Obj. 2: Further, affirmative precepts are of greater import than negative precepts, since the affirmative include the negative, but not vice versa. Therefore it is unsuitable for the Divine Law to contain none but negative precepts in prohibition of fear.
Obj. 3: Further, fort.i.tude is one of the princ.i.p.al virtues, as stated above (Q. 123, A. 2; I-II, Q. 61, A. 2). Now the precepts are directed to the virtues as to their end: wherefore they should be proportionate to them. Therefore the precepts of fort.i.tude should have been placed among the precepts of the decalogue, which are the chief precepts of the Law.
_On the contrary,_ stands Holy Writ which contains these precepts.
_I answer that,_ Precepts of law are directed to the end intended by the lawgiver. Wherefore precepts of law must needs be framed in various ways according to the various ends intended by lawgivers, so that even in human affairs there are laws of democracies, others of kingdoms, and others again of tyrannical governments. Now the end of the Divine Law is that man may adhere to G.o.d: wherefore the Divine Law contains precepts both of fort.i.tude and of the other virtues, with a view to directing the mind to G.o.d. For this reason it is written (Deut. 20:3, 4): "Fear ye them not: because the Lord your G.o.d is in the midst of you, and will fight for you against your enemies."
As to human laws, they are directed to certain earthly goods, and among them we find precepts of fort.i.tude according to the requirements of those goods.
Reply Obj. 1: The Old Testament contained temporal promises, while the promises of the New Testament are spiritual and eternal, according to Augustine (Contra Faust. iv). Hence in the Old Law there was need for the people to be taught how to fight, even in a bodily contest, in order to obtain an earthly possession. But in the New Testament men were to be taught how to come to the possession of eternal life by fighting spiritually, according to Matt. 11:12, "The kingdom of heaven suffereth violence, and the violent bear it away."
Hence Peter commands (1 Pet. 5:8, 9): "Your adversary the devil, as a roaring lion, goeth about, seeking whom he may devour: whom resist ye, strong in faith," as also James 4:7: "Resist the devil, and he will fly from you." Since, however, men while tending to spiritual goods may be withdrawn from them by corporal dangers, precepts of fort.i.tude had to be given even in the New Law, that they might bravely endure temporal evils, according to Matt. 10:28, "Fear ye not them that kill the body."
Reply Obj. 2: The law gives general directions in its precepts. But the things that have to be done in cases of danger are not, like the things to be avoided, reducible to some common thing. Hence the precepts of fort.i.tude are negative rather than affirmative.
Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (Q. 122, A. 1), the precepts of the decalogue are placed in the Law, as first principles, which need to be known to all from the outset. Wherefore the precepts of the decalogue had to be chiefly about those acts of justice in which the notion of duty is manifest, and not about acts of fort.i.tude, because it is not so evident that it is a duty for a person not to fear dangers of death.
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SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 140, Art. 2]
Whether the Precepts of the Parts of Fort.i.tude Are Suitably Given in the Divine Law?
Objection 1: It seems that the precept of the parts of fort.i.tude are unsuitably given in the Divine Law. For just as patience and perseverance are parts of fort.i.tude, so also are magnificence, magnanimity, and confidence, as stated above (Q. 128). Now we find precepts of patience in the Divine Law, as also of perseverance.
Therefore there should also have been precepts of magnificence and magnanimity.
Obj. 2: Further, patience is a very necessary virtue, since it is the guardian of the other virtues, as Gregory says (Hom. in Evang. x.x.xv).
Now the other virtues are commanded absolutely. Therefore patience should not have been commanded merely, as Augustine says (De Serm.
Dom. in Monte i), as to the preparedness of the mind.
Obj. 3: Further, patience and perseverance are parts of fort.i.tude, as stated above (Q. 128; Q. 136, A. 4; Q. 137, A. 2). Now the precepts of fort.i.tude are not affirmative but only negative, as stated above (A. 1, ad 2). Therefore the precepts of patience and perseverance should have been negative and not affirmative.
The contrary, however, follows from the way in which they are given by Holy Writ.
_I answer that,_ The Divine Law instructs man perfectly about such things as are necessary for right living. Now in order to live aright man needs not only the princ.i.p.al virtues, but also the secondary and annexed virtues. Wherefore the Divine Law contains precepts not only about the acts of the princ.i.p.al virtues, but also about the acts of the secondary and annexed virtues.
Reply Obj. 1: Magnificence and magnanimity do not belong to the genus of fort.i.tude, except by reason of a certain excellence of greatness which they regard in their respective matters. Now things pertaining to excellence come under the counsels of perfection rather than under precepts of obligation. Wherefore, there was need of counsels, rather than of precepts about magnificence and magnanimity. On the other hand, the hardships and toils of the present life pertain to patience and perseverance, not by reason of any greatness observable in them, but on account of the very nature of those virtues. Hence the need of precepts of patience and perseverance.
Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 3, A. 2), although affirmative precepts are always binding, they are not binding for always, but according to place and time. Wherefore just as the affirmative precepts about the other virtues are to be understood as to the preparedness of the mind, in the sense that man be prepared to fulfil them when necessary, so too are the precepts of patience to be understood in the same way.
Reply Obj. 3: Fort.i.tude, as distinct from patience and perseverance, is about the greatest dangers wherein one must proceed with caution; nor is it necessary to determine what is to be done in particular. On the other hand, patience and perseverance are about minor hardships and toils, wherefore there is less danger in determining, especially in general, what is to be done in such cases.
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QUESTION 141
OF TEMPERANCE (In Eight Articles)
In the next place we must consider temperance: (1) Temperance itself; (2) its parts; (3) its precepts. With regard to temperance we must consider (1) temperance itself; (2) the contrary vices.
Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether temperance is a virtue?
(2) Whether it is a special virtue?
(3) Whether it is only about desires and pleasures?
(4) Whether it is only about pleasures of touch?
(5) Whether it is about pleasures of taste, as such, or only as a kind of touch?
(6) What is the rule of temperance?
(7) Whether it is a cardinal, or princ.i.p.al, virtue?
(8) Whether it is the greatest of virtues?
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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 141, Art. 1]
Whether Temperance Is a Virtue?
Objection 1: It seems that temperance is not a virtue. For no virtue goes against the inclination of nature, since "there is in us a natural apt.i.tude for virtue," as stated in _Ethic._ ii, 1. Now temperance withdraws us from pleasures to which nature inclines, according to _Ethic._ ii, 3, 8. Therefore temperance is not a virtue.
Obj. 2: Further, virtues are connected with one another, as stated above (I-II, Q. 65, A. 1). But some people have temperance without having the other virtues: for we find many who are temperate, and yet covetous or timid. Therefore temperance is not a virtue.
Obj. 3: Further, to every virtue there is a corresponding gift, as appears from what we have said above (I-II, Q. 68, A. 4). But seemingly no gift corresponds to temperance, since all the gifts have been already ascribed to the other virtues (QQ. 8, 9, 19, 45, 52, 71, 139). Therefore temperance is not a virtue.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Music. vi, 15): "Temperance is the name of a virtue."
_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 55, A. 3), it is essential to virtue to incline man to good. Now the good of man is to be in accordance with reason, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Hence human virtue is that which inclines man to something in accordance with reason. Now temperance evidently inclines man to this, since its very name implies moderation or temperateness, which reason causes.
Therefore temperance is a virtue.
Reply Obj. 1: Nature inclines everything to whatever is becoming to it. Wherefore man naturally desires pleasures that are becoming to him. Since, however, man as such is a rational being, it follows that those pleasures are becoming to man which are in accordance with reason. From such pleasures temperance does not withdraw him, but from those which are contrary to reason. Wherefore it is clear that temperance is not contrary to the inclination of human nature, but is in accord with it. It is, however, contrary to the inclination of the animal nature that is not subject to reason.
Reply Obj. 2: The temperance which fulfils the conditions of perfect virtue is not without prudence, while this is lacking to all who are in sin. Hence those who lack other virtues, through being subject to the opposite vices, have not the temperance which is a virtue, though they do acts of temperance from a certain natural disposition, in so far as certain imperfect virtues are either natural to man, as stated above (I-II, Q. 63, A. 1), or acquired by habituation, which virtues, through lack of prudence, are not perfected by reason, as stated above (I-II, Q. 65, A. 1).
Reply Obj. 3: Temperance also has a corresponding gift, namely, fear, whereby man is withheld from the pleasures of the flesh, according to Ps. 118:120: "Pierce Thou my flesh with Thy fear." The gift of fear has for its princ.i.p.al object G.o.d, Whom it avoids offending, and in this respect it corresponds to the virtue of hope, as stated above (Q. 19, A. 9, ad 1). But it may have for its secondary object whatever a man shuns in order to avoid offending G.o.d. Now man stands in the greatest need of the fear of G.o.d in order to shun those things which are most seductive, and these are the matter of temperance: wherefore the gift of fear corresponds to temperance also.
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SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 141, Art. 2]
Whether Temperance Is a Special Virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that temperance is not a special virtue.
For Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xv) that "it belongs to temperance to preserve one"s integrity and freedom from corruption for G.o.d"s sake." But this is common to every virtue. Therefore temperance is not a special virtue.
Obj. 2: Further, Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 42) that "what we observe and seek most in temperance is tranquillity of soul." But this is common to every virtue. Therefore temperance is not a special virtue.
Obj. 3: Further, Tully says (De Offic. i, 27) that "we cannot separate the beautiful from the virtuous," and that "whatever is just is beautiful." Now the beautiful is considered as proper to temperance, according to the same authority (Tully, De Offic. i, 27).
Therefore temperance is not a special virtue.