Obj. 3: Further, by the same love the Father loves the Son, and Himself, and us. But the Father does not love Himself by the Holy Ghost; for no notional act is reflected back on the principle of the act; since it cannot be said that the "Father begets Himself," or that "He spirates Himself." Therefore, neither can it be said that "He loves Himself by the Holy Ghost," if "to love" is taken in a notional sense. Again, the love wherewith He loves us is not the Holy Ghost; because it imports a relation to creatures, and this belongs to the essence. Therefore this also is false: "The Father loves the Son by the Holy Ghost."
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 5): "The Holy Ghost is He whereby the Begotten is loved by the one begetting and loves His Begetter."
_I answer that,_ A difficulty about this question is objected to the effect that when we say, "the Father loves the Son by the Holy Ghost,"
since the ablative is construed as denoting a cause, it seems to mean that the Holy Ghost is the principle of love to the Father and the Son; which cannot be admitted.
In view of this difficulty some have held that it is false, that "the Father and the Son love each other by the Holy Ghost"; and they add that it was retracted by Augustine when he retracted its equivalent to the effect that "the Father is wise by the Wisdom begotten." Others say that the proposition is inaccurate and ought to be expounded, as that "the Father loves the Son by the Holy Ghost"--that is, "by His essential Love," which is appropriated to the Holy Ghost. Others further say that this ablative should be construed as importing a sign, so that it means, "the Holy Ghost is the sign that the Father loves the Son"; inasmuch as the Holy Ghost proceeds from them both, as Love. Others, again, say that this ablative must be construed as importing the relation of formal cause, because the Holy Ghost is the love whereby the Father and the Son formally love each other. Others, again, say that it should be construed as importing the relation of a formal effect; and these approach nearer to the truth.
To make the matter clear, we must consider that since a thing is commonly denominated from its forms, as "white" from whiteness, and "man" from humanity; everything whence anything is denominated, in this particular respect stands to that thing in the relation of form.
So when I say, "this man is clothed with a garment," the ablative is to be construed as having relation to the formal cause, although the garment is not the form. Now it may happen that a thing may be denominated from that which proceeds from it, not only as an agent is from its action, but also as from the term itself of the action--that is, the effect, when the effect itself is included in the idea of the action. For we say that fire warms by heating, although heating is not the heat which is the form of the fire, but is an action proceeding from the fire; and we say that a tree flowers with the flower, although the flower is not the tree"s form, but is the effect proceeding from the form. In this way, therefore, we must say that since in G.o.d "to love" is taken in two ways, essentially and notionally, when it is taken essentially, it means that the Father and the Son love each other not by the Holy Ghost, but by their essence.
Hence Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 7): "Who dares to say that the Father loves neither Himself, nor the Son, nor the Holy Ghost, except by the Holy Ghost?" The opinions first quoted are to be taken in this sense. But when the term Love is taken in a notional sense it means nothing else than "to spirate love"; just as to speak is to produce a word, and to flower is to produce flowers. As therefore we say that a tree flowers by its flower, so do we say that the Father, by the Word or the Son, speaks Himself, and His creatures; and that the Father and the Son love each other and us, by the Holy Ghost, or by Love proceeding.
Reply Obj. 1: To be wise or intelligent is taken only essentially in G.o.d; therefore we cannot say that "the Father is wise or intelligent by the Son." But to love is taken not only essentially, but also in a notional sense; and in this way, we can say that the Father and the Son love each other by the Holy Ghost, as was above explained.
Reply Obj. 2: When the idea of an action includes a determined effect, the principle of the action may be denominated both from the action, and from the effect; so we can say, for instance, that a tree flowers by its flowering and by its flower. When, however, the idea of an action does not include a determined effect, then in that case, the principle of the action cannot be denominated from the effect, but only from the action. For we do not say that the tree produces the flower by the flower, but by the production of the flower. So when we say, "spirates" or "begets," this imports only a notional act. Hence we cannot say that the Father spirates by the Holy Ghost, or begets by the Son. But we can say that the Father speaks by the Word, as by the Person proceeding, "and speaks by the speaking," as by a notional act; forasmuch as "to speak" imports a determinate person proceeding; since "to speak" means to produce a word. Likewise to love, taken in a notional sense, means to produce love; and so it can be said that the Father loves the Son by the Holy Ghost, as by the person proceeding, and by Love itself as a notional act.
Reply Obj. 3: The Father loves not only the Son, but also Himself and us, by the Holy Ghost; because, as above explained, to love, taken in a notional sense, not only imports the production of a divine person, but also the person produced, by way of love, which has relation to the object loved. Hence, as the Father speaks Himself and every creature by His begotten Word, inasmuch as the Word "begotten"
adequately represents the Father and every creature; so He loves Himself and every creature by the Holy Ghost, inasmuch as the Holy Ghost proceeds as the love of the primal goodness whereby the Father loves Himself and every creature. Thus it is evident that relation to the creature is implied both in the Word and in the proceeding Love, as it were in a secondary way, inasmuch as the divine truth and goodness are a principle of understanding and loving all creatures.
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QUESTION 38
OF THE NAME OF THE HOLY GHOST, AS GIFT (In Two Articles)
There now follows the consideration of the Gift; concerning which there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether "Gift" can be a personal name?
(2) Whether it is the proper name of the Holy Ghost?
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FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 38, Art. 1]
Whether "Gift" Is a Personal Name?
Objection 1: It would seem that "Gift" is not a personal name. For every personal name imports a distinction in G.o.d. But the name of "Gift" does not import a distinction in G.o.d; for Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 19): that "the Holy Ghost is so given as G.o.d"s Gift, that He also gives Himself as G.o.d." Therefore "Gift" is not a personal name.
Obj. 2: Further, no personal name belongs to the divine essence. But the divine essence is the Gift which the Father gives to the Son, as Hilary says (De Trin. ix). Therefore "Gift" is not a personal name.
Obj. 3: Further, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. iv, 19) there is no subjection nor service in the divine persons. But gift implies a subjection both as regards him to whom it is given, and as regards him by whom it is given. Therefore "Gift" is not a personal name.
Obj. 4: Further, "Gift" imports relation to the creature, and it thus seems to be said of G.o.d in time. But personal names are said of G.o.d from eternity; as "Father," and "Son." Therefore "Gift" is not a personal name.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 19): "As the body of flesh is nothing but flesh; so the gift of the Holy Ghost is nothing but the Holy Ghost." But the Holy Ghost is a personal name; so also therefore is "Gift."
_I answer that,_ The word "gift" imports an apt.i.tude for being given.
And what is given has an apt.i.tude or relation both to the giver and to that to which it is given. For it would not be given by anyone, unless it was his to give; and it is given to someone to be his. Now a divine person is said to belong to another, either by origin, as the Son belongs to the Father; or as possessed by another. But we are said to possess what we can freely use or enjoy as we please: and in this way a divine person cannot be possessed, except by a rational creature united to G.o.d. Other creatures can be moved by a divine person, not, however, in such a way as to be able to enjoy the divine person, and to use the effect thereof. The rational creature does sometimes attain thereto; as when it is made partaker of the divine Word and of the Love proceeding, so as freely to know G.o.d truly and to love G.o.d rightly. Hence the rational creature alone can possess the divine person. Nevertheless in order that it may possess Him in this manner, its own power avails nothing: hence this must be given it from above; for that is said to be given to us which we have from another source.
Thus a divine person can "be given," and can be a "gift."
Reply Obj. 1: The name "Gift" imports a personal distinction, in so far as gift imports something belonging to another through its origin. Nevertheless, the Holy Ghost gives Himself, inasmuch as He is His own, and can use or rather enjoy Himself; as also a free man belongs to himself. And as Augustine says (In Joan. Tract. xxix): "What is more yours than yourself?" Or we might say, and more fittingly, that a gift must belong in a way to the giver. But the phrase, "this is this one"s," can be understood in several senses. In one way it means ident.i.ty, as Augustine says (In Joan. Tract. xxix); and in that sense "gift" is the same as "the giver," but not the same as the one to whom it is given. The Holy Ghost gives Himself in that sense. In another sense, a thing is another"s as a possession, or as a slave; and in that sense gift is essentially distinct from the giver; and the gift of G.o.d so taken is a created thing. In a third sense "this is this one"s" through its origin only; and in this sense the Son is the Father"s; and the Holy Ghost belongs to both.
Therefore, so far as gift in this way signifies the possession of the giver, it is personally distinguished from the giver, and is a personal name.
Reply Obj. 2: The divine essence is the Father"s gift in the first sense, as being the Father"s by way of ident.i.ty.
Reply Obj. 3: Gift as a personal name in G.o.d does not imply subjection, but only origin, as regards the giver; but as regards the one to whom it is given, it implies a free use, or enjoyment, as above explained.
Reply Obj. 4: Gift is not so called from being actually given, but from its apt.i.tude to be given. Hence the divine person is called Gift from eternity, although He is given in time. Nor does it follow that it is an essential name because it imports relation to the creature; but that it includes something essential in its meaning; as the essence is included in the idea of person, as stated above (Q. 34, A.
3).
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SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 38, Art. 2]
Whether "Gift" Is the Proper Name of the Holy Ghost?
Objection 1: It would seem that Gift is not the proper name of the Holy Ghost. For the name Gift comes from being given. But, as Isaiah says (9:16): "A Son is given to us." Therefore to be Gift belongs to the Son, as well as to the Holy Ghost.
Obj. 2: Further, every proper name of a person signifies a property.
But this word Gift does not signify a property of the Holy Ghost.
Therefore Gift is not a proper name of the Holy Ghost.
Obj. 3: Further, the Holy Ghost can be called the spirit of a man, whereas He cannot be called the gift of any man, but "G.o.d"s Gift"
only. Therefore Gift is not the proper name of the Holy Ghost.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20): "As "to be born"
is, for the Son, to be from the Father, so, for the Holy Ghost, "to be the Gift of G.o.d" is to proceed from Father and Son." But the Holy Ghost receives His proper name from the fact that He proceeds from Father and Son. Therefore Gift is the proper name of the Holy Ghost.
_I answer that,_ Gift, taken personally in G.o.d, is the proper name of the Holy Ghost.
In proof of this we must know that a gift is properly an unreturnable giving, as Aristotle says (Topic. iv, 4)--i.e. a thing which is not given with the intention of a return--and it thus contains the idea of a gratuitous donation. Now, the reason of donation being gratuitous is love; since therefore do we give something to anyone gratuitously forasmuch as we wish him well. So what we first give him is the love whereby we wish him well. Hence it is manifest that love has the nature of a first gift, through which all free gifts are given. So since the Holy Ghost proceeds as love, as stated above (Q.
27, A. 4; Q. 37, A. 1), He proceeds as the first gift. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 24): "By the gift, which is the Holy Ghost, many particular gifts are portioned out to the members of Christ."
Reply Obj. 1: As the Son is properly called the Image because He proceeds by way of a word, whose nature it is to be the similitude of its principle, although the Holy Ghost also is like to the Father; so also, because the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father as love, He is properly called Gift, although the Son, too, is given. For that the Son is given is from the Father"s love, according to the words, "G.o.d so loved the world, as to give His only begotten Son" (John 3:16).
Reply Obj. 2: The name Gift involves the idea of belonging to the Giver through its origin; and thus it imports the property of the origin of the Holy Ghost--that is, His procession.
Reply Obj. 3: Before a gift is given, it belongs only to the giver; but when it is given, it is his to whom it is given. Therefore, because "Gift" does not import the actual giving, it cannot be called a gift of man, but the Gift of G.o.d giving. When, however, it has been given, then it is the spirit of man, or a gift bestowed on man.
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QUESTION 39
OF THE PERSONS IN RELATION TO THE ESSENCE (In Eight Articles)
Those things considered which belong to the divine persons absolutely, we next treat of what concerns the person in reference to the essence, to the properties, and to the notional acts; and of the comparison of these with each other.
As regards the first of these, there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the essence in G.o.d is the same as the person?
(2) Whether we should say that the three persons are of one essence?