Reply Obj. 4: This change has not properly a subject, as was stated above (A. 4, ad 1); nevertheless the accidents which remain have some resemblance of a subject.
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SIXTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 75, Art. 6]
Whether the Substantial Form of the Bread Remains in This Sacrament After the Consecration?
Objection 1: It seems that the substantial form of the bread remains in this sacrament after the consecration. For it has been said (A. 5) that the accidents remain after the consecration. But since bread is an artificial thing, its form is an accident. Therefore it remains after the consecration.
Obj. 2: Further, the form of Christ"s body is His soul: for it is said in _De Anima_ ii, that the soul "is the act of a physical body which has life in potentiality". But it cannot be said that the substantial form of the bread is changed into the soul. Therefore it appears that it remains after the consecration.
Obj. 3: Further, the proper operation of a things follows its substantial form. But what remains in this sacrament, nourishes, and performs every operation which bread would do were it present.
Therefore the substantial form of the bread remains in this sacrament after the consecration.
_On the contrary,_ The substantial form of bread is of the substance of bread. But the substance of the bread is changed into the body of Christ, as stated above (AA. 2, 3, 4). Therefore the substantial form of the bread does not remain.
_I answer that,_ Some have contended that after the consecration not only do the accidents of the bread remain, but also its substantial form. But this cannot be. First of all, because if the substantial form of the bread were to remain, nothing of the bread would be changed into the body of Christ, excepting the matter; and so it would follow that it would be changed, not into the whole body of Christ, but into its matter, which is repugnant to the form of the sacrament, wherein it is said: "This is My body."
Secondly, because if the substantial form of the bread were to remain, it would remain either in matter, or separated from matter.
The first cannot be, for if it were to remain in the matter of the bread, then the whole substance of the bread would remain, which is against what was said above (A. 2). Nor could it remain in any other matter, because the proper form exists only in its proper matter. But if it were to remain separate from matter, it would then be an actually intelligible form, and also an intelligence; for all forms separated from matter are such.
Thirdly, it would be unbefitting this sacrament: because the accidents of the bread remain in this sacrament, in order that the body of Christ may be seen under them, and not under its proper species, as stated above (A. 5).
And therefore it must be said that the substantial form of the bread does not remain.
Reply Obj. 1: There is nothing to prevent art from making a thing whose form is not an accident, but a substantial form; as frogs and serpents can be produced by art: for art produces such forms not by its own power, but by the power of natural energies. And in this way it produces the substantial forms of bread, by the power of fire baking the matter made up of flour and water.
Reply Obj. 2: The soul is the form of the body, giving it the whole order of perfect being, i.e. being, corporeal being, and animated being, and so on. Therefore the form of the bread is changed into the form of Christ"s body, according as the latter gives corporeal being, but not according as it bestows animated being.
Reply Obj. 3: Some of the operations of bread follow it by reason of the accidents, such as to affect the senses, and such operations are found in the species of the bread after the consecration on account of the accidents which remain. But some other operations follow the bread either by reason of the matter, such as that it is changed into something else, or else by reason of the substantial form, such as an operation consequent upon its species, for instance, that it "strengthens man"s heart" (Ps. 103:15); and such operations are found in this sacrament, not on account of the form or matter remaining, but because they are bestowed miraculously upon the accidents themselves, as will be said later (Q. 77, A. 3, ad 2, 3; AA. 5, 6).
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SEVENTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 75, Art. 7]
Whether This Change Is Wrought Instantaneously?
Objection 1: It seems that this change is not wrought instantaneously, but successively. For in this change there is first the substance of bread, and afterwards the substance of Christ"s body. Neither, then, is in the same instant, but in two instants. But there is a mid-time between every two instants. Therefore this change must take place according to the succession of time, which is between the last instant in which the bread is there, and the first instant in which the body of Christ is present.
Obj. 2: Further, in every change something is _in becoming_ and something is _in being._ But these two things do not exist at the one time for, what is _in becoming,_ is not yet, whereas what is _in being,_ already is. Consequently, there is a before and an after in such change: and so necessarily the change cannot be instantaneous, but successive.
Obj. 3: Further, Ambrose says (De Sacram. iv) that this sacrament "is made by the words of Christ." But Christ"s words are p.r.o.nounced successively. Therefore the change takes place successively.
_On the contrary,_ This change is effected by a power which is infinite, to which it belongs to operate in an instant.
_I answer that,_ A change may be instantaneous from a threefold reason. First on the part of the form, which is the terminus of the change. For, if it be a form that receives more and less, it is acquired by its subject successively, such as health; and therefore because a substantial form does not receive more and less, it follows that its introduction into matter is instantaneous.
Secondly on the part of the subject, which sometimes is prepared successively for receiving the form; thus water is heated successively. When, however, the subject itself is in the ultimate disposition for receiving the form, it receives it suddenly, as a transparent body is illuminated suddenly. Thirdly on the part of the agent, which possesses infinite power: wherefore it can instantly dispose the matter for the form. Thus it is written (Mk. 7:34) that when Christ had said, ""Ephpheta," which is "Be thou opened,"
immediately his ears were opened, and the string of his tongue was loosed."
For these three reasons this conversion is instantaneous. First, because the substance of Christ"s body which is the term of this conversion, does not receive more or less. Secondly, because in this conversion there is no subject to be disposed successively. Thirdly, because it is effected by G.o.d"s infinite power.
Reply Obj. 1: Some [*Cf. Albert the Great, Sent. iv, D, 11; St.
Bonaventure, Sent., iv, D, 11] do not grant simply that there is a mid-time between every two instants. For they say that this is true of two instants referring to the same movement, but not if they refer to different things. Hence between the instant that marks the close of rest, and another which marks the beginning of movement, there is no mid-time. But in this they are mistaken, because the unity of time and of instant, or even their plurality, is not taken according to movements of any sort, but according to the first movement of the heavens, which is the measure of all movement and rest.
Accordingly others grant this of the time which measures movement depending on the movement of the heavens. But there are some movements which are not dependent on the movement of the heavens, nor measured by it, as was said in the First Part (Q. 53, A. 3) concerning the movements of the angels. Hence between two instants responding to those movements there is no mid-time. But this is not to the point, because although the change in question has no relation of itself to the movement of the heavens, still it follows the p.r.o.nouncing of the words, which (p.r.o.nouncing) must necessarily be measured by the movement of the heavens. And therefore there must of necessity be a mid-time between every two signate instants in connection with that change.
Some say therefore that the instant in which the bread was last, and the instant in which the body of Christ is first, are indeed two in comparison with the things measured, but are one comparatively to the time measuring; as when two lines touch, there are two points on the part of the two lines, but one point on the part of the place containing them. But here there is no likeness, because instant and time is not the intrinsic measure of particular movements, as a line and point are of a body, but only the extrinsic measure, as place is to bodies.
Hence others say that it is the same instant in fact, but another according to reason. But according to this it would follow that things really opposite would exist together; for diversity of reason does not change a thing objectively.
And therefore it must be said that this change, as stated above, is wrought by Christ"s words which are spoken by the priest, so that the last instant of p.r.o.nouncing the words is the first instant in which Christ"s body is in the sacrament; and that the substance of the bread is there during the whole preceding time. Of this time no instant is to be taken as proximately preceding the last one, because time is not made up of successive instants, as is proved in _Phys._ vi. And therefore a first instant can be a.s.signed in which Christ"s body is present; but a last instant cannot be a.s.signed in which the substance of bread is there, but a last time can be a.s.signed. And the same holds good in natural changes, as is evident from the Philosopher (Phys. viii).
Reply Obj. 2: In instantaneous changes a thing is "in becoming," and is "in being" simultaneously; just as becoming illuminated and to be actually illuminated are simultaneous: for in such, a thing is said to be "in being" according as it now is; but to be "in becoming,"
according as it was not before.
Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (ad 1), this change comes about in the last instant of the p.r.o.nouncing of the words. For then the meaning of the words is finished, which meaning is efficacious in the forms of the sacraments. And therefore it does not follow that this change is successive.
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EIGHTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 75, Art. 8]
Whether This Proposition Is False: "The Body of Christ Is Made Out of Bread"?
Objection 1: It seems that this proposition is false: "The body of Christ is made out of bread." For everything out of which another is made, is that which is made the other; but not conversely: for we say that a black thing is made out of a white thing, and that a white thing is made black: and although we may say that a man becomes black still we do not say that a black thing is made out of a man, as is shown in _Phys._ i. If it be true, then, that Christ"s body is made out of bread, it will be true to say that bread is made the body of Christ. But this seems to be false, because the bread is not the subject of the making, but rather its term. Therefore, it is not said truly that Christ"s body is made out of bread.
Obj. 2: Further, the term of _becoming_ is something that is, or something that is _made._ But this proposition is never true: "The bread is the body of Christ"; or "The bread is made the body of Christ"; or again, "The bread will be the body of Christ." Therefore it seems that not even this is true: "The body of Christ is made out of bread."
Obj. 3: Further, everything out of which another is made is converted into that which is made from it. But this proposition seems to be false: "The bread is converted into the body of Christ," because such conversion seems to be more miraculous than the creation of the world, in which it is not said that non-being is converted into being. Therefore it seems that this proposition likewise is false: "The body of Christ is made out of bread."
Obj. 4: Further, that out of which something is made, can be that thing. But this proposition is false: "Bread can be the body of Christ." Therefore this is likewise false: "The body of Christ is made out of bread."
_On the contrary,_ Ambrose says (De Sacram. iv): "When the consecration takes place, the body of Christ is made out of the bread."
_I answer that,_ This conversion of bread into the body of Christ has something in common with creation, and with natural trans.m.u.tation, and in some respect differs from both. For the order of the terms is common to these three; that is, that after one thing there is another (for, in creation there is being after non-being; in this sacrament, Christ"s body after the substance of bread; in natural trans.m.u.tation white after black, or fire after air); and that the aforesaid terms are not coexistent.
Now the conversion, of which we are speaking, has this in common with creation, that in neither of them is there any common subject belonging to either of the extremes; the contrary of which appears in every natural trans.m.u.tation.
Again, this conversion has something in common with natural trans.m.u.tation in two respects, although not in the same fashion.
First of all because in both, one of the extremes pa.s.ses into the other, as bread into Christ"s body, and air into fire; whereas non-being is not converted into being. But this comes to pa.s.s differently on the one side and on the other; for in this sacrament the whole substance of the bread pa.s.ses into the whole body of Christ; whereas in natural trans.m.u.tation the matter of the one receives the form of the other, the previous form being laid aside.
Secondly, they have this in common, that on both sides something remains the same; whereas this does not happen in creation: yet differently; for the same matter or subject remains in natural trans.m.u.tation; whereas in this sacrament the same accidents remain.
From these observations we can gather the various ways of speaking in such matters. For, because in no one of the aforesaid three things are the extremes coexistent, therefore in none of them can one extreme be predicated of the other by the substantive verb of the present tense: for we do not say, "Non-being is being" or, "Bread is the body of Christ," or, "Air is fire," or, "White is black." Yet because of the relationship of the extremes in all of them we can use the preposition _ex_ (out of), which denotes order; for we can truly and properly say that "being is made out of non-being," and "out of bread, the body of Christ," and "out of air, fire," and "out of white, black." But because in creation one of the extremes does not pa.s.s into the other, we cannot use the word "conversion" in creation, so as to say that "non-being is converted into being": we can, however, use the word in this sacrament, just as in natural trans.m.u.tation. But since in this sacrament the whole substance is converted into the whole substance, on that account this conversion is properly termed transubstantiation.
Again, since there is no subject of this conversion, the things which are true in natural conversion by reason of the subject, are not to be granted in this conversion. And in the first place indeed it is evident that potentiality to the opposite follows a subject, by reason whereof we say that "a white thing can be black," or that "air can be fire"; although the latter is not so proper as the former: for the subject of whiteness, in which there is potentiality to blackness, is the whole substance of the white thing; since whiteness is not a part thereof; whereas the subject of the form of air is part thereof: hence when it is said, "Air can be fire," it is verified by synecdoche by reason of the part. But in this conversion, and similarly in creation, because there is no subject, it is not said that one extreme can be the other, as that "non-being can be being,"
or that "bread can be the body of Christ": and for the same reason it cannot be properly said that "being is made of (_de_) non-being," or that "the body of Christ is made of bread," because this preposition "of" (_de_) denotes a consubstantial cause, which consubstantiality of the extremes in natural trans.m.u.tations is considered according to something common in the subject. And for the same reason it is not granted that "bread will be the body of Christ," or that it "may become the body of Christ," just as it is not granted in creation that "non-being will be being," or that "non-being may become being,"
because this manner of speaking is verified in natural trans.m.u.tations by reason of the subject: for instance, when we say that "a white thing becomes black," or "a white thing will be black."
Nevertheless, since in this sacrament, after the change, something remains the same, namely, the accidents of the bread, as stated above (A. 5), some of these expressions may be admitted by way of similitude, namely, that "bread is the body of Christ," or, "bread will be the body of Christ," or "the body of Christ is made of bread"; provided that by the word "bread" is not understood the substance of bread, but in general "that which is contained under the species of bread," under which species there is first contained the substance of bread, and afterwards the body of Christ.
Reply Obj. 1: That out of which something else is made, sometimes implies together with the subject, one of the extremes of the trans.m.u.tation, as when it is said "a black thing is made out of a white one"; but sometimes it implies only the opposite or the extreme, as when it is said--"out of morning comes the day." And so it is not granted that the latter becomes the former, that is, "that morning becomes the day." So likewise in the matter in hand, although it may be said properly that "the body of Christ is made out of bread," yet it is not said properly that "bread becomes the body of Christ," except by similitude, as was said above.