(4) Whether a religious order can be established for preaching and the exercise of like works?
(5) Whether a religious order can be established for the study of science?
(6) Whether a religious order that is directed to the contemplative life is more excellent than one that is directed to the active life?
(7) Whether religious perfection is diminished by possessing something in common?
(8) Whether the religious life of solitaries is to be preferred to the religious life of those who live in community?
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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 188, Art. 1]
Whether There Is Only One Religious Order?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is but one religious order. For there can be no diversity in that which is possessed wholly and perfectly; wherefore there can be only one sovereign good, as stated in the First Part (Q. 6, AA. 2, 3, 4). Now as Gregory says (Hom. xx in Ezech.), "when a man vows to Almighty G.o.d all that he has, all his life, all his knowledge, it is a holocaust," without which there is no religious life. Therefore it would seem that there are not many religious orders but only one.
Obj. 2: Further, things which agree in essentials differ only accidentally. Now there is no religious order without the three essential vows of religion, as stated above (Q. 186, AA. 6, 7).
Therefore it would seem that religious orders differ not specifically, but only accidentally.
Obj. 3: Further, the state of perfection is competent both to religious and to bishops, as stated above (Q. 185, AA. 5, 7). Now the episcopate is not diversified specifically, but is one wherever it may be; wherefore Jerome says (Ep. cxlvi ad Evan.): "Wherever a bishop is, whether at Rome, or Gubbio, or Constantinople, or Reggio, he has the same excellence, the same priesthood." Therefore in like manner there is but one religious order.
Obj. 4: Further, anything that may lead to confusion should be removed from the Church. Now it would seem that a diversity of religious orders might confuse the Christian people, as stated in the Decretal de Statu Monach. et Canon. Reg. [*Cap. Ne Nimia, de Relig.
Dom.]. Therefore seemingly there ought not to be different religious orders.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 44:10) that it pertains to the adornment of the queen that she is "surrounded with variety."
_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 186, A, 7; Q. 187, A. 2), the religious state is a training school wherein one aims by practice at the perfection of charity. Now there are various works of charity to which a man may devote himself; and there are also various kinds of exercise. Wherefore religious orders may be differentiated in two ways. First, according to the different things to which they may be directed: thus one may be directed to the lodging of pilgrims, another to visiting or ransoming captives. Secondly, there may be various religious orders according to the diversity of practices; thus in one religious order the body is chastised by abstinence in food, in another by the practice of manual labor, scantiness of clothes, or the like.
Since, however, the end imports most in every matter, [*Arist., _Topic._ vi 8] religious orders differ more especially according to their various ends than according to their various practices.
Reply Obj. 1: The obligation to devote oneself wholly to G.o.d"s service is common to every religious order; hence religious do not differ in this respect, as though in one religious order a person retained some one thing of his own, and in another order some other thing. But the difference is in respect of the different things wherein one may serve G.o.d, and whereby a man may dispose himself to the service of G.o.d.
Reply Obj. 2: The three essential vows of religion pertain to the practice of religion as principles to which all other matters are reduced, as stated above (Q. 186, A. 7). But there are various ways of disposing oneself to the observance of each of them. For instance one disposes oneself to observe the vow of continence, by solitude of place, by abstinence, by mutual fellowship, and by many like means.
Accordingly it is evident that the community of the essential vows is compatible with diversity of religious life, both on account of the different dispositions and on account of the different ends, as explained above.
Reply Obj. 3: In matters relating to perfection, the bishop stands in the position of agent, and the religious as pa.s.sive, as stated above (Q. 184, A. 7). Now the agent, even in natural things, the higher it is, is so much the more one, whereas the things that are pa.s.sive are various. Hence with reason the episcopal state is one, while religious orders are many.
Reply Obj. 4: Confusion is opposed to distinction and order.
Accordingly the mult.i.tude of religious orders would lead to confusion, if different religious orders were directed to the same end and in the same way, without necessity or utility. Wherefore to prevent this happening it has been wholesomely forbidden to establish a new religious order without the authority of the Sovereign Pontiff.
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SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 188, Art. 2]
Whether a Religious Order Should Be Established for the Works of the Active Life?
Objection 1: It would seem that no religious order should be established for the works of the active life. For every religious order belongs to the state of perfection, as stated above (Q. 184, A.
5; Q. 186, A. 1). Now the perfection of the religious state consists in the contemplation of divine things. For Dionysius says (Eccl.
Hier. vi) that they are "called servants of G.o.d by reason of their rendering pure service and subjection to G.o.d, and on account of the indivisible and singular life which unites them by holy reflections,"
i.e. contemplations, "on invisible things, to the G.o.dlike unity and the perfection beloved of G.o.d." Therefore seemingly no religious order should be established for the works of the active life.
Obj. 2: Further, seemingly the same judgment applies to canons regular as to monks, according to Extra, De Postul., cap. Ex parte; and De Statu Monach., cap. Quod Dei timorem: for it is stated that "they are not considered to be separated from the fellowship of monks": and the same would seem to apply to all other religious. Now the monastic rule was established for the purpose of the contemplative life; wherefore Jerome says (Ep. lviii ad Paulin.): "If you wish to be what you are called, a monk," i.e. a solitary, "what business have you in a city?" The same is found stated in Extra, De Renuntiatione, cap. Nisi c.u.m pridem; and De Regular., cap. Licet quibusdam. Therefore it would seem that every religious order is directed to the contemplative life, and none to the active life.
Obj. 3: Further, the active life is concerned with the present world.
Now all religious are said to renounce the world; wherefore Gregory says (Hom. xx in Ezech.): "He who renounces this world, and does all the good he can, is like one who has gone out of Egypt and offers sacrifice in the wilderness." Therefore it would seem that no religious order can be directed to the active life.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (James 1:27): "Religion clean and undefiled before G.o.d and the Father, is this: to visit the fatherless and widows in their tribulation." Now this belongs to the active life. Therefore religious life can be fittingly directed to the active life.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), the religious state is directed to the perfection of charity, which extends to the love of G.o.d and of our neighbor. Now the contemplative life which seeks to devote itself to G.o.d alone belongs directly to the love of G.o.d, while the active life, which ministers to our neighbor"s needs, belongs directly to the love of one"s neighbor. And just as out of charity we love our neighbor for G.o.d"s sake, so the services we render our neighbor redound to G.o.d, according to Matt. 25:40, "What you have done [Vulg.: "As long as you did it"] to one of these My least brethren, you did it to Me." Consequently those services which we render our neighbor, in so far as we refer them to G.o.d, are described as sacrifices, according to Heb. 13:16, "Do not forget to do good and to impart, for by such sacrifices G.o.d"s favor is obtained." And since it belongs properly to religion to offer sacrifice to G.o.d, as stated above (Q. 81, A. 1, ad 1; A. 4, ad 1), it follows that certain religious orders are fittingly directed to the works of the active life. Wherefore in the Conferences of the Fathers (Coll. xiv, 4) the Abbot Nesteros in distinguishing the various aims of religious orders says: "Some direct their intention exclusively to the hidden life of the desert and purity of heart; some are occupied with the instruction of the brethren and the care of the monasteries; while others delight in the service of the guesthouse," i.e. in hospitality.
Reply Obj. 1: Service and subjection rendered to G.o.d are not precluded by the works of the active life, whereby a man serves his neighbor for G.o.d"s sake, as stated in the Article. Nor do these works preclude singularity of life; not that they involve man"s living apart from his fellow-men, but in the sense that each man individually devotes himself to things pertaining to the service of G.o.d; and since religious occupy themselves with the works of the active life for G.o.d"s sake, it follows that their action results from their contemplation of divine things. Hence they are not entirely deprived of the fruit of the contemplative life.
Reply Obj. 2: The same judgment applies to monks and to all other religious, as regards things common to all religious orders: for instance as regards their devoting themselves wholly to the divine service, their observance of the essential vows of religion, and their refraining from worldly business. But it does not follow that this likeness extends to other things that are proper to the monastic profession, and are directed especially to the contemplative life.
Hence in the aforesaid Decretal, De Postulando, it is not simply stated that "the same judgment applies to canons regular" as "to monks," but that it applies "in matters already mentioned," namely that "they are not to act as advocates in lawsuits." Again the Decretal quoted, De Statu Monach., after the statement that "canons regular are not considered to be separated from the fellowship of monks," goes on to say: "Nevertheless they obey an easier rule."
Hence it is evident that they are not bound to all that monks are bound.
Reply Obj. 3: A man may be in the world in two ways: in one way by his bodily presence, in another way by the bent of his mind. Hence our Lord said to His disciples (John 15:19): "I have chosen you out of the world," and yet speaking of them to His Father He said (John 17:11): "These are in the world, and I come to Thee." Although, then, religious who are occupied with the works of the active life are in the world as to the presence of the body, they are not in the world as regards their bent of mind, because they are occupied with external things, not as seeking anything of the world, but merely for the sake of serving G.o.d: for "they ... use this world, as if they used it not," to quote 1 Cor. 7:31. Hence (James 1:27) after it is stated that "religion clean and undefiled ... is ... to visit the fatherless and widows in their tribulation," it is added, "and to keep one"s self unspotted from this world," namely to avoid being attached to worldly things.
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THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 188, Art. 3]
Whether a Religious Order Can Be Directed to Soldiering?
Objection 1: It would seem that no religious order can be directed to soldiering. For all religious orders belong to the state of perfection. Now our Lord said with reference to the perfection of Christian life (Matt. 5:39): "I say to you not to resist evil; but if one strike thee on the right cheek, turn to him also the other,"
which is inconsistent with the duties of a soldier. Therefore no religious order can be established for soldiering.
Obj. 2: Further, the bodily encounter of the battlefield is more grievous than the encounter in words that takes place between counsel at law. Yet religious are forbidden to plead at law, as appears from the Decretal De Postulando quoted above (A. 2, Obj. 2). Therefore it is much less seemly for a religious order to be established for soldiering.
Obj. 3: Further, the religious state is a state of penance, as we have said above (Q. 187, A. 6). Now according to the code of laws soldiering is forbidden to penitents. For it is said in the Decretal De Poenit., Dist. v, cap. 3: "It is altogether opposed to the rules of the Church, to return to worldly soldiering after doing penance."
Therefore it is unfitting for any religious order to be established for soldiering.
Obj. 4: Further, no religious order may be established for an unjust object. But as Isidore says (Etym. xviii, 1), "A just war is one that is waged by order of the emperor." Since then religious are private individuals, it would seem unlawful for them to wage war; and consequently no religious order may be established for this purpose.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Ep. clx.x.xix; ad Bonifac.), "Beware of thinking that none of those can please G.o.d who handle war-like weapons. Of such was holy David to whom the Lord gave great testimony." Now religious orders are established in order that men may please G.o.d. Therefore nothing hinders the establishing of a religious order for the purpose of soldiering.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), a religious order may be established not only for the works of the contemplative life, but also for the works of the active life, in so far as they are concerned in helping our neighbor and in the service of G.o.d, but not in so far as they are directed to a worldly object. Now the occupation of soldiering may be directed to the a.s.sistance of our neighbor, not only as regards private individuals, but also as regards the defense of the whole commonwealth. Hence it is said of Judas Machabeus (1 Macc. 3:2, 3) that "he [Vulg.: "they"] fought with cheerfulness the battle of Israel, and he got his people great honor." It can also be directed to the upkeep of divine worship, wherefore (1 Macc. 3:21) Judas is stated to have said: "We will fight for our lives and our laws," and further on (1 Macc. 13:3) Simon said: "You know what great battles I and my brethren, and the house of my father, have fought for the laws and the sanctuary."
Hence a religious order may be fittingly established for soldiering, not indeed for any worldly purpose, but for the defense of divine worship and public safety, or also of the poor and oppressed, according to Ps. 81:4: "Rescue the poor, and deliver the needy out of the hand of the sinner."
Reply Obj. 1: Not to resist evil may be understood in two ways.
First, in the sense of forgiving the wrong done to oneself, and thus it may pertain to perfection, when it is expedient to act thus for the spiritual welfare of others. Secondly, in the sense of tolerating patiently the wrongs done to others: and this pertains to imperfection, or even to vice, if one be able to resist the wrongdoer in a becoming manner. Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 27): "The courage whereby a man in battle defends his country against barbarians, or protects the weak at home, or his friends against robbers is full of justice": even so our Lord says in the pa.s.sage quoted [*Luke 6:30: "Of him that taketh away thy goods, ask them not again"; Cf. Matt. 5:40," ... thy goods, ask them not again."] If, however, a man were not to demand the return of that which belongs to another, he would sin if it were his business to do so: for it is praiseworthy to give away one"s own, but not another"s property. And much less should the things of G.o.d be neglected, for as Chrysostom [*Hom. v in Matth. in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St.
John Chrysostom] says, "it is most wicked to overlook the wrongs done to G.o.d."
Reply Obj. 2: It is inconsistent with any religious order to act as counsel at law for a worldly object, but it is not inconsistent to do so at the orders of one"s superior and in favor of one"s monastery, as stated in the same Decretal, or for the defense of the poor and widows. Wherefore it is said in the Decretals (Dist. lx.x.xviii, cap.
1): "The holy synod has decreed that henceforth no cleric is to buy property or occupy himself with secular business, save with a view to the care of the fatherless ... and widows." Likewise to be a soldier for the sake of some worldly object is contrary to all religious life, but this does not apply to those who are soldiers for the sake of G.o.d"s service.
Reply Obj. 3: Worldly soldiering is forbidden to penitents, but the soldiering which is directed to the service of G.o.d is imposed as a penance on some people, as in the case of those upon whom it is enjoined to take arms in defense of the Holy Land.
Reply Obj. 4: The establishment of a religious order for the purpose of soldiering does not imply that the religious can wage war on their own authority; but they can do so only on the authority of the sovereign or of the Church.