If, on the other hand, a man demands an oath as a public person, in accordance with the requirements of the law, on the requisition of a third person: he does not seem to be at fault, if he demands an oath of a person, whether he knows that he will swear falsely or truly, because seemingly it is not he that exacts the oath but the person at whose instance he demands it.
Reply Obj. 1: This argument avails in the case of one who demands an oath on his own account. Yet he does not always know that the other will swear truly or falsely, for at times he has doubts about the fact, and believes he will swear truly. In such a case he exacts an oath in order that he may be more certain.
Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says (ad Public. serm. xlvii), "though we are forbidden to swear, I do not remember ever to have read in the Holy Scriptures that we must not accept oaths from others." Hence he that accepts an oath does not sin, except perchance when of his own accord he forces another to swear, knowing that he will swear falsely.
Reply Obj. 3: As Augustine says (QQ. Super Lev, qu. i), Moses in the pa.s.sage quoted did not state to whom one man had to denounce another"s perjury: wherefore it must be understood that the matter had to be denounced "to those who would do the perjurer good rather than harm." Again, neither did he state in what order the denunciation was to be made: wherefore seemingly the Gospel order should be followed, if the sin of perjury should be hidden, especially when it does not tend to another person"s injury: because if it did, the Gospel order would not apply to the case, as stated above (Q. 33, A. 7; Q. 68, A. 1).
Reply Obj. 4: It is lawful to make use of an evil for the sake of good, as G.o.d does, but it is not lawful to lead anyone to do evil.
Consequently it is lawful to accept the oath of one who is ready to swear by false G.o.ds, but it is not lawful to induce him to swear by false G.o.ds. Yet it seems to be different in the case of one who swears falsely by the true G.o.d, because an oath of this kind lacks the good of faith, which a man makes use of in the oath of one who swears truly by false G.o.ds, as Augustine says (ad Public. Ep. xlvii).
Hence when a man swears falsely by the true G.o.d his oath seems to lack any good that one may use lawfully.
_______________________
QUESTION 99
OF SACRILEGE (In Four Articles)
We must now consider the vices which pertain to irreligion, whereby sacred things are treated with irreverence. We shall consider (1) Sacrilege; (2) Simony.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) What is sacrilege?
(2) Whether it is a special sin?
(3) Of the species of sacrilege;
(4) Of the punishment of sacrilege.
_______________________
FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 99, Art. 1]
Whether Sacrilege Is the Violation of a Sacred Thing?
Objection 1: It would seem that sacrilege is not the violation of a sacred thing. It is stated (XVII, qu. iv [*Append. Gratian, on can.
Si quis suadente]): "They are guilty of sacrilege who disagree about the sovereign"s decision, and doubt whether the person chosen by the sovereign be worthy of honor." Now this seems to have no connection with anything sacred. Therefore sacrilege does not denote the violation of something sacred.
Obj. 2: Further, it is stated further on [*Append. Gratian, on can.
Const.i.tuit.] that if any man shall allow the Jews to hold public offices, "he must be excommunicated as being guilty of sacrilege."
Yet public offices have nothing to do with anything sacred. Therefore it seems that sacrilege does not denote the violation of a sacred thing.
Obj. 3: Further, G.o.d"s power is greater than man"s. Now sacred things receive their sacred character from G.o.d. Therefore they cannot be violated by man: and so a sacrilege would not seem to be the violation of a sacred thing.
_On the contrary,_ Isidore says (Etym. x) that "a man is said to be sacrilegious because he selects," i.e. steals, "sacred things."
_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 81, A. 5; I-II, Q. 101, A. 4), a thing is called "sacred" through being deputed to the divine worship.
Now just as a thing acquires an aspect of good through being deputed to a good end, so does a thing a.s.sume a divine character through being deputed to the divine worship, and thus a certain reverence is due to it, which reverence is referred to G.o.d. Therefore whatever pertains to irreverence for sacred things is an injury to G.o.d, and comes under the head of sacrilege.
Reply Obj. 1: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 2) the common good of the nation is a divine thing, wherefore in olden times the rulers of a commonwealth were called divines, as being the ministers of divine providence, according to Wis. 6:5, "Being ministers of His kingdom, you have not judged rightly." Hence by an extension of the term, whatever savors of irreverence for the sovereign, such as disputing his judgment, and questioning whether one ought to follow it, is called sacrilege by a kind of likeness.
Reply Obj. 2: Christians are sanctified by faith and the sacraments of Christ, according to 1 Cor. 6:11, "But you are washed, but you are sanctified." Wherefore it is written (1 Pet. 2:9): "You are a chosen generation, a kingly priesthood, a holy nation, a purchased people."
Therefore any injury inflicted on the Christian people, for instance that unbelievers should be put in authority over it, is an irreverence for a sacred thing, and is reasonably called a sacrilege.
Reply Obj. 3: Violation here means any kind of irreverence or dishonor. Now as "honor is in the person who honors and not in the one who is honored" (Ethic. i, 5), so again irreverence is in the person who behaves irreverently even though he do no harm to the object of his irreverence. Hence, so far he is concerned, he violates the sacred thing, though the latter be not violated in itself.
_______________________
SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 99, Art. 2]
Whether Sacrilege Is a Special Sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that sacrilege is not a special sin. It is stated (XVII, qu. iv) "They are guilty of sacrilege who through ignorance sin against the sanct.i.ty of the law, violate and defile it by their negligence." But this is done in every sin, because sin is "a word, deed or desire contrary to the law of G.o.d," according to Augustine (Contra Faust. xxi, 27). Therefore sacrilege is a general sin.
Obj. 2: Further, no special sin is comprised under different kinds of sin. Now sacrilege is comprised under different kinds of sin, for instance under murder, if one kill a priest under l.u.s.t, as the violation of a consecrate virgin, or of any woman in a sacred place under theft, if one steal a sacred thing. Therefore sacrilege is not a special sin.
Obj. 3: Further, every special sin is to found apart from other sins as the Philosopher states, in speaking of special justice (Ethic. v, 11). But, seemingly, sacrilege is not to be found apart from other sins; for it is sometimes united to theft, sometimes to murder, as stated in the preceding objection. Therefore it is not a special sin.
_On the contrary,_ That which is opposed to a special virtue is a special sin. But sacrilege is opposed to a special virtue, namely religion, to which it belongs to reverence G.o.d and divine things.
Therefore sacrilege is a special sin.
_I answer that,_ Wherever we find a special aspect of deformity, there must needs be a special sin; because the species of a thing is derived chiefly from its formal aspect, and not from its matter or subject. Now in sacrilege we find a special aspect of deformity, namely, the violation of a sacred thing by treating it irreverently.
Hence it is a special sin.
Moreover, it is opposed to religion. For according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. iv, 3), "When the purple has been made into a royal robe, we pay it honor and homage, and if anyone dishonor it he is condemned to death," as acting against the king: and in the same way if a man violate a sacred thing, by so doing his behavior is contrary to the reverence due to G.o.d and consequently he is guilty of irreligion.
Reply Obj. 1: Those are said to sin against the sanct.i.ty of the divine law who a.s.sail G.o.d"s law, as heretics and blasphemers do.
These are guilty of unbelief, through not believing in G.o.d; and of sacrilege, through perverting the words of the divine law.
Reply Obj. 2: Nothing prevents one specific kind of sin being found in various generic kinds of sin, inasmuch as various sins are directed to the end of one sin, just as happens in the case of virtues commanded by one virtue. In this way, by whatever kind of sin a man acts counter to reverence due to sacred things, he commits a sacrilege formally; although his act contains various kinds of sin materially.
Reply Obj. 3: Sacrilege is sometimes found apart from other sins, through its act having no other deformity than the violation of a sacred thing: for instance, if a judge were to take a person from a sacred place, for he might lawfully have taken him from elsewhere.
_______________________
THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 99, Art. 3]
Whether the Species of Sacrilege Are Distinguished According to the Sacred Things?
Objection 1: It would seem that the species of sacrilege are not distinguished according to the sacred things. Material diversity does not differentiate species, if the formal aspect remains the same. Now there would seem to be the same formal aspect of sin in all violations of sacred things, and that the only difference is one of matter. Therefore the species of sacrilege are not distinguished thereby.
Obj. 2: Further, it does not seem possible that things belonging to the same species should at the same time differ specifically. Now murder, theft, and unlawful intercourse, are different species of sin. Therefore they cannot belong to the one same species of sacrilege: and consequently it seems that the species of sacrilege are distinguished in accordance with the species of other sins, and not according to the various sacred things.
Obj. 3: Further, among sacred things sacred persons are reckoned. If, therefore, one species of sacrilege arises from the violation of a sacred person, it would follow that every sin committed by a sacred person is a sacrilege, since every sin violates the person of the sinner. Therefore the species of sacrilege are not reckoned according to the sacred things.
_On the contrary,_ Acts and habits are distinguished by their objects. Now the sacred thing is the object of sacrilege, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore the species of sacrilege are distinguished according to the sacred things.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), the sin of sacrilege consists in the irreverent treatment of a sacred thing. Now reverence is due to a sacred thing by reason of its holiness: and consequently the species of sacrilege must needs be distinguished according to the different aspects of sanct.i.ty in the sacred things which are treated irreverently: for the greater the holiness ascribed to the sacred thing that is sinned against, the more grievous the sacrilege.
Now holiness is ascribed, not only to sacred persons, namely, those who are consecrated to the divine worship, but also to sacred places and to certain other sacred things. And the holiness of a place is directed to the holiness of man, who worships G.o.d in a holy place.
For it is written (2 Macc. 5:19): "G.o.d did not choose the people for the place"s sake, but the place for the people"s sake." Hence sacrilege committed against a sacred person is a graver sin than that which is committed against a sacred place. Yet in either species there are various degrees of sacrilege, according to differences of sacred persons and places.