Reply Obj. 2: In offering a thing to a man on account of its usefulness to him, the more needy the man the more praiseworthy the offering, because it is more useful: whereas we offer a thing to G.o.d not on account of its usefulness to Him, but for the sake of His glory, and on account of its usefulness to us.
Reply Obj. 3: Where there is an obligation to do a thing it loses the l.u.s.ter of supererogation, but not the merit of virtue, provided it be done voluntarily. Hence the argument proves nothing.
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SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 81, Art. 7]
Whether Religion Has an External Act?
Objection 1: It would seem that religion has not an external act. It is written (John 4:24): "G.o.d is a spirit, and they that adore Him, must adore Him in spirit and in truth." Now external acts pertain, not to the spirit but to the body. Therefore religion, to which adoration belongs, has acts that are not external but internal.
Obj. 2: Further, the end of religion is to pay G.o.d reverence and honor. Now it would savor of irreverence towards a superior, if one were to offer him that which properly belongs to his inferior. Since then whatever man offers by bodily actions, seems to be directed properly to the relief of human needs, or to the reverence of inferior creatures, it would seem unbecoming to employ them in showing reverence to G.o.d.
Obj. 3: Further, Augustine (De Civ. Dei vi, 10) commends Seneca for finding fault with those who offered to idols those things that are wont to be offered to men, because, to wit, that which befits mortals is unbecoming to immortals. But such things are much less becoming to the true G.o.d, Who is "exalted above all G.o.ds" [*Ps. 94:3]. Therefore it would seem wrong to worship G.o.d with bodily actions. Therefore religion has no bodily actions.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 83:3): "My heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the living G.o.d." Now just as internal actions belong to the heart, so do external actions belong to the members of the flesh. Therefore it seems that G.o.d ought to be worshiped not only by internal but also by external actions.
_I answer that,_ We pay G.o.d honor and reverence, not for His sake (because He is of Himself full of glory to which no creature can add anything), but for our own sake, because by the very fact that we revere and honor G.o.d, our mind is subjected to Him; wherein its perfection consists, since a thing is perfected by being subjected to its superior, for instance the body is perfected by being quickened by the soul, and the air by being enlightened by the sun. Now the human mind, in order to be united to G.o.d, needs to be guided by the sensible world, since "invisible things ... are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made," as the Apostle says (Rom.
1:20). Wherefore in the Divine worship it is necessary to make use of corporeal things, that man"s mind may be aroused thereby, as by signs, to the spiritual acts by means of which he is united to G.o.d.
Therefore the internal acts of religion take precedence of the others and belong to religion essentially, while its external acts are secondary, and subordinate to the internal acts.
Reply Obj. 1: Our Lord is speaking of that which is most important and directly intended in the worship of G.o.d.
Reply Obj. 2: These external things are offered to G.o.d, not as though He stood in need of them, according to Ps. 49:13, "Shall I eat the flesh of bullocks? or shall I drink the blood of goats?" but as signs of the internal and spiritual works, which are of themselves acceptable to G.o.d. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 5): "The visible sacrifice is the sacrament or sacred sign of the invisible sacrifice."
Reply Obj. 3: Idolaters are ridiculed for offering to idols things pertaining to men, not as signs arousing them to certain spiritual things, but as though they were of themselves acceptable to the idols; and still more because they were foolish and wicked.
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EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 81, Art. 8]
Whether Religion Is the Same As Sanct.i.ty?
Objection 1: It would seem that religion is not the same as sanct.i.ty.
Religion is a special virtue, as stated above (A. 4): whereas sanct.i.ty is a general virtue, because it makes us faithful, and fulfil our just obligations to G.o.d, according to Andronicus [*De Affectibus]. Therefore sanct.i.ty is not the same as religion.
Obj. 2: Further, sanct.i.ty seems to denote a kind of purity. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. xii) that "sanct.i.ty is free from all uncleanness, and is perfect and altogether unspotted purity." Now purity would seem above all to pertain to temperance which repels bodily uncleanness. Since then religion belongs to justice, it would seem that sanct.i.ty is not the same as religion.
Obj. 3: Further, things that are opposite members of a division are not identified with one another. But in an enumeration given above (Q. 80, ad 4) of the parts of justice, sanct.i.ty is reckoned as distinct from religion. Therefore sanct.i.ty is not the same as religion.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Luke 1:74, 75): "That ... we may serve Him ... in holiness and justice." Now, "to serve G.o.d" belongs to religion, as stated above (A. 1, ad 3; A. 3, ad 2). Therefore religion is the same as sanct.i.ty.
_I answer that,_ The word "sanct.i.ty" seems to have two significations. In one way it denotes purity; and this signification fits in with the Greek, for _hagios_ means "unsoiled." In another way it denotes firmness, wherefore in olden times the term "sancta" was applied to such things as were upheld by law and were not to be violated. Hence a thing is said to be sacred (_sancitum_) when it is ratified by law. Again, in Latin, this word _sanctus_ may be connected with purity, if it be resolved into _sanguine tinctus,_ "since, in olden times, those who wished to be purified were sprinkled with the victim"s blood," according to Isidore (Etym. x).
In either case the signification requires sanct.i.ty to be ascribed to those things that are applied to the Divine worship; so that not only men, but also the temple, vessels and such like things are said to be sanctified through being applied to the worship of G.o.d. For purity is necessary in order that the mind be applied to G.o.d, since the human mind is soiled by contact with inferior things, even as all things depreciate by admixture with baser things, for instance, silver by being mixed with lead. Now in order for the mind to be united to the Supreme Being it must be withdrawn from inferior things: and hence it is that without purity the mind cannot be applied to G.o.d. Wherefore it is written (Heb. 12:14): "Follow peace with all men, and holiness, without which no man shall see G.o.d." Again, firmness is required for the mind to be applied to G.o.d, for it is applied to Him as its last end and first beginning, and such things must needs be most immovable. Hence the Apostle said (Rom. 8:38, 39): "I am sure that neither death, nor life ... shall separate me [*Vulg.: "shall be able to separate us"] from the love of G.o.d."
Accordingly, it is by sanct.i.ty that the human mind applies itself and its acts to G.o.d: so that it differs from religion not essentially but only logically. For it takes the name of religion according as it gives G.o.d due service in matters pertaining specially to the Divine worship, such as sacrifices, oblations, and so forth; while it is called sanct.i.ty, according as man refers to G.o.d not only these but also the works of the other virtues, or according as man by means of certain good works disposes himself to the worship of G.o.d.
Reply Obj. 1: Sanct.i.ty is a special virtue according to its essence; and in this respect it is in a way identified with religion. But it has a certain generality, in so far as by its command it directs the acts of all the virtues to the Divine good, even as legal justice is said to be a general virtue, in so far as it directs the acts of all the virtues to the common good.
Reply Obj. 2: Temperance practices purity, yet not so as to have the character of sanct.i.ty unless it be referred to G.o.d. Hence of virginity itself Augustine says (De Virgin. viii) that "it is honored not for what it is, but for being consecrated to G.o.d."
Reply Obj. 3: Sanct.i.ty differs from religion as explained above, not really but logically.
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QUESTION 82
OF DEVOTION (In Four Articles)
We must now consider the acts of religion. First, we shall consider the interior acts, which, as stated above, are its princ.i.p.al acts; secondly, we shall consider its exterior acts, which are secondary.
The interior acts of religion are seemingly devotion and prayer.
Accordingly we shall treat first of devotion, and afterwards of prayer.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether devotion is a special act?
(2) Whether it is an act of religion?
(3) Of the cause of devotion?
(4) Of its effect?
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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 82, Art. 1]
Whether Devotion Is a Special Act?
Objection 1: It would seem that devotion is not a special act. That which qualifies other acts is seemingly not a special act. Now devotion seems to qualify other acts, for it is written (2 Paralip.
29:31): "All the mult.i.tude offered victims, and praises, and holocausts with a devout mind." Therefore devotion is not a special act.
Obj. 2: Further, no special kind of act is common to various genera of acts. But devotion is common to various genera of acts, namely, corporal and spiritual acts: for a person is said to meditate devoutly and to genuflect devoutly. Therefore devotion is not a special act.
Obj. 3: Further, every special act belongs either to an appet.i.tive or to a cognitive virtue or power. But devotion belongs to neither, as may be seen by going through the various species of acts of either faculty, as enumerated above (I, QQ. 78, seqq.; I-II, Q. 23, A. 4).
Therefore devotion is not a special act.
_On the contrary,_ Merits are acquired by acts as stated above (I-II, Q. 21, AA. 34). But devotion has a special reason for merit.
Therefore devotion is a special act.
_I answer that,_ Devotion is derived from "devote" [*The Latin _devovere_ means "to vow"]; wherefore those persons are said to be "devout" who, in a way, devote themselves to G.o.d, so as to subject themselves wholly to Him. Hence in olden times among the heathens a devotee was one who vowed to his idols to suffer death for the safety of his army, as Livy relates of the two Decii (Decad. I, viii, 9; x, 28). Hence devotion is apparently nothing else but the will to give oneself readily to things concerning the service of G.o.d. Wherefore it is written (Ex. 35:20, 21) that "the mult.i.tude of the children of Israel ... offered first-fruits to the Lord with a most ready and devout mind." Now it is evident that the will to do readily what concerns the service of G.o.d is a special kind of act. Therefore devotion is a special act of the will.
Reply Obj. 1: The mover prescribes the mode of the movement of the thing moved. Now the will moves the other powers of the soul to their acts, and the will, in so far as it regards the end, moves both itself and whatever is directed to the end, as stated above (I-II, Q.
9, A. 3). Wherefore, since devotion is an act of the will whereby a man offers himself for the service of G.o.d Who is the last end, it follows that devotion prescribes the mode to human acts, whether they be acts of the will itself about things directed to the end, or acts of the other powers that are moved by the will.
Reply Obj. 2: Devotion is to be found in various genera of acts, not as a species of those genera, but as the motion of the mover is found virtually in the movements of the things moved.
Reply Obj. 3: Devotion is an act of the appet.i.tive part of the soul, and is a movement of the will, as stated above.
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SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 82, Art. 2]
Whether Devotion Is an Act of Religion?