.d curses in respect of final reprobation, it is possible to know who is accursed of G.o.d in respect of being guilty of present sin.
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SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 76, Art. 2]
Whether It Is Lawful to Curse an Irrational Creature?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is unlawful to curse an irrational creature. Cursing would seem to be lawful chiefly in its relation to punishment. Now irrational creatures are not competent subjects either of guilt or of punishment. Therefore it is unlawful to curse them.