Reply Obj. 1: This argument takes dulia in a wide sense.
Reply Obj. 2: Hyperdulia is the highest species of dulia taken in a wide sense, since the greatest reverence is that which is due to a man by reason of his having an affinity to G.o.d.
Reply Obj. 3: Man owes neither subjection nor honor to an irrational creature considered in itself, indeed all such creatures are naturally subject to man. As to the Cross of Christ, the honor we pay to it is the same as that which we pay to Christ, just as the king"s robe receives the same honor as the king himself, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. iv).
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QUESTION 104
OF OBEDIENCE (In Six Articles)
We must now consider obedience, under which head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether one man is bound to obey another?
(2) Whether obedience is a special virtue?
(3) Of its comparison with other virtues;
(4) Whether G.o.d must be obeyed in all things?
(5) Whether subjects are bound to obey their superiors in all things?
(6) Whether the faithful are bound to obey the secular power?
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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 104, Art. 1]
Whether One Man Is Bound to Obey Another?
Objection 1: It seems that one man is not bound to obey another. For nothing should be done contrary to the divine ordinance. Now G.o.d has so ordered that man is ruled by his own counsel, according to Ecclus.
15:14, "G.o.d made man from the beginning, and left him in the hand of his own counsel." Therefore one man is not bound to obey another.
Obj. 2: Further, if one man were bound to obey another, he would have to look upon the will of the person commanding him, as being his rule of conduct. Now G.o.d"s will alone, which is always right, is a rule of human conduct. Therefore man is bound to obey none but G.o.d.
Obj. 3: Further, the more gratuitous the service the more is it acceptable. Now what a man does out of duty is not gratuitous.
Therefore if a man were bound in duty to obey others in doing good deeds, for this very reason his good deeds would be rendered less acceptable through being done out of obedience. Therefore one man is not bound to obey another.
_On the contrary,_ It is prescribed (Heb. 13:17): "Obey your prelates and be subject to them."
_I answer that,_ Just as the actions of natural things proceed from natural powers, so do human actions proceed from the human will. In natural things it behooved the higher to move the lower to their actions by the excellence of the natural power bestowed on them by G.o.d: and so in human affairs also the higher must move the lower by their will in virtue of a divinely established authority. Now to move by reason and will is to command. Wherefore just as in virtue of the divinely established natural order the lower natural things need to be subject to the movement of the higher, so too in human affairs, in virtue of the order of natural and divine law, inferiors are bound to obey their superiors.
Reply Obj. 1: G.o.d left man in the hand of his own counsel, not as though it were lawful to him to do whatever he will, but because, unlike irrational creatures, he is not compelled by natural necessity to do what he ought to do, but is left the free choice proceeding from his own counsel. And just as he has to proceed on his own counsel in doing other things, so too has he in the point of obeying his superiors. For Gregory says (Moral. x.x.xv), "When we humbly give way to another"s voice, we overcome ourselves in our own hearts."
Reply Obj. 2: The will of G.o.d is the first rule whereby all rational wills are regulated: and to this rule one will approaches more than another, according to a divinely appointed order. Hence the will of the one man who issues a command may be as a second rule to the will of this other man who obeys him.
Reply Obj. 3: A thing may be deemed gratuitous in two ways. In one way on the part of the deed itself, because, to wit, one is not bound to do it; in another way, on the part of the doer, because he does it of his own free will. Now a deed is rendered virtuous, praiseworthy and meritorious, chiefly according as it proceeds from the will.
Wherefore although obedience be a duty, if one obey with a prompt will, one"s merit is not for that reason diminished, especially before G.o.d, Who sees not only the outward deed, but also the inward will.
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SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q, 104, Art. 2]
Whether Obedience Is a Special Virtue?
Objection 1: It seems that obedience is not a special virtue. For disobedience is contrary to obedience. But disobedience is a general sin, because Ambrose says (De Parad. viii) that "sin is to disobey the divine law." Therefore obedience is not a special virtue.
Obj. 2: Further, every special virtue is either theological or moral.
But obedience is not a theological virtue, since it is not comprised under faith, hope or charity. Nor is it a moral virtue, since it does not hold the mean between excess and deficiency, for the more obedient one is the more is one praised. Therefore obedience is not a special virtue.
Obj. 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. x.x.xv) that "obedience is the more meritorious and praiseworthy, the less it holds its own." But every special virtue is the more to be praised the more it holds its own, since virtue requires a man to exercise his will and choice, as stated in _Ethic._ ii, 4. Therefore obedience is not a special virtue.
Obj. 4: Further, virtues differ in species according to their objects. Now the object of obedience would seem to be the command of a superior, of which, apparently, there are as many kinds as there are degrees of superiority. Therefore obedience is a general virtue, comprising many special virtues.
_On the contrary,_ obedience is reckoned by some to be a part of justice, as stated above (Q. 80).
_I answer that,_ A special virtue is a.s.signed to all good deeds that have a special reason of praise: for it belongs properly to virtue to render a deed good. Now obedience to a superior is due in accordance with the divinely established order of things, as shown above (A. 1), and therefore it is a good, since good consists in mode, species and order, as Augustine states (De Natura Boni iii) [*Cf. First Part, Q.
5, A. 5]. Again, this act has a special aspect of praiseworthiness by reason of its object. For while subjects have many obligations towards their superiors, this one, that they are bound to obey their commands, stands out as special among the rest. Wherefore obedience is a special virtue, and its specific object is a command tacit or express, because the superior"s will, however it become known, is a tacit precept, and a man"s obedience seems to be all the more prompt, forasmuch as by obeying he forestalls the express command as soon as he understands his superior"s will.
Reply Obj. 1: Nothing prevents the one same material object from admitting two special aspects to which two special virtues correspond: thus a soldier, by defending his king"s fortress, fulfils both an act of fort.i.tude, by facing the danger of death for a good end, and an act of justice, by rendering due service to his lord.
Accordingly the aspect of precept, which obedience considers, occurs in acts of all virtues, but not in all acts of virtue, since not all acts of virtue are a matter of precept, as stated above (I-II, Q. 96, A. 3). Moreover, certain things are sometimes a matter of precept, and pertain to no other virtue, such things for instance as are not evil except because they are forbidden. Wherefore, if obedience be taken in its proper sense, as considering formally and intentionally the aspect of precept, it will be a special virtue, and disobedience a special sin: because in this way it is requisite for obedience that one perform an act of justice or of some other virtue with the intention of fulfilling a precept; and for disobedience that one treat the precept with actual contempt. On the other hand, if obedience be taken in a wide sense for the performance of any action that may be a matter of precept, and disobedience for the omission of that action through any intention whatever, then obedience will be a general virtue, and disobedience a general sin.
Reply Obj. 2: Obedience is not a theological virtue, for its direct object is not G.o.d, but the precept of any superior, whether expressed or inferred, namely, a simple word of the superior, indicating his will, and which the obedient subject obeys promptly, according to t.i.tus 3:1, "Admonish them to be subject to princes, and to obey at a word," etc.
It is, however, a moral virtue, since it is a part of justice, and it observes the mean between excess and deficiency. Excess thereof is measured in respect, not of quant.i.ty, but of other circ.u.mstances, in so far as a man obeys either whom he ought not, or in matters wherein he ought not to obey, as we have stated above regarding religion (Q.
92, A. 2). We may also reply that as in justice, excess is in the person who retains another"s property, and deficiency in the person who does not receive his due, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 4), so too obedience observes the mean between excess on the part of him who fails to pay due obedience to his superior, since he exceeds in fulfilling his own will, and deficiency on the part of the superior, who does not receive obedience. Wherefore in this way obedience will be a mean between two forms of wickedness, as was stated above concerning justice (Q. 58, A. 10).
Reply Obj. 3: Obedience, like every virtue, requires the will to be prompt towards its proper object, but not towards that which is repugnant to it. Now the proper object of obedience is a precept, and this proceeds from another"s will. Wherefore obedience makes a man"s will prompt in fulfilling the will of another, the maker, namely, of the precept. If that which is prescribed to him is willed by him for its own sake apart from its being prescribed, as happens in agreeable matters, he tends towards it at once by his own will and seems to comply, not on account of the precept, but on account of his own will. But if that which is prescribed is nowise willed for its own sake, but, considered in itself, repugnant to his own will, as happens in disagreeable matters, then it is quite evident that it is not fulfilled except on account of the precept. Hence Gregory says (Moral. x.x.xv) that "obedience perishes or diminishes when it holds its own in agreeable matters," because, to wit, one"s own will seems to tend princ.i.p.ally, not to the accomplishment of the precept, but to the fulfilment of one"s own desire; but that "it increases in disagreeable or difficult matters," because there one"s own will tends to nothing beside the precept. Yet this must be understood as regards outward appearances: for, on the other hand, according to the judgment of G.o.d, Who searches the heart, it may happen that even in agreeable matters obedience, while holding its own, is nonetheless praiseworthy, provided the will of him that obeys tend no less devotedly [*Cf. Q. 82, A. 2] to the fulfilment of the precept.
Reply Obj. 4: Reverence regards directly the person that excels: wherefore it admits a various species according to the various aspects of excellence. Obedience, on the other hand, regards the precept of the person that excels, and therefore admits of only one aspect. And since obedience is due to a person"s precept on account of reverence to him, it follows that obedience to a man is of one species, though the causes from which it proceeds differ specifically.
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THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 104, Art. 3]
Whether Obedience Is the Greatest of the Virtues?
Objection 1: It seems that obedience is the greatest of the virtues.
For it is written (1 Kings 15:22): "Obedience is better than sacrifices." Now the offering of sacrifices belongs to religion, which is the greatest of all moral virtues, as shown above (Q. 81, A.
6). Therefore obedience is the greatest of all virtues.
Obj. 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. x.x.xv) that "obedience is the only virtue that ingrafts virtues in the soul and protects them when ingrafted." Now the cause is greater than the effect. Therefore obedience is greater than all the virtues.
Obj. 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. x.x.xv) that "evil should never be done out of obedience: yet sometimes for the sake of obedience we should lay aside the good we are doing." Now one does not lay aside a thing except for something better. Therefore obedience, for whose sake the good of other virtues is set aside, is better than other virtues.
_On the contrary,_ obedience deserves praise because it proceeds from charity: for Gregory says (Moral. x.x.xv) that "obedience should be practiced, not out of servile fear, but from a sense of charity, not through fear of punishment, but through love of justice." Therefore charity is a greater virtue than obedience.
_I answer that,_ Just as sin consists in man contemning G.o.d and adhering to mutable things, so the merit of a virtuous act consists in man contemning created goods and adhering to G.o.d as his end. Now the end is greater than that which is directed to the end. Therefore if a man contemns created goods in order that he may adhere to G.o.d, his virtue derives greater praise from his adhering to G.o.d than from his contemning earthly things. And so those, namely the theological, virtues whereby he adheres to G.o.d in Himself, are greater than the moral virtues, whereby he holds in contempt some earthly thing in order to adhere to G.o.d.
Among the moral virtues, the greater the thing which a man contemns that he may adhere to G.o.d, the greater the virtue. Now there are three kinds of human goods that man may contemn for G.o.d"s sake. The lowest of these are external goods, the goods of the body take the middle place, and the highest are the goods of the soul; and among these the chief, in a way, is the will, in so far as, by his will, man makes use of all other goods. Therefore, properly speaking, the virtue of obedience, whereby we contemn our own will for G.o.d"s sake, is more praiseworthy than the other moral virtues, which contemn other goods for the sake of G.o.d.