Reply Obj. 2: According to the Philosopher, necessity of coercion, in so far as it is opposed to the will, causes sorrow. But the necessity resulting from a vow, in those who are well disposed, in so far as it strengthens the will, causes not sorrow but joy. Hence Augustine says (Ep. ad Arment. et Paulin. cxxcii): "Repent not of thy vow: thou shouldst rather rejoice that thou canst no longer do what thou mightest lawfully have done to thy detriment." If, however, the very deed, considered in itself, were to become disagreeable and involuntary after one has taken the vow, the will to fulfil it remaining withal, it is still more meritorious than if it were done without the vow, since the fulfilment of a vow is an act of religion which is a greater virtue than abstinence, of which fasting is an act.
Reply Obj. 3: He who does something without having vowed it has an immovable will as regards the individual deed which he does and at the time when he does it; but his will does not remain altogether fixed for the time to come, as does the will of one who makes a vow: for the latter has bound his will to do something, both before he did that particular deed, and perchance to do it many times.
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SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 88, Art. 7]
Whether a Vow Is Solemnized by the Reception of Holy Orders, and by the Profession of a Certain Rule?
Objection 1: It would seem that a vow is not solemnized by the reception of holy orders and by the profession of a certain rule. As stated above (A. 1), a vow is a promise made to G.o.d. Now external actions pertaining to solemnity seem to be directed, not to G.o.d, but to men. Therefore they are related to vows accidentally: and consequently a solemnization of this kind is not a proper circ.u.mstance of a vow.
Obj. 2: Further, whatever belongs to the condition of a thing, would seem to be applicable to all in which that thing is found. Now many things may be the subject of a vow, which have no connection either with holy orders, or to any particular rule: as when a man vows a pilgrimage, or something of the kind. Therefore the solemnization that takes place in the reception of holy orders or in the profession of a certain rule does not belong to the condition of a vow.
Obj. 3: Further, a solemn vow seems to be the same as a public vow.
Now many other vows may be made in public besides that which is p.r.o.nounced in receiving holy orders or in professing a certain rule; which latter, moreover, may be made in private. Therefore not only these vows are solemn.
_On the contrary,_ These vows alone are an impediment to the contract of marriage, and annul marriage if it be contracted, which is the effect of a solemn vow, as we shall state further on in the Third Part of this work [*Suppl., Q. 53, A. 2].
_I answer that,_ The manner in which a thing is solemnized depends on its nature (_conditio_): thus when a man takes up arms he solemnizes the fact in one way, namely, with a certain display of horses and arms and a concourse of soldiers, while a marriage is solemnized in another way, namely, the array of the bridegroom and bride and the gathering of their kindred. Now a vow is a promise made to G.o.d: wherefore, the solemnization of a vow consists in something spiritual pertaining to G.o.d; i.e. in some spiritual blessing or consecration which, in accordance with the inst.i.tution of the apostles, is given when a man makes profession of observing a certain rule, in the second degree after the reception of holy orders, as Dionysius states (Eccl. Hier. vi). The reason of this is that solemnization is not wont to be employed, save when a man gives himself up entirely to some particular thing. For the nuptial solemnization takes place only when the marriage is celebrated, and when the bride and bridegroom mutually deliver the power over their bodies to one another. In like manner a vow is solemnized when a man devotes himself to the divine ministry by receiving holy orders, or embraces the state of perfection by renouncing the world and his own will by the profession of a certain rule.
Reply Obj. 1: This kind of solemnization regards not only men but also G.o.d in so far as it is accompanied by a spiritual consecration or blessing, of which G.o.d is the author, though man is the minister, according to Num. 6:27, "They shall invoke My name upon the children of Israel, and I will bless them." Hence a solemn vow is more binding with G.o.d than a simple vow, and he who breaks a solemn vow sins more grievously. When it is said that a simple vow is no less binding than a solemn vow, this refers to the fact that the transgressor of either commits a mortal sin.
Reply Obj. 2: It is not customary to solemnize particular acts, but the embracing of a new state, as we have said above. Hence when a man vows particular deeds, such as a pilgrimage, or some special fast, such a vow is not competent to be solemnized, but only such as the vow whereby a man entirely devotes himself to the divine ministry or service: and yet many particular works are included under this vow as under a universal.
Reply Obj. 3: Through being p.r.o.nounced in public vows may have a certain human solemnity, but not a spiritual and divine solemnity, as the aforesaid vows have, even when they are p.r.o.nounced before a few persons. Hence the publicity of a vow differs from its solemnization.
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EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 88, Art. 8]
Whether Those Who Are Subject to Another"s Power Are Hindered from Taking Vows?
Objection 1: It would seem that those who are subject to another"s power are not hindered from taking vows. The lesser bond is surpa.s.sed by the greater. Now the obligation of one man subject to another is a lesser bond than a vow whereby one is under an obligation to G.o.d.
Therefore those who are subject to another"s power are not hindered from taking vows.
Obj. 2: Further, children are under their parents" power. Yet children may make religious profession even without the consent of their parents. Therefore one is not hindered from taking vows, through being subject to another"s power.
Obj. 3: Further, to do is more than to promise. But religious who are under the power of their superiors can do certain things such as to say some psalms, or abstain from certain things. Much more therefore seemingly can they promise such things to G.o.d by means of vows.
Obj. 4: Further, whoever does what he cannot do lawfully sins. But subjects do not sin by taking vows, since nowhere do we find this forbidden. Therefore it would seem that they can lawfully take vows.
_On the contrary,_ It is commanded (Num. 30:4-6) that "if a woman vow any thing ... being in her father"s house, and yet but a girl in age," she is not bound by the vow, unless her father consent: and the same is said there (Num. 30:7-9) of the woman that has a husband.
Therefore in like manner other persons that are subject to another"s power cannot bind themselves by vow.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), a vow is a promise made to G.o.d. Now no man can firmly bind himself by a promise to do what is in another"s power, but only to that which is entirely in his own power.
Now whoever is subject to another, as to the matter wherein he is subject to him, it does not lie in his power to do as he will, but it depends on the will of the other. And therefore without the consent of his superior he cannot bind himself firmly by a vow in those matters wherein he is subject to another.
Reply Obj. 1: Nothing but what is virtuous can be the subject of a promise made to G.o.d, as stated above (A. 2). Now it is contrary to virtue for a man to offer to G.o.d that which belongs to another, as stated above (Q. 86, A. 3). Hence the conditions necessary for a vow are not altogether ensured, when a man who is under another"s power vows that which is in that other"s power, except under the condition that he whose power it concerns does not gainsay it.
Reply Obj. 2: As soon as a man comes of age, if he be a freeman he is in his own power in all matters concerning his person, for instance with regard to binding himself by vow to enter religion, or with regard to contracting marriage. But he is not in his own power as regards the arrangements of the household, so that in these matters he cannot vow anything that shall be valid without the consent of his father.
A slave, through being in his master"s power, even as regards his personal deeds, cannot bind himself by vow to enter religion, since this would withdraw him from his master"s service.
Reply Obj. 3: A religious is subject to his superior as to his actions connected with his profession of his rule. Wherefore even though one may be able to do something now and then, when one is not being occupied with other things by one"s superior, yet since there is no time when his superior cannot occupy him with something, no vow of a religious stands without the consent of his superior, as neither does the vow of a girl while in (her father"s) house without his consent; nor of a wife, without the consent of her husband.
Reply Obj. 4: Although the vow of one who is subject to another"s power does not stand without the consent of the one to whom he is subject, he does not sin by vowing; because his vow is understood to contain the requisite condition, providing, namely, that his superior approve or do not gainsay it.
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NINTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 88, Art. 9]
Whether Children Can Bind Themselves by Vow to Enter Religion?
Objection 1: It would seem that children cannot bind themselves by vow to enter religion. Since a vow requires deliberation of the mind, it is fitting that those alone should vow who have the use of reason.
But this is lacking in children just as in imbeciles and madmen.
Therefore just as imbeciles and madmen cannot bind themselves to anything by vow, so neither, seemingly, can children bind themselves by vow to enter religion.
Obj. 2: Further, that which can be validly done by one cannot be annulled by another. Now a vow to enter religion made by a boy or girl before the age of p.u.b.erty can be revoked by the parents or guardian (20, qu. ii, cap. Puella). Therefore it seems that a boy or girl cannot validly make a vow before the age of fourteen.
Obj. 3: Further, according to the rule of Blessed Benedict [*Ch. 58]
and a statute of Innocent IV, a year"s probation is granted to those who enter religion, so that probation may precede the obligation of the vow. Therefore it seems unlawful, before the year of probation, for children to be bound by vow to enter religion.
_On the contrary,_ That which is not done aright is invalid without being annulled by anyone. But the vow p.r.o.nounced by a maiden, even before attaining the age of p.u.b.erty, is valid, unless it be annulled by her parents within a year (20, qu. ii, cap. Puella). Therefore even before attaining to p.u.b.erty children can lawfully and validly be bound by a vow to enter religion.
_I answer that,_ As may be gathered from what has been said above (A.
7), vows are of two kinds, simple and solemn. And since, as stated in the same article, the solemnization of a vow consists in a spiritual blessing and consecration bestowed through the ministry of the Church, it follows that it comes under the Church"s dispensation. Now a simple vow takes its efficacy from the deliberation of the mind, whereby one intends to put oneself under an obligation. That such an obligation be of no force may happen in two ways. First, through defect of reason, as in madmen and imbeciles, who cannot bind themselves by vow so long as they remain in a state of madness or imbecility. Secondly, through the maker of a vow being subject to another"s power, as stated above (A. 8). Now these two circ.u.mstances concur in children before the age of p.u.b.erty, because in most instances they are lacking in reason, and besides are naturally under the care of their parents, or guardians in place of their parents: wherefore in both events their vows are without force. It happens, however, through a natural disposition which is not subject to human laws, that the use of reason is accelerated in some, albeit few, who on this account are said to be capable of guile: and yet they are not, for this reason, exempt in any way from the care of their parents; for this care is subject to human law, which takes into account that which is of most frequent occurrence.
Accordingly we must say that boys or girls who have not reached the years of p.u.b.erty and have not attained the use of reason can nowise bind themselves to anything by vow. If, however, they attain the use of reason, before reaching the years of p.u.b.erty, they can for their own part, bind themselves by vow; but their vows can be annulled by their parents, under whose care they are still subject.
Yet no matter how much they be capable of guile before the years of p.u.b.erty, they cannot be bound by a solemn religious vow, on account of the Church"s decree [*s.e.xt. Decret. cap. Is qui, de Reg. et transeunt. ad Relig.] which considers the majority of cases. But after the years of p.u.b.erty have been reached, they can bind themselves by religious vows, simple or solemn, without the consent of their parents.
Reply Obj. 1: This argument avails in the case of children who have not yet reached the use of reason: for their vows then are invalid, as stated above.
Reply Obj. 2: The vows of persons subject to another"s power contain an implied condition, namely, that they be not annulled by the superior. This condition renders them licit and valid if it be fulfilled, as stated above.
Reply Obj. 3: This argument avails in the case of solemn vows which are taken in profession.
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TENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 88, Art. 10]
Whether Vows Admit of Dispensation?
Objection 1: It would seem that vows are not subject to dispensation.
It is less to have a vow commuted than to be dispensed from keeping it. But a vow cannot be commuted, according to Lev. 27:9, 10, "A beast that may be sacrificed to the Lord, if anyone shall vow, shall be holy, and cannot be changed, neither a better for a worse, nor a worse for a better." Much less, therefore, do vows admit of dispensation.
Obj. 2: Further, no man can grant a dispensation in matters concerning the natural law and in the Divine precepts, especially those of the First Table, since these aim directly at the love of G.o.d, which is the last end of the precepts. Now the fulfilment of a vow is a matter of the natural law, and is commanded by the Divine law, as shown above (A. 3), and belongs to the precepts of the First Table since it is an act of religion. Therefore vows do not admit of dispensation.
Obj. 3: Further, the obligation of a vow is based on the fidelity which a man owes to G.o.d, as stated above (A. 3). But no man can dispense in such a matter as this. Neither, therefore, can any one grant a dispensation from a vow.
_On the contrary,_ That which proceeds from the common will of many has apparently greater stability than that which proceeds from the individual will of some one person. Now the law which derives its force from the common will admits of dispensation by a man. Therefore it seems that vows also admit of dispensation by a man.
_I answer that,_ The dispensation from a vow is to be taken in the same sense as a dispensation given in the observance of a law because, as stated above (I-II, Q. 96, A. 6; Q. 97, A. 4), a law is made with an eye to that which is good in the majority of instances.