Reply Obj. 7: If a man wish to sell his goods at a higher price than that which is just, so that he may wait for the buyer to pay, it is manifestly a case of usury: because this waiting for the payment of the price has the character of a loan, so that whatever he demands beyond the just price in consideration of this delay, is like a price for a loan, which pertains to usury. In like manner if a buyer wishes to buy goods at a lower price than what is just, for the reason that he pays for the goods before they can be delivered, it is a sin of usury; because again this antic.i.p.ated payment of money has the character of a loan, the price of which is the rebate on the just price of the goods sold. On the other hand if a man wishes to allow a rebate on the just price in order that he may have his money sooner, he is not guilty of the sin of usury.
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THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 78, Art. 3]
Whether a Man Is Bound to Restore Whatever Profits He Has Made Out of Money Gotten by Usury?
Objection 1: It would seem that a man is bound to restore whatever profits he has made out of money gotten by usury. For the Apostle says (Rom. 11:16): "If the root be holy, so are the branches."
Therefore likewise if the root be rotten so are the branches. But the root was infected with usury. Therefore whatever profit is made therefrom is infected with usury. Therefore he is bound to restore it.
Obj. 2: Further, it is laid down (Extra, De Usuris, in the Decretal: "c.u.m tu sicut a.s.seris"): "Property accruing from usury must be sold, and the price repaid to the persons from whom the usury was extorted." Therefore, likewise, whatever else is acquired from usurious money must be restored.
Obj. 3: Further, that which a man buys with the proceeds of usury is due to him by reason of the money he paid for it. Therefore he has no more right to the thing purchased than to the money he paid. But he was bound to restore the money gained through usury. Therefore he is also bound to restore what he acquired with it.
_On the contrary,_ A man may lawfully hold what he has lawfully acquired. Now that which is acquired by the proceeds of usury is sometimes lawfully acquired. Therefore it may be lawfully retained.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), there are certain things whose use is their consumption, and which do not admit of usufruct, according to law (ibid., ad 3). Wherefore if such like things be extorted by means of usury, for instance money, wheat, wine and so forth, the lender is not bound to restore more than he received (since what is acquired by such things is the fruit not of the thing but of human industry), unless indeed the other party by losing some of his own goods be injured through the lender retaining them: for then he is bound to make good the loss.
On the other hand, there are certain things whose use is not their consumption: such things admit of usufruct, for instance house or land property and so forth. Wherefore if a man has by usury extorted from another his house or land, he is bound to restore not only the house or land but also the fruits accruing to him therefrom, since they are the fruits of things owned by another man and consequently are due to him.
Reply Obj. 1: The root has not only the character of matter, as money made by usury has; but has also somewhat the character of an active cause, in so far as it administers nourishment. Hence the comparison fails.
Reply Obj. 2: Further, Property acquired from usury does not belong to the person who paid usury, but to the person who bought it. Yet he that paid usury has a certain claim on that property just as he has on the other goods of the usurer. Hence it is not prescribed that such property should be a.s.signed to the persons who paid usury, since the property is perhaps worth more than what they paid in usury, but it is commanded that the property be sold, and the price be restored, of course according to the amount taken in usury.
Reply Obj. 3: The proceeds of money taken in usury are due to the person who acquired them not by reason of the usurious money as instrumental cause, but on account of his own industry as princ.i.p.al cause. Wherefore he has more right to the goods acquired with usurious money than to the usurious money itself.
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FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 78, Art. 4]
Whether It Is Lawful to Borrow Money Under a Condition of Usury?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not lawful to borrow money under a condition of usury. For the Apostle says (Rom. 1:32) that they "are worthy of death ... not only they that do" these sins, "but they also that consent to them that do them." Now he that borrows money under a condition of usury consents in the sin of the usurer, and gives him an occasion of sin. Therefore he sins also.
Obj. 2: Further, for no temporal advantage ought one to give another an occasion of committing a sin: for this pertains to active scandal, which is always sinful, as stated above (Q. 43, A. 2). Now he that seeks to borrow from a usurer gives him an occasion of sin. Therefore he is not to be excused on account of any temporal advantage.
Obj. 3: Further, it seems no less necessary sometimes to deposit one"s money with a usurer than to borrow from him. Now it seems altogether unlawful to deposit one"s money with a usurer, even as it would be unlawful to deposit one"s sword with a madman, a maiden with a libertine, or food with a glutton. Neither therefore is it lawful to borrow from a usurer.
_On the contrary,_ He that suffers injury does not sin, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 11), wherefore justice is not a mean between two vices, as stated in the same book (ch. 5). Now a usurer sins by doing an injury to the person who borrows from him under a condition of usury. Therefore he that accepts a loan under a condition of usury does not sin.
_I answer that,_ It is by no means lawful to induce a man to sin, yet it is lawful to make use of another"s sin for a good end, since even G.o.d uses all sin for some good, since He draws some good from every evil as stated in the Enchiridion (xi). Hence when Publicola asked whether it were lawful to make use of an oath taken by a man swearing by false G.o.ds (which is a manifest sin, for he gives Divine honor to them) Augustine (Ep. xlvii) answered that he who uses, not for a bad but for a good purpose, the oath of a man that swears by false G.o.ds, is a party, not to his sin of swearing by demons, but to his good compact whereby he kept his word. If however he were to induce him to swear by false G.o.ds, he would sin.
Accordingly we must also answer to the question in point that it is by no means lawful to induce a man to lend under a condition of usury: yet it is lawful to borrow for usury from a man who is ready to do so and is a usurer by profession; provided the borrower have a good end in view, such as the relief of his own or another"s need.
Thus too it is lawful for a man who has fallen among thieves to point out his property to them (which they sin in taking) in order to save his life, after the example of the ten men who said to Ismahel (Jer.
41:8): "Kill us not: for we have stores in the field."
Reply Obj. 1: He who borrows for usury does not consent to the usurer"s sin but makes use of it. Nor is it the usurer"s acceptance of usury that pleases him, but his lending, which is good.
Reply Obj. 2: He who borrows for usury gives the usurer an occasion, not for taking usury, but for lending; it is the usurer who finds an occasion of sin in the malice of his heart. Hence there is pa.s.sive scandal on his part, while there is no active scandal on the part of the person who seeks to borrow. Nor is this pa.s.sive scandal a reason why the other person should desist from borrowing if he is in need, since this pa.s.sive scandal arises not from weakness or ignorance but from malice.
Reply Obj. 3: If one were to entrust one"s money to a usurer lacking other means of practising usury; or with the intention of making a greater profit from his money by reason of the usury, one would be giving a sinner matter for sin, so that one would be a partic.i.p.ator in his guilt. If, on the other hand, the usurer to whom one entrusts one"s money has other means of practising usury, there is no sin in entrusting it to him that it may be in safer keeping, since this is to use a sinner for a good purpose.
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QUESTION 79
OF THE QUASI-INTEGRAL PARTS OF JUSTICE (In Four Articles)
We must now consider the quasi-integral parts of justice, which are _to do good,_ and _to decline from evil,_ and the opposite vices.
Under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether these two are parts of justice?
(2) Whether transgression is a special sin?
(3) Whether omission is a special sin?
(4) Of the comparison between omission and transgression.
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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 79, Art. 1]
Whether to Decline from Evil and to Do Good Are Parts of Justice?
Objection 1: It would seem that to decline from evil and to do good are not parts of justice. For it belongs to every virtue to perform a good deed and to avoid an evil one. But parts do not exceed the whole. Therefore to decline from evil and to do good should not be reckoned parts of justice, which is a special kind of virtue.
Obj. 2: Further, a gloss on Ps. 33:15, "Turn away from evil and do good," says: "The former," i.e. to turn away from evil, "avoids sin, the latter," i.e. to do good, "deserves the life and the palm." But any part of a virtue deserves the life and the palm. Therefore to decline from evil is not a part of justice.
Obj. 3: Further, things that are so related that one implies the other, are not mutually distinct as parts of a whole. Now declining from evil is implied in doing good: since no one does evil and good at the same time. Therefore declining from evil and doing good are not parts of justice.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine (De Correp. et Grat. i) declares that "declining from evil and doing good" belong to the justice of the law.
_I answer that,_ If we speak of good and evil in general, it belongs to every virtue to do good and to avoid evil: and in this sense they cannot be reckoned parts of justice, except justice be taken in the sense of "all virtue" [*Cf. Q. 58, A. 5]. And yet even if justice be taken in this sense it regards a certain special aspect of good; namely, the good as due in respect of Divine or human law.
On the other hand justice considered as a special virtue regards good as due to one"s neighbor. And in this sense it belongs to special justice to do good considered as due to one"s neighbor, and to avoid the opposite evil, that, namely, which is hurtful to one"s neighbor; while it belongs to general justice to do good in relation to the community or in relation to G.o.d, and to avoid the opposite evil.
Now these two are said to be quasi-integral parts of general or of special justice, because each is required for the perfect act of justice. For it belongs to justice to establish equality in our relations with others, as shown above (Q. 58, A. 2): and it pertains to the same cause to establish and to preserve that which it has established. Now a person establishes the equality of justice by doing good, i.e. by rendering to another his due: and he preserves the already established equality of justice by declining from evil, that is by inflicting no injury on his neighbor.
Reply Obj. 1: Good and evil are here considered under a special aspect, by which they are appropriated to justice. The reason why these two are reckoned parts of justice under a special aspect of good and evil, while they are not reckoned parts of any other moral virtue, is that the other moral virtues are concerned with the pa.s.sions wherein to do good is to observe the mean, which is the same as to avoid the extremes as evils: so that doing good and avoiding evil come to the same, with regard to the other virtues. On the other hand justice is concerned with operations and external things, wherein to establish equality is one thing, and not to disturb the equality established is another.
Reply Obj. 2: To decline from evil, considered as a part of justice, does not denote a pure negation, viz. "not to do evil"; for this does not deserve the palm, but only avoids the punishment. But it implies a movement of the will in repudiating evil, as the very term "decline" shows. This is meritorious; especially when a person resists against an instigation to do evil.
Reply Obj. 3: Doing good is the completive act of justice, and the princ.i.p.al part, so to speak, thereof. Declining from evil is a more imperfect act, and a secondary part of that virtue. Hence it is a material part, so to speak, thereof, and a necessary condition of the formal and completive part.
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SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 79, Art. 2]
Whether Transgression Is a Special Sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that transgression is not a special sin.
For no species is included in the definition of its genus. Now transgression is included in the definition of sin; because Ambrose says (De Parad. viii) that sin is "a transgression of the Divine law." Therefore transgression is not a species of sin.