Reply Obj. 3: Delicacy regards princ.i.p.ally the substance of the food, but secondarily it regards its delicious savor and the way in which it is served.
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SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 141, Art. 6]
Whether the Rule of Temperance Depends on the Need of the Present Life?
Objection 1: It would seem that the rule of temperance does not depend on the needs of the present life. For higher things are not regulated according to lower. Now, as temperance is a virtue of the soul, it is above the needs of the body. Therefore the rule of temperance does not depend on the needs of the body.
Obj. 2: Further, whoever exceeds a rule sins. Therefore if the needs of the body were the rule of temperance, it would be a sin against temperance to indulge in any other pleasure than those required by nature, which is content with very little. But this would seem unreasonable.
Obj. 3: Further, no one sins in observing a rule. Therefore if the need of the body were the rule of temperance, there would be no sin in using any pleasure for the needs of the body, for instance, for the sake of health. But this is apparently false. Therefore the need of the body is not the rule of temperance.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xxi): "In both Testaments the temperate man finds confirmation of the rule forbidding him to love the things of this life, or to deem any of them desirable for its own sake, and commanding him to avail himself of those things with the moderation of a user not the attachment of a lover, in so far as they are requisite for the needs of this life and of his station."
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1; Q. 109, A. 2; Q. 123, A. 12), the good of moral virtue consists chiefly in the order of reason: because "man"s good is to be in accord with reason," as Dionysius a.s.serts (Div. Nom. iv). Now the princ.i.p.al order of reason is that by which it directs certain things towards their end, and the good of reason consists chiefly in this order; since good has the aspect of end, and the end is the rule of whatever is directed to the end. Now all the pleasurable objects that are at man"s disposal, are directed to some necessity of this life as to their end. Wherefore temperance takes the need of this life, as the rule of the pleasurable objects of which it makes use, and uses them only for as much as the need of this life requires.
Reply Obj. 1: As stated above, the need of this life is regarded as a rule in so far as it is an end. Now it must be observed that sometimes the end of the worker differs from the end of the work, thus it is clear that the end of building is a house, whereas sometimes the end of the builder is profit. Accordingly the end and rule of temperance itself is happiness; while the end and rule of the thing it makes use of is the need of human life, to which whatever is useful for life is subordinate.
Reply Obj. 2: The need of human life may be taken in two ways. First, it may be taken in the sense in which we apply the term "necessary"
to that without which a thing cannot be at all; thus food is necessary to an animal. Secondly, it may be taken for something without which a thing cannot be becomingly. Now temperance regards not only the former of these needs, but also the latter. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 11) that "the temperate man desires pleasant things for the sake of health, or for the sake of a sound condition of body." Other things that are not necessary for this purpose may be divided into two cla.s.ses. For some are a hindrance to health and a sound condition of body; and these temperance makes not use of whatever, for this would be a sin against temperance. But others are not a hindrance to those things, and these temperance uses moderately, according to the demands of place and time, and in keeping with those among whom one dwells. Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 11) says that the "temperate man also desires other pleasant things," those namely that are not necessary for health or a sound condition of body, "so long as they are not prejudicial to these things."
Reply Obj. 3: As stated (ad 2), temperance regards need according to the requirements of life, and this depends not only on the requirements of the body, but also on the requirements of external things, such as riches and station, and more still on the requirements of good conduct. Hence the Philosopher adds (Ethic. iii, 11) that "the temperate man makes use of pleasant things provided that not only they be not prejudicial to health and a sound bodily condition, but also that they be not inconsistent with good," i.e.
good conduct, nor "beyond his substance," i.e. his means. And Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xxi) that the "temperate man considers the need" not only "of this life" but also "of his station."
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SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 141, Art. 7]
Whether Temperance Is a Cardinal Virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that temperance is not a cardinal virtue.
For the good of moral virtue depends on reason. But temperance is about those things that are furthest removed from reason, namely about pleasures common to us and the lower animals, as stated in _Ethic._ iii, 10. Therefore temperance, seemingly, is not a princ.i.p.al virtue.
Obj. 2: Further, the greater the impetus the more difficult is it to control. Now anger, which is controlled by meekness, seems to be more impetuous than desire, which is controlled by temperance. For it is written (Prov. 27:4): "Anger hath no mercy, nor fury when it breaketh forth; and who can bear the violence (_impetum_) of one provoked?"
Therefore meekness is a princ.i.p.al virtue rather than temperance.
Obj. 3: Further, hope as a movement of the soul takes precedence of desire and concupiscence, as stated above (I-II, Q. 25, A. 4). But humility controls the presumption of immoderate hope. Therefore, seemingly, humility is a princ.i.p.al virtue rather than temperance which controls concupiscence.
_On the contrary,_ Gregory reckons temperance among the princ.i.p.al virtues (Moral. ii, 49).
_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 123, A. 11; Q. 61, A. 3), a princ.i.p.al or cardinal virtue is so called because it has a foremost claim to praise on account of one of those things that are requisite for the notion of virtue in general. Now moderation, which is requisite in every virtue, deserves praise princ.i.p.ally in pleasures of touch, with which temperance is concerned, both because these pleasures are most natural to us, so that it is more difficult to abstain from them, and to control the desire for them, and because their objects are more necessary to the present life, as stated above (A. 4). For this reason temperance is reckoned a princ.i.p.al or cardinal virtue.
Reply Obj. 1: The longer the range of its operation, the greater is the agent"s power (_virtus_) shown to be: wherefore the very fact that the reason is able to moderate desires and pleasures that are furthest removed from it, proves the greatness of reason"s power.
This is how temperance comes to be a princ.i.p.al virtue.
Reply Obj. 2: The impetuousness of anger is caused by an accident, for instance, a painful hurt; wherefore it soon pa.s.ses, although its impetus be great. On the other hand, the impetuousness of the desire for pleasures of touch proceeds from a natural cause, wherefore it is more lasting and more general, and consequently its control regards a more princ.i.p.al virtue.
Reply Obj. 3: The object of hope is higher than the object of desire, wherefore hope is accounted the princ.i.p.al pa.s.sion in the irascible.
But the objects of desires and pleasures of touch move the appet.i.te with greater force, since they are more natural. Therefore temperance, which appoints the mean in such things, is a princ.i.p.al virtue.
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EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 141, Art. 8]
Whether Temperance Is the Greatest of the Virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that temperance is the greatest of the virtues. For Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 43) that "what we observe and seek most in temperance is the safeguarding of what is honorable, and the regard for what is beautiful." Now virtue deserves praise for being honorable and beautiful. Therefore temperance is the greatest of the virtues.
Obj. 2: Further, the more difficult the deed the greater the virtue.
Now it is more difficult to control desires and pleasures of touch than to regulate external actions, the former pertaining to temperance and the latter to justice. Therefore temperance is a greater virtue than justice.
Obj. 3: Further, seemingly the more general a thing is, the more necessary and the better it is. Now fort.i.tude is about dangers of death which occur less frequently than pleasures of touch, for these occur every day; so that temperance is in more general use than fort.i.tude. Therefore temperance is a more excellent virtue than fort.i.tude.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 9) that the "greatest virtues are those which are most profitable to others, for which reason we give the greatest honor to the brave and the just."
_I answer that,_ As the Philosopher declares (Ethic. i, 2) "the good of the many is more of the G.o.dlike than the good of the individual,"
wherefore the more a virtue regards the good of the many, the better it is. Now justice and fort.i.tude regard the good of the many more than temperance does, since justice regards the relations between one man and another, while fort.i.tude regards dangers of battle which are endured for the common weal: whereas temperance moderates only the desires and pleasures which affect man himself. Hence it is evident that justice and fort.i.tude are more excellent virtues than temperance: while prudence and the theological virtues are more excellent still.
Reply Obj. 1: Honor and beauty are especially ascribed to temperance, not on account of the excellence of the good proper to temperance, but on account of the disgrace of the contrary evil from which it withdraws us, by moderating the pleasures common to us and the lower animals.
Reply Obj. 2: Since virtue is about the difficult and the good, the excellence of a virtue is considered more under the aspect of good, wherein justice excels, than under the aspect of difficult, wherein temperance excels.
Reply Obj. 3: That which is general because it regards the many conduces more to the excellence of goodness than that which is general because it occurs frequently: fort.i.tude excels in the former way, temperance in the latter. Hence fort.i.tude is greater simply, although in some respects temperance may be described as greater not only than fort.i.tude but also than justice.
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QUESTION 142
OF THE VICES OPPOSED TO TEMPERANCE (In Four Articles)
We must now consider the vices opposed to temperance. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether insensibility is a sin?
(2) Whether intemperance is a childish sin?
(3) Of the comparison between intemperance and timidity;
(4) Whether intemperance is the most disgraceful of vices?
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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 142, Art. 1]
Whether Insensibility Is a Vice?
Objection 1: It would seem that insensibility is not a vice. For those are called insensible who are deficient with regard to pleasures of touch. Now seemingly it is praiseworthy and virtuous to be altogether deficient in such matters: for it is written (Dan.
10:2, 3): "In those days Daniel mourned the days of three weeks, I ate no desirable bread, and neither flesh nor wine entered my mouth, neither was I anointed with ointment." Therefore insensibility is not a sin.
Obj. 2: Further, "man"s good is to be in accord with reason,"
according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). Now abstinence from all pleasures of touch is most conducive to man"s progress in the good of reason: for it is written (Dan. 1:17) that "to the children" who took pulse for their food (Dan. 1:12), "G.o.d gave knowledge, and understanding in every book and wisdom." Therefore insensibility, which rejects these pleasures altogether, is not sinful.
Obj. 3: Further, that which is a very effective means of avoiding sin would seem not to be sinful. Now the most effective remedy in avoiding sin is to shun pleasures, and this pertains to insensibility. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 9) that "if we deny ourselves pleasures we are less liable to sin." Therefore there is nothing vicious in insensibility.