With regard to abstinence three points have to be considered: (1) Abstinence itself; (2) its act which is fasting; (3) its opposite vice which is gluttony. Under the first head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether abstinence is a virtue?
(2) Whether it is a special virtue?
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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 146, Art. 1]
Whether Abstinence Is a Virtue?
Objection 1: It seems that abstinence is not a virtue. For the Apostle says (1 Cor. 4:20): "The kingdom of G.o.d is not in speech but in power (_virtute_)." Now the kingdom of G.o.d does not consist in abstinence, for the Apostle says (Rom. 14:17): "The kingdom of G.o.d is not meat and drink," where a gloss [*Cf. St. Augustine, QQ. Evang.
ii, qu. 11] observes that "justice consists neither in abstaining nor in eating." Therefore abstinence is not a virtue.
Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (Confess. x, 11) addressing himself to G.o.d: "This hast Thou taught me, that I should set myself to take food as physic." Now it belongs not to virtue, but to the medical art to regulate medicine. Therefore, in like manner, to regulate one"s food, which belongs to abstinence, is an act not of virtue but of art.
Obj. 3: Further, every virtue "observes the mean," as stated in _Ethic._ ii, 6, 7. But abstinence seemingly inclines not to the mean but to deficiency, since it denotes retrenchment. Therefore abstinence is not a virtue.
Obj. 4: Further, no virtue excludes another virtue. But abstinence excludes patience: for Gregory says (Pastor. iii, 19) that "impatience not unfrequently dislodges the abstainer"s mind from its peaceful seclusion." Likewise he says (Pastor. iii, 19) that "sometimes the sin of pride pierces the thoughts of the abstainer,"
so that abstinence excludes humility. Therefore abstinence is not a virtue.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (2 Pet. 1:5, 6): "Join with your faith virtue, and with virtue knowledge, and with knowledge abstinence"; where abstinence is numbered among other virtues.
Therefore abstinence is a virtue.
_I answer that,_ Abstinence by its very name denotes retrenchment of food. Hence the term abstinence may be taken in two ways. First, as denoting retrenchment of food absolutely, and in this way it signifies neither a virtue nor a virtuous act, but something indifferent. Secondly, it may be taken as regulated by reason, and then it signifies either a virtuous habit or a virtuous act. This is the meaning of Peter"s words quoted above, where he says that we ought "to join abstinence with knowledge," namely that in abstaining from food a man should act with due regard for those among whom he lives, for his own person, and for the requirements of health.
Reply Obj. 1: The use of and abstinence from food, considered in themselves, do not pertain to the kingdom of G.o.d, since the Apostle says (1 Cor. 8:8): "Meat doth not commend us to G.o.d. For neither, if we eat not [*Vulg.: "Neither if we eat ... nor if we eat not"], shall we have the less, nor if we eat, shall we have the more," i.e.
spiritually. Nevertheless they both belong to the kingdom of G.o.d, in so far as they are done reasonably through faith and love of G.o.d.
Reply Obj. 2: The regulation of food, in the point of quant.i.ty and quality, belongs to the art of medicine as regards the health of the body: but in the point of internal affections with regard to the good of reason, it belongs to abstinence. Hence Augustine says (QQ. Evang.
ii, qu. 11): "It makes no difference whatever to virtue what or how much food a man takes, so long as he does it with due regard for the people among whom he lives, for his own person, and for the requirements of his health: but it matters how readily and uncomplainingly he does without food when bound by duty or necessity to abstain."
Reply Obj. 3: It belongs to temperance to bridle the pleasures which are too alluring to the soul, just as it belongs to fort.i.tude to strengthen the soul against fears that deter it from the good of reason. Wherefore, just as fort.i.tude is commended on account of a certain excess, from which all the parts of fort.i.tude take their name, so temperance is commended for a kind of deficiency, from which all its parts are denominated. Hence abstinence, since it is a part of temperance, is named from deficiency, and yet it observes the mean, in so far as it is in accord with right reason.
Reply Obj. 4: Those vices result from abstinence in so far as it is not in accord with right reason. For right reason makes one abstain as one ought, i.e. with gladness of heart, and for the due end, i.e.
for G.o.d"s glory and not one"s own.
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SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 146, Art. 1]
Whether Abstinence Is a Special Virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that abstinence is not a special virtue.
For every virtue is praiseworthy by itself. But abstinence is not praiseworthy by itself; for Gregory says (Pastor. iii, 19) that "the virtue of abstinence is praised only on account of the other virtues." Therefore abstinence is not a special virtue.
Obj. 2: Further, Augustine [*Fulgentius] says (De Fide ad Pet. xlii) that "the saints abstain from meat and drink, not that any creature of G.o.d is evil, but merely in order to chastise the body." Now this belongs to chast.i.ty, as its very name denotes. Therefore abstinence is not a special virtue distinct from chast.i.ty.
Obj. 3: Further, as man should be content with moderate meat, so should he be satisfied with moderate clothes, according to 1 Tim.
6:8, "Having food, and wherewith to be covered, with these we should be [Vulg.: "are"] content." Now there is no special virtue in being content with moderate clothes. Neither, therefore, is there in abstinence which moderates food.
_On the contrary,_ Macrobius [*In Somn. Scip. i, 8] reckons abstinence as a special part of temperance.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 136, A. 1; Q. 141, A. 3) moral virtue maintains the good of reason against the onslaught of the pa.s.sions: hence whenever we find a special motive why a pa.s.sion departs from the good of reason, there is need of a special virtue.
Now pleasures of the table are of a nature to withdraw man from the good of reason, both because they are so great, and because food is necessary to man who needs it for the maintenance of life, which he desires above all other things. Therefore abstinence is a special virtue.
Reply Obj. 1: Virtues are of necessity connected together, as stated above (I-II, Q. 65, A. 1). Wherefore one virtue receives help and commendation from another, as justice from fort.i.tude. Accordingly in this way the virtue of abstinence receives commendation on account of the other virtues.
Reply Obj. 2: The body is chastised by means of abstinence, not only against the allurements of l.u.s.t, but also against those of gluttony: since by abstaining a man gains strength for overcoming the onslaughts of gluttony, which increase in force the more he yields to them. Yet abstinence is not prevented from being a special virtue through being a help to chast.i.ty, since one virtue helps another.
Reply Obj. 3: The use of clothing was devised by art, whereas the use of food is from nature. Hence it is more necessary to have a special virtue for the moderation of food than for the moderation of clothing.
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QUESTION 147
OF FASTING (In Eight Articles)
We must now consider fasting: under which head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether fasting is an act of virtue?
(2) Of what virtue is it the act?
(3) Whether it is a matter of precept?
(4) Whether anyone is excused from fulfilling this precept?
(5) The time of fasting;
(6) Whether it is requisite for fasting to eat but once?
(7) The hour of eating for those who fast;
(8) The meats from which it is necessary to abstain.
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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 147, Art. 1]
Whether Fasting Is an Act of Virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that fasting is not an act of virtue. For every act of virtue is acceptable to G.o.d. But fasting is not always acceptable to G.o.d, according to Isa. 58:3, "Why have we fasted and Thou hast not regarded?" Therefore fasting is not an act of virtue.
Obj. 2: Further, no act of virtue forsakes the mean of virtue. Now fasting forsakes the mean of virtue, which in the virtue of abstinence takes account of the necessity of supplying the needs of nature, whereas by fasting something is retrenched therefrom: else those who do not fast would not have the virtue of abstinence.
Therefore fasting is not an act of virtue.
Obj. 3: Further, that which is competent to all, both good and evil, is not an act of virtue. Now such is fasting, since every one is fasting before eating. Therefore fasting is not an act of virtue.
_On the contrary,_ It is reckoned together with other virtuous acts (2 Cor. 6:5, 6) where the Apostle says: "In fasting, in knowledge, in chast.i.ty, etc. [Vulg.: "in chast.i.ty, in knowledge"]."
_I answer that,_ An act is virtuous through being directed by reason to some virtuous (_honestum_) [*Cf. Q. 145, A. 1] good. Now this is consistent with fasting, because fasting is practiced for a threefold purpose. First, in order to bridle the l.u.s.ts of the flesh, wherefore the Apostle says (2 Cor. 6:5, 6): "In fasting, in chast.i.ty," since fasting is the guardian of chast.i.ty. For, according to Jerome [*Contra Jov. ii.] "Venus is cold when Ceres and Bacchus are not there," that is to say, l.u.s.t is cooled by abstinence in meat and drink. Secondly, we have recourse to fasting in order that the mind may arise more freely to the contemplation of heavenly things: hence it is related (Dan. 10) of Daniel that he received a revelation from G.o.d after fasting for three weeks. Thirdly, in order to satisfy for sins: wherefore it is written (Joel 2:12): "Be converted to Me with all your heart, in fasting and in weeping and in mourning." The same is declared by Augustine in a sermon (De orat. et Jejun. [*Serm.