Objection 1: It seems that the innocent is more bound to give thanks to G.o.d than the penitent. For the greater the gift one has received from G.o.d, the more one is bound to give Him thanks. Now the gift of innocence is greater than that of justice restored. Therefore it seems that the innocent is more bound to give thanks to G.o.d than the penitent.
Obj. 2: Further, a man owes love to his benefactor just as he owes him grat.i.tude. Now Augustine says (Confess. ii): "What man, weighing his own infirmity, would dare to ascribe his purity and innocence to his own strength; that so he should love Thee the less, as if he had less needed Thy mercy, whereby Thou remittest sins to those that turn to Thee?" And farther on he says: "And for this let him love Thee as much, yea and more, since by Whom he sees me to have been recovered from such deep torpor of sin, by Him he sees himself to have been from the like torpor of sin preserved." Therefore the innocent is also more bound to give thanks than the penitent.
Obj. 3: Further, the more a gratuitous favor is continuous, the greater the thanksgiving due for it. Now the favor of divine grace is more continuous in the innocent than in the penitent. For Augustine says (Confess. iii): "To Thy grace I ascribe it, and to Thy mercy, that Thou hast melted away my sins as it were ice. To Thy grace I ascribe also whatsoever I have not done of evil; for what might I not have done? ... Yea, all I confess to have been forgiven me, both what evils I committed by my own wilfulness, and what by Thy guidance committed not." Therefore the innocent is more bound to give thanks than the penitent.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Luke 7:43): "To whom more is forgiven, he loveth more [*Vulg.: "To whom less is forgiven, he loveth less" Luke 7:47]." Therefore for the same reason he is bound to greater thanksgiving.
_I answer that,_ Thanksgiving (_gratiarum actio_) in the recipient corresponds to the favor (_gratia_) of the giver: so that when there is greater favor on the part of the giver, greater thanks are due on the part of the recipient. Now a favor is something bestowed _gratis:_ wherefore on the part of the giver the favor may be greater on two counts. First, owing to the quant.i.ty of the thing given: and in this way the innocent owes greater thanksgiving, because he receives a greater gift from G.o.d, also, absolutely speaking, a more continuous gift, other things being equal. Secondly, a favor may be said to be greater, because it is given more gratuitously; and in this sense the penitent is more bound to give thanks than the innocent, because what he receives from G.o.d is more gratuitously given: since, whereas he was deserving of punishment, he has received grace. Wherefore, although the gift bestowed on the innocent is, considered absolutely, greater, yet the gift bestowed on the penitent is greater in relation to him: even as a small gift bestowed on a poor man is greater to him than a great gift is to a rich man. And since actions are about singulars, in matters of action, we have to take note of what is such here and now, rather than of what is such absolutely, as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. iii) in treating of the voluntary and the involuntary.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
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THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 106, Art. 3]
Whether a Man Is Bound to Give Thanks to Every Benefactor?
Objection 1: It seems that a man is not bound to give thanks to every benefactor. For a man may benefit himself just as he may harm himself, according to Ecclus. 14:5, "He that is evil to himself, to whom will he be good?" But a man cannot thank himself, since thanksgiving seems to pa.s.s from one person to another. Therefore thanksgiving is not due to every benefactor.
Obj. 2: Further, grat.i.tude is a repayment of an act of grace. But some favors are granted without grace, and are rudely, slowly and grudgingly given. Therefore grat.i.tude is not always due to a benefactor.
Obj. 3: Further, no thanks are due to one who works for his own profit. But sometimes people bestow favors for their own profit.
Therefore thanks are not due to them.
Obj. 4: Further, no thanks are due to a slave, for all that he is belongs to his master. Yet sometimes a slave does a good turn to his master. Therefore grat.i.tude is not due to every benefactor.
Obj. 5: Further, no one is bound to do what he cannot do equitably and advantageously. Now it happens at times that the benefactor is very well off, and it would be of no advantage to him to be repaid for a favor he has bestowed. Again it happens sometimes that the benefactor from being virtuous has become wicked, so that it would not seem equitable to repay him. Also the recipient of a favor may be a poor man, and is quite unable to repay. Therefore seemingly a man is not always bound to repayment for favors received.
Obj. 6: Further, no one is bound to do for another what is inexpedient and hurtful to him. Now sometimes it happens that repayment of a favor would be hurtful or useless to the person repaid. Therefore favors are not always to be repaid by grat.i.tude.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (1 Thess. 5:18): "In all things give thanks."
_I answer that,_ Every effect turns naturally to its cause; wherefore Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i) that "G.o.d turns all things to Himself because He is the cause of all": for the effect must needs always be directed to the end of the agent. Now it is evident that a benefactor, as such, is cause of the beneficiary. Hence the natural order requires that he who has received a favor should, by repaying the favor, turn to his benefactor according to the mode of each. And, as stated above with regard to a father (Q. 31, A. 3; Q. 101, A. 2), a man owes his benefactor, as such, honor and reverence, since the latter stands to him in the relation of principle; but accidentally he owes him a.s.sistance or support, if he need it.
Reply Obj. 1: In the words of Seneca (1 Benef. v), "just as a man is liberal who gives not to himself but to others, and gracious who forgives not himself but others, and merciful who is moved, not by his own misfortunes but by another"s, so too, no man confers a favor on himself, he is but following the bent of his nature, which moves him to resist what hurts him, and to seek what is profitable."
Wherefore in things that one does for oneself, there is no place for grat.i.tude or ingrat.i.tude, since a man cannot deny himself a thing except by keeping it. Nevertheless things which are properly spoken of in relation to others are spoken of metaphorically in relation to oneself, as the Philosopher states regarding justice (Ethic. v, 11), in so far, to wit, as the various parts of man are considered as though they were various persons.
Reply Obj. 2: It is the mark of a happy disposition to see good rather than evil. Wherefore if someone has conferred a favor, not as he ought to have conferred it, the recipient should not for that reason withhold his thanks. Yet he owes less thanks, than if the favor had been conferred duly, since in fact the favor is less, for, as Seneca remarks (De Benef. ii.) "promptness enhances, delay discounts a favor."
Reply Obj. 3: As Seneca observes (De Benef. vi), "it matters much whether a person does a kindness to us for his own sake, or for ours, or for both his and ours. He that considers himself only, and benefits because cannot otherwise benefit himself, seems to me like a man who seeks fodder for his cattle." And farther on: "If he has done it for me in common with himself, having both of us in his mind, I am ungrateful and not merely unjust, unless I rejoice that what was profitable to him is profitable to me also. It is the height of malevolence to refuse to recognize a kindness, unless the giver has been the loser thereby."
Reply Obj. 4: As Seneca observes (De Benef. iii), "when a slave does what is wont to be demanded of a slave, it is part of his service: when he does more than a slave is bound to do, it is a favor: for as soon as he does anything from a motive of friendship, if indeed that be his motive, it is no longer called service." Wherefore grat.i.tude is due even to a slave, when he does more than his duty.
Reply Obj. 5: A poor man is certainly not ungrateful if he does what he can. For since kindness depends on the heart rather than on the deed, so too grat.i.tude depends chiefly the heart. Hence Seneca says (De Benef. ii): "Who receives a favor gratefully, has already begun to pay it back: and that we are grateful for favors received should be shown by the outpourings of the heart, not only in his hearing but everywhere." From this it is evident that however well off a man may be, it is possible to thank him for his kindness by showing him reverence and honor. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 14): "He that abounds should be repaid with honor, he that is in want should be repaid with money": and Seneca writes (De Benef. vi): "There are many ways of repaying those who are well off, whatever we happen to owe them; such as good advice, frequent fellowship, affable and pleasant conversation without flattery." Therefore there is no need for a man to desire neediness or distress in his benefactor before repaying his kindness, because, as Seneca says (De Benef. vi), "it were inhuman to desire this in one from whom you have received no favor; how much more so to desire it in one whose kindness has made you his debtor!"
If, however, the benefactor has lapsed from virtue, nevertheless he should be repaid according to his state, that he may return to virtue if possible. But if he be so wicked as to be incurable, then his heart has changed, and consequently no repayment is due for his kindness, as heretofore. And yet, as far as it possible without sin, the kindness he has shown should be held in memory, as the Philosopher says (Ethic.
ix, 3).
Reply Obj. 6: As stated in the preceding reply, repayment of a favor depends chiefly on the affection of the heart: wherefore repayment should be made in such a way as to prove most beneficial. If, however, through the benefactor"s carelessness it prove detrimental to him, this is not imputed to the person who repays him, as Seneca observes (De Benef. vii): "It is my duty to repay, and not to keep back and safeguard my repayment."
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FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 106, Art. 4]
Whether a Man Is Bound to Repay a Favor at Once?
Objection 1: It seems that a man is bound to repay a favor at once.
For we are bound to restore at once what we owe, unless the term be fixed. Now there is no term prescribed for the repayment of favors, and yet this repayment is a duty, as stated above (A. 3). Therefore a man is bound to repay a favor at once.
Obj. 2: Further, a good action would seem to be all the more praiseworthy according as it is done with greater earnestness. Now earnestness seems to make a man do his duty without any delay.
Therefore it is apparently more praiseworthy to repay a favor at once.
Obj. 3: Further, Seneca says (De Benef. ii) that "it is proper to a benefactor to act freely and quickly." Now repayment ought to equal the favor received. Therefore it should be done at once.
_On the contrary,_ Seneca says (De Benef. iv): "He that hastens to repay, is animated with a sense, not of grat.i.tude but of indebtedness."
_I answer that,_ Just as in conferring a favor two things are to be considered, namely, the affection of the heart and the gift, so also must these things be considered in repaying the favor. As regards the affection of the heart, repayment should be made at once, wherefore Seneca says (De Benef. ii): "Do you wish to repay a favor? Receive it graciously." As regards the gift, one ought to wait until such a time as will be convenient to the benefactor. In fact, if instead of choosing a convenient time, one wished to repay at once, favor for favor, it would not seem to be a virtuous, but a constrained repayment. For, as Seneca observes (De Benef. iv), "he that wishes to repay too soon, is an unwilling debtor, and an unwilling debtor is ungrateful."
Reply Obj. 1: A legal debt must be paid at once, else the equality of justice would not be preserved, if one kept another"s property without his consent. But a moral debt depends on the equity of the debtor: and therefore it should be repaid in due time according as the rect.i.tude of virtue demands.
Reply Obj. 2: Earnestness of the will is not virtuous unless it be regulated by reason; wherefore it is not praiseworthy to forestall the proper time through earnestness.
Reply Obj. 3: Favors also should be conferred at a convenient time and one should no longer delay when the convenient time comes; and the same is to be observed in repaying favors.
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FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 106, Art. 5]
Whether in Giving Thanks We Should Look at the Benefactor"s Disposition or at the Deed?
Objection 1: It seems that in repaying favors we should not look at the benefactor"s disposition but at the deed. For repayment is due to beneficence, and beneficence consists in deeds, as the word itself denotes. Therefore in repaying favors we should look at the deed.
Obj. 2: Further, thanksgiving, whereby we repay favors, is a part of justice. But justice considers equality between giving and taking.
Therefore also in repaying favors we should consider the deed rather than the disposition of the benefactor.
Obj. 3: Further, no one can consider what he does not know. Now G.o.d alone knows the interior disposition. Therefore it is impossible to repay a favor according to the benefactor"s disposition.
_On the contrary,_ Seneca says (De Benef. i): "We are sometimes under a greater obligation to one who has given little with a large heart, and has bestowed a small favor, yet willingly."
_I answer that,_ The repayment of a favor may belong to three virtues, namely, justice, grat.i.tude and friendship. It belongs to justice when the repayment has the character of a legal debt, as in a loan and the like: and in such cases repayment must be made according to the quant.i.ty received.
On the other hand, repayment of a favor belongs, though in different ways, to friendship and likewise to the virtue of grat.i.tude when it has the character of a moral debt. For in the repayment of friendship we have to consider the cause of friendship; so that in the friendship that is based on the useful, repayment should be made according to the usefulness accruing from the favor conferred, and in the friendship based on virtue repayment should be made with regard for the choice or disposition of the giver, since this is the chief requisite of virtue, as stated in _Ethic._ viii, 13. And likewise, since grat.i.tude regards the favor inasmuch as it is bestowed gratis, and this regards the disposition of the giver, it follows again that repayment of a favor depends more on the disposition of the giver than on the effect.
Reply Obj. 1: Every moral act depends on the will. Hence a kindly action, in so far as it is praiseworthy and is deserving of grat.i.tude, consists materially in the thing done, but formally and chiefly in the will. Hence Seneca says (De Benef. i): "A kindly action consists not in deed or gift, but in the disposition of the giver or doer."
Reply Obj. 2: Grat.i.tude is a part of justice, not indeed as a species is part of a genus, but by a kind of reduction to the genus of justice, as stated above (Q. 80). Hence it does not follow that we shall find the same kind of debt in both virtues.
Reply Obj. 3: G.o.d alone sees man"s disposition in itself: but in so far as it is shown by certain signs, man also can know it. It is thus that a benefactor"s disposition is known by the way in which he does the kindly action, for instance through his doing it joyfully and readily.
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SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 106, Art. 6]