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FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 39, Art. 4]
Whether the Concrete Essential Names Can Stand for the Person?
Objection 1: It would seem that the concrete, essential names cannot stand for the person, so that we can truly say "G.o.d begot G.o.d." For, as the logicians say, "a singular term signifies what it stands for."
But this name "G.o.d" seems to be a singular term, for it cannot be predicated in the plural, as above explained (A. 3). Therefore, since it signifies the essence, it stands for essence, and not for person.
Obj. 2: Further, a term in the subject is not modified by a term in the predicate, as to its signification; but only as to the sense signified in the predicate. But when I say, "G.o.d creates," this name "G.o.d" stands for the essence. So when we say "G.o.d begot," this term "G.o.d" cannot by reason of the notional predicate, stand for person.
Obj. 3: Further, if this be true, "G.o.d begot," because the Father generates; for the same reason this is true, "G.o.d does not beget,"
because the Son does not beget. Therefore there is G.o.d who begets, and there is G.o.d who does not beget; and thus it follows that there are two G.o.ds.
Obj. 4: Further, if "G.o.d begot G.o.d," He begot either G.o.d, that is Himself, or another G.o.d. But He did not beget G.o.d, that is Himself; for, as Augustine says (De Trin. i, 1), "nothing begets itself."
Neither did He beget another G.o.d; as there is only one G.o.d. Therefore it is false to say, "G.o.d begot G.o.d."
Obj. 5: Further, if "G.o.d begot G.o.d," He begot either G.o.d who is the Father, or G.o.d who is not the Father. If G.o.d who is the Father, then G.o.d the Father was begotten. If G.o.d who is not the Father, then there is a G.o.d who is not G.o.d the Father: which is false. Therefore it cannot be said that "G.o.d begot G.o.d."
_On the contrary,_ In the Creed it is said, "G.o.d of G.o.d."
_I answer that,_ Some have said that this name "G.o.d" and the like, properly according to their nature, stand for the essence, but by reason of some notional adjunct are made to stand for the Person. This opinion apparently arose from considering the divine simplicity, which requires that in G.o.d, He "who possesses" and "what is possessed" be the same. So He who possesses G.o.dhead, which is signified by the name G.o.d, is the same as G.o.dhead. But when we consider the proper way of expressing ourselves, the mode of signification must be considered no less than the thing signified. Hence as this word "G.o.d" signifies the divine essence as in Him Who possesses it, just as the name "man"
signifies humanity in a subject, others more truly have said that this word "G.o.d," from its mode of signification, can, in its proper sense, stand for person, as does the word "man." So this word "G.o.d" sometimes stands for the essence, as when we say "G.o.d creates"; because this predicate is attributed to the subject by reason of the form signified--that is, G.o.dhead. But sometimes it stands for the person, either for only one, as when we say, "G.o.d begets," or for two, as when we say, "G.o.d spirates"; or for three, as when it is said: "To the King of ages, immortal, invisible, the only G.o.d," etc. (1 Tim. 1:17).
Reply Obj. 1: Although this name "G.o.d" agrees with singular terms as regards the form signified not being multiplied; nevertheless it agrees also with general terms so far as the form signified is to be found in several _supposita._ So it need not always stand for the essence it signifies.
Reply Obj. 2: This holds good against those who say that the word "G.o.d" does not naturally stand for person.
Reply Obj. 3: The word "G.o.d" stands for the person in a different way from that in which this word "man" does; for since the form signified by this word "man"--that is, humanity--is really divided among its different subjects, it stands of itself for the person, even if there is no adjunct determining it to the person--that is, to a distinct subject. The unity or community of the human nature, however, is not a reality, but is only in the consideration of the mind. Hence this term "man" does not stand for the common nature, unless this is required by some adjunct, as when we say, "man is a species"; whereas the form signified by the name "G.o.d"--that is, the divine essence--is really one and common. So of itself it stands for the common nature, but by some adjunct it may be restricted so as to stand for the person. So, when we say, "G.o.d generates," by reason of the notional act this name "G.o.d" stands for the person of the Father. But when we say, "G.o.d does not generate," there is no adjunct to determine this name to the person of the Son, and hence the phrase means that generation is repugnant to the divine nature. If, however, something be added belonging to the person of the Son, this proposition, for instance, "G.o.d begotten does not beget," is true. Consequently, it does not follow that there exists a "G.o.d generator," and a "G.o.d not generator"; unless there be an adjunct pertaining to the persons; as, for instance, if we were to say, "the Father is G.o.d the generator"
and the "Son is G.o.d the non-generator" and so it does not follow that there are many G.o.ds; for the Father and the Son are one G.o.d, as was said above (A. 3).
Reply Obj. 4: This is false, "the Father begot G.o.d, that is Himself,"
because the word "Himself," as a reciprocal term, refers to the same _suppositum._ Nor is this contrary to what Augustine says (Ep. lxvi ad Maxim.) that "G.o.d the Father begot another self [alterum se],"
forasmuch as the word "se" is either in the ablative case, and then it means "He begot another from Himself," or it indicates a single relation, and thus points to ident.i.ty of nature. This is, however, either a figurative or an emphatic way of speaking, so that it would really mean, "He begot another most like to Himself." Likewise also it is false to say, "He begot another G.o.d," because although the Son is another than the Father, as above explained (Q. 31, A. 2), nevertheless it cannot be said that He is "another G.o.d"; forasmuch as this adjective "another" would be understood to apply to the substantive G.o.d; and thus the meaning would be that there is a distinction of G.o.dhead. Yet this proposition "He begot another G.o.d"
is tolerated by some, provided that "another" be taken as a substantive, and the word "G.o.d" be construed in apposition with it.
This, however, is an inexact way of speaking, and to be avoided, for fear of giving occasion to error.
Reply Obj. 5: To say, "G.o.d begot G.o.d Who is G.o.d the Father," is wrong, because since the word "Father" is construed in apposition to "G.o.d," the word "G.o.d" is restricted to the person of the Father; so that it would mean, "He begot G.o.d, Who is Himself the Father"; and then the Father would be spoken of as begotten, which is false.
Wherefore the negative of the proposition is true, "He begot G.o.d Who is not G.o.d the Father." If however, we understand these words not to be in apposition, and require something to be added, then, on the contrary, the affirmative proposition is true, and the negative is false; so that the meaning would be, "He begot G.o.d Who is G.o.d Who is the Father." Such a rendering however appears to be forced, so that it is better to say simply that the affirmative proposition is false, and the negative is true. Yet Prepositivus said that both the negative and affirmative are false, because this relative "Who" in the affirmative proposition can be referred to the _suppositum_; whereas in the negative it denotes both the thing signified and the _suppositum._ Whence, in the affirmative the sense is that "to be G.o.d the Father" is befitting to the person of the Son; and in the negative sense is that "to be G.o.d the Father," is to be removed from the Son"s divinity as well as from His personality. This, however, appears to be irrational; since, according to the Philosopher (Peri Herm. ii), what is open to affirmation, is open also to negation.
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FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 39, Art. 5]
Whether Abstract Essential Names Can Stand for the Person?
Objection 1: It would seem that abstract essential names can stand for the person, so that this proposition is true, "Essence begets essence." For Augustine says (De Trin. vii, i, 2): "The Father and the Son are one Wisdom, because they are one essence; and taken singly Wisdom is from Wisdom, as essence from essence."
Obj. 2: Further, generation or corruption in ourselves implies generation or corruption of what is within us. But the Son is generated. Therefore since the divine essence is in the Son, it seems that the divine essence is generated.
Obj. 3: Further, G.o.d and the divine essence are the same, as is clear from what is above explained (Q. 3, A. 3). But, as was shown, it is true to say that "G.o.d begets G.o.d." Therefore this is also true: "Essence begets essence."
Obj. 4: Further, a predicate can stand for that of which it is predicated. But the Father is the divine essence; therefore essence can stand for the person of the Father. Thus the essence begets.
Obj. 5: Further, the essence is "a thing begetting," because the essence is the Father who is begetting. Therefore if the essence is not begetting, the essence will be "a thing begetting," and "not begetting": which cannot be.
Obj. 6: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20): "The Father is the principle of the whole G.o.dhead." But He is principle only by begetting or spirating. Therefore the Father begets or spirates the G.o.dhead.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. i, 1): "Nothing begets itself." But if the essence begets the essence, it begets itself only, since nothing exists in G.o.d as distinguished from the divine essence.
Therefore the essence does not beget essence.
_I answer that,_ Concerning this, the abbot Joachim erred in a.s.serting that as we can say "G.o.d begot G.o.d," so we can say "Essence begot essence": considering that, by reason of the divine simplicity G.o.d is nothing else but the divine essence. In this he was wrong, because if we wish to express ourselves correctly, we must take into account not only the thing which is signified, but also the mode of its signification as above stated (A. 4). Now although "G.o.d" is really the same as "G.o.dhead," nevertheless the mode of signification is not in each case the same. For since this word "G.o.d" signifies the divine essence in Him that possesses it, from its mode of signification it can of its own nature stand for person. Thus the things which properly belong to the persons, can be predicated of this word, "G.o.d," as, for instance, we can say "G.o.d is begotten" or is "Begetter," as above explained (A. 4). The word "essence,"
however, in its mode of signification, cannot stand for Person, because it signifies the essence as an abstract form. Consequently, what properly belongs to the persons whereby they are distinguished from each other, cannot be attributed to the essence. For that would imply distinction in the divine essence, in the same way as there exists distinction in the _supposita._
Reply Obj. 1: To express unity of essence and of person, the holy Doctors have sometimes expressed themselves with greater emphasis than the strict propriety of terms allows. Whence instead of enlarging upon such expressions we should rather explain them: thus, for instance, abstract names should be explained by concrete names, or even by personal names; as when we find "essence from essence"; or "wisdom from wisdom"; we should take the sense to be, _the Son_ who is essence and wisdom, is from the Father who is essence and wisdom.
Nevertheless, as regards these abstract names a certain order should be observed, forasmuch as what belongs to action is more nearly allied to the persons because actions belong to _supposita._ So "nature from nature," and "wisdom from wisdom" are less inexact than "essence from essence."
Reply Obj. 2: In creatures the one generated has not the same nature numerically as the generator, but another nature, numerically distinct, which commences to exist in it anew by generation, and ceases to exist by corruption, and so it is generated and corrupted accidentally; whereas G.o.d begotten has the same nature numerically as the begetter. So the divine nature in the Son is not begotten either directly or accidentally.
Reply Obj. 3: Although G.o.d and the divine essence are really the same, nevertheless, on account of their different mode of signification, we must speak in a different way about each of them.
Reply Obj. 4: The divine essence is predicated of the Father by mode of ident.i.ty by reason of the divine simplicity; yet it does not follow that it can stand for the Father, its mode of signification being different. This objection would hold good as regards things which are predicated of another as the universal of a particular.
Reply Obj. 5: The difference between substantive and adjectival names consist in this, that the former carry their subject with them, whereas the latter do not, but add the thing signified to the substantive. Whence logicians are wont to say that the substantive is considered in the light of _suppositum,_ whereas the adjective indicates something added to the _suppositum._ Therefore substantive personal terms can be predicated of the essence, because they are really the same; nor does it follow that a personal property makes a distinct essence; but it belongs to the _suppositum_ implied in the substantive. But notional and personal adjectives cannot be predicated of the essence unless we add some substantive. We cannot say that the "essence is begetting"; yet we can say that the "essence is a thing begetting," or that it is "G.o.d begetting," if "thing" and G.o.d stand for person, but not if they stand for essence. Consequently there exists no contradiction in saying that "essence is a thing begetting," and "a thing not begetting"; because in the first case "thing" stands for person, and in the second it stands for the essence.
Reply Obj. 6: So far as G.o.dhead is one in several _supposita,_ it agrees in a certain degree with the form of a collective term. So when we say, "the Father is the principle of the whole G.o.dhead," the term G.o.dhead can be taken for all the persons together, inasmuch as it is the principle in all the divine persons. Nor does it follow that He is His own principle; as one of the people may be called the ruler of the people without being ruler of himself. We may also say that He is the principle of the whole G.o.dhead; not as generating or spirating it, but as communicating it by generation and spiration.
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SIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 39, Art. 6]
Whether the Persons Can Be Predicated of the Essential Terms?
Objection 1: It would seem that the persons cannot be predicated of the concrete essential names; so that we can say for instance, "G.o.d is three persons"; or "G.o.d is the Trinity." For it is false to say, "man is every man," because it cannot be verified as regards any particular subject. For neither Socrates, nor Plato, nor anyone else is every man. In the same way this proposition, "G.o.d is the Trinity," cannot be verified of any one of the _supposita_ of the divine nature. For the Father is not the Trinity; nor is the Son; nor is the Holy Ghost. So to say, "G.o.d is the Trinity," is false.
Obj. 2: Further, the lower is not predicated of the higher except by accidental predication; as when I say, "animal is man"; for it is accidental to animal to be man. But this name "G.o.d" as regards the three persons is as a general term to inferior terms, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 4). Therefore it seems that the names of the persons cannot be predicated of this name "G.o.d," except in an accidental sense.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says, in his sermon on Faith [*Serm. ii, in coena Domini], "We believe that one G.o.d is one divinely named Trinity."
_I answer that,_ As above explained (A. 5), although adjectival terms, whether personal or notional, cannot be predicated of the essence, nevertheless substantive terms can be so predicated, owing to the real ident.i.ty of essence and person. The divine essence is not only really the same as one person, but it is really the same as the three persons. Whence, one person, and two, and three, can be predicated of the essence as if we were to say, "The essence is the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Ghost." And because this word "G.o.d"
can of itself stand for the essence, as above explained (A. 4, ad 3), hence, as it is true to say, "The essence is the three persons"; so likewise it is true to say, "G.o.d is the three persons."
Reply Obj. 1: As above explained this term "man" can of itself stand for person, whereas an adjunct is required for it to stand for the universal human nature. So it is false to say, "Man is every man"; because it cannot be verified of any particular human subject. On the contrary, this word "G.o.d" can of itself be taken for the divine essence. So, although to say of any of the _supposita_ of the divine nature, "G.o.d is the Trinity," is untrue, nevertheless it is true of the divine essence. This was denied by Porreta.n.u.s because he did not take note of this distinction.
Reply Obj. 2: When we say, "G.o.d," or "the divine essence is the Father," the predication is one of ident.i.ty, and not of the lower in regard to a higher species: because in G.o.d there is no universal and singular. Hence, as this proposition, "The Father is G.o.d" is of itself true, so this proposition "G.o.d is the Father" is true of itself, and by no means accidentally.
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SEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 39, Art. 7]
Whether the Essential Names Should Be Appropriated to the Persons?
Objection 1: It would seem that the essential names should not be appropriated to the persons. For whatever might verge on error in faith should be avoided in the treatment of divine things; for, as Jerome says, "careless words involve risk of heresy" [*In substance Ep. lvii.]. But to appropriate to any one person the names which are common to the three persons, may verge on error in faith; for it may be supposed either that such belong only to the person to whom they are appropriated or that they belong to Him in a fuller degree than to the others. Therefore the essential attributes should not be appropriated to the persons.