If, however, we take it in a more general sense, as comprising any kind of human knowledge, then prudence, as regards a certain part thereof, belongs to the contemplative life. In this sense Tully (De Offic. i, 5) says that "the man who is able most clearly and quickly to grasp the truth and to unfold his reasons, is wont to be considered most prudent and wise."
Reply Obj. 1: Moral works take their species from their end, as stated above (I-II, Q. 18, AA. 4, 6), wherefore the knowledge pertaining to the contemplative life is that which has its end in the very knowledge of truth; whereas the knowledge of prudence, through having its end in an act of the appet.i.tive power, belongs to the active life.
Reply Obj. 2: External occupation makes a man see less in intelligible things, which are separated from sensible objects with which the works of the active life are concerned. Nevertheless the external occupation of the active life enables a man to see more clearly in judging of what is to be done, which belongs to prudence, both on account of experience, and on account of the mind"s attention, since "brains avail when the mind is attentive" as Sall.u.s.t observes [*Bell. Catilin., LI].
Reply Obj. 3: Prudence is said to be intermediate between the intellectual and the moral virtues because it resides in the same subject as the intellectual virtues, and has absolutely the same matter as the moral virtues. But this third kind of life is intermediate between the active and the contemplative life as regards the things about which it is occupied, because it is occupied sometimes with the contemplation of the truth, sometimes with eternal things.
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THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 811, Art. 3]
Whether Teaching Is a Work of the Active or of the Contemplative Life?
Objection 1: It would seem that teaching is a work not of the active but of the contemplative life. For Gregory says (Hom. v in Ezech.) that "the perfect who have been able to contemplate heavenly goods, at least through a gla.s.s, proclaim them to their brethren, whose minds they inflame with love for their hidden beauty." But this pertains to teaching. Therefore teaching is a work of the contemplative life.
Obj. 2: Further, act and habit would seem to be referable to the same kind of life. Now teaching is an act of wisdom: for the Philosopher says (Metaph. i, 1) that "to be able to teach is an indication of knowledge." Therefore since wisdom or knowledge pertain to the contemplative life, it would seem that teaching also belongs to the contemplative life.
Obj. 3: Further, prayer, no less than contemplation, is an act of the contemplative life. Now prayer, even when one prays for another, belongs to the contemplative life. Therefore it would seem that it belongs also to the contemplative life to acquaint another, by teaching him, of the truth we have meditated.
_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.): "The active life is to give bread to the hungry, to teach the ignorant the words of wisdom."
_I answer that,_ The act of teaching has a twofold object. For teaching is conveyed by speech, and speech is the audible sign of the interior concept. Accordingly one object of teaching is the matter or object of the interior concept; and as to this object teaching belongs sometimes to the active, sometimes to the contemplative life.
It belongs to the active life, when a man conceives a truth inwardly, so as to be directed thereby in his outward action; but it belongs to the contemplative life when a man conceives an intelligible truth, in the consideration and love whereof he delights. Hence Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. Serm. civ, 1): "Let them choose for themselves the better part," namely the contemplative life, "let them be busy with the word, long for the sweetness of teaching, occupy themselves with salutary knowledge," thus stating clearly that teaching belongs to the contemplative life.
The other object of teaching is on the part of the speech heard, and thus the object of teaching is the hearer. As to this object all doctrine belongs to the active life to which external actions pertain.
Reply Obj. 1: The authority quoted speaks expressly of doctrine as to its matter, in so far as it is concerned with the consideration and love of truth.
Reply Obj. 2: Habit and act have a common object. Hence this argument clearly considers the matter of the interior concept. For it pertains to the man having wisdom and knowledge to be able to teach, in so far as he is able to express his interior concept in words, so as to bring another man to understand the truth.
Reply Obj. 3: He who prays for another does nothing towards the man for whom he prays, but only towards G.o.d Who is the intelligible truth; whereas he who teaches another does something in his regard by external action. Hence the comparison fails.
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FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 181, Art. 4]
Whether the Active Life Remains After This Life?
Objection 1: It would seem that the active life remains after this life. For the acts of the moral virtues belong to the active life, as stated above (A. 1). But the moral virtues endure after this life according to Augustine (De Trin. xiv, 9). Therefore the active life remains after this life.
Obj. 2: Further, teaching others belongs to the active life, as stated above (A. 3). But in the life to come when "we shall be like the angels," teaching will be possible: even as apparently it is in the angels of whom one "enlightens, cleanses, and perfects" [*Coel.
Hier. iii, viii] another, which refers to the "receiving of knowledge," according to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii). Therefore it would seem that the active life remains after this life.
Obj. 3: Further, the more lasting a thing is in itself, the more is it able to endure after this life. But the active life is seemingly more lasting in itself: for Gregory says (Hom. v in Ezech.) that "we can remain fixed in the active life, whereas we are nowise able to maintain an attentive mind in the contemplative life." Therefore the active life is much more able than the contemplative to endure after this life.
_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.): "The active life ends with this world, but the contemplative life begins here, to be perfected in our heavenly home."
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), the active life has its end in external actions: and if these be referred to the quiet of contemplation, for that very reason they belong to the contemplative life. But in the future life of the blessed the occupation of external actions will cease, and if there be any external actions at all, these will be referred to contemplation as their end. For, as Augustine says at the end of _De Civitate Dei_ xxii, 30, "there we shall rest and we shall see, we shall see and love, we shall love and praise." And he had said before (De Civ. Dei xxii, 30) that "there G.o.d will be seen without end, loved without wearying, praised without tiring: such will be the occupation of all, the common love, the universal activity."
Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (Q. 136, A. 1, ad 1), the moral virtues will remain not as to those actions which are about the means, but as to the actions which are about the end. Such acts are those that conduce to the quiet of contemplation, which in the words quoted above Augustine denotes by "rest," and this rest excludes not only outward disturbances but also the inward disturbance of the pa.s.sions.
Reply Obj. 2: The contemplative life, as stated above (Q. 180, A. 4), consists chiefly in the contemplation of G.o.d, and as to this, one angel does not teach another, since according to Matt. 18:10, "the little ones" angels," who belong to the lower order, "always see the face of the Father"; and so, in the life to come, no man will teach another of G.o.d, but "we shall" all "see Him as He is" (1 John 3:2).
This is in keeping with the saying of Jeremiah 31:34: "They shall teach no more every man his neighbor ... saying: Know the Lord: for all shall know me, from the least of them even to the greatest."
But as regards things pertaining to the "dispensation of the mysteries of G.o.d," one angel teaches another by cleansing, enlightening, and perfecting him: and thus they have something of the active life so long as the world lasts, from the fact that they are occupied in administering to the creatures below them. This is signified by the fact that Jacob saw angels "ascending" the ladder--which refers to contemplation--and "descending"--which refers to action. Nevertheless, as Gregory remarks (Moral. ii, 3), "they do not wander abroad from the Divine vision, so as to be deprived of the joys of inward contemplation." Hence in them the active life does not differ from the contemplative life as it does in us for whom the works of the active life are a hindrance to contemplation.
Nor is the likeness to the angels promised to us as regards the administering to lower creatures, for this is competent to us not by reason of our natural order, as it is to the angels, but by reason of our seeing G.o.d.
Reply Obj. 3: That the durability of the active life in the present state surpa.s.ses the durability of the contemplative life arises not from any property of either life considered in itself, but from our own deficiency, since we are withheld from the heights of contemplation by the weight of the body. Hence Gregory adds (Moral.
ii, 3) that "the mind through its very weakness being repelled from that immense height recoils on itself."
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QUESTION 182
OF THE ACTIVE LIFE IN COMPARISON WITH THE CONTEMPLATIVE LIFE (In Four Articles)
We must now consider the active life in comparison with the contemplative life, under which head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Which of them is of greater import or excellence?
(2) Which of them has the greater merit?
(3) Whether the contemplative life is hindered by the active life?
(4) Of their order.
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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 182, Art. 1]
Whether the Active Life Is More Excellent Than the Contemplative?
Objection 1: It would seem that the active life is more excellent than the contemplative. For "that which belongs to better men would seem to be worthier and better," as the Philosopher says (Top. iii, 1). Now the active life belongs to persons of higher rank, namely prelates, who are placed in a position of honor and power; wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19) that "in our actions we must not love honor or power in this life." Therefore it would seem that the active life is more excellent than the contemplative.
Obj. 2: Further, in all habits and acts, direction belongs to the more important; thus the military art, being the more important, directs the art of the bridle-maker [*Ethic. i, 1]. Now it belongs to the active life to direct and command the contemplative, as appears from the words addressed to Moses (Ex. 19:21), "Go down and charge the people, lest they should have a mind to pa.s.s the" fixed "limits to see the Lord." Therefore the active life is more excellent than the contemplative.
Obj. 3: Further, no man should be taken away from a greater thing in order to be occupied with lesser things: for the Apostle says (1 Cor.
12:31): "Be zealous for the better gifts." Now some are taken away from the state of the contemplative life to the occupations of the active life, as in the case of those who are transferred to the state of prelacy. Therefore it would seem that the active life is more excellent than the contemplative.
_On the contrary,_ Our Lord said (Luke 10:42): "Mary hath chosen the best part, which shall not be taken away from her." Now Mary figures the contemplative life. Therefore the contemplative life is more excellent than the active.
_I answer that,_ Nothing prevents certain things being more excellent in themselves, whereas they are surpa.s.sed by another in some respect.
Accordingly we must reply that the contemplative life is simply more excellent than the active: and the Philosopher proves this by eight reasons (Ethic. x, 7, 8). The first is, because the contemplative life becomes man according to that which is best in him, namely the intellect, and according to its proper objects, namely things intelligible; whereas the active life is occupied with externals.
Hence Rachael, by whom the contemplative life is signified, is interpreted "the vision of the principle," [*Or rather, "One seeing the principle," if derived from _rah_ and _irzn_; Cf. Jerome, De Nom.
Hebr.] whereas as Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37) the active life is signified by Lia who was blear-eyed. The second reason is because the contemplative life can be more continuous, although not as regards the highest degree of contemplation, as stated above (Q. 180, A. 8, ad 2; Q. 181, A. 4, ad 3), wherefore Mary, by whom the contemplative life is signified, is described as "sitting" all the time "at the Lord"s feet." Thirdly, because the contemplative life is more delightful than the active; wherefore Augustine says (De Verb. Dom.
Serm. ciii) that "Martha was troubled, but Mary feasted." Fourthly, because in the contemplative life man is more self-sufficient, since he needs fewer things for that purpose; wherefore it was said (Luke 10:41): "Martha, Martha, thou art careful and art troubled about many things." Fifthly, because the contemplative life is loved more for its own sake, while the active life is directed to something else.
Hence it is written (Ps. 36:4): "One thing I have asked of the Lord, this will I seek after, that I may dwell in the house of the Lord all the days of my life, that I may see the delight of the Lord."
Sixthly, because the contemplative life consists in leisure and rest, according to Ps. 45:11, "Be still and see that I am G.o.d." Seventhly, because the contemplative life is according to Divine things, whereas active life is according to human things; wherefore Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. Serm. civ): ""In the beginning was the Word": to Him was Mary hearkening: "The Word was made flesh": Him was Martha serving." Eighthly, because the contemplative life is according to that which is most proper to man, namely his intellect; whereas in the works of the active life the lower powers also, which are common to us and brutes, have their part; wherefore (Ps. 35:7) after the words, "Men and beasts Thou wilt preserve, O Lord," that which is special to man is added (Ps. 35:10): "In Thy light we shall see light."
Our Lord adds a ninth reason (Luke 10:42) when He says: "Mary hath chosen the best part, which shall not be taken away from her," which words Augustine (De Verb. Dom. Serm. ciii) expounds thus: "Not--Thou hast chosen badly but--She has chosen better. Why better?
Listen--because it shall not be taken away from her. But the burden of necessity shall at length be taken from thee: whereas the sweetness of truth is eternal."