Obj. 6: Further, Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xvi) that "what food is to the well-being of the body, such is s.e.xual intercourse to the welfare of the human race." But inordinate use of food is not always a mortal sin. Therefore neither is all inordinate s.e.xual intercourse; and this would seem to apply especially to simple fornication, which is the least grievous of the aforesaid species.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Tob. 4:13): "Take heed to keep thyself ... from all fornication, and beside thy wife never endure to know a crime." Now crime denotes a mortal sin. Therefore fornication and all intercourse with other than one"s wife is a mortal sin.
Further, nothing but mortal sin debars a man from G.o.d"s kingdom. But fornication debars him, as shown by the words of the Apostle (Gal.
5:21), who after mentioning fornication and certain other vices, adds: "They who do such things shall not obtain the kingdom of G.o.d."
Therefore simple fornication is a mortal sin.
Further, it is written in the Decretals (XXII, qu. i, can.
Praedicandum): "They should know that the same penance is to be enjoined for perjury as for adultery, fornication, and wilful murder and other criminal offenses." Therefore simple fornication is a criminal or mortal sin.
_I answer that,_ Without any doubt we must hold simple fornication to be a mortal sin, notwithstanding that a gloss [*St. Augustine, QQ. in Deut., qu. 37] on Deut. 23:17, says: "This is a prohibition against going with wh.o.r.es, whose vileness is venial." For instead of "venial"
it should be "venal," since such is the wanton"s trade. In order to make this evident, we must take note that every sin committed directly against human life is a mortal sin. Now simple fornication implies an inordinateness that tends to injure the life of the offspring to be born of this union. For we find in all animals where the upbringing of the offspring needs care of both male and female, that these come together not indeterminately, but the male with a certain female, whether one or several; such is the case with all birds: while, on the other hand, among those animals, where the female alone suffices for the offspring"s upbringing, the union is indeterminate, as in the case of dogs and like animals. Now it is evident that the upbringing of a human child requires not only the mother"s care for his nourishment, but much more the care of his father as guide and guardian, and under whom he progresses in goods both internal and external. Hence human nature rebels against an indeterminate union of the s.e.xes and demands that a man should be united to a determinate woman and should abide with her a long time or even for a whole lifetime. Hence it is that in the human race the male has a natural solicitude for the certainty of offspring, because on him devolves the upbringing of the child: and this certainly would cease if the union of s.e.xes were indeterminate.
This union with a certain definite woman is called matrimony; which for the above reason is said to belong to the natural law. Since, however, the union of the s.e.xes is directed to the common good of the whole human race, and common goods depend on the law for their determination, as stated above (I-II, Q. 90, A. 2), it follows that this union of man and woman, which is called matrimony, is determined by some law. What this determination is for us will be stated in the Third Part of this work (Suppl., Q. 50, seqq.), where we shall treat of the sacrament of matrimony. Wherefore, since fornication is an indeterminate union of the s.e.xes, as something incompatible with matrimony, it is opposed to the good of the child"s upbringing, and consequently it is a mortal sin.
Nor does it matter if a man having knowledge of a woman by fornication, make sufficient provision for the upbringing of the child: because a matter that comes under the determination of the law is judged according to what happens in general, and not according to what may happen in a particular case.
Reply Obj. 1: Fornication is reckoned in conjunction with these things, not as being on a par with them in sinfulness, but because the matters mentioned there were equally liable to cause dispute between Jews and Gentiles, and thus prevent them from agreeing unanimously. For among the Gentiles, fornication was not deemed unlawful, on account of the corruption of natural reason: whereas the Jews, taught by the Divine law, considered it to be unlawful.
The other things mentioned were loathsome to the Jews through custom introduced by the law into their daily life. Hence the Apostles forbade these things to the Gentiles, not as though they were unlawful in themselves, but because they were loathsome to the Jews, as stated above (I-II, Q. 103, A. 4, ad 3).
Reply Obj. 2: Fornication is said to be a sin, because it is contrary to right reason. Now man"s reason is right, in so far as it is ruled by the Divine Will, the first and supreme rule. Wherefore that which a man does by G.o.d"s will and in obedience to His command, is not contrary to right reason, though it may seem contrary to the general order of reason: even so, that which is done miraculously by the Divine power is not contrary to nature, though it be contrary to the usual course of nature. Therefore just as Abraham did not sin in being willing to slay his innocent son, because he obeyed G.o.d, although considered in itself it was contrary to right human reason in general, so, too, Osee sinned not in committing fornication by G.o.d"s command. Nor should such a copulation be strictly called fornication, though it be so called in reference to the general course of things. Hence Augustine says (Confess. iii, 8): "When G.o.d commands a thing to be done against the customs or agreement of any people, though it were never done by them heretofore, it is to be done"; and afterwards he adds: "For as among the powers of human society, the greater authority is obeyed in preference to the lesser, so must G.o.d in preference to all."
Reply Obj. 3: Abraham and Jacob went in to their handmaidens with no purpose of fornication, as we shall show further on when we treat of matrimony (Suppl., Q. 65, A. 5, ad 2). As to Juda there is no need to excuse him, for he also caused Joseph to be sold.
Reply Obj. 4: Simple fornication is contrary to the love of our neighbor, because it is opposed to the good of the child to be born, as we have shown, since it is an act of generation accomplished in a manner disadvantageous to the future child.
Reply Obj. 5: A person, who, while given to works of piety, yields to the inconstancy of the flesh, is freed from eternal loss, in so far as these works dispose him to receive the grace to repent, and because by such works he makes satisfaction for his past inconstancy; but not so as to be freed by pious works, if he persist in carnal inconstancy impenitent until death.
Reply Obj. 6: One copulation may result in the begetting of a man, wherefore inordinate copulation, which hinders the good of the future child, is a mortal sin as to the very genus of the act, and not only as to the inordinateness of concupiscence. On the other hand, one meal does not hinder the good of a man"s whole life, wherefore the act of gluttony is not a mortal sin by reason of its genus. It would, however, be a mortal sin, if a man were knowingly to partake of a food which would alter the whole condition of his life, as was the case with Adam.
Nor is it true that fornication is the least of the sins comprised under l.u.s.t, for the marriage act that is done out of sensuous pleasure is a lesser sin.
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THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 154, Art. 3]
Whether Fornication Is the Most Grievous of Sins?
Objection 1: It would seem that fornication is the most grievous of sins. For seemingly a sin is the more grievous according as it proceeds from a greater sensuous pleasure. Now the greatest sensuous pleasure is in fornication, for a gloss on 1 Cor. 7:9 says that the "flame of sensuous pleasure is most fierce in l.u.s.t." Therefore it seems that fornication is the gravest of sins.
Obj. 2: Further, a sin is the more grievous that is committed against a person more closely united to the sinner: thus he sins more grievously who strikes his father than one who strikes a stranger.
Now according to 1 Cor. 6:18, "He that committeth fornication sinneth against his own body," which is most intimately connected with a man.
Therefore it seems that fornication is the most grievous of sins.
Obj. 3: Further, the greater a good is, the graver would seem to be the sin committed against it. Now the sin of fornication is seemingly opposed to the good of the whole human race, as appears from what was said in the foregoing Article. It is also against Christ, according to 1 Cor. 6:15, "Shall I ... take the members of Christ, and make them the members of a harlot?" Therefore fornication is the most grievous of sins.
_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. x.x.xiii, 12) that the sins of the flesh are less grievous than spiritual sins.
_I answer that,_ The gravity of a sin may be measured in two ways, first with regard to the sin in itself, secondly with regard to some accident. The gravity of a sin is measured with regard to the sin itself, by reason of its species, which is determined according to the good to which that sin is opposed. Now fornication is contrary to the good of the child to be born. Wherefore it is a graver sin, as to its species, than those sins which are contrary to external goods, such as theft and the like; while it is less grievous than those which are directly against G.o.d, and sins that are injurious to the life of one already born, such as murder.
Reply Obj. 1: The sensual pleasure that aggravates a sin is that which is in the inclination of the will. But the sensual pleasure that is in the sensitive appet.i.te, lessens sin, because a sin is the less grievous according as it is committed under the impulse of a greater pa.s.sion. It is in this way that the greatest sensual pleasure is in fornication. Hence Augustine says (De Agone Christiano [*Serm.
ccxciii; ccl de Temp.; see Appendix to St. Augustine"s works]) that of all a Christian"s conflicts, the most difficult combats are those of chast.i.ty; wherein the fight is a daily one, but victory rare: and Isidore declares (De Summo Bono ii, 39) that "mankind is subjected to the devil by carnal l.u.s.t more than by anything else," because, to wit, the vehemence of this pa.s.sion is more difficult to overcome.
Reply Obj. 2: The fornicator is said to sin against his own body, not merely because the pleasure of fornication is consummated in the flesh, which is also the case in gluttony, but also because he acts against the good of his own body by an undue resolution and defilement thereof, and an undue a.s.sociation with another. Nor does it follow from this that fornication is the most grievous sin, because in man reason is of greater value than the body, wherefore if there be a sin more opposed to reason, it will be more grievous.
Reply Obj. 3: The sin of fornication is contrary to the good of the human race, in so far as it is prejudicial to the individual begetting of the one man that may be born. Now one who is already an actual member of the human species attains to the perfection of the species more than one who is a man potentially, and from this point of view murder is a more grievous sin than fornication and every kind of l.u.s.t, through being more opposed to the good of the human species.
Again, a Divine good is greater than the good of the human race: and therefore those sins also that are against G.o.d are more grievous.
Moreover, fornication is a sin against G.o.d, not directly as though the fornicator intended to offend G.o.d, but consequently, in the same way as all mortal sins. And just as the members of our body are Christ"s members, so too, our spirit is one with Christ, according to 1 Cor. 6:17, "He who is joined to the Lord is one spirit." Wherefore also spiritual sins are more against Christ than fornication is.
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FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 154, Art. 4]
Whether There Can Be Mortal Sin in Touches and Kisses?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is no mortal sin in touches and kisses. For the Apostle says (Eph. 5:3): "Fornication and all uncleanness, or covetousness, let it not so much as be named among you, as becometh saints," then he adds: "Or obscenity" (which a gloss refers to "kissing and fondling"), "or foolish talking" (as "soft speeches"), "or scurrility" (which "fools call geniality--i.e.
jocularity"), and afterwards he continues (Eph. 5:5): "For know ye this and understand that no fornicator, or unclean, or covetous person (which is the serving of idols), hath inheritance in the kingdom of Christ and of G.o.d," thus making no further mention of obscenity, as neither of foolish talking or scurrility. Therefore these are not mortal sins.
Obj. 2: Further, fornication is stated to be a mortal sin as being prejudicial to the good of the future child"s begetting and upbringing. But these are not affected by kisses and touches or blandishments. Therefore there is no mortal sin in these.
Obj. 3: Further, things that are mortal sins in themselves can never be good actions. Yet kisses, touches, and the like can be done sometimes without sin. Therefore they are not mortal sins in themselves.
_On the contrary,_ A l.u.s.tful look is less than a touch, a caress or a kiss. But according to Matt. 5:28, "Whosoever shall look on a woman to l.u.s.t after her hath already committed adultery with her in his heart." Much more therefore are l.u.s.tful kisses and other like things mortal sins.
Further, Cyprian says (Ad Pompon, de Virgin., Ep. lxii), "By their very intercourse, their blandishments, their converse, their embraces, those who are a.s.sociated in a sleep that knows neither honor nor shame, acknowledge their disgrace and crime." Therefore by doing these things a man is guilty of a crime, that is, of mortal sin.
_I answer that,_ A thing is said to be a mortal sin in two ways.
First, by reason of its species, and in this way a kiss, caress, or touch does not, of its very nature, imply a mortal sin, for it is possible to do such things without l.u.s.tful pleasure, either as being the custom of one"s country, or on account of some obligation or reasonable cause. Secondly, a thing is said to be a mortal sin by reason of its cause: thus he who gives an alms, in order to lead someone into heresy, sins mortally on account of his corrupt intention. Now it has been stated above (I-II, Q. 74, A. 8), that it is a mortal sin not only to consent to the act, but also to the delectation of a mortal sin. Wherefore since fornication is a mortal sin, and much more so the other kinds of l.u.s.t, it follows that in such like sins not only consent to the act but also consent to the pleasure is a mortal sin. Consequently, when these kisses and caresses are done for this delectation, it follows that they are mortal sins, and only in this way are they said to be l.u.s.tful.
Therefore in so far as they are l.u.s.tful, they are mortal sins.
Reply Obj. 1: The Apostle makes no further mention of these three because they are not sinful except as directed to those that he had mentioned before.
Reply Obj. 2: Although kisses and touches do not by their very nature hinder the good of the human offspring, they proceed from l.u.s.t, which is the source of this hindrance: and on this account they are mortally sinful.
Reply Obj. 3: This argument proves that such things are not mortal sins in their species.
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FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 154, Art. 5]
Whether Nocturnal Pollution Is a Mortal Sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that nocturnal pollution is a sin. For the same things are the matter of merit and demerit. Now a man may merit while he sleeps, as was the case with Solomon, who while asleep obtained the gift of wisdom from the Lord (3 Kings 3:2, Par. 1).
Therefore a man may demerit while asleep; and thus nocturnal pollution would seem to be a sin.
Obj. 2: Further, whoever has the use of reason can sin. Now a man has the use of reason while asleep, since in our sleep we frequently discuss matters, choose this rather than that, consenting to one thing, or dissenting to another. Therefore one may sin while asleep, so that nocturnal pollution is not prevented by sleep from being a sin, seeing that it is a sin according to its genus.
Obj. 3: Further, it is useless to reprove and instruct one who cannot act according to or against reason. Now man, while asleep, is instructed and reproved by G.o.d, according to Job 33:15, 16, "By a dream in a vision by night, when deep sleep is wont to lay hold of men [*Vulg.: "When deep sleep falleth upon men." St. Thomas is apparently quoting from memory, as the pa.s.sage is given correctly above, Q. 95, A. 6, Obj. 1.] ... Then He openeth the ears of men, and teaching instructeth them in what they are to learn." Therefore a man, while asleep, can act according to or against his reason, and this is to do good or sinful actions, and thus it seems that nocturnal pollution is a sin.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 15): "When the same image that comes into the mind of a speaker presents itself to the mind of the sleeper, so that the latter is unable to distinguish the imaginary from the real union of bodies, the flesh is at once moved, with the result that usually follows such motions; and yet there is as little sin in this as there is in speaking and therefore thinking about such things while one is awake."
_I answer that,_ Nocturnal pollution may be considered in two ways.