As regards the genus itself of the sin, the sin of each is considered to be equal, for each sinned by pride. Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 35): "Eve in excusing herself betrays disparity of s.e.x, though parity of pride."
But as regards the species of pride, the woman sinned more grievously, for three reasons. First, because she was more puffed up than the man. For the woman believed in the serpent"s persuasive words, namely that G.o.d had forbidden them to eat of the tree, lest they should become like to Him; so that in wishing to attain to G.o.d"s likeness by eating of the forbidden fruit, her pride rose to the height of desiring to obtain something against G.o.d"s will. On the other hand, the man did not believe this to be true; wherefore he did not wish to attain to G.o.d"s likeness against G.o.d"s will: but his pride consisted in wishing to attain thereto by his own power.
Secondly, the woman not only herself sinned, but suggested sin to the man; wherefore she sinned against both G.o.d and her neighbor. Thirdly, the man"s sin was diminished by the fact that, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 42), "he consented to the sin out of a certain friendly good-will, on account of which a man sometimes will offend G.o.d rather than make an enemy of his friend. That he ought not to have done so is shown by the just issue of the Divine sentence."
It is therefore evident that the woman"s sin was more grievous than the man"s.
Reply Obj. 1: The woman was deceived because she was first of all puffed up with pride. Wherefore her ignorance did not excuse, but aggravated her sin, in so far as it was the cause of her being puffed up with still greater pride.
Reply Obj. 2: This argument considers the circ.u.mstance of personal condition, on account of which the man"s sin was more grievous than the woman"s.
Reply Obj. 3: The man"s reliance on G.o.d"s mercy did not reach to contempt of G.o.d"s justice, wherein consists the sin against the Holy Ghost, but as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi [*De Civ. Dei xiv, 11]), it was due to the fact that, "having had no experience of G.o.d"s severity, he thought the sin to be venial," i.e. easily forgiven [*Cf. I-II, Q. 89, A. 3, ad 1].
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QUESTION 164
OF THE PUNISHMENTS OF THE FIRST MAN"S SIN (In Two Articles)
We must now consider the punishments of the first sin; and under this head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Death, which is the common punishment; (2) the other particular punishments mentioned in Genesis.
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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 164, Art. 1]
Whether Death Is the Punishment of Our First Parents" Sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that death is not the punishment of our first parents" sin. For that which is natural to man cannot be called a punishment of sin, because sin does not perfect nature but vitiates it. Now death is natural to man: and this is evident both from the fact that his body is composed of contraries, and because "mortal" is included in the definition of man. Therefore death is not a punishment of our first parents" sin.
Obj. 2: Further, death and other bodily defects are similarly found in man as well as in other animals, according to Eccles. 3:19, "The death of man and of beasts is one, and the condition of them both equal." But in dumb animals death is not a punishment of sin.
Therefore neither is it so in men.
Obj. 3: Further, the sin of our first parents was the sin of particular individuals: whereas death affects the entire human nature. Therefore it would seem that it is not a punishment of our first parents" sin.
Obj. 4: Further, all are equally descended from our first parents.
Therefore if death were the punishment of our first parents" sin, it would follow that all men would suffer death in equal measure. But this is clearly untrue, since some die sooner, and some more painfully, than others. Therefore death is not the punishment of the first sin.
Obj. 5: Further, the evil of punishment is from G.o.d, as stated above (I, Q. 48, A. 6; Q. 49, A. 2). But death, apparently, is not from G.o.d: for it is written (Wis. 1:13): "G.o.d made not death." Therefore death is not the punishment of the first sin.
Obj. 6: Further, seemingly, punishments are not meritorious, since merit is comprised under good, and punishment under evil. Now death is sometimes meritorious, as in the case of a martyr"s death.
Therefore it would seem that death is not a punishment.
Obj. 7: Further, punishment would seem to be painful. But death apparently cannot be painful, since man does not feel it when he is dead, and he cannot feel it when he is not dying. Therefore death is not a punishment of sin.
Obj. 8: Further, if death were a punishment of sin, it would have followed sin immediately. But this is not true, for our first parents lived a long time after their sin (Gen. 5:5). Therefore, seemingly, death is not a punishment of sin.
_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Rom. 5:12): "By one man sin entered into this world, and by sin death."
_I answer that,_ If any one, on account of his fault, be deprived of a favor bestowed on him the privation of that favor is a punishment of that fault. Now as we stated in the First Part (Q. 95, A. 1; Q.
97, A. 1), G.o.d bestowed this favor on man, in his primitive state, that as long as his mind was subject to G.o.d, the lower powers of his soul would be subject to his rational mind, and his body to his soul.
But inasmuch as through sin man"s mind withdrew from subjection to G.o.d, the result was that neither were his lower powers wholly subject to his reason, whence there followed so great a rebellion of the carnal appet.i.te against the reason: nor was the body wholly subject to the soul; whence arose death and other bodily defects. For life and soundness of body depend on the body being subject to the soul, as the perfectible is subject to its perfection. Consequently, on the other hand, death, sickness, and all defects of the body are due to the lack of the body"s subjection to the soul.
It is therefore evident that as the rebellion of the carnal appet.i.te against the spirit is a punishment of our first parents" sin, so also are death and all defects of the body.
Reply Obj. 1: A thing is said to be natural if it proceeds from the principles of nature. Now the essential principles of nature are form and matter. The form of man is his rational soul, which is, of itself, immortal: wherefore death is not natural to man on the part of his form. The matter of man is a body such as is composed of contraries, of which corruptibility is a necessary consequence, and in this respect death is natural to man. Now this condition attached to the nature of the human body results from a natural necessity, since it was necessary for the human body to be the organ of touch, and consequently a mean between objects of touch: and this was impossible, were it not composed of contraries, as the Philosopher states (De Anima ii, 11). On the other hand, this condition is not attached to the adaptability of matter to form because, if it were possible, since the form is incorruptible, its matter should rather be incorruptible. In the same way a saw needs to be of iron, this being suitable to its form and action, so that its hardness may make it fit for cutting. But that it be liable to rust is a necessary result of such a matter and is not according to the agent"s choice; for, if the craftsman were able, of the iron he would make a saw that would not rust. Now G.o.d Who is the author of man is all-powerful, wherefore when He first made man, He conferred on him the favor of being exempt from the necessity resulting from such a matter: which favor, however, was withdrawn through the sin of our first parents.
Accordingly death is both natural on account of a condition attaching to matter, and penal on account of the loss of the Divine favor preserving man from death [*Cf. I-II, Q. 85, A. 6].
Reply Obj. 2: This likeness of man to other animals regards a condition attaching to matter, namely the body being composed of contraries. But it does not regard the form, for man"s soul is immortal, whereas the souls of dumb animals are mortal.
Reply Obj. 3: Our first parents were made by G.o.d not only as particular individuals, but also as principles of the whole human nature to be transmitted by them to their posterity, together with the Divine favor preserving them from death. Hence through their sin the entire human nature, being deprived of that favor in their posterity, incurred death.
Reply Obj. 4: A twofold defect arises from sin. One is by way of a punishment appointed by a judge: and such a defect should be equal in those to whom the sin pertains equally. The other defect is that which results accidentally from this punishment; for instance, that one who has been deprived of his sight for a sin he has committed, should fall down in the road. Such a defect is not proportionate to the sin, nor does a human judge take it into account, since he cannot foresee chance happenings. Accordingly, the punishment appointed for the first sin and proportionately corresponding thereto, was the withdrawal of the Divine favor whereby the rect.i.tude and integrity of human nature was maintained. But the defects resulting from this withdrawal are death and other penalties of the present life.
Wherefore these punishments need not be equal in those to whom the first sin equally appertains. Nevertheless, since G.o.d foreknows all future events, Divine providence has so disposed that these penalties are apportioned in different ways to various people. This is not on account of any merits or demerits previous to this life, as Origen held [*Peri Archon ii, 9]: for this is contrary to the words of Rom.
9:11, "When they ... had not done any good or evil"; and also contrary to statements made in the First Part (Q. 90, A. 4; Q. 118, A. 3), namely that the soul is not created before the body: but either in punishment of their parents" sins, inasmuch as the child is something belonging to the father, wherefore parents are often punished in their children; or again it is for a remedy intended for the spiritual welfare of the person who suffers these penalties, to wit that he may thus be turned away from his sins, or lest he take pride in his virtues, and that he may be crowned for his patience.
Reply Obj. 5: Death may be considered in two ways. First, as an evil of human nature, and thus it is not of G.o.d, but is a defect befalling man through his fault. Secondly, as having an aspect of good, namely as being a just punishment, and thus it is from G.o.d. Wherefore Augustine says (Retract. i, 21) that G.o.d is not the author of death, except in so far as it is a punishment.
Reply Obj. 6: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii, 5), "just as the wicked abuse not only evil but also good things, so do the righteous make good use not only of good but also of evil things. Hence it is that both evil men make evil use of the law, though the law is good, while good men die well, although death is an evil." Wherefore inasmuch as holy men make good use of death, their death is to them meritorious.
Reply Obj. 7: Death may be considered in two ways. First, as the privation of life, and thus death cannot be felt, since it is the privation of sense and life. In this way it involves not pain of sense but pain of loss. Secondly, it may be considered as denoting the corruption which ends in the aforesaid privation. Now we may speak of corruption even as of generation in two ways: in one way as being the term of alteration, and thus in the first instant in which life departs, death is said to be present. In this way also death has no pain of sense. In another way corruption may be taken as including the previous alteration: thus a person is said to die, when he is in motion towards death; just as a thing is said to be engendered, while in motion towards the state of having been engendered: and thus death may be painful.
Reply Obj. 8: According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. [*De Pecc. Mer. et Rem. i, 16. Cf. Gen. ad lit. ii. 32]), "although our first parents lived thereafter many years, they began to die on the day when they heard the death-decree, condemning them to decline to old age."
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SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 164, Art. 2]
Whether the Particular Punishments of Our First Parents Are Suitably Appointed in Scripture?
Objection 1: It would seem that the particular punishments of our first parents are unsuitably appointed in Scripture. For that which would have occurred even without sin should not be described as a punishment for sin. Now seemingly there would have been "pain in child-bearing," even had there been no sin: for the disposition of the female s.e.x is such that offspring cannot be born without pain to the bearer. Likewise the "subjection of woman to man" results from the perfection of the male, and the imperfection of the female s.e.x.
Again it belongs to the nature of the earth "to bring forth thorns and thistles," and this would have occurred even had there been no sin. Therefore these are unsuitable punishments of the first sin.
Obj. 2: Further, that which pertains to a person"s dignity does not, seemingly, pertain to his punishment. But the "multiplying of conceptions" pertains to a woman"s dignity. Therefore it should not be described as the woman"s punishment.
Obj. 3: Further, the punishment of our first parents" sin is transmitted to all, as we have stated with regard to death (A. 1).
But all "women"s conceptions" are not "multiplied," nor does "every man eat bread in the sweat of his face." Therefore these are not suitable punishments of the first sin.
Obj. 4: Further, the place of paradise was made for man. Now nothing in the order of things should be without purpose. Therefore it would seem that the exclusion of man from paradise was not a suitable punishment of man.
Obj. 5: Further, this place of the earthly paradise is said to be naturally inaccessible. Therefore it was useless to put other obstacles in the way lest man should return thither, to wit the cherubim, and the "flaming sword turning every way."
Obj. 6: Further, immediately after his sin man was subject to the necessity of dying, so that he could not be restored to immortality by the beneficial tree of life. Therefore it was useless to forbid him to eat of the tree of life, as instanced by the words of Gen.
3:22: "See, lest perhaps he ... take ... of the tree of life ... and live for ever."
Obj. 7: Further, to mock the unhappy seems inconsistent with mercy and clemency, which are most of all ascribed to G.o.d in Scripture, according to Ps. 144:9, "His tender mercies are over all His works."
Therefore G.o.d is unbecomingly described as mocking our first parents, already reduced through sin to unhappy straits, in the words of Gen.
3:22, "Behold Adam is become as one of Us, knowing good and evil."
Obj. 8: Further, clothes are necessary to man, like food, according to 1 Tim. 6:8, "Having food, and wherewith to be covered, with these we are content." Therefore just as food was appointed to our first parents before their sin, so also should clothing have been ascribed to them. Therefore after their sin it was unsuitable to say that G.o.d made for them garments of skin.
Objection 9: Further, the punishment inflicted for a sin should outweigh in evil the gain realized through the sin: else the punishment would not deter one from sinning. Now through sin our first parents gained in this, that their eyes were opened, according to Gen. 3:7. But this outweighs in good all the penal evils which are stated to have resulted from sin. Therefore the punishments resulting from our first parents" sin are unsuitably described.