Summa Theologica

Chapter 647

Whether the Incarnation Ought to Have Been Put Off Till the End of the World?

Objection 1: It would seem that the work of the Incarnation ought to have been put off till the end of the world. For it is written (Ps.

91:11): "My old age in plentiful mercy"--i.e. "in the last days," as a gloss says. But the time of the Incarnation is especially the time of mercy, according to Ps. 101:14: "For it is time to have mercy on it." Therefore the Incarnation ought to have been put off till the end of the world.

Obj. 2: Further, as has been said (A. 5, ad 3), in the same subject, perfection is subsequent in time to imperfection. Therefore, what is most perfect ought to be the very last in time. But the highest perfection of human nature is in the union with the Word, because "in Christ it hath pleased the Father that all the fulness of the G.o.dhead should dwell," as the Apostle says (Col. 1:19, and 2:9). Therefore the Incarnation ought to have been put off till the end of the world.

Obj. 3: Further, what can be done by one ought not to be done by two.

But the one coming of Christ at the end of the world was sufficient for the salvation of human nature. Therefore it was not necessary for Him to come beforehand in His Incarnation; and hence the Incarnation ought to have been put off till the end of the world.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Hab. 3:2): "In the midst of the years Thou shalt make it known." Therefore the mystery of the Incarnation which was made known to the world ought not to have been put off till the end of the world.

_I answer that,_ As it was not fitting that G.o.d should become incarnate at the beginning of the world, so also it was not fitting that the Incarnation should be put off till the end of the world. And this is shown first from the union of the Divine and human nature.

For, as it has been said (A. 5, ad 3), perfection precedes imperfection in time in one way, and contrariwise in another way imperfection precedes perfection. For in that which is made perfect from being imperfect, imperfection precedes perfection in time, whereas in that which is the efficient cause of perfection, perfection precedes imperfection in time. Now in the work of the Incarnation both concur; for by the Incarnation human nature is raised to its highest perfection; and in this way it was not becoming that the Incarnation should take place at the beginning of the human race. And the Word incarnate is the efficient cause of the perfection of human nature, according to John 1:16: "Of His fulness we have all received"; and hence the work of the Incarnation ought not to have been put off till the end of the world. But the perfection of glory to which human nature is to be finally raised by the Word Incarnate will be at the end of the world.

Secondly, from the effect of man"s salvation; for, as is said _Qq.

Vet. et Nov. Test., qu. 83,_ "it is in the power of the Giver to have pity when, or as much as, He wills. Hence He came when He knew it was fitting to succor, and when His boons would be welcome. For when by the feebleness of the human race men"s knowledge of G.o.d began to grow dim and their morals lax, He was pleased to choose Abraham as a standard of the restored knowledge of G.o.d and of holy living; and later on when reverence grew weaker, He gave the law to Moses in writing; and because the gentiles despised it and would not take it upon themselves, and they who received it would not keep it, being touched with pity, G.o.d sent His Son, to grant to all remission of their sin and to offer them, justified, to G.o.d the Father." But if this remedy had been put off till the end of the world, all knowledge and reverence of G.o.d and all uprightness of morals would have been swept away from the earth.

Thirdly, this appears fitting to the manifestation of the Divine power, which has saved men in several ways--not only by faith in some future thing, but also by faith in something present and past.

Reply Obj. 1: This gloss has in view the mercy of G.o.d, which leads us to glory. Nevertheless, if it is referred to the mercy shown the human race by the Incarnation of Christ, we must reflect that, as Augustine says (Retract. i), the time of the Incarnation may be compared to the youth of the human race, "on account of the strength and fervor of faith, which works by charity"; and to old age--i.e.

the sixth age--on account of the number of centuries, for Christ came in the sixth age. And although youth and old age cannot be together in a body, yet they can be together in a soul, the former on account of quickness, the latter on account of gravity. And hence Augustine says elsewhere (Qq. lx.x.xiii, qu. 44) that "it was not becoming that the Master by Whose imitation the human race was to be formed to the highest virtue should come from heaven, save in the time of youth."

But in another work (De Gen. cont. Manich. i, 23) he says: that Christ came in the sixth age--i.e. in the old age--of the human race.

Reply Obj. 2: The work of the Incarnation is to be viewed not as merely the terminus of a movement from imperfection to perfection, but also as a principle of perfection to human nature, as has been said.

Reply Obj. 3: As Chrysostom says on John 3:11, "For G.o.d sent not His Son into the world to judge the world" (Hom. xxviii): "There are two comings of Christ: the first, for the remission of sins; the second, to judge the world. For if He had not done so, all would have perished together, since all have sinned and need the glory of G.o.d."

Hence it is plain that He ought not to have put off the coming in mercy till the end of the world.

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QUESTION 2

OF THE MODE OF UNION OF THE WORD INCARNATE (In Twelve Articles)

Now we must consider the mode of union of the Incarnate Word; and, first, the union itself; secondly, the Person a.s.suming; thirdly, the nature a.s.sumed.

Under the first head there are twelve points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the union of the Word Incarnate took place in the nature?

(2) Whether it took place in the Person?

(3) Whether it took place in the suppositum or hypostasis?

(4) Whether the Person or hypostasis of Christ is composite after the Incarnation?

(5) Whether any union of body and soul took place in Christ?

(6) Whether the human nature was united to the Word accidentally?

(7) Whether the union itself is something created?

(8) Whether it is the same as a.s.sumption?

(9) Whether the union of the two natures is the greatest union?

(10) Whether the union of the two natures in Christ was brought about by grace?

(11) Whether any merits preceded it?

(12) Whether the grace of union was natural to the man Christ?

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FIRST ARTICLE [III, Q. 2, Art. 1]

Whether the Union of the Incarnate Word Took Place in the Nature?

Objection 1: It would seem that the Union of the Word Incarnate took place in the nature. For Cyril says (he is quoted in the acts of the Council of Chalcedon, part ii, act. 1): "We must understand not two natures, but one incarnate nature of the Word of G.o.d"; and this could not be unless the union took place in the nature. Therefore the union of the Word Incarnate took place in the nature.

Obj. 2: Further, Athanasius says that, as the rational soul and the flesh together form the human nature, so G.o.d and man together form a certain one nature; therefore the union took place in the nature.

Obj. 3: Further, of two natures one is not denominated by the other unless they are to some extent mutually trans.m.u.ted. But the Divine and human natures in Christ are denominated one by the other; for Cyril says (quoted in the acts of the Council of Chalcedon, part ii, act. 1) that the Divine nature "is incarnate"; and Gregory n.a.z.ianzen says (Ep. i ad Cledon.) that the human nature is "deified," as appears from Damascene (De Fide Orth. iii, 6, 11). Therefore from two natures one seems to have resulted.

_On the contrary,_ It is said in the declaration of the Council of Chalcedon: "We confess that in these latter times the only-begotten Son of G.o.d appeared in two natures, without confusion, without change, without division, without separation--the distinction of natures not having been taken away by the union." Therefore the union did not take place in the nature.

_I answer that,_ To make this question clear we must consider what is "nature." Now it is to be observed that the word "nature" comes from nativity. Hence this word was used first of all to signify the begetting of living beings, which is called "birth" or "sprouting forth," the word "natura" meaning, as it were, "nascitura."

Afterwards this word "nature" was taken to signify the principle of this begetting; and because in living things the principle of generation is an intrinsic principle, this word "nature" was further employed to signify any intrinsic principle of motion: thus the Philosopher says (Phys. ii) that "nature is the principle of motion in that in which it is essentially and not accidentally." Now this principle is either form or matter. Hence sometimes form is called nature, and sometimes matter. And because the end of natural generation, in that which is generated, is the essence of the species, which the definition signifies, this essence of the species is called the "nature." And thus Boethius defines nature (De Duab.

Nat.): "Nature is what informs a thing with its specific difference, "--i.e. which perfects the specific definition. But we are now speaking of nature as it signifies the essence, or the "what-it-is,"

or the quiddity of the species.

Now, if we take nature in this way, it is impossible that the union of the Incarnate Word took place in the nature. For one thing is made of two or more in three ways. First, from two complete things which remain in their perfection. This can only happen to those whose form is composition, order, or figure, as a heap is made up of many stones brought together without any order, but solely with juxtaposition; and a house is made of stones and beams arranged in order, and fashioned to a figure. And in this way some said the union was by manner of confusion (which is without order) or by manner of commensuration (which is with order). But this cannot be. First, because neither composition nor order nor figure is a substantial form, but accidental; and hence it would follow that the union of the Incarnation was not essential, but accidental, which will be disproved later on (A. 6). Secondly, because thereby we should not have an absolute unity, but relative only, for there remain several things actually. Thirdly, because the form of such is not a nature, but an art, as the form of a house; and thus one nature would not be const.i.tuted in Christ, as they wish.

Secondly, one thing is made up of several things, perfect but changed, as a mixture is made up of its elements; and in this way some have said that the union of the Incarnation was brought about by manner of combination. But this cannot be. First, because the Divine Nature is altogether immutable, as has been said (I, Q. 9, AA. 1, 2), hence neither can it be changed into something else, since it is incorruptible; nor can anything else be changed into it, for it cannot be generated. Secondly, because what is mixed is of the same species with none of the elements; for flesh differs in species from any of its elements. And thus Christ would be of the same nature neither with His Father nor with His Mother. Thirdly, because there can be no mingling of things widely apart; for the species of one of them is absorbed, e.g. if we were to put a drop of water in a flagon of wine. And hence, since the Divine Nature infinitely exceeds the human nature, there could be no mixture, but the Divine Nature alone would remain.

Thirdly, a thing is made up of things not mixed nor changed, but imperfect; as man is made up of soul and body, and likewise of divers members. But this cannot be said of the mystery of the Incarnation.

First, because each nature, i.e. the Divine and the human, has its specific perfection. Secondly, because the Divine and human natures cannot const.i.tute anything after the manner of quant.i.tative parts, as the members make up the body; for the Divine Nature is incorporeal; nor after the manner of form and matter, for the Divine Nature cannot be the form of anything, especially of anything corporeal, since it would follow that the species resulting therefrom would be communicable to several, and thus there would be several Christs.

Thirdly, because Christ would exist neither in human nature nor in the Divine Nature: since any difference varies the species, as unity varies number, as is said (Metaph. viii, text. 10).

Reply Obj. 1: This authority of Cyril is expounded in the Fifth Synod (i.e. Constantinople II, coll. viii, can. 8) thus: "If anyone proclaiming one nature of the Word of G.o.d to be incarnate does not receive it as the Fathers taught, viz. that from the Divine and human natures (a union in subsistence having taken place) one Christ results, but endeavors from these words to introduce one nature or substance of the Divinity and flesh of Christ, let such a one be anathema." Hence the sense is not that from two natures one results; but that the Nature of the Word of G.o.d united flesh to Itself in Person.

Reply Obj. 2: From the soul and body a double unity, viz. of nature and person--results in each individual--of nature inasmuch as the soul is united to the body, and formally perfects it, so that one nature springs from the two as from act and potentiality or from matter and form. But the comparison is not in this sense, for the Divine Nature cannot be the form of a body, as was proved (I, Q. 3, A. 8). Unity of person results from them, however, inasmuch as there is an individual subsisting in flesh and soul; and herein lies the likeness, for the one Christ subsists in the Divine and human natures.

Reply Obj. 3: As Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 6, 11), the Divine Nature is said to be incarnate because It is united to flesh personally, and not that It is changed into flesh. So likewise the flesh is said to be deified, as he also says (De Fide Orth. 15, 17), not by change, but by union with the Word, its natural properties still remaining, and hence it may be considered as deified, inasmuch as it becomes the flesh of the Word of G.o.d, but not that it becomes G.o.d.

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SECOND ARTICLE [III, Q. 2, Art. 2]

Whether the Union of the Incarnate Word Took Place in the Person?

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